Is Afghanistan another Vietnam?

[roloshack]

The following citation best describes in condensed form the conduct of a successful Special Forces Tribal Counterinsurgency program in Vietnam from which the basis of my premise “Is Afghanistan another Vietnam?” was presented in March 2010. A Postscript was added in March 2012.

Combined Studies Branch
United States Army Element (MAC-V)
APO 143
5 January 1964

SUBJECT: Award of the Meritorious Unit Commendation

TO: The Adjutant General
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D.C.
ATTN: Awards and Decorations

THRU: Channels

1. Under the provisions of AR 627-5-1 as changed by DA messages 332784 and
334015, Detachment A-113, Company A, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special forces, is recommended for award of the Meritorious Unit Commendation.

2. During the six month period, 13 February through 12 August 1962, Detachment A-113, consisting of one officer and seven enlisted men, initiated the first Village Defense project in the Republic of Vietnam. Their mission was: to organize, train, arm, support, and direct the Rhade tribesmen against Viet Cong aggressions. Included in this mission were population control measures, civic action programs and psychological operations. If successful, this program would be the forerunner of many more Village Defense programs to be established throughout Vietnam.

3. Within four months of establishment the Buon Enao project, as it became known, was successful. Some of the tasks and accomplishments achieved, which made it the most renowned and most popular program during this period are:

a. One hundred and twenty two (122) villages were trained and armed to defend and protect themselves from the VC.
b. More than 750 tribesmen were trained and organized as an operational strike force.
c. More than 5780 village defenders were trained and armed.
d. Eight companies of ARVN soldiers were trained in counterinsurgency tactics.
e. One hundred and eighty seven (187) village medics were trained and provided organic medical coverage for 126 villages.
f. Inflicted the following losses on the Viet Cong.
(1). More than 200 killed.
(2). More than 125 wounded.
(3). Two hundred and sixty five (265) captured including agents.
(4), Seventy eight (78) defectors.
g. Secured more than 10000 kilometers of land from VC support.
h. Brought more than 50000 Rhade under the protection of the program.
i. Provided doctrine, standards, procedures, guidance, and experience factors for future programs.
j. Established a training program for United States and Vietnamese personnel who were to subsequently participate in similar programs.
k. Demoralized the VC in the area through successful military operations.

4. The overwhelming success and outstanding performance of duty of Detachment A-113, can be attributed to their fine training, their painstaking efforts and desire and teamwork, and determination to accomplish their mission. The members of this unit risked their lives many times without thought of personal danger to successfully perform their duties. As was evidenced by their personal behavior and hygiene; not once was any member disciplined nor was there any loss of duty time due to sickness, even under the most adverse conditions, this Detachment functioned outstanding in all respects. Detachment A-113 became a part of the local people, sharing in their happiness and in their grief’s, abiding by their customs and their beliefs, and living with them, working with them, and fighting with them. They truly portrayed a living example as to the extent the American soldier will go to assist a friend. Detachment A-113 is to be commended for their outstanding contribution to the effort in Vietnam.

Gilbert Layton
Colonel GS
Chief

10 March 2010

Is Afghanistan Another Vietnam?
Ron Shackleton, COL (Ret), USA

Although now retired from the United States Army for nearly thirty years I still maintain a strong affinity for my assignments as a Special Forces soldier. First as an A-Detachment Commander in Vietnam in 1962; then as a C-Detachment Commander with the 5th Special Forces Group, Vietnam in 1969; and finally as the 7th Special Forces Group Commander, Fort Bragg, N.C. in 1973.

Special Forces continue to be utilized throughout the world in mostly underdeveloped countries by employing their unconventional skills mostly on covert missions of all types. Whether in Grenada, Panama, Iraq, the Philippines and most recently Afghanistan it has truly come a long way since 1962.

It is Afghanistan; however, that has most attracted my attention. The natural tendency has been to secure major urban areas and let remote, isolated and tribal areas manage as best they can. Increasingly larger military forces have been required to maintain an anti-Taliban/anti Al-Qaeda urban oriented Afghan government. This abandonment of rural villages and vast peasant / tribal populations has widened the insurgency which has resulted in the loss of peasant support primarily because of inadequate protection and security from the insurgents.

Tribal Warfare in Afghanistan appears to have evolved from the rudimentary application of forming a tribal counterinsurgency force that was applied with the Rhade tribe in Vietnam in 1962; to the more sophisticated application of today. Regardless of new technology and a more astute enemy the basic principles for success remain the same.

