Boyd on AQ

[Jimbo]

http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/05/journal_boyd_on.html



08.05.2004



BOYD ON AL QAEDA'S GRAND STRATEGY



Col. John Boyd (he died in 1997) is considered one of America's best military thinkers. His thinking dramatically influenced the plan of attack in the first gulf war. Boyd's thinking also serves as a good basis for a deeper understanding 4GW (fourth generation warfare).



Grand strategy, according to Boyd, is a quest to isolate your enemy's (a nation-state or a global terrorist network) thinking processes from connections to the external/reference environment. This process of isolation is essentially the imposition of insanity on a group. To wit: any organism that operates without reference to external stimuli (the real world), falls into a destructive cycle of false internal dialogues. These corrupt internal dialogues eventually cause dissolution and defeat.



The dynamic of Boyd's grand strategy is to isolate your enemy across three essential vectors (physical, mental, and moral), while at the same time improving your connectivity across those same vectors. Here's more detail:



• Physical isolation is accomplished by severing communications both to the outside world (ie. allies) and internal audiences (ie. between branches of command and between the command organization and its supporters).



• Mental isolation is done through the introduction of ambiguous information, novel situations, and by operating at a tempo an enemy cannot keep up with. A lack of solid information impedes decision making.



• Moral isolation is achieved when an enemy improves its well being at the expense of others (allies) or violates rules of behavior they profess to uphold (standards of conduct). Moral rules are a very important reference point in times of uncertainty. When these are violated, it is very hard to recover.



Our progress so far

When we evaluate our progress in the war on terrorism based on Boyd's measures of isolation, the following is seen:



• Physical isolation. America has been physically isolated from many of its allies due to its rush to war in Iraq. It also has demonstated (via the slow process by which news of Abu Ghraib reached the President and Congress) that internal communications have been disrupted. The destruction of al Qaeda's training camps and visible communications systems have resulted in a degree of isolation. However, the network-based organizational structure of al Qaeda and its ability to manipulate the media to send messages to supporters has mitigated this effort.



• Mental isolation. The rapid emergence of new threats (al Sadr, al Zarqawi, and Fallujah) and the myriad of geographically dispersed attacks that require response (from Spain to Saudi Arabia -- from Basra to Mosel) have served to isolate the US on the mental plane. It is also very difficult, due to ambiguity of information, to determine who the enemy is (this is true in Iraq and across the world from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia). The bulk of the early effort to continuously attack al Qaeda has subsided as the US concentrates on Iraq -- our early gains have been squandered.



• Moral isolation. The excesses at the Abu Ghraib prison demonstrate a classic violation of moral codes of conduct. The evidence indicates that the US intentionally (in that there was a climate of urgency that permitted it) violated these rules due to desire to gain information needed to fight guerrilla groups in Iraq. Another example of moral isolation is America's insistance on the right to self-defense, at the expense of the rest of the world. There has not been any evidence that al Qaeda sponsored operations have drastically violated any internal moral codes. However, the proliferation of groups associated with al Qaeda have resulted in attacks (for example: attacks on Shiites in Pakistan and Iraq that are against al Qaeda policy) may serve to isolate al Qaeda if their actions are adopted by the main organization.



A vision statement for this conflict

From this analysis it is clear that the US is, as the result of this war, more isolated than our enemy. However, Boyd suggests that the best corrective action is for the US to articulate a grand unifying vision for this war. A "with us or against us" approach and unilateral military action is not productive (it drives isolation). A better vision statement (we should have a contest for this):



The United States will commit all of the resources at its disposal to help nations everywhere preserve those values that we all hold as vital to our future success."

[The Reaper]

Well, John Kerry says he plans to do all of that.

Build a coalition, less isolationism, work more closely with our allies, etc.

You think Boyd was a Kerry man?

TR

[Jimbo]

Kerry would build a coalition just to say that everyone got along. Boyd would build a coalition for a specific purpose.

[NousDefionsDoc]

If we have been isolated from many of our allies over one operation, they weren't really our allies to begin with. Who are we isolated from? France? Not much of a contributer IMO and largely irrelevant on the world stage. Germany? Spain will pay a price for what they did as will many others.

While I agree completely with the theory, I think we use the word "allies" a little loosely. Maybe its time to dump some of the WWII and WWIII allies for some new friends. Perhaps we should support Russia more in their fight against the Chechnyan AWGs and worry less about what France has to say, for example.

