Richard
08-30-2010, 15:56
An interesting perspective from an analytical report by the REGNUM News Agency based on its own sources.
And so it goes...
Richard :munchin
Prospects of war in Transcaucasia and Central Asia
Regnum News Agency, 31 Aug 2010
Part 1 of 3
1. The global scene
Trasncaucasia and Central Asia are still key conflict areas in the post-Soviet territory (apart from Crimea). Security prospects are determined here by following factors:
(1) the nature of the strategic dialog between Russia, the United States and the accompanying European Union, interests of China, Turkey and Iran;
(2) domestic political situation in the countries of the mentioned regions;
(3) regional conflicts (Georgian-Abkhaz, Georgian-Ossetian and Nagorno Karabakh, Azerbaijani-Iranian ones), other regional conflicts (Kazakh-Uzbek, Uzbek-Tajik, Afghan-Tajik (Uzbek, Kyrgyz) ones) and other discreet conflicts taking shape of the “security expansion” (for instance, Iran's in Transcaucasia and Central Asia, Iran and China's in Central Asia);
(4) capability of local regimes to generate domestic and external conflicts on their own.
The key problem around which the regional competition is taking place is in control over the energy potential of the Caspian and the transit potential of the Black Sea region, which is a part of the bigger Balkan-Black Sea region and the prospect of “the global Balkans from Suez (Kosovo) to Xinjiang” directly including Central Asia and Kazakhstan. In this case, the traditional role of “restraining” Russia from its southern borders is being accomplished by the western line of “containment” through the Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian axis. And, which is the most important, “restraining” Russia is a part of the Euro-Atlantic “containment” of the Arabic world and China, and Eurasia in general.
The West has been suffering economic losses and is short of time in the practical implementation of its new Euro-Atlantic projects around the “Transcaucasian Corridor”: after investing finances into laying alternative pipelines, including the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, by promoting Nabucco, by involving Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan into the “corridor,” the West has failed to provide guaranteed sources for filling the pipes, and even estimated amounts of the resources to be exported have no principal influence upon the energy market. That is why Kazakhstan rich in natural resources becomes a focus of special political, military and humanitarian attention of the West, whose key task is to pull Kazakhstan away from Russia and China. Evidently, the most realistic scenario of such pulling away will be communicational, economic and defense isolation of Kazakhstan in the region. The harder for Kazakhstan will be the results of rearming its anti-aircraft defense by NATO specialists that would put under its control the whole Western China, Russia's territory up to the Arctic Ocean and the Persian Gulf countries and pose a direct threat to all Kazakhstan's neighbors. Opposite to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan has not acknowledged the prospect of turning into a small change in the strategy of “containment.”
Meanwhile, the key generator of political conflicts in the “global Balkans” area are the United States rather than regional forces; namely, the inability of the USA as an irresponsible external force results of whose policy were disintegration of Iraq, activity of Iran, indetermination of Turkey and the drug and terror epidemic from Afghanistan.
2. Transcaucasia
Up to date, the priority practical and tactical goal of the West in region is to implement the Trans-Caspian pipeline that could fuel the pipeline junctions along the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey line as well as load transshipping capacities of Georgian ports.
At the same time, the West has been strategically pushing Iran and Turkey from the region which makes them situational partners of Russia. Nevertheless, Turkey is still exerting gross political impact upon the situation in Azerbaijan using extended social networks as well. In its turn, Iran, parallel to weakening Russia's positions, is increasing its presence in Armenia, turning eventually into a factor guaranteeing security of the republic.
After Mikhail Saakashvili and his team came to power, Georgia handed over its sovereignty to the United States, assuming a role of a full-extent buffer zone from Russia that hampered its capability to increase its regional interests. Withdrawal of the Russian military bases from Batumi and Akhalkalaki as well as a many-year massive anti-Russian campaign instigated by Saakashvili bereaved Moscow of any influence in Georgia. As a result, Russia practically had to fence off the region blocking transport links via a check-point on the Georgian Military Highway and the ports of Poti and Batumi. Within whole that period, the only legal land way from Russia to the region was via Dagestan to Azerbaijan and was used only locally.