They are to be adhered to with innovation and unbridled determination even in the face of opposition. Some who question United States involvements in Afghanistan make comparisons to Vietnam. Although it is true that they are similar, they are not the same.

FOR THE SIMILARITIES

External forces ultimately succumbed.

After more than 100 years of French colonialism the Viet Minh defeated the French in 1954 and Vietnam was divided into North Vietnam and South Vietnam. Almost immediately North Vietnam, under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, embarked on a communist inspired insurgency into South Vietnam to take control of the entire country.

The latest civil war in Afghanistan began in 1978 when an insurgency broke out against the government. This led to Soviet intervention supporting the Marxist government against the Mujahideen. The Soviets were defeated in 1989. Power fell to the Taliban in 2006 and today is leading the insurgency in Afghanistan.

American involvement

The U.S. led support for the Republic of South Vietnam lasted ten years before succumbing in 1975 to the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam.

In Afghanistan it is the ninth year, and counting, when in 2001 American led NATO forces invaded Afghanistan to destroy Al-Qaeda and to topple the Taliban.

A weak government persisted

The South Vietnamese government wasn’t anymore popular with the urban peasantry than hey were with their tribal outcasts. In the former they permitted religious discontent to sway their actions. In the latter group, they clearly lacked the knowledge, will and effective interface necessary to garnish their support.

The Afghan government was in turmoil from the start. With so many factions vying for political control it was the tribal clans that were left to provide for the needs of the people leaving the government hapless.

Lacked foresight

South Vietnam paid little attention as the communist Viet Minh were left unfettered to infiltrate the south tribal areas until their control of the Central Highlands made the Vietnamese enclaves along the coastal and Delta regions vulnerable.

In Afghanistan, while the Al-Qaeda was being severely damaged militarily, the Taliban were left to organize, recruit and terrorize against the government until they became a formidable insurgent opponent.

Unscrupulous government

In Vietnam rampant corruption and political misdeeds adversely affected the counterinsurgency effort. As important was the mistreatment, neglect and the suffering
the tribal groups faced when they were denied most social programs.

In Afghanistan political corruption as well as illicit activities is tantamount to defeat. Without stability and development the government is considered to be weak.

Sanctuaries

Laos and Cambodia were ideal sanctuaries for the Viet Minh. They provided safe havens, supply routes, training camps, rest areas along the entire western border of Vietnam. Both Laos and Cambodia, under Chinese influence, denied the United States
permission to conduct cross border operations.

The problem in Afghanistan lies mostly in the southeast border with Pakistan. This is rugged terrain that abuts tribal groups that have a long history of support for the Taliban who moved there in large numbers when Russia invaded Afghanistan. Pakistan does not possess the capability or the will to eradicate this sanctuary due to their internal problems and interests.

(Cont'd)

[Richard]

Covert Operations

In Vietnam the United States military was hesitant on taking on the Buon Enao Tribal Counterinsurgency project as they believed it was improper for them to be conducting covert operations without the knowledge of the Government of Vietnam. The project was defaulted to the CIA for whom clandestine missions was not new. It was also understood that if uncovered the public outcry would create a public relations nightmare.

In Afghanistan under today’s climate it has been politically correct to acknowledge that covert operations are being undertaken with the full knowledge of the Afghan Government; and the U.S. press as well. The only problem is that when each specific covert action is uncovered whether a drone attack, the killing or capture of an insurgent leader or the loss of special operation personnel the Afghan Government is either forced to condemn it or claim no knowledge of it; while the press clamors for details
Political

A sitting Senator, John Kennedy, in 1962 became the newly elected President of the United States and was shortly faced with the decision to expand the counterinsurgency war in Vietnam.

A sitting Senator, Barack Obama, in 2008 became the newly elected President of the United States and was shortly faced with the decision to expand the counterinsurgency war in Afghanistan.

FOR THE DIFFERENCES

Political structure

At the outset of the insurgency South Vietnam had an elected, functioning government in
place; as well as an Armed Force - weak as it was.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union intervention in Afghanistan one government after another was overthrown until 1992 when the Mujahideen assumed control and declared the Islamic State of Afghanistan. Almost immediately thereafter civil war continued among the various clans and religious groups. The only armed forces were the militias.
Economy

Vietnam had a market economy with many resources. Rubber, coffee, rice, lumber, fishing, tourism, agriculture and light industry were major products. They had a transportation system, communications system, education system and health system.