The renewed anti-semitism and resistance to our support for Israel in Europe is very troubling to me.

[Jimbo]

"The only truth is what you observe at any given point in time," Tucker said. "And when what you are observing changes, that's the new truth."

Same with allies.

The above quote was taken from 'Zen and the Art of Counterinsurgency' : http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/20040729-105204-1385r.htm

I've got a Zen-Boyd thing going. Its cool.

[Airbornelawyer]

Even as far as the relationship has sunk in the past decade plus (well before GWB's election), France is far more of an ally than Russia.

As for the sentence that started this - "America has been physically isolated from many of its allies due to its rush to war in Iraq" - whoever writes that blog is not really worth of my time. The "rush to war" is a tried trope. And to the extent there is isolation, it is just as much the choice of those allies to isolate themselves from us. These formulations have little to do with rationally addressing geopolitical realities, and more to do with finding some way to shift blame back on us. We sought international support, making our greatest tactical error in the process.* The French and German governments chose the company of Russia, a semi-dictatorship, and China, an actual dictoatorship, over that of the world's leading democracies. They chose to isolate themselves from us, not the other way around. And even if we are politically isolated from "many of [our] allies," how exactly are we physically isolated?

In Iraq, we have the support of a majority of the G-7, the world's leading advanced economies, a majority of our formal allies (NATO, ANZUS, major non-NATO allies), a majority of the world's advanced economies, and even, at one point, a majority of European countries. Even many countries outwardly critical, like various Arab states, provided material support.

In any event, having allies is not an end unto itself. Had we abandoned what we felt was necessary, we probably could have gotten lots more allies and done absolutely nothing. The Desert Storm coalition was nice and broad, but to get all those Arab countries on board we had to promise a return to the status quo ante - no overthrowing Saddam and no upsetting the dictatorial/monarchic apple cart.

_____
* The tactical error was that in going to the UN, we rested the main (but not the entire) case for regime change on Iraqi violations of UN resolutions related to WMDs. The WMD threat was just one component of the casus belli, and actual stockpiles of weapons systems were just one component of the WMD threat (and, frankly, not the most important).

[Jimbo]

Originally posted by Airbornelawyer
whoever writes that blog is not really worth of my time.

Some of what he says, especially about the social network structure of terrorist cells, is just wrong. However, he does get some other things right. And he provokes a little thought. And I must say that gettign a lunk like me to think about things is pretty tough.

One of the things that piqued my interest was this from his 'About me' page:Mission Commander in the USAF. John served as a pilot in USAF special operations where he worked on counter-terrorist operations. His unit provided air support for Delta and Seal Team 6. John participated in operations on four continents as both a pilot and a mission planner. He also managed the units daily operations and scheduling when not flying or planning missions. Numerous medals for exemplary service.

[NousDefionsDoc]

Why do you say France is more of an ally than Russia in this context?

[Airbornelawyer]

Originally posted by NousDefionsDoc
Why do you say France is more of an ally than Russia in this context? "More of an ally" implies Russia is an ally. Russia is not an ally of the United States, as Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov noted in October 2003.

But "in this context"? Russia has provided some intelligence cooperation and allowed overflight rights to coalition aircraft travelling to bases in Central Asia. Russia provided some humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. Russia has taken no part in military operations in the GWOT. To the extent Russia shows any interest in terrorism, it is to denounce Western countries for not branding the entire Chechen opposition as Islamist terrorists. See, for instance, Defense Minister Ivanov's remarks at the International Institute for Strategic Studies on July 13, 2004.

