JJ_BPK
10-04-2010, 07:50
Coincidence?? Timing is everything..
Woodward Hints at Powell as Next SecDef
http://www.military.com/news/article/woodward-hints-at-powell-as-next-secdef.html?ESRC=eb.nl
October 01, 2010, Military.com, by Ward Carroll
Legendary author and reporter Bob Woodward indicated that former JCS Chairman and Secretary of State Colin Powell might get the nod to replace Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense when Gates leaves in 2011.
“I’ve heard suggestions that [President Obama] might lean on Colin Powell,” Woodward said to Military.com during an exclusive interview behind the release of Obama’s Wars, his latest book. “Obama needs some good news in this war,” he added with the notion that persuading Powell to take the job would certainly be a good move in the eyes of most of the American public. Woodward also pointed out that the Powell Doctrine deals with the use of overwhelming force, which could mean Powell’s instincts might be to ask for even more troops in order to end the war faster and more definitively.
Continued....
From Richard's post:
Battle of Mogadishu: Anatomy of a Failure, Abstract:
By applying Cohen and Gooch's model to the Battle of Mogadishu, this paper has shows that the failure of the TFR mission on 3-4 October 1993 was the result of a system failure. Secretary Aspin received far more blame than he deserved for making the decision. Misperception of the real impact tanks and APCs could have had on the overall mission is the real cause of this disproportionate blame. Gen. Hoar and Gen. Powell, in addition, bear as much responsibility as Secretary Aspin for the decision. Neither of these generals strongly advocated the deployment to Aspin even though the worsening situation on the ground merited their strong support. Both Hoar and Powell's approval recommendations can be characterized as lukewarm. Aspin's real failure was of not being more critical of the conduct of the TFR operations. In light of Secretary Aspin's acknowledged concern over the number of similar operations conducted by TFR and his knowledge that the Administration was seeking a political solution, he should have notified MG Garrison of the policy shift though the JCS and CINCCENT and provided additional guidance on risk. Had Aspin either reassessed the risk of each TER operation more thoroughly or done a better job coordinating the policy shift in light of the increased risks, it is likely that the three October raid would not have occurred. While better policy coordination from the Secretary of Defense down to TFR could have prevented the 3 October 1993 raid from occurring, TFR did have all the means in Mogadishu to successfully accomplish the mission. However, overconfidence in TFR's capabilities and underestimation of the enemy's ability to find and attack TFR vulnerabilities were critical failures that led to a series of other failures. First, TFR did not request the AC-130s and extra platoon. Second, TER conducted the 3 October raid without protecting its vulnerable helicopters.
:munchin
Woodward Hints at Powell as Next SecDef
http://www.military.com/news/article/woodward-hints-at-powell-as-next-secdef.html?ESRC=eb.nl
October 01, 2010, Military.com, by Ward Carroll
Legendary author and reporter Bob Woodward indicated that former JCS Chairman and Secretary of State Colin Powell might get the nod to replace Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense when Gates leaves in 2011.
“I’ve heard suggestions that [President Obama] might lean on Colin Powell,” Woodward said to Military.com during an exclusive interview behind the release of Obama’s Wars, his latest book. “Obama needs some good news in this war,” he added with the notion that persuading Powell to take the job would certainly be a good move in the eyes of most of the American public. Woodward also pointed out that the Powell Doctrine deals with the use of overwhelming force, which could mean Powell’s instincts might be to ask for even more troops in order to end the war faster and more definitively.
Continued....
From Richard's post:
Battle of Mogadishu: Anatomy of a Failure, Abstract:
By applying Cohen and Gooch's model to the Battle of Mogadishu, this paper has shows that the failure of the TFR mission on 3-4 October 1993 was the result of a system failure. Secretary Aspin received far more blame than he deserved for making the decision. Misperception of the real impact tanks and APCs could have had on the overall mission is the real cause of this disproportionate blame. Gen. Hoar and Gen. Powell, in addition, bear as much responsibility as Secretary Aspin for the decision. Neither of these generals strongly advocated the deployment to Aspin even though the worsening situation on the ground merited their strong support. Both Hoar and Powell's approval recommendations can be characterized as lukewarm. Aspin's real failure was of not being more critical of the conduct of the TFR operations. In light of Secretary Aspin's acknowledged concern over the number of similar operations conducted by TFR and his knowledge that the Administration was seeking a political solution, he should have notified MG Garrison of the policy shift though the JCS and CINCCENT and provided additional guidance on risk. Had Aspin either reassessed the risk of each TER operation more thoroughly or done a better job coordinating the policy shift in light of the increased risks, it is likely that the three October raid would not have occurred. While better policy coordination from the Secretary of Defense down to TFR could have prevented the 3 October 1993 raid from occurring, TFR did have all the means in Mogadishu to successfully accomplish the mission. However, overconfidence in TFR's capabilities and underestimation of the enemy's ability to find and attack TFR vulnerabilities were critical failures that led to a series of other failures. First, TFR did not request the AC-130s and extra platoon. Second, TER conducted the 3 October raid without protecting its vulnerable helicopters.
:munchin