View Full Version : The Powell Doctrine and OIF
If the Powell Doctrine is taken as-
expressing that military action should be used only as a last resort and only if there is a clear risk to national security by the intended target; the force, when used, should be overwhelming and disproportionate to the force used by the enemy; there must be strong support for the campaign by the general public; and there must be a clear exit strategy from the conflict in which the military is engaged,
to what extent was the Powell Doctrine employed in OIF?
Is the Powell Doctrine purely Clausewitzian?
Thank you,
Solid
The Reaper
07-31-2004, 08:11
The "Powell Doctrine" is largely lifted from the "Weinberger Doctrine" which was no doubt lifted from someone else prior to my institutional memory.
TR
Adam White
07-31-2004, 08:35
I've always found the Powell doctrine and mentality earily similar to what I know of McLellan's "doctrine" in the Civil War (War of Northern Aggression, for The Reaper's sake ;) ).
Esentially it can only be lauded if there was no inherent risk to inaction - if we held all the cards. We DID hold all the cards in 1991 - Hussein presented no direct threat to our homeland, and time was completely on OUR side. From the perspective of decreasing the threat of global Isamic Terrorism, however, the Powell doctrine becomes quite a crutch, as did McLellans mentality in fighting the Confederates.
Th Powell doctrined is no doubt favored by politicians who are more worried about a bloody nose on their reelection campaign then the security of the nation.
One could argue that a Powell doctrine mentality existed in France and England when they were unable or unwilling to call Hitler's bluffs in the 1930s - or among most of the League of Nations when Japan's attack on Manchuria was ignored. Sometimes bold is better.
- Just my humble (maybe not so humble) opinion.
NousDefionsDoc
07-31-2004, 10:19
Originally posted by Solid
If the Powell Doctrine is taken as-
expressing that military action should be used only as a last resort and only if there is a clear risk to national security by the intended target; the force, when used, should be overwhelming and disproportionate to the force used by the enemy; there must be strong support for the campaign by the general public; and there must be a clear exit strategy from the conflict in which the military is engaged,
to what extent was the Powell Doctrine employed in OIF?
Is the Powell Doctrine purely Clausewitzian?
Thank you,
Solid
Not purely and very early. Clausewitz was in the process of revising his works when he died. It looks like the major revision was going to be the inclusion of "limited objective warfare" to which he alludes in several places. The "clear risk to national security" is not Clauswitz, not does he call for an exit strategy. He assumes victory in that the political objectives will be met.
Interesting you should ask. This is one of the areas that I think he is most misunderstood - the call for total war. Its a shame he died before he could clarify.
NDD- My interpretation of the matter is that he did not call for total war, but for war with sufficient force to overwhelm the enemy (I think it's the fourth or fifth section of chapter one). There, I think, the Powell Doctrine and Clausewitz have similar views. Also, they both view war as a secondary political option, a continuation of policy by other means (although that is a misquote if properly translated).
One of my major questions regarding OIF is if the CINC attempted to limit the number of coalition assets deployed, or if they tried to maximise the number (use ever capable soldier, for example). I read in many analyses that the coalition employed too few assets, but never that limiting the number of soldiers deployed was an objective.
Adam- I think that the Powell doctrine as defined above is vague enough in its criteria to be used as a justification for war, or as a crutch. Terrorism, for example, could be seen as a direct threat to national security, or, as during the Clinton years, not.
Interestingly, there seems to be some circularity in this conversation. The concept of maximum use of force to win dictated by Clausewitz is often portrayed as one of the central reasons for the pointless slaughter of WW1- military machine societies building up armies in anticipation of war. The carnage of WW1 may have influenced the British and certainly influenced the French in their choice of a strategy of appeasement in WW2, which could be seen as an implementation of a prototypical Powell Doctrine. In this case, Clausewitzian and [umm] Powellian theories are apparently diametrically opposed.
I'm interested in determining the compatability of 'the Powell Doctrine', or, if it is, Clausewitzian strategy in general, and attempts to combat insurgency and nation build. I'd like to use OIF as an example, but first I need to determine the extent to which the Powell Doctrine and/or Clausewitzian strategies were employed.