As for France, French opposition to the war in Iraq went well beyond a difference of strategic approach. But in the GWOT, France has made the third largest contribution after the US and the UK.
As of July 2004, 33,000 French troops are deployed overseas. Many of these are stationed in French overseas territories, but approximately 15,000 are on combat or peacekeeping missions. These numbers pale in comparison to the US, as allied participation has in pretty much every conflict since 1945, but France is far from alone in this category. For comparison, as of July 28 2004, the Netherlands had 2,063 troops deployed overseas. As of June 28, 8,730 Italians were deployed abroad. As of July 30, Germany had 7,150 troops abroad. As of June 8, approximately 2,000 Australian Defence Force personnel were deployed abroad.
On June 1, 2004, Rear Adm. Jean-Pierre Teule took over command of Task Force 150 from Royal Navy Rear Adm. Tony Rix. Task Force 150 was previously responsible for maritime interdiction operations in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa region, but now with its merger with TF 151, it is responsible for maritime interdiction operations throughout the Indian Ocean crisis region - the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Horn of Africa, Somalia Basin, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman and Straits of Hormuz. As of June 2004, TF-150 had 10 frigates - 2 French, 2 US and 1 each from the UK, Germany, Italy, Spain, New Zealand and Pakistan.
The first part of OEF was the overthrow of the Taliban regime and the targeting of al-Qaida. Again, the US took the lead. Canada and the UK each provided a combat battalion. There were some French ground forces, but not on combat operations. France deployed a carrier battle group and land-based aviation. Super Etendards, Mirage IVs and Mirage 2000s flew hundreds of combat missions, including flying CAS during Operation Anaconda.
Since then, France has participated in ISAF in Kabul primarily with a battalion-sized battle group, and on August 11, 2004, Lt. Gen. Jean-Louis Py will take command of ISAF.
Separately, France and the US are running the training program for the Afghan National Army.
CJTF-HOA, responsible for counterterrorist and antiterrorist activities in the Horn of Africa region, is headquartered at a French base in Djibouti. French Foreign Legionnaires from the Djibouti-based 13e DBLE are working with US Marines and US Army personnel, as well as other coalition forces.
And, while official French armed forces policy is, like in the UK, "ne répondre jamais Ã_ des questions sur les forces spéciales" ("to never answer questions on special forces."), I will note for their benefit that 200-300 French special operations forces are currently deployed in Afghanistan under the command of the US-led CJSOTF.
There is more to say on the question of France's level of cooperation but I don't have time to get into it now. Suffice to say, there is no comparison between France and Russia.

[NousDefionsDoc]

Maybe potential ally would have been a better choice of words.

AL, to me, quoting numbers of French soldiers deployed is a waste of time. You can have 10,000 of them guarding a power station in Afghanistan and they will not contribute as much to the GWOT as the 100 SF soldiers that went in and lazed for the AF.

"Participated" is a relative term. Cheerleaders can be said to have "participated" in a victory, but we all know its the team on the field and usually just a few of those that really wins the game.

I don't consider the FFL as French. They are expendable to the French government and always have been. I doubt French policy makers count their casualties as "real".

Maybe the answer isn't the Russians, but I'm pretty sure the answer isn't the French either. With their muslim population, they risk an uprising on French soil if they actually participate in any material form.

I'm surprised at you throwing numbers to justify them, I didn't know you are a McNamara fan.:munchin

[Airbornelawyer]

On numbers and Russia vs. France. You want a number? How about "0"? That would be the number of Russian soldiers currently participating in Operation Enduring Freedom.

But drop every bullet-point except the last one. The task force from COS, whose missions are SR and DA along the Afghan-Pak border, numbers about 200-300. If you want to just count special operators, then France is currently the second-largest member of the OEF coalition after the US. But that clearly makes no sense as a measure of allies.

And coalition SOF lazed for the Armee de l'air as well as the USAF in Operation Anaconda.

BTW, exactly how many US forces are guarding power stations and the like in Iraq and Afghanistan (and New York for that matter)? Shall we discount them from the list of US forces and if they're killed, tell their families their deaths did "not contribute as much to the GWOT"?

You are also completely wrong about the Legion. It is an integrated part of the French Army, the majority of its soldiers are French (even if officially carried as Belgian, Swiss or Canadian), and its training and doctrine come out of French manuals and French experience. The French armed forces are all-volunteer now. Sending Legionnaires off to foreign lands while French conscripts are undeployable is a thing of the past. For example, the French combined arms battle group in Afghanistan is an integrated unit from elements of the 4ème Régiment de chasseurs, a light armored cavalry unit, the 13ème Bataillon de chasseurs alpins, a mountain infantry unit, and the 2ème Régiment étranger du génie, a Legion engineer unit. Similarly, the French deployments to Haiti and Côte d’Ivoire involved mostly "regular" units, with some Legion support.

And how is it dispositive what politicians think anyway?

