View Full Version : Thoughts from Kandahar
From a Marine (another web ring I belong to- worked with some J Heads in Astan)
interesting
Stray Round – Last one from Kandahar
First I want to apologize for not sending more missives from the “front”. I intended these to come monthly or at most quarterly. Somehow the time slipped away which also explains why my diary is so spotty.
A year in Kandahar is a long time. We [Marines] used to deploy during peacetime for 6 months at time. We thought this was long and we took pride in it. This will be my third one year tour since September 11th. Those 6 month deployments that included beer look pretty good from here. Before I start my own pity party, I would like to tell you about a young Corporal (Army) that I met here standing in one of the many lines that define life around here… he told me he was on his fourth deployment to Afghanistan. He was still on his first enlistment. His son drew a picture of his family for school that included the mom, the son, the dog and a sign that said ‘My Dad lives in Afghanistan’. We have not yet begun to grapple with the sacrifices we have asked and received from a generation of young Americans.
Allies. I want to take a moment and mention a few things about our brothers and sisters to the north. Canadians, they really have made quite an impression on me over the last year. The whole French speaking thing is a bit overdone at times, and it can impact on tactical efficiency because when I ride around with them, the Quebec ones, they conduct business in French, their version of French. My one college class is woefully inadequate; I am not sure how it would play out in a tight situation with French commands being yelled. However, the Canadian soldiers seem good. They carry themselves and behave just as soldiers do. They are game to fight and have given a good measure of themselves on the battlefield by all accounts. They certainly have paid a price in their own national treasure. I think we should remember that Canada only has about 30 million souls. They are fighting on an international stage with military and civilian diplomats far exceeding their per capita fair share. They are concentrated in Kandahar and I have worked alongside them for the entire time. Their young people, soldier and diplomat alike, have impressed me with their professionalism and pride. When I went to school at Michigan, I thought Canada was just for beer and skiing. I have a completely new respect for the great white north, eh?
My Mission. I have written about “Reintegration” before and its place in this campaign. However, since I took so long to write, I will recap! All around the world nations try to help end warfare using “DDR”, Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration. This process has been perfected by a number of nations, not the US, and is mostly a UN effort in places we don’t think much about. In Afghanistan, as far as I can tell from history and a year of interaction and observation, reintegration has been an aspect of ending hostilities in Central Asia since the time of Alexander the Great. The Pashtoons understand it and use it themselves frequently because they are always starting and ending blood feuds or wars. In the 10+ years we have been campaigning in Afghanistan there have been two major efforts to reintegrate insurgents and try to “take fighters off the field of battle”. These two programs (PTS & DIAG) were and still are utter failures judged not by me or the military but independent organizations, non-governmental sources and the media. Reintegration today in Afghanistan is what I spent a year of my life trying to help along. There was a law created by Karzai called the Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Program (APRP). I want to tell you that it is a good piece of paper and in it are ideals and aspirations worthy of praise. It is a high goal to shoot for in this place.
pt2
Not so easy. Most people and most warlords are illiterate. Also, there are a number of Afghan officials from Kabul down to the smallest government offices that also cannot read or write. I believe the population is about 90% illiterate and from what I have seen that seems correct. The bar for being ‘literate’ around these parts is pretty low, further underscoring a huge problem. Understanding the lack of capacity in their own government, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) asked the Coalition to help implement this law, specifically to help find and stand up teams that would go to the Governors of the 34 Provinces and provide the brains to help explain the reintegration program and to fill out the paperwork. As an example, in Kandahar Province, the home of the Taliban, and the seat of the Taliban Government in its day, the current Governor does not have many Afghans around to help him run the Province. If you go into his compound and into his big building, you will find him working to solve everything. He is smart [former professor in British Columbia] and dedicated [been here since Dec 2008] but he is mostly alone. His last Deputy Governor was blown up on the way to work, and many others who tried to work in the government have been assassinated. So, in order to start the reintegration process there needs to be a group of Afghans that are educated and can handle the paperwork. I keep saying paperwork because if money is to ever be shared from Kabul to Kandahar, the typical inefficient bureaucratic machine must be fed. By the way, the “money” they should be spending was actually donated by many countries, including us, and is held in a trust account for the Afghan government to spend toward peace and reconciliation.
I have spent the last 6 months trying to put a team together for the Kandahar Governor. I cannot dedicate enough time or space to explain the difficulty in setting up this team. It became an obsession and a defining goal for me as I approached a year in Kandahar. I was rewarded by actually signing them to a contract and getting them started on helping the Governor build the long road of peace. I was recently present at a Reintegration Ceremony along with three other AFPAK Hands [we were the only westerners attending but more on this ceremony later]. I watched the Team I helped create begin to do their job, interacting with Taliban and government officials alike trying to interject some organization into a cultural process that allows two sides to come back together. This was gratifying but I am getting ahead of myself.
The view I see. In Kandahar and we are experiencing Insurgents that want to stop fighting…imagine that. The surge worked, just as a stick is supposed to work and the talk about reintegration has worked, just like a carrot is supposed to work. In the birthplace of the Taliban, some of them want to “take a knee” and come back. However, a lot of Afghans make money from the war in contracts plus the war keeps us from interfering with the enormous drug trade, so there are a lot of reasons this could fail, but I am here to tell anyone, we have at least reached the point where it was possible to talk with the insurgents. I am talking about the ‘middle management’ of the insurgency here, the big insurgent leaders are “dancing” with Karzai in Kabul, which is a nearly detached world, far away from Kandahar.
It may just be wishful thinking on my part but I see hope. Now, I am not directly responsible for military operations in my job here, but having been in this business for a little while I am comfortable commenting and I think we really put a hurtin’ on the insurgents. They got a glimpse of what we can do on the battlefield when we put our minds to it. Add to this the fact they have been fighting for over 30 years and you can imagine the motivation for trying something new. The two previous peace program failures did not have the financial support, the political attention, nor the presence of so many US forces backing them up and creating the right conditions. The insurgents can afford to take a break and wait three more years until we leave, and it appears they want to “dip their toes” in the peace process right now. If it does not work out they can always start fighting again. They benefit from taking a break now because it gives them time to build up their numbers and quality in the relative safety of Pakistan until we leave. However, we have approached our one opportunity in the campaign where we have a chance to implement a formal reintegration program in Kandahar. I say “formal” because if you do not follow the Afghan law, the APRP, your reintegration is “informal” and there is no money set aside to help you. There have been some events in Kandahar that are called reintegration events and they even include the Governor and other officials and powerbrokers, but they are not ‘formal’ by the law. The Governor knows this but must play along, he does not wield the power around here, the drug dealers, powerbrokers, and warlords do. That is why he must play along even if the reintegration is informal.
One of the ways to encourage formal reintegration is to support efforts to follow Afghan law. To do this,the Afghans still need some people to handle the paperwork. It is like having all the bullies from a grade school playground in charge… they need the weaker but smarter students to actually enable them to do something more sophisticated. These sort of Afghans are in short supply and it is they who we are trying to put into place to run the program in a sense. We are not involved in putting ‘our guys’ in place to do our bidding, these Afghans are making this process their very own. The theory goes that if we could just get some educated Afghans in the right place at the right time, they might make a difference. The success will be if the locals learn to make peace, peacefully. Assassination will be the preferred method for the summer I suspect, but underneath will be a guided effort that offers a better way. With a lot of luck and if “the creek don’t rise” there may be a better future this year.
Hiring a Team. Kandahar is a dangerous place full of dangerous people, my hope is the men that rose to the occasion; to talk peace and promote a peaceful reintegration effort, do not perish like so many others. I sat with them, I drank tea with them, they discuss life with me, they showed me what they can do and I came to respect them. I will hand them over to my replacement and do what I can to help from back home at the Pentagon.
They actually had to form a company called “Kandahar Peace Consulting Company” to accept a contract to provide the services needed by the government. The story behind the creation of a company is part of that long story best told over a beer or 12 if anyone wants to hear. Suffice to say, the rules of spending money in this campaign are hard to understand and near impossible to comply with at times. Our desire to prevent fraud waste and abuse has created a system that is wholly unresponsive. I am not smartest man, but I am fairly educated and getting through the funding request system to actually spend money to support the peace process was a labor. As of 6 April 2011, in Kandahar, perhaps one if not the best place to spend Reintegration earmarked money, the USG has not spent one dime. After my year working to support this program, I finally created a contract that was signed effective 7 April that will spend money in Kandahar to support the peace process. You hear a lot about how much money is spent here and the stories are true, campaigns cost a lot of money. There was money set aside by US law and regulation for the last two fiscal years, intended to be spent on Reintegration, however, it is so encumbered with conflicting, vague, and unsupportive rules that we are just now spending a few dollars in the Taliban homeland to offer something other than war. It wasn’t for lack of trying, just lack of foresight that held us back so long. I have served in Iraq. I was the Executive Officer of a 6,250+ Marine Regiment. We were in Fallujah just after the big battle and we stayed for a year. I learned a lot about spending money in a campaign. I think in the early stages of Iraq we did not have enough oversight or controls in place. When I got there in February of 2005, the rules started to tighten up. I think somewhere between 2005 and 2010, we put too many rules in place and basically we over corrected. Someday after the “Big Audit” of the first decade of this century, maybe we will come to grips with how we employ our strategic powers, the military and our economy.
The Ceremony. This is not a war story in the classical sense of a battle and things done under stress. This is a short account from me of the event I mentioned in the beginning. I find myself honored to have been present and think this event sort of puts a fitting end to my many experiences campaigning as a Marine.
There was a Taliban leader from Kandahar. He was important to their cause, so much so, that he was recently promoted to what we call a “Shadow Governor” position for a Province up north. The Taliban tries to run a shadow version of government around the country. I cannot say exactly what his motivations were, but the local Afghan leaders basically believe he did not want to go to a foreign land. Moving a Kandaharis to the north is just that, even if you are Taliban, it is moving someone away from what they consider home. I am reminded of General Lee CSA commenting on his push into Pennsylvania as being a foray into a foreign land. The analogy of using our Civil War (War Between the States) is useful when describing what I saw that day in April, in Kandahar City.
pt3
I went a bit early with three other AFPAK Hands to the NDS (National Directorate of Security) headquarters in Kandahar City. This was an Afghan affair and the ISAF (US) military and diplomats were not attending. The Afghan media were there to include some stringers from the New York Times and the AP. There was a lot of local media. The government officials arrived first and waited together in a small dirty courtyard. There were gunmen on the roofs and armed men all around. The NDS takes its security seriously and they are good at protecting themselves, but if you looked at them it would not appear to be a very professional looking group. This is the secret police for Afghanistan and they are not professional soldiers so the scene appeared more thrown together than it actually was.
The insurgents, that is the proper name commonly used, arrived by their trademark motorcycle convoy. They ride around the country in pairs, usually armed, normally trying to conceal the weapons so we do not see them and shoot them. They had their turbans wrapped around their faces and weapons aplenty. I was not at the outer gate, instead wanting to see the action in the courtyard, so I can just assume they were checked for ammo. The weapons are an important prop and part of the Reintegration Ceremony therefore they had to bring them. This was all planned in advance. The planning done by Afghans is not planning like our military would do, but it seems to work for them. They dismounted and formed a line. The leader and his number two at the front of a line. Now, the trademark battle flag for the Taliban is a simple white piece of cloth. These are seen around the countryside and often used to mark territory or goad ISAF forces into attacking or investigating some area laden with IEDs. The white battle flag is well known and should not be misinterpreted as a western surrender flag. These white pieces of cloth represent purity and are their battle colors in every sense of the word. In true insurgent fashion, the white flag which was tied to the top of a simple tree branch. The Taliban leader held it high and to his front, not letting it lean or dip. He was a relatively tall man, bearded and wrapped in his local attire and a scarf draped around his shoulders. He was looking very Pashtoon. His face was uncovered, but his followers kept their faces covered and carried their weapons on their shoulders. The manner in which they carried themselves and their arms made me think of how far and how long some of them had been under arms and moving across battlefields, probably all their adult lives.
The scenario was laid out so that as the insurgents formed up they were out of sight around a corner of the building along a road. The government officials too made a line of some seniority and placed themselves in the middle of the courtyard facing the approach and waiting. The insurgents moved in a column and rounded the corner and as they did a man representing the government with a flag bearer of his own began his approach. The end result was two lines, led by two flags coming together. At the end only the flags approached each other. There was an embrace of the two leaders and the insurgent flag was handed over. Then all the government leaders lined up to welcome and hug the insurgent leaders. The rank and file continued to follow and silently laid their weapons on tables lined up in the courtyard. These were rifles, machine guns, rocket launchers but the one that caught my eye was an old rifle, a British .303 I think. This rifle was decorated in a simple fashion and appeared to be in good condition, but was also old and made me wonder how long it had been carried in battle.
For me, what I saw, well I am a bit of a romantic. I saw brothers coming back together. The same people divided by distinct differences of opinion and belief. However, the ones that came in that day wanted to be back home. I could not help wonder what it was like 150 years ago across our country, when unit after unit from the south had to finally come home and hand over weapons. The event was moving to me. I am no fool, I know it may not last. I know the history of the Pashtoons, because that is my job and I read a lot. There is a Pashtoon propensity to start fighting so these very men could again take up arms tomorrow. But on that day, in that place, I saw with my own eyes what Reintegration means to these people and the enemy was not a mystery anymore.
Closing thoughts. The insurgents are Pashtoon. They defended and fought alongside some foreigners called Al Qaeda. This is what made the Taliban a target of the US. They supported Al Qaeda for many reasons both cultural and practical. It is only now that you hear Afghans, Kandaharis, talk about not wanting to be associated with these foreign fighters anymore. They want to come back to their home and they do not want any foreigners to be here anymore. That not only applies to ISAF, but also to Al Qaeda and the Pakistanis.
My second last point is a personal analysis and should not be construed as having any association with the US military. I feel that Pakistan is the real point of this whole campaign. It sounds odd, but a Muslim country with hundreds of millions of people, nuclear weapons, a large military and over run by fundamentalist extremist from all around the Middle East, is really the place we need to create stability. The thought of Pakistan going rogue or being run by Al Qaeda is something to consider… the people of Pakistan are already under the rule of the military and that has been the case for their entire, short, existence. The civilian leaders they have can only rule as much as they are allowed to by the military. Next door is Afghanistan to the west of Pakistan, I can generalize and say that throughout history this area now known as Afghanistan has been a battleground. It was never anyone’s prize, it was where they staged forces and fought. The desire was for control of the lands, people, and countries to its east and west. Once again, it is a battlefield, our battlefield and in my opinion our greatest concerns are to its east and west. The Pashtoons are prone to fight, because they live at the crossroads of history, where armies have marched and fought across time. We cannot save Afghanistan, even if it needs saving, but in our calculations and decisions, we should not lose sight of Pakistan
MTN Medic
04-25-2011, 09:54
Good read; especially the end.