Al Sadr

[NousDefionsDoc]

Are we being to soft on him? Why isn't he dead? What's the strategy?

[Footmobile]

Haven't we tried to snatch him a few times already? I remember hearing snippets in the news about how we did a few raids on his house and offices recently. There was an SF Captain KIA'd on one of them I beleive.

I think the Coalition strategy is to let the new government deal with him. I don't think we can just go around whacking their religious leaders (no matter how much they might deserve it). It would just upset too many people, in Iraq, and in the media.

Would killing Sadr solve any of our problems with his militia? I don't know. Probably not. His followers are many, and I think it would make the situation worse with them and ulitimatly for our troops.

I also don't think the Bush administration can afford to effectively deal with Sadr this close to the election either.

[shootandloot]

NDD,

I've had a ongoing discussion about al-Sadr with one of my officers. Personally, I think we are being soft on him, or, maybe more acurately, I think the new Iraqi government is being too soft on him. My officer believes that we are afraid of turning him into a martyr. In my opinion, I don't think killing him will make him a martyr. I think he's nothing more than a thug. His popularity is do to the fact that he is the one talking the loudest over there. He's no more than "the flavor of the month".

My thought on the "why isn't he dead" question: I think making him dead will be much easier now that he isn't holed up in the Najaf equivolent to the Vatican. Since he broke the truce, I've been saying that he needs a date with a Hellfire missile just like that former leader of Hamas.

Maybe my thoughts on him are way off, but I think he's no more than a nuisance. What do you think sir?

[shootandloot]

Originally posted by Footmobile
I don't think we can just go around whacking their religious leaders (no matter how much they might deserve it). It would just upset too many people, in Iraq, and in the media.


Yes, but keep in mind, "cleric" is his self-appointed title. He has no religious schooling, and no claim to a religous hierarchy other than the fact that his father was a respected cleric killed under Saddam's regime. I may be wrong, but I don't think anyone other than 3,000 some odd followers view him as a religious leader.

[ktek01]

He has strong support in a few areas, mostly with the very poor. His support grows a little each day he holds out against the "occupiers" so we do need to take him out of the picture. They just need to do it in a way that doesnt ignite the rest of the Shiite community.

[Airbornelawyer]

Originally posted by ktek01
He has strong support in a few areas, mostly with the very poor. His support grows a little each day he holds out against the "occupiers" so we do need to take him out of the picture. They just need to do it in a way that doesnt ignite the rest of the Shiite community. Six months ago, he was a hothead with no following. We have allowed him to grow in stature both by not dealing with him when we should have and by a series of other mistakes that have alienated Iraqi Shi'ites. First, we put a former Ba'athist general in charge in Fallujah, and cut short our operations there. Every day we continue the pressure in Najaf is one more day the story among Shi'ites is how soft we were on the Sunnis in Fallujah, but how tough we are one the Shi'ites. Second, we put the country in the hands of a former Ba'athist who, while a Shi'ite, is no friend of the Shi'ite community. Iyad Allawi was the CIA's man, and his elevation reflects a victory for the CIA/State types (as well as the French and British governments) who believe that Iraq is best put in the hands of a strongman, thus obviating every thing we had been saying about our belief in democracy. Third, and related to this, the CIA and State succeeded in marginalizing the one Iraqi Shi'ite politician known for his close relations with the US, Ahmad Chalabi, based on a whisper campaign and charges of corruption that so far have not been shown to have merit. And, ironically, one of the charges against Chalabi was that he had dealings with Iran. So, through a series of events, we are now empowering someone whose strongest ties are with Iran, and who absolutely hates us and everything we stand for.

VP Cheney got heat for predicting that Iraqis would welcome coalition troops with open arms. When we invaded, the Iraqis proved distrustful. Shi'ites especially recalled our abandonment of them in 1991, when we expressed our preference for a strongman coup rather than a popular uprising. But once it was clear that Saddam was going down, the Shi'ites did welcome us with open arms and expressions of gratitude. The Shi'ite part of the country was so relatively pacific that we entrusted it to other coalition forces - principally the Poles, British, Ukrainians, Italians and Spanish - while we concentrated on the so-called Sunni Triangle.