The Georgian-Russian confrontation granted a great limit of time to the West and an extensive space for maneuvering in increasing their influence upon the political systems of the countries. At the same time, the energy dialog of the West with Azerbaijan was grounded basically upon prospects of neutralizing Iran, and with Armenia upon a possibility to take the country out of the Russian orbit and unblock the border with Turkey. Neither of the goals can be considered to be fully accomplished, as both Tehran and Ankara did their best not to let Washington's positions strengthen excessively.
Meanwhile, the West gained substantial success particular in engaging the three countries in the region into NATO Individual Partnership Action Plans and for Georgia, in stating clearly the prospect of the country joining the alliance. The USA announced directly it was considering the region as a territory for deploying its air defense. The Azerbaijani territory is already granted for putting into practice interests of the American radiolocation systems and Air Forces. An agreement signed by the US and Azerbaijan on military and technical cooperation foresees US plans to connect the radiolocation station in Lerik and radiotelephone observer station in Agstafa to the Kavkaznet radiolocation system that they intend to establish in South Caucasus. The USA has placed its radars in the territory of Astara and Xizi districts, modernized an air-defense base in Kurdamir, is taking part in talks between Moscow and Baku about future exploitation of the Gabala Radiolocation Station. From time to time, Azerbaijan is trying to calm down Tehran saying it would not take actions against the southern neighbor, however, it is evident that it is impossible to calm down Iran by statements and pledges. Iran continues developing its military cooperation with Russia in improving its air defense, including supply of S-300 air defense systems. Russia has been leveling off the actions in arming Armenia and Azerbaijan. Tehran is pursuing not only the evident “security expansion” to Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, but is carrying out the most active intelligence activity in Transcaucasia, while it does not give up attempts to establish pressure groups within frameworks of religious schools. The regional policy of Iran is in backing the outlines of the Moscow-Yerevan-Tehran axis, maneuvering in the relations with Yerevan and Baku by using the Karabakh factor. In this situation, Armenia acts as a weak sister, which is, in spite of its peculiar ties with Iran and Russia, subjected to the will of the USA.
If US active policy in Transcaucasia brings about tension in the relations of Iran and Azerbaijan, Tehran and Yerevan, on the opposite, are having a pointedly constructive dialog with each other. For the Iranian side, the relations with Armenia are important in terms of securing pressure levers upon Baku and preserving its presence in the border region at all; for Armenia, Iran is becoming an alternative pole in providing its national security.
Russia is actively involved in Armenian-Iranian energy projects. Iran, Russia and Armenia have a number of joint projects — a railway link from Armenia to Iran with participation of the RZhD Russian Railways company, an oil refinery at the Armenia-Iran border with participation of Gazprom, supply of gas from Iran to electricity producing facilities in Armenia owned by Russia, increasing carrying capacity of electricity networks to export electricity from Armenia to Iran. Meanwhile, Tehran is trying to sustain relations with the authorities in Nagorno Karabakh, particularly by conducting several construction projects there.
The Turkish-Armenian and Turkish-Azerbaijani relations are built on the reverse logic. Washington's effort aimed at reconciliation of Yerevan and Ankara and unblocking a section of the state border between the two countries bore no results. The government in Yerevan knows it perfectly well that Ankara is in no way interested in establishing dialog with the Armenians. The prospect will not suit Azerbaijan either, which is the major regional Turkish prop and supplier of hydrocarbons via Turkish transit routes. One can state that the United States has abandoned promoting its reconciliation strategy, moreover, discrepancies between the USA and Turkey around Iran and sovereignization of Kurdistan appeared.
Thus, the policy of the USA and its allies in Transcaucasia met practically consolidated aversion from Russia, Iran and Turkey. Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia will have to choose in the long run their own way depending on outcomes of this struggle of positions: either to form their own strategy at their own risk or become small change of the American strategy of “containment,” responsibility for which would be assumed by neither the United States nor Russia or Iran. The options are not satisfactory.
[B]
(cont'd)
And so it goes...
Richard :munchin
Prospects of war in Transcaucasia and Central Asia
Regnum News Agency, 31 Aug 2010
Part 1 of 3
1. The global scene
Trasncaucasia and Central Asia are still key conflict areas in the post-Soviet territory (apart from Crimea). Security prospects are determined here by following factors:
(1) the nature of the strategic dialog between Russia, the United States and the accompanying European Union, interests of China, Turkey and Iran;
(2) domestic political situation in the countries of the mentioned regions;
(3) regional conflicts (Georgian-Abkhaz, Georgian-Ossetian and Nagorno Karabakh, Azerbaijani-Iranian ones), other regional conflicts (Kazakh-Uzbek, Uzbek-Tajik, Afghan-Tajik (Uzbek, Kyrgyz) ones) and other discreet conflicts taking shape of the “security expansion” (for instance, Iran's in Transcaucasia and Central Asia, Iran and China's in Central Asia);
(4) capability of local regimes to generate domestic and external conflicts on their own.
The key problem around which the regional competition is taking place is in control over the energy potential of the Caspian and the transit potential of the Black Sea region, which is a part of the bigger Balkan-Black Sea region and the prospect of “the global Balkans from Suez (Kosovo) to Xinjiang” directly including Central Asia and Kazakhstan. In this case, the traditional role of “restraining” Russia from its southern borders is being accomplished by the western line of “containment” through the Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian axis. And, which is the most important, “restraining” Russia is a part of the Euro-Atlantic “containment” of the Arabic world and China, and Eurasia in general.
The West has been suffering economic losses and is short of time in the practical implementation of its new Euro-Atlantic projects around the “Transcaucasian Corridor”: after investing finances into laying alternative pipelines, including the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, by promoting Nabucco, by involving Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan into the “corridor,” the West has failed to provide guaranteed sources for filling the pipes, and even estimated amounts of the resources to be exported have no principal influence upon the energy market. That is why Kazakhstan rich in natural resources becomes a focus of special political, military and humanitarian attention of the West, whose key task is to pull Kazakhstan away from Russia and China. Evidently, the most realistic scenario of such pulling away will be communicational, economic and defense isolation of Kazakhstan in the region. The harder for Kazakhstan will be the results of rearming its anti-aircraft defense by NATO specialists that would put under its control the whole Western China, Russia's territory up to the Arctic Ocean and the Persian Gulf countries and pose a direct threat to all Kazakhstan's neighbors. Opposite to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan has not acknowledged the prospect of turning into a small change in the strategy of “containment.”
Meanwhile, the key generator of political conflicts in the “global Balkans” area are the United States rather than regional forces; namely, the inability of the USA as an irresponsible external force results of whose policy were disintegration of Iraq, activity of Iran, indetermination of Turkey and the drug and terror epidemic from Afghanistan.
2. Transcaucasia
Up to date, the priority practical and tactical goal of the West in region is to implement the Trans-Caspian pipeline that could fuel the pipeline junctions along the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey line as well as load transshipping capacities of Georgian ports.
At the same time, the West has been strategically pushing Iran and Turkey from the region which makes them situational partners of Russia. Nevertheless, Turkey is still exerting gross political impact upon the situation in Azerbaijan using extended social networks as well. In its turn, Iran, parallel to weakening Russia's positions, is increasing its presence in Armenia, turning eventually into a factor guaranteeing security of the republic.
After Mikhail Saakashvili and his team came to power, Georgia handed over its sovereignty to the United States, assuming a role of a full-extent buffer zone from Russia that hampered its capability to increase its regional interests. Withdrawal of the Russian military bases from Batumi and Akhalkalaki as well as a many-year massive anti-Russian campaign instigated by Saakashvili bereaved Moscow of any influence in Georgia. As a result, Russia practically had to fence off the region blocking transport links via a check-point on the Georgian Military Highway and the ports of Poti and Batumi. Within whole that period, the only legal land way from Russia to the region was via Dagestan to Azerbaijan and was used only locally.
The Georgian-Russian confrontation granted a great limit of time to the West and an extensive space for maneuvering in increasing their influence upon the political systems of the countries. At the same time, the energy dialog of the West with Azerbaijan was grounded basically upon prospects of neutralizing Iran, and with Armenia upon a possibility to take the country out of the Russian orbit and unblock the border with Turkey. Neither of the goals can be considered to be fully accomplished, as both Tehran and Ankara did their best not to let Washington's positions strengthen excessively.
Meanwhile, the West gained substantial success particular in engaging the three countries in the region into NATO Individual Partnership Action Plans and for Georgia, in stating clearly the prospect of the country joining the alliance. The USA announced directly it was considering the region as a territory for deploying its air defense. The Azerbaijani territory is already granted for putting into practice interests of the American radiolocation systems and Air Forces. An agreement signed by the US and Azerbaijan on military and technical cooperation foresees US plans to connect the radiolocation station in Lerik and radiotelephone observer station in Agstafa to the Kavkaznet radiolocation system that they intend to establish in South Caucasus. The USA has placed its radars in the territory of Astara and Xizi districts, modernized an air-defense base in Kurdamir, is taking part in talks between Moscow and Baku about future exploitation of the Gabala Radiolocation Station. From time to time, Azerbaijan is trying to calm down Tehran saying it would not take actions against the southern neighbor, however, it is evident that it is impossible to calm down Iran by statements and pledges. Iran continues developing its military cooperation with Russia in improving its air defense, including supply of S-300 air defense systems. Russia has been leveling off the actions in arming Armenia and Azerbaijan. Tehran is pursuing not only the evident “security expansion” to Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, but is carrying out the most active intelligence activity in Transcaucasia, while it does not give up attempts to establish pressure groups within frameworks of religious schools. The regional policy of Iran is in backing the outlines of the Moscow-Yerevan-Tehran axis, maneuvering in the relations with Yerevan and Baku by using the Karabakh factor. In this situation, Armenia acts as a weak sister, which is, in spite of its peculiar ties with Iran and Russia, subjected to the will of the USA.
If US active policy in Transcaucasia brings about tension in the relations of Iran and Azerbaijan, Tehran and Yerevan, on the opposite, are having a pointedly constructive dialog with each other. For the Iranian side, the relations with Armenia are important in terms of securing pressure levers upon Baku and preserving its presence in the border region at all; for Armenia, Iran is becoming an alternative pole in providing its national security.
Russia is actively involved in Armenian-Iranian energy projects. Iran, Russia and Armenia have a number of joint projects — a railway link from Armenia to Iran with participation of the RZhD Russian Railways company, an oil refinery at the Armenia-Iran border with participation of Gazprom, supply of gas from Iran to electricity producing facilities in Armenia owned by Russia, increasing carrying capacity of electricity networks to export electricity from Armenia to Iran. Meanwhile, Tehran is trying to sustain relations with the authorities in Nagorno Karabakh, particularly by conducting several construction projects there.
The Turkish-Armenian and Turkish-Azerbaijani relations are built on the reverse logic. Washington's effort aimed at reconciliation of Yerevan and Ankara and unblocking a section of the state border between the two countries bore no results. The government in Yerevan knows it perfectly well that Ankara is in no way interested in establishing dialog with the Armenians. The prospect will not suit Azerbaijan either, which is the major regional Turkish prop and supplier of hydrocarbons via Turkish transit routes. One can state that the United States has abandoned promoting its reconciliation strategy, moreover, discrepancies between the USA and Turkey around Iran and sovereignization of Kurdistan appeared.
Thus, the policy of the USA and its allies in Transcaucasia met practically consolidated aversion from Russia, Iran and Turkey. Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia will have to choose in the long run their own way depending on outcomes of this struggle of positions: either to form their own strategy at their own risk or become small change of the American strategy of “containment,” responsibility for which would be assumed by neither the United States nor Russia or Iran. The options are not satisfactory.
[B]
(cont'd)