On the other hand Afghanistan is extremely poor, landlocked, and highly dependent on foreign aid, agriculture, and trade with neighboring countries. Sheep and sheep products, fruit, nuts, and precious and semi-precious gems offer a small export market. Much of the population continues to suffer from shortages of housing, clean water, electricity, medical care, and jobs. They lack developed natural resources with the exception of the poppy trade for which opium is their largest export.

External support

In Vietnam the Viet Cong received major support from the Chinese and Russians. Financial aid, equipment and material, advisors, training and political backing was unrelenting and instrumental in the advances they made.

The Taliban receives the bulk of their support from Pakistan; and to a lesser extent from Saudi Arabia. This comes in the form of financing, military aid and political backing.

Insurgents

The Viet Cong evolved into a large and well organized, equipped and dedicated external force referred to as the North Vietnamese Army. Capable of massing only to quickly disperse and fade into the jungles they employed mostly guerrilla tactics.

The Taliban, on the other hand, is a relatively small number of determined locals working out of small cells mostly independently. They are tenacious and well trained for what they do. Creating chaos through acts of terrorism is their modus operandi either in the form of threats, suicide bombings or assassinations.

Infrastructure

The infrastructure in Vietnam was modestly advanced so that there was little
discontentment of the living conditions that could easily detract from the counterinsurgency effort. That is, except for the tribal regions where the Viet Cong made their greatest inroads.

In Afghanistan infrastructure is almost non-existent. This makes it difficult to provide even the basic services the population expects to include security. This foments hatred and disrespect for the Kabul government.

Tribal status

In Vietnam over 40 Montagnard tribal groups with close similarities were found mostly in the Central Highlands covering nearly two thirds of the country. Both sides of the insurgency had generally conceded that “he who gained the Central Highlands would win the war”. The tribes themselves, though strategically located, did not possess the political influence or resistance capability to influence the government of South Vietnam.

Afghanistan, on the other hand, is loosely knit ethnic groups who have their own way of living and who are spread throughout the country. These are tribal groups who self govern based on tradition; and who have leverage on political decisions.

Landscape

The tribes of Vietnam occupied a vast territory that was dispersed, with the largest tribes, the Rhade, Jarai, Bahnar and Sedang separated by distinct provinces. These tribes, collectively defined as Montagnards, were mutually supporting of one another.

In Afghanistan overlapping tribal areas create inter-tribal conflict. The Pashtuns, the country’s largest ethnic group, is particularly important.

Technology

In Vietnam the insurgency was fought with the technology available of that era. At the outset a rudimentary form of warfare was fought by both sides with the Viet Cong the more austere of the two. As the insurgency expanded modern weapons were introduced.

In Afghanistan the most evident progress has been in the field of electronics. Lap Tops, cell phones, satellite navigation systems, drones and others have provided both the insurgents and counterinsurgents new capabilities.

Public support

In Vietnam counterinsurgency began on a small scale with U.S. involvement primarily that of training and assistance provided by the Military Assistance Advisory Group. As the war escalated and large numbers of American troops were committed to the conflict the anti-war factions began to strengthen; and as American casualties mounted support was at its lowest ebb.
In Afghanistan the conflict began with an invasion of a U.S. led coalition supported in general by the American public. A counterinsurgency plan was not put into effect until years later. To date public support for this all-volunteer military force has remained relatively steady; but as the war drags on and American casualties increase support is faltering.

On the right course

It is my opinion that the best condition for success in Afghanistan lies with the tribal groups. Although special operation forces have been working with the tribes almost from the outset I sense that they are facing some of the same pitfalls that rendered the once highly successful Vietnam tribal program neutralized.

I recently read Major Gant’s “One Tribe at a Time” paper. It was no surprise to me that his approach much mirrored that which I employed in Vietnam in 1962. In each situation there were signs that the tribal groups offered the best hope against the insurgency – for both political and tactical reasons.

Before proceeding let me be clear about one important consideration. Although this war can be classified as a “low intensity conflict” the conditions that existed for conducting Tribal Counterinsurgency against the Viet Cong in Vietnam were not as severe, nor as dangerous nor as complicated as they are today in Afghanistan. Nevertheless Tribal Counterinsurgency has many similarities in Afghanistan today as they were in Vietnam in 1962. There are, therefore, lessons to be learned. Not everything done in Vietnam was done wrong! However, do not confuse the Viet Cong conflict in the early 1960’s with the conventional conflict against the North Vietnamese Army which later followed when the U.S. fully committed.