Solid
NousDefionsDoc
07-31-2004, 13:32
One thing to keep in mind is that Iraq is not a war, it is an operation. Any "limiting" of assets would like be with an eye on future operations in GWOT. POTUS has made it very plain that this is a long term situation. Therefore, why would any one committ all or even most assets to one operation? In addition, the assets were obviously enough to achieve the principle political objective, that of removing SH from pwoer and ensuring he didn't hand over to one of his Devil children.
What version of On War are you reading?
Peter Paret's Princeton version. I don't have it out here with me, though, so this is all off the top of my head.
What differentiates an operation from a war?
NousDefionsDoc
07-31-2004, 15:45
That's very elemental - look it up.:D
Originally posted by Solid
Peter Paret's Princeton version. I don't have it out here with me, though, so this is all off the top of my head.
What differentiates an operation from a war?
"War therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will."
A strategic operation/strategy is the use of combats to attain the political objective.
A tactical operation/tactics is how the combat is conducted.
To further differentiate:
Things like logistical support and training of troops are part of the war, if done when it has already started, but are according to Clausewitz not part of strategy nor tactics.
But why is it Operation Iraqi Freedom?
I'm thinking this over to ensure a good response, no point in giving in so early.
Solid
Originally posted by Solid
But why is it Operation Iraqi Freedom?
I'm thinking this over to ensure a good response, no point in giving in so early.
Solid
The war's political objective as derived from its name:
To free the world of terror.
The policy set is for anybody who is not with us, to be against.
Saddam Hussein's regime had links to terror groups, terrorist camps within Iraq's borders, was a threat by spread of WMDs to terrorist groups and oppressed his own people. He was therefore somebody who either had to be convinced to change his mind and move in the right direction or he had to be eliminated for the attainment of the political object of the war.
Just off the top of my hat... hope I'm right.
If you didn't get it, although the operation is part of the war, it does not span the entire war.
An operation may or may not decide the conclusion of the war, depending on which function it had in reaching the war's objective.
brownapple
07-31-2004, 19:55
The Powell Doctrine does not take logistical realities into account either. The idea of having employed every available soldier in OIF is unrealistic, since the lines of supply which were available for the attacking forces simply wouldn't allow for the logistical support of every available soldier.
Consider Thermopolye. The Persians had all the parts for the Powell Doctrine (from their viewpoint).
Greenhat-
I think that that is the key. The Persians THOUGHT that they had deployed enough forces to win easily. Similarly, although the results were different, we THOUGHT we had deployed sufficient forces to achieve our objectives. As long as the side is deploying what it sees as the correct number of assets to achieve its objectives, I think the Powell doctrine, and Clausewitz, for that matter, hold. Limitations of supply, although not discussed in the Powell doctrine and only alluded to (I believe?) in On War, are a factor that would limit the number of troops fielded. But, nevertheless, as long as the commander was confident that he had enough soldiers, the doctrine and theory apply.
JMO,
Solid
Originally posted by Solid
If the Powell Doctrine...the force, when used, should be overwhelming and disproportionate to the force used by the enemy;...
[...]
...we THOUGHT we had deployed sufficient forces to achieve our objectives. As long as the side is deploying what it sees as the correct number of assets to achieve its objectives, I think the Powell doctrine, and Clausewitz, for that matter, hold.
Excuse me for being a bit slow here, but don't you always want to deploy a sufficient number of troops? If you think what you're doing is not enough, and keep doing it... DARWIN!
Clausewitz, On War; there is a chapter called Superiority of Numbers, book three, chapter 8. You might want to check it out. It, together with the Strategic Reserve chapter, basically states his thoughts about overwhelming troop allocation, reserve of them in strategy and tactics, number counting theory to predict war, etc.
I think you need more than just the numbers, at least regarding Clausewitz. I haven't read anything about Powell and Weinberger.
Just my uneducated mind, hope that helps.
If you want to know the source of something, OIF planning, why do you go through all the doctrines first? Wouldn't it be wiser to try to find out the patterns of OIF and then see what fits?
No offense, just a thought.
The Reaper
08-01-2004, 07:25
Background:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1992/MCF.htm
An interesting perspective opposing Weinberger-Powell, possibly worthy of another thread:
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj00/sum00/record.htm
TR