Sadr and his thugs were quiet for a while, focusing primarily on assassinating potential rivals like Ayatullah Sayyed Abdulmajid al-Kho'i and Ayatullah Sayyed Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, and terrorizing civilians in Sadr City. After we closed down his newspaper in Baghdad and word of a sealed indictment of Sadr leaked, though, he came out of the woodwork. If we had gotten rid of him in mid-2003, when he first started trying to radicalize the poor Shi'ites of Sadr City and first assassinated more popular leaders, we might have done quick work of him with no fear of martyrdom. Had we acted more decisively in April 2004, we might have taken him down without too much backlash, as he was still derided by most Shi'ites. Instead, like Saddam in 1991, we empowered him by our own restraint, and sowed the seeds for the problems we face now.

A combination of our actions and inactions have helped empower Sadr and his militia, and it may no longer be accurate to describe him as a thug with no following. The Shi'a who welcomed us in 1991 and then felt abandoned, who feared to welcome us in 2003 until they were sure we would not abandon them again, again have reason to distrust us and our motives, and are ripe targets for Sadr's propaganda.

There is another factor, of course, which is the degree of support Sadr gets from Iran, especially from Iraqis exiled there and others who come under the tutelage of Sadr's mentor, Ayatullah al-Haeri. But Sadr is not the main beneficiary of Iranian efforts to undermine the coalition.

Waiting on the sidelines in all of this is SCIRI, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. This faction enjoys strong support from the Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, or IRGC. The IRGC trained SCIRI's armed wing, the Badr Brigades. SCIRI has assumed a non-confrontational approach to the US-led coalition, and has participated in the Iraqi interim government process. It may see an opportunity, however, to exploit dissatisfaction with how Allawi and the US deal with Najaf, as well as the degradation of Sadr's military power by coalition operations, to increase its power. And the IRGC has made sure that it still has a good supply of weapons.

Sadr's supporters and SCIRI are two of the main factions among Iraqi Shi'ites. The others are the so-called marja'iyya, the network of senior clerics led by Grand Ayatullah Sistani, and the Islamic Da'wa ("Call" or "Summons") Party, led by Sistani's brother-in-law Ibrahim al-Ja'fari, which is close to the marja'iyya (otherwise the marja'iyya claim to wish to stay out of politics).

Grand Ayatullah Sistani remains critical of Sadr and generally supportive of the coalition, but he seems more concerned with protecting the Imam Ali Mosque than taking a political stand. At least one prominent "moderate" cleric (meaning one who was critical of the US invasion but participated in the Interim Governing Council), Ayatullah Muhammad Bahr al-Ulum, has joined the criticism of US operations in Najaf, telling al-Jazeerah that "there is no wisdom to what the Americans and Allawi are doing." Da'wa leader al-Ja'fari is also interim Deputy President under Allawi. He has also called for US forces to leave Najaf.

To judge by the results of various local elections held in predominantly Shi'a provinces over the past year, most Shi'ites just want life to get back to normal, and do not support even the "moderate" Islamists like Da'wa, much less Sadr. But the various political factions - SCIRI and Da'wa especially - hope that the outcome is both a greater radicalization and unity among Iraqi Shi'ites and the demise of Sadr himself, so they can try to fill the gap. Getting rid of Sadr will deal with a short-term headache, but in the long run we may have lost a lot of ground in Iraq.

[shootandloot]

Airbornelawyer,

That was a mighty fine assessment. Thank you, sir, for the educational experience.

[shootandloot]

I found this article yesterday. If this situation grows, it won't be us who turns him into a martyr.

Los Angeles Times
August 24, 2004
Pg. 1

Fed-Up Residents Of Najaf Turn Against Rebel Cleric

Sadr and his militia are blamed as families and livelihoods suffer during fighting around shrine.

By Raheem Salman and T. Christian Miller, Special to The Times

NAJAF, Iraq — Haydar Hasan Abdullah wandered the twisting streets of this ancient city on Monday looking for a fight.

He was not seeking to battle American troops who have encircled one of Islam's holiest shrines for nearly three weeks. Instead, he wanted a shot at militants loyal to cleric Muqtada Sadr who are hiding beneath its gleaming gold dome.

"There are some fighters among the group of Muqtada who are actually saboteurs who have done such bad things to the city of Najaf," said Abdullah, who was searching for the police station on Monday to offer himself as a recruit. "We feel so sorry for what is happening to kids, women and innocent other people. We are quite prepared to do whatever the government wants us to do."

Sadr built his support among the poorest Shiites, Iraq's majority religious sect that was oppressed by the Sunni-dominated government of Saddam Hussein. In fiery speeches, the youthful preacher has promised an end to the U.S.-led occupation.

Sadr's message has resonated with his supporters in some parts of Iraq, including Baghdad's sprawling Sadr City slum.

But in Najaf, there is growing frustration with his lengthy standoff at the Imam Ali shrine, revered among Shiites around the world as the burial place of their sect's founder, Ali, the son-in-law of the prophet Muhammad.

The shrine, its massive cemetery and the neighborhood around it have become a bloody battleground during the last few weeks, sacrilege to many faithful.

Since Aug. 5, U.S. Marines have fought Sadr's Al Mahdi militia in mausoleums and in private homes, on public streets and near the mosque itself. The stench of rotting corpses fills the narrow alleys.

The fighting has been fierce, close and constant.

The battles have killed at least 40 Iraqi policemen, eight U.S. soldiers and dozens of civilian bystanders. The U.S. military says it has killed hundreds of Sadr's fighters, though the militia says its casualties have been far lower.

On Monday, two civilians — including a baby — were killed and two others injured. More casualties were reported in the Old City but victims could not be reached by emergency workers, hospital officials said.

Families have been trapped in their homes. Food and fuel are scarce. And many residents of Najaf, long among the Iraqi Shiites least sympathetic to Sadr, have now begun to rebel against the cleric.

Majid Saleh, a doctor who lives in a nearby neighborhood, said his house had been hit by mortar shells fired by Al Mahdi militiamen. While he escaped unharmed, a neighbor's wife and children were killed, he said.

"I blame the men of the Mahdi army because they are kids playing with mortar shells and randomly bombing houses," Saleh said. "I blame the U.S. government that was able to occupy Iraq in a matter of three days and hasn't been able to enter the shrine for the past several weeks."

The city is a center of Shiite learning and pilgrimage because of its holy sites and its role as the seat of the marjaia, the senior clerics who lead Iraqi Shiites. Many Najafis are followers of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the nation's leading Shiite cleric.

The presence of such exalted religious figures has given Najaf special status in the minds of many locals. To them, Sadr is a relatively unlearned outsider from faraway Baghdad.

Sadr's takeover of the shrine has also meant a drop in income for Najafis, who rely on business from the tens of thousands of religious pilgrims who make their way to the city each month.

While many Najafis may have welcomed Sadr's resistance against the Americans, the siege has taken a toll on their livelihood as the flow of pilgrims has dropped to a trickle. Some residents refer to the seizure of the shrine as "the second occupation," the first being the U.S. conquest of Iraq.

Small business owners have seen their shops destroyed. Families have fled their homes. Both Mahdi and American fighters have taken over buildings to use them in their battles.

One resident who stayed was Bassim Nawaf, a 45-year-old man who lives in the area surrounding the shrine.

"Most of the families who are living in the old neighborhood have left," he said. "I stayed here with my wife and daughters. My family got used to the sound of the bombs and aren't afraid of them anymore."

Nawaf and several other residents said they had also seen signs that the militia fighters were suffering under the nightly attacks by U.S. AC-130 gunships, which light up the night sky.

They said the number of roadblocks manned by fighters had dwindled. Militia members appeared drawn and worn. And some had been seen leaving town.

"It was like a human wave, but now you could count them with your fingers," Nawaf said. "The cemetery was full of fighters with different kinds of weapons, but their numbers have decreased."

Others, however, said that volunteers continued coming into the city, stopping to ask directions on how to join Sadr's forces.

"Sometimes Mahdi militiamen pass by without weapons, but their spirits are high, and they are hopeful that they will be martyrs" by being killed by occupation forces, said Abdul-Abbas Naja, a 22-year-old baker and neighborhood guard. "They have faith in their cause."

Other residents expressed understanding, if not outright support for Sadr's men, many of them young, poor and uneducated.

Um Mohammed, a nurse, said that she and her daughter had cared for several injured guerrillas.

"We do not like them, and do not support them," she said, but added that she found herself sympathizing with some of the men.

Abbas Naji returned to the city after hearing that conditions had improved. Instead, the 33-year-old antiques shop owner found his home's facade pockmarked with bullet holes, and American tanks parked 200 yards away.

For Naji, there is only one way out.

"It's better to solve the conflict peacefully," he said. "If it progressed into street fighting, it will last longer, and Iraq will become another Palestine."