Again, you picked Russia over France, not me. As I have pointed out repeatedly on the question of allies, our core allies are the other members of the Anglosphere - the UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand - with the first two being more reliable than the latter two, with whom we share a common heritage. After that, it is the Western or Westernized capitalist democracies whose interests converge with the US far more than they diverge - countries like Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Israel and Japan (this is not an exhaustive list). Beyond that you begin to enter the realm of countries who are at best notional allies. And the vicissitudes of national politics can change who is this year's reliable ally. Spain was "reliable" last year, not so much this year. New Zealand has been pretty much on the outs with the US since the mid-1980s, but a change of government away from the Labour coalition would bring about a sea change in policy. The same might be said for Germany if the CDU/CSU took over, but anti-American sentiment in Germany is much more deeply rooted than many people realize.

[NousDefionsDoc]

Ok, our old "allies" aren't with us except for the UK and Australia and the UK likely will not be after its all said and done and Blair's gone. Who's left?

The way I see it, these old alliances don't make much sense for a new war. The French may be helping a little in 'Stan, but I think we've shown they can't be depended on. i don't have a problem with them not sending troops to Iraq if they don't want, but they shouldn't have tried to block the NATO trainers. They are not not supporting, they are actively working against. That's not an ally.

[Airbornelawyer]

Originally posted by NousDefionsDoc
Ok, our old "allies" aren't with us except for the UK and Australia and the UK likely will not be after its all said and done and Blair's gone. Who's left?

The way I see it, these old alliances don't make much sense for a new war. The French may be helping a little in 'Stan, but I think we've shown they can't be depended on. i don't have a problem with them not sending troops to Iraq if they don't want, but they shouldn't have tried to block the NATO trainers. They are not not supporting, they are actively working against. That's not an ally. I actually disagree about the UK and Blair. Remember, Blair is Labour (albeit "New Labour"). If the Tories were to take power... there are quite a few Tory wets who are old school conservatives (i.e., aristocratic and patrician) who dislike us crass loutish American boobs, but most Tories remember that they are the party of Churchill and Thatcher.

I would recommend rechecking what was actually at issue in the debate over NATO's role in Iraq.

As for "old" or "new" alliances, as a general rule we should not oversentimentalize alliances. The "coalition of the willing" had some 60+ members, but less than a half-dozen were willing to commit troops for the ground combat phase, and just under 40 joined the occupation. Of these, more than half joined solely for peacekeeping/reconstruction tasks, and eschewed a combat role other than in self-defense.

In Afghanistan, both ISAF and the CJTF have a lot of countries represented, but maybe a dozen have played a combat role. And only Canada, Britain, Italy and Romania have deployed conventional ground combat forces. The others have been SOF and close air support.

And no matter how many countries contribute to a multinational operation, the US will almost invariably shoulder the greatest share of the burden. This isn't just the case in "unpopular" wars like Iraq and it isn't even solely the result of so many countries' gutting of their military capabilities after the Cold War. It was the case in Korea and Desert Storm, both of which had UN mandates, strong US diplomacy, and broad international support (all those things the lack of which Kerry claims is at issue in Iraq).

I of course don't have a real solution. At heart I am an American pseudo-imperialist. I think we should have a grand strategy to gradually absorb the world. :D The Canadian PM has talked somewhat of supplanting the UN structure with a somewhat more permanent version of the "coalition of the willing" - a semiformal grouping of the major advanced capitalist democracies. But he wants to invite a few non-advanced capitalist democracies who are otherwise "major" players like India, Brazil and Russia to the table, which will simply gut any possibility of effectiveness.
______

BTW, you do realize that for many the United States is not always a dependable ally too?

The UK, France, Russia and their allies had stood up to the Central Powers for 3 years, and some 7 million soldiers had already been killed by the time the US decided to go "Over There" in 1917.

In 1939, as the totalitarian threat reached the tipping point, we again decided that the affairs of Europeans were not our concern, leaving the UK and France alone to face Hitler. In July 1940, the US recognized the Vichy government. On December 20, 1940, FDR dispatched Admiral Leahy as Ambassador to Vichy France. In his instructions, he told Leahy: "I have noticed with sympathetic interest the efforts of France to maintain its authority in its North African possessions and to improve their economic status. In your discussions you may say that your Government is prepared to assist in this regard in any appropriate way." Other than Free French and other small forces from occupied countries (Norwegians, Poles, Czechs, Belgians, etc.), the UK was left to face Germany alone as 1940 turned into 1941. It was not until November 8, 1942, that US relations with Vichy were terminated, and that was by Pierre Laval's action, not that of the US.

On April 25, 1943, after the Polish Government-in-exile demanded an International Red Cross investigation of the Katyn Forest massacre, the USSR severed relations. The US and UK continued to nominally recognize the GIