JJ_BPK
04-17-2011, 04:22
Obvious to the choir, ignored by the MSM, and a tax gobbling bureaucratic monster of biblical proportions to the New World Left (UN).
But none the less, it is part of the NEEDS section for the SWA AO..
Isn't this where JFK's Peace Corp is suppose to pop in and save the day??
:munchin
Harvard Kennedy School Review: 2011 Edition
The Exit: Why the Civilian-Military Strategy Is Failing in Afghanistan
by Bob Kinder
Bob Kinder is a 2011 Master in Public Administration candidate at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. A retired Army officer with more than thirty years experience in unconventional and conventional warfare, he spent 2009-2010 in Afghanistan creating and leading a counterinsurgency advisory team for the former commander U.S. General Stanley McChrystal.
In a remote, dusty village in Southern Afghanistan, a young Marine captain talked through his interpreter to a tribal elder. The large room was bursting to capacity as dozens of men from the village listened. Just two days earlier, Taliban controlled the village, but that was before a combined force of Afghan Army and U.S. Marines arrived on the scene to rout the insurgents and secure the area. The insurgents had been separated from the population, peace was secured, and now the more complicated work of gaining the trust of the villagers had begun.
As that Marine sat and listened to the long list of issues raised by the tribal leaders, he jotted notes and wondered how he could accomplish everything they asked of him. The men wanted a school to educate their children, a mosque to replace the crumbling structure they had been using, help getting their produce to a market, and myriad other projects. The captain was tired, frustrated, and confused. He had lost two Marines during the fight against the Taliban. He felt his men had done their part, but where were the people that were supposed to help him extend governance into this newly liberated village? What happened to the detailed plan to connect U.S. government civilians with the Marines to get the development projects underway quickly? The captain knew that without being able to provide some modicum of support to the villagers, he would lose them. The Taliban, though temporarily defeated, hid in the shadows and was ready to return to the village and challenge the government of Afghanistan’s legitimacy.
Can the military solve Afghanistan’s problems? Not alone. Although critical to meeting our national objectives, uniformed armed forces are secondary when executing a counterinsurgency. Civilian-political activities such as governance development and creating a functioning economy must have primacy. And on this count, the United States is failing in Afghanistan. Without quick, bold action to ramp up the civilian side of war—the side with health experts, engineers, lawyers, public administrators, and more—we may never win the peace.
continued...
http://isites.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?keyword=k74756&pageid=icb.page414665
But none the less, it is part of the NEEDS section for the SWA AO..
Isn't this where JFK's Peace Corp is suppose to pop in and save the day??
:munchin
Harvard Kennedy School Review: 2011 Edition
The Exit: Why the Civilian-Military Strategy Is Failing in Afghanistan
by Bob Kinder
Bob Kinder is a 2011 Master in Public Administration candidate at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. A retired Army officer with more than thirty years experience in unconventional and conventional warfare, he spent 2009-2010 in Afghanistan creating and leading a counterinsurgency advisory team for the former commander U.S. General Stanley McChrystal.
In a remote, dusty village in Southern Afghanistan, a young Marine captain talked through his interpreter to a tribal elder. The large room was bursting to capacity as dozens of men from the village listened. Just two days earlier, Taliban controlled the village, but that was before a combined force of Afghan Army and U.S. Marines arrived on the scene to rout the insurgents and secure the area. The insurgents had been separated from the population, peace was secured, and now the more complicated work of gaining the trust of the villagers had begun.
As that Marine sat and listened to the long list of issues raised by the tribal leaders, he jotted notes and wondered how he could accomplish everything they asked of him. The men wanted a school to educate their children, a mosque to replace the crumbling structure they had been using, help getting their produce to a market, and myriad other projects. The captain was tired, frustrated, and confused. He had lost two Marines during the fight against the Taliban. He felt his men had done their part, but where were the people that were supposed to help him extend governance into this newly liberated village? What happened to the detailed plan to connect U.S. government civilians with the Marines to get the development projects underway quickly? The captain knew that without being able to provide some modicum of support to the villagers, he would lose them. The Taliban, though temporarily defeated, hid in the shadows and was ready to return to the village and challenge the government of Afghanistan’s legitimacy.
Can the military solve Afghanistan’s problems? Not alone. Although critical to meeting our national objectives, uniformed armed forces are secondary when executing a counterinsurgency. Civilian-political activities such as governance development and creating a functioning economy must have primacy. And on this count, the United States is failing in Afghanistan. Without quick, bold action to ramp up the civilian side of war—the side with health experts, engineers, lawyers, public administrators, and more—we may never win the peace.
continued...
http://isites.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?keyword=k74756&pageid=icb.page414665