Solid
08-02-2004, 06:36
Reading material-
The Weinberger Doctrine (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1992/MCF.htm)
Dr. Record's argument against the Doctrine (http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj00/sum00/record.htm)
The Weinberger Doctrine is comprised of three 'tests' or criteria which must be fulfilled for the US to go to commit her forces.
1. The objective is critical to US national interests or that of her allies.
2. Overwhelming force will be used.
3. Objectives are clearly defined.
4. Assets committed must be dynamically tailored to the objectives.
5. The action must have the support of the American people.
6. The commitment of US forces must be a last resort.
If the above is taken to be the WP Doctrine, is this doctrine appropriate for deliberating the commitment of US forces in combat?
Several questions occurred to me when reading through both links, posted by TR on another thread (thank you.). I would appreciate discussing them.
1. The WP doctrine requires wars to be legitimate, or supported by the people. What determines popular support? The average citizen is politically ignorant. He is therefore susceptible to propaganda from both the government (we assume pro-war) and media (we assume anti-war). Dr. Record's article suggests that the US population can stomach more deaths than its political masters. Is this the case? He lists actions including LIC, WMD policing, and full war, each with their corresponding appropriate casualty rates as determined by the military and civilian elites and then the normal citizen. The report, however, does not factor in the effects of propaganda. The military and civilian elites, with lower casualty allowances than the third group, seem less likely to be effected by propaganda either for or against the war. The average citizen, however, seems to be most effected by propaganda, especially, given the changing opinion polls on OIF, anti-war propaganda originating from the news-media. While it seems important to fight only legitimate wars, to what extent should legitimacy be a factor, considering how easily influenced it is? Many argue that LIC will be a large factor in warfare in the coming years. Low Intensity Conflict tends to be prolonged, involve slow and less numerous deaths, occurs in areas where US interests are not necessarily immediately clear, and require large amounts of money. These factors seem to be easily propagandised by the media, and the war therefore easily becomes less popular amongst the people and therefore less legitimate. If LIC features heavily in American military activity in the future, is the WP Doctrine appropriate?
2. If ‘winning’ an action is taken as fulfilling all objectives, Dr. Record suggests that the WP Doctrine is vague and therefore inappropriate in its requirement of clearly defined objectives simply because they are so likely to change during the course of the action. I am reminded of the Battle of the Black Sea in Somalia. The primary objective of this operation was the capture of several tier-two individuals. In the initial part of the engagement, these individuals were captured and eventually delivered to Task Force Ranger’s Headquarters and taken into official custody. This mission would therefore be considered successful- it was won. However, during the mission two helicopters were shot down, and their crash-sites had to be secured. War had imposed its own dynamic influence on military objectives. One crash site was secured, the second was secured only after one of the pilots had been taken prisoner and the bodies of several American soldiers brutalised in the streets. The objectives had changed and one of them was not met. Militarily, the mission was a success. The military anticipates loss of life. However, the political masters and the public did not focus on the same objectives that the military focused on- instead, they saw (on the news) American bodies being brutalised and heard of an American being held hostage. They declared the operation a failure, and TF Ranger was withdrawn later in the year. The WP Doctrine does not specify which objectives should be paid attention to. Based on this example, an action was lost not because of military losses, but because the public saw it as lost. This harks back to the question of public support and how easily influenced, and significant, it is. The public are not soldiers- why should they and their non-military political masters be able to determine when an action is completed, won, or lost?
3. Where does Low Intensity Conflict fit in? In Larry Cable’s Conflict of Myths, which analyses the roots of the failures in the Indochina conflict, he mentions that in the Malay insurgency, ‘the principle of minimum force governed all military operations’. When winning hearts and minds, he implies, minimum force is often the more appropriate strategy. This often means relying on limited, infantry oriented assets being deployed with at most Close Air Support. This, in many cases, forfeits US military technological advantages. First, it seems that the WP Doctrine disagrees entirely with the deployment of such limited forces. Secondly, by forfeiting the US technological advantages the potential for US casualties is potentially increased. As the WP Doctrine requires actions to be legitimate and legitimacy seems to correlate inversely to casualty rates, is LIC even viable under the WP Doctrine? One answer to this may be fighting covert wars, but why should the WP Doctrine force a specific kind of war to be fought covertly? Why is it not appropriate for ALL kinds of conflict, especially given the LIC seems to be one of the major forms of future conflict?
4. Finally, the WP Doctrine implies that US forces will be committed to war only once their use as a deterrent fails- War is seen as the final option. This, however, assumes that the state actors which the US is challenging are rational. Increasingly, it appears that either these state actors (Hussein, Milosevic, Kim Il Sung etcetera) are not rational or that they see the US as a paper tiger. Either way, it seems that there are times when US forces must be deployed as a primary option as their deterrent effects will be negligible. In fact, by deploying US forces in this manner in appropriate situations, the deterrence effect of US forces will most likely increase when dealing with other state actors.
JMO, I wanted to get the ball rolling. I hope I haven’t overstepped my bounds.