Not much more need be done than dust off the After Action reports and other studies to find that counterinsurgency succeeds when the right application and type of forces are utilized to fight an insurgent. The enemy needs to be fought as he fights us– tactically and psychologically. Support of the population for security and intelligence is as necessary for the Afghan government as it is for the Taliban.

Although one might compare NATO”s involvement in Afghanistan with the coalition involvement in Vietnam, I cannot fully accept that political comparison. However, it is an insurgent conflict and for that I must conclude that the activity at the grass roots level remains relatively unchanged. The conflict must be kept austere, rudimentary and with the local people and Civic Action foremost in mind. Physical security and personal protection; improved living conditions; and a better way of life – or at the very least the hope for this - is what will win the population over.

In any event, the indigenous forces need to be trained only to the extent necessary to do their job; equipped only to the extent to get the job done; and advised only to the extent of influencing what these needs should be. We do not want to make the mistake of arming them beyond their capability. It is not necessary to train, equip or organize them in the image of the American Army. Rather, we need to capitalize on their natural abilities and inherent capabilities, to build their confidence and strengthen their leadership. Civic Action programs must go hand in hand with military activity.

(Cont'd)

[Richard]

If there is anything new in counterinsurgency warfare it is only in its political application. Tools of the guerrilla have not changed as they remain primarily non-military. That is, they are all calculated to gain control of the people. Voluntary support at first; support through fear and intimidation if necessary. Tools of the counterinsurgency force must be the same. It does not want to nourish the insurgency or escalate it. It must determine what it wants in Afghanistan (mission); what if any limitations to impose; to what extent it is willing to go to reach its goal(s); and to allow the commander on the ground to do the job.

All NATO and Afghan agencies must coordinate and speak off the same sheet of music. The Afghan government must be made to respond positively to the general direction in which NATO thinks it should go. Do not expect them to buy each and every action proposed. Try to make them believe it is their idea. It must be the Afghan government that solves this problem if it is to be a lasting solution. Advantage must be taken of the capabilities of the government forces. The NATO trained regular forces need to operate in the remote areas against strong Taliban resistance. Special Forces trained tribal groups must maintain security and population support in the rural and remote towns and villages. NATO trained police and security forces must maintain law and order in the cities. Unfortunately, to date, most of this training has been slow to reach the desired levels for the Afghans to take responsibility. Therefore the bulk of these responsibilities are being deferred to NATO forces as they were in Vietnam.

Tribal Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan has taken on an unconventional approach and that is as it should be. And who better trained than forces such as the “Green Berets”? They are trained to work with an indigenous population; they have the skills necessary to be deployed as an independent unit; they have the training to be innovative, to think on their feet, to improvise, to work as a team under stressful conditions. And if they are properly employed they are a cost effective force multiplier. They must be considered the experts in the field. As such it is imperative that they have complete freedom from planning, organizing and execution of the mission. Very likely employed in remote areas they must have complete decision making authority and report to the single authority that is responsible for covert operations. Simply stated, complete autonomy comes to mind.
They must have full funding, the authority to make timely direct purchases of material and equipment off the local economy; for payment to the locals for support required; and for Civic Action projects. If at all possible they must be able to have access to artillery support; close air support and troop lift capability if a large Taliban force is engaged.

However, it is not prudent for them to go toe to toe with a large force when not necessary.

Building a Tribal Army is usually conducted in phases which can then become milestones as to the progress being made. The phases established by Special Forces detachments in Vietnam were as follows:

Phase I: Pre-deployment - The Detachment begins its preparation for the mission.
Phase II: Deployment - The Detachment is transported into the area of operations to begin the preparations for counterinsurgency.
Phase III: Growth - This will be based upon the progress made and the will of the tribe.
Phase IV: Expansion – This will be a major decision as it will require the establishment of sub-OBs and the necessary resources to support them.
Phase V: Sustainability – This program will endure only as long as the Afghan government maintains the trust of the tribe; continues to finance and support the program; incorporates humanitarian projects as promised; and maintains the U.S. Special Forces presence until the time is right to integrate the tribes into the national realm of things.

Phase V is that which is troublesome to me. In Vietnam it was called “Operation Switchback” whereby the Village Defense Program would convert to the Civilian Irregular Defense Group. What are some of the pitfalls of this Phase that occurred in Vietnam that I fear may now be trending in Afghanistan? Premature conversion is the most devastating for it leads to all the other problems. At first no one wants to become involved in organizing the tribes for counterinsurgency warfare. The local government has its political reasons; the U.S. leadership has the uncertainty of a covert operation.

In Vietnam the Village Defense Program began as a covert operation under the aegis of the Saigon stationed CIA’s Combined Studies Branch. Within two months the Village Defense Program showed such progress and promise that it was uncovered in a N.Y. Times article under the banner “U.S. Making Army of Vietnam Tribe”. Other than a Vietnamese government directed “down time” the program progressed relentlessly despite the following. The Vietnamese Government insisted that a Public Survey Officer, a civilian member of the Politburo, be assigned to Buon Enao to monitor the program and be responsive to the Provincial Chief.

Every senior U.S. government official from the American Ambassador, the Commander in Chief Vietnam, the Commander in Chief Pacific, U.S. Army Chief of Staff; and throw in the Army Pictorial Service who produced a TV documentary, hastily visited Buon Enao for briefings. The pressure was now on from the Vietnamese Government for the U.S. to pass control of the Buon Enao Project to the Vietnamese Special Forces. While still working Phase III, and several months removed from reaching Phase IV of the plan, the Department of Defense agreed to “Operation Switchback”.

Then, in July 1962, only five months into our deployment, the Department of Defense made the decision to transfer complete responsibility for Special Forces operations to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, thus making the Army responsible for U.S. support of the Civilian Irregular Defense Program. “Switchback” was to be accomplished in Phases to be completed by July 1963.

At the time of my Team’s departure in August 1962 there were 18 U.S. Special Forces A-Detachments deployed in Vietnam. By November, assigned to the recently activated Headquarters, U.S. Army Special Forces (Provisional), Vietnam reporting to the Military Assistance Command Vietnam, there was a C-Detachment, three B-Detachments and twenty six A-Detachments who were operating in camps in each of the four Corps Tactical Zones. Needless to say, this expansion was so rapid that much of the criteria established for insuring success with the Rhade tribe was either overlooked or ignored. Instead the emphasis was on speed while the psychological impact went sorely lacking.

In December 1962 the Vietnamese Government declared the entire Rhade Area of Operation of Darlac Province “secure”. This triggered a shift in emphasis from the original sense of the Village Defense Program from an area development/denial project to Civilian Irregular Defense Group camps for offensive strike force operations. The Montagnards were no longer being utilized to secure, defend and support themselves from their own villages. Rather they were being employed in situations favorable to Vietnamese pacification programs. Civic Action programs for the Montagnards came to a halt. Village defenders were being disarmed; and the strike force was placed under the command of the Province Chief. The Montagnard camps were soon situated in remote areas along the western border with the primary mission of border surveillance. And there they remained until the war’s end.

Without getting into details needless to say the Vietnamese were not ready to gain control of this operation. They did not have the training, experience, financing or resources to support the Civilian Irregular Defense Group. The result turned out to be devastating. The entire concept of Tribal Counterinsurgency was turned on its head. The Montagnards became “Gypsies of the Battlefield”. Ever changing missions, misuse by Vietnamese commanders who knew little or nothing of their capabilities and limitations. They were relocated or resettled at the whim of the Vietnamese who did not take into account Montagnard culture. This was a prime factor when in 1963 eighteen Civilian Irregular Defense Group border camps were forced to close before becoming operational; and for the Montagnard uprising (FULRO Movement) that took place in Ban Me Thout (the heart of Rhade country) on 19 September 1964 when “more than 3,000 heavily armed tribesmen … were killing 29 Vietnamese, capturing a hundred more, and seizing twenty American Special Forces advisors as hostages”.

I cannot claim to have first hand information as to what the tribal counterinsurgency program is undergoing in Afghanistan. I can only surmise from written accounts that they may have already or are undergoing some of these same pitfalls. It is well known that in Afghanistan ‘tribal teams’ are being employed with much success and promise. Thus, they are being considered for a greater counterinsurgency role. But what is the trade off? Is the Afghan government associated with the Command and Control; are the Special Forces A-Detachment commanders located with the tribes now tied to a military chain-of-command; will financial and logistical support now be subject to the Afghan budget; will A-Detachments no longer have the autonomy heretofore mentioned as being necessary for the grass roots success? Will the Rules of Engagement be tailored to tribal warfare? These are questions I have no answer for.

(Cont'd)

[Richard]

I cannot predict the outcome of the war in Afghanistan. I am fairly certain, however, that a favorable outcome will not be accomplished without the participation of the tribal groups on both a military front and with a political/social contribution. But for the sake of argument let us assume that none of the impediments heretofore mentioned come to be and that the program succeeds as envisioned to reach Phase V: Sustainability. Will it then suffer the same fate as in Vietnam? The success of Phase V in Afghanistan can be enhanced when tribal cultures are considered in the National Strategy. Of utmost importance is that each tribe must be deployed in the area in which they live. They must be made to retain their culture and identity for as long as it is prudent.

The tribal groups secure their area one at a time; or in concert. As a tribal area is deemed “secure” it maintains this responsibility. Realignment in the make-up of the fighting force occurs so that tribesmen can return to a normal way of life in supporting themselves. This does not mean disarming tribesmen who consider owning a weapon a given right. Forming a ‘Home Force’ (National Guard/police force) is a consideration. Ongoing Civic Action programs must be expanded to include an infrastructure. Tribal leadership is maintained in accordance with their own customs. The tribe must be made to feel that the Afghan government by its actions is their government as well. As tribal villages become secure it expands to Districts, then Provinces and then Regions. These then enjoin with the cities and towns (which were secured by NATO/Afghan military forces) and which are now maintained by local police forces.

It is my judgment that the Afghan tribes are too headstrong to be made into “Gypsies of the Battlefield” as were made the tribes of Vietnam. Or will the Afghan tribes suffer the same fate as the Montagnards in Vietnam because, like the Vietnamese government, the Afghan government feels threatened by armed tribesmen who are by nature better combatants than the Afghan military?


POSTSCRIPT
10 March 2012

It has now been two years to the date that this manuscript was written. One cannot overlook the numerous missteps made by NATO in conducting this war from the outset foremost being the delay in a counterinsurgency strategy; nor can the serious shortcomings of the Afghan Government be ignored as contributing to the growing unrest and increasing outbursts – both from the Afghans and Americans as well - for getting NATO out of Afghanistan as quickly as it can be achieved.

Although many of the original U.S. war goals such as defeating the Taliban, installing democracy and abolishing corruption have largely been abandoned, it is my belief that the Administration’s policies have been based more and more on political decisions these past few years than on outcome considerations just as they were late into the Vietnam War. I can see the pattern developing whereby negotiations will begin with the Taliban, such as they began with Communist North Vietnam, only to have Vietnam ultimately under the control of the North.

In this regard, as in Vietnam, the United States is focused not on the mission, but on how soon it can leave Afghanistan while the Taliban are in no hurry and are willing to wait it out for their advantage. It won’t now be long before we will know the answer to “Is Afghanistan another Vietnam? Will the Taliban once again gain control over Afghanistan? I am not at all comfortable with what that answer will be!

[Richard]

Thank you, Sir, for adding a historical perspective and insight to our on-going dealings with Afghanistan, the Taliban, and AQ. I can only hope our efforts there will one day make you feel a bit more comfortable with whatever the 'answer' there may be.

Richard :munchin

[MtnGoat]

Richard well put.. I still say ISAF works. I See Americans Fights.. Doing what we do best!!!

[Inflexible Six]

I certainly hope the efforts and sacrifices of our Special Forces teams in Afghanistan are not ultimately in vain. If they prove to be, it won't be the fault of Special Forces but, as in Vietnam, failure on the part of the myriad other elements necessary to prosecute a successful counter-insurgency, a tough symphony to pull off in the best of circumstances, and impossible without strong political commitment. After all, all your enemy has to do to win is wait.

My group, for what little it's worth, conducted FID and operations with what can best be described as peasant soldiers in I Corps, and I came to like and respect many of them, particularly a few notable NCOs who were receptive, willing to learn, who lent stability and dependability to their "men", some of whom could not have been more than sixteen. It was not easy to look them in the eye when word came down that we were deactivating. To their credit, the few that I have been reunited with in later years have not held bitterness at what must have seemed to them at the time as our betrayal.

Like most Americans I've been impressed by Special Forces activities in OEF and have followed them with great interest since the earliest days of the Northern Alliance. Thank you Colonel and Richard for your illuminating posts.