View Full Version : Statistical Irrelevance of SIGACT Data: Iraq Surge Analysis Reveals Reality
The Statistical Irrelevance of American SIGACT Data: Iraq Surge Analysis Reveals Reality
Joshua Thiel, MAJ, SF
Maneuver warfare at its core is a mechanistic endeavor and fits with a corresponding necessity of top-down hierarchies. Conversely, counterinsurgency is a more ambiguous environment that varies in its complexity and context; it is the chess match of war. It is different in every locale and can cover the entire spectrum of war simultaneously. Consequently, counterinsurgency is difficult to put on a bumper sticker, to trademark as a catch phrase, or sell to a population and their representatives. In 2006 the United States (U.S.) public’s perception of success or failure of the Iraqi counterinsurgency strategy was concentrated around the concept of massing combat power in time and space, often called the “The Surge.” The term, “The Surge,” condensed a new counterinsurgency strategy into a simple and quantifiable slogan for the sound bite culture surrounding current affairs in the modern world. Unfortunately, counterinsurgency is more complex than “add more and then you win.”
Download The Full Article: The Statistical Irrelevance of American SIGACT Data (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/732-thiel.pdf):
Major Joshua Thiel is a United States Army Special Forces Officer and a recent graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School with a Masters of Science in Defense Analysis. He is currently serving in 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne).
I know Josh Thiel and served with him in Iraq. An absolutely outstanding officer with a big brain on his shoulders, but I'm not sure if I agree with his conclusions here (or the way that he arrives at his conclusion---because I am in agreement with him that the introduction of additional forces must be a carefully thought out decision, not entered into lightly). Interestingly, we observed the same phenomenon in northern Afghanistan in 2010. When we had few troops on the ground outside of our AOB and 4 ODAs + ISAF units, SIGACTS were low. Everybody thought nothing much was going on in the north outside of Konduz and the HiG-Taliban intra-insurgency dustups in Baghlan. With the introduction of 4/10 MTN beginning in April of 2010, SIGACTS went up.
My personal opinion is that the reason that there weren't a significant amount of SIGACTS reported in the north prior to the introduction of the 4/10 BCT was due to two primary factors:
(1) insurgents weren't using IEDs as the weapon of choice as they were in southern Afghanisan, because it just wasn't effective from a manpower standpoint (guys sitting on IEDs for days waiting for the odd coalition convoy to pass by) + the scarcity of coalition forces meant that if the insurgents emplaced a PPIED or some other VOIED, the odds were that it would be initiated by a civilian as much or more so than by coalition forces, due to coalition forces (ISAF) rarely operating outside of narrowly defined "comfort zones", and
(2) the completeness of the database(s) from which SIGACTs data is derived. If the host nation forces aren't reporting or are underreporting their SIGACTs to coalition forces for inclusion into CIDNE or other data repositories, the SIGACTs data is skewed. Moreover, many host nation and coalition SIGACTs aren't uploaded into databases due to manpower shortages, the difficulty of ISAF forces transfering data to US SIPR for inclusion, or through general laziness and apathy (YMMV).
If you put more troops into any area, you are exponentially increasing the opportunities for the insurgency to IED/shoot at them. Prior to the influx of additional combat troops in northern Afghanistan, an insurgent with a command detonated IED wouldn't have any coalition forces coming by more than once a month, so he didn't bother sticking IEDs in the roads for the most part since he would be sitting on his ass for a long, long time before he might even get one whack at the pinata. Prior to the introduction of more troops, PPIEDs didn't really work because the paucity of coalition forces traveling into many areas meant that the insurgent's IED was more likely to blow up civilians vs. coalition forces.
The majority of engagements we encountered in northern Afghanistan were "old school" direct fire engagements. I had teams doing more shooting in a week than some of the ODAs from one of our sister BNs did during their entire rotation. Doesn't mean anything one way or another other than the insurgents were being pragmatic about the best available means to engage coalition forces (and the nature of many ODAs missions in the south was VSO-centric).
I liken increasing SIGACTs with the introduction of additional troops with the following analogy:
If I go duck hunting and I only see one duck over the course of day, my odds of bringing home a duck for dinner are much less than if I have an entire flock of ducks fly by or ducks transiting past me throughout the day. More importantly, I have exponentially increased my odds of hitting a duck as well as the number of opportunities for engagement.
With any increase of troops, I would expect to see an initial increase of SIGACTs. I think that using SIGACTs data as the sole metric as to the efficacy of introducing additional troops (is it up when more troops go in vs. down?) isn't as relevant (or better put---as cut and dried) as the paper asserts.
I would argue that it should be expected to see an initial increase in SIGACTs any time additional troops are introduced such as they were in Iraq and Afghanistan. Only through a holisitic assessment of all the factors and variables unique to the particular area where additional troops are introduced can we then start to understand and draw conclusions about whether or not it was beneficial or detrimental.
My .02
Your duck hunting analogy is spot on. I'd be interested in the correlation of similar numbers of troops in the same area over time, as well as the number of patrols versus SIGACT ratio.
What exactly defines a "SIGACT" can inflate numbers significantly. If SIGACT is only defined as kinetic attack resulting in direct or indirect fire contact with a coalition patrol will lessen the ratio. If SIGACT means everything from IED to cashe found the number will go up - If I have more troops looking for cashes, conducting checkpoints, conducting raids, and generally doing more patrolling as opposed to last week the number of SIGACTs from benign to kinetic will go up because opportunity has increased. I will have more assets operating in an area with a greater opportunity to develop the situation as well as providing the enemy with more opportunity to interdict and influence operations.
SIGACTs will usually be a function of opportunities granted to both sides resultant of the volume of forces in an area and exposure time (length/number of patrols) in the area of operation.
I think that you are definitely on track with your thoughts there. Maybe it is just Josh's over-generalization that has struck a chord with me, where in the conclusion he wrote,
"Thus, this study allows counterinsurgent planners and policy-makers to put aside massive troop surges as the essential ingredient in stemming an insurgency. Rather, the reduced significance of troop surges suggests that intangibles are the cornerstone of counterinsurgent victory..."
I think his study should be a catalyst for more indepth planning and analysis to determine the correct mix of tangibles vs. intangibles for the counterinsurgent including those that he highlighted: troop increases, coalition policies, enemy strategy, and neighboring country assistance.
As with any counterinsurgent strategy, what works well in one place may not work at all in another due to the constraints/limitations of the counterinsurgent force, the nature and compositon of the insurgency, malign external actors and influences, corrupt/ineffective/dysfunctional host nation governmental institutions, and the population itself.