Thank you,
Solid
The Weinberger Doctrine (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1992/MCF.htm)
Dr. Record's argument against the Doctrine (http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj00/sum00/record.htm)
The Weinberger Doctrine is comprised of three 'tests' or criteria which must be fulfilled for the US to go to commit her forces.
1. The objective is critical to US national interests or that of her allies.
2. Overwhelming force will be used.
3. Objectives are clearly defined.
4. Assets committed must be dynamically tailored to the objectives.
5. The action must have the support of the American people.
6. The commitment of US forces must be a last resort.
If the above is taken to be the WP Doctrine, is this doctrine appropriate for deliberating the commitment of US forces in combat?
Several questions occurred to me when reading through both links, posted by TR on another thread (thank you.). I would appreciate discussing them.
1. The WP doctrine requires wars to be legitimate, or supported by the people. What determines popular support? The average citizen is politically ignorant. He is therefore susceptible to propaganda from both the government (we assume pro-war) and media (we assume anti-war). Dr. Record's article suggests that the US population can stomach more deaths than its political masters. Is this the case? He lists actions including LIC, WMD policing, and full war, each with their corresponding appropriate casualty rates as determined by the military and civilian elites and then the normal citizen. The report, however, does not factor in the effects of propaganda. The military and civilian elites, with lower casualty allowances than the third group, seem less likely to be effected by propaganda either for or against the war. The average citizen, however, seems to be most effected by propaganda, especially, given the changing opinion polls on OIF, anti-war propaganda originating from the news-media. While it seems important to fight only legitimate wars, to what extent should legitimacy be a factor, considering how easily influenced it is? Many argue that LIC will be a large factor in warfare in the coming years. Low Intensity Conflict tends to be prolonged, involve slow and less numerous deaths, occurs in areas where US interests are not necessarily immediately clear, and require large amounts of money. These factors seem to be easily propagandised by the media, and the war therefore easily becomes less popular amongst the people and therefore less legitimate. If LIC features heavily in American military activity in the future, is the WP Doctrine appropriate?
2. If ‘winning’ an action is taken as fulfilling all objectives, Dr. Record suggests that the WP Doctrine is vague and therefore inappropriate in its requirement of clearly defined objectives simply because they are so likely to change during the course of the action. I am reminded of the Battle of the Black Sea in Somalia. The primary objective of this operation was the capture of several tier-two individuals. In the initial part of the engagement, these individuals were captured and eventually delivered to Task Force Ranger’s Headquarters and taken into official custody. This mission would therefore be considered successful- it was won. However, during the mission two helicopters were shot down, and their crash-sites had to be secured. War had imposed its own dynamic influence on military objectives. One crash site was secured, the second was secured only after one of the pilots had been taken prisoner and the bodies of several American soldiers brutalised in the streets. The objectives had changed and one of them was not met. Militarily, the mission was a success. The military anticipates loss of life. However, the political masters and the public did not focus on the same objectives that the military focused on- instead, they saw (on the news) American bodies being brutalised and heard of an American being held hostage. They declared the operation a failure, and TF Ranger was withdrawn later in the year. The WP Doctrine does not specify which objectives should be paid attention to. Based on this example, an action was lost not because of military losses, but because the public saw it as lost. This harks back to the question of public support and how easily influenced, and significant, it is. The public are not soldiers- why should they and their non-military political masters be able to determine when an action is completed, won, or lost?
3. Where does Low Intensity Conflict fit in? In Larry Cable’s Conflict of Myths, which analyses the roots of the failures in the Indochina conflict, he mentions that in the Malay insurgency, ‘the principle of minimum force governed all military operations’. When winning hearts and minds, he implies, minimum force is often the more appropriate strategy. This often means relying on limited, infantry oriented assets being deployed with at most Close Air Support. This, in many cases, forfeits US military technological advantages. First, it seems that the WP Doctrine disagrees entirely with the deployment of such limited forces. Secondly, by forfeiting the US technological advantages the potential for US casualties is potentially increased. As the WP Doctrine requires actions to be legitimate and legitimacy seems to correlate inversely to casualty rates, is LIC even viable under the WP Doctrine? One answer to this may be fighting covert wars, but why should the WP Doctrine force a specific kind of war to be fought covertly? Why is it not appropriate for ALL kinds of conflict, especially given the LIC seems to be one of the major forms of future conflict?
4. Finally, the WP Doctrine implies that US forces will be committed to war only once their use as a deterrent fails- War is seen as the final option. This, however, assumes that the state actors which the US is challenging are rational. Increasingly, it appears that either these state actors (Hussein, Milosevic, Kim Il Sung etcetera) are not rational or that they see the US as a paper tiger. Either way, it seems that there are times when US forces must be deployed as a primary option as their deterrent effects will be negligible. In fact, by deploying US forces in this manner in appropriate situations, the deterrence effect of US forces will most likely increase when dealing with other state actors.
JMO, I wanted to get the ball rolling. I hope I haven’t overstepped my bounds.
Thank you,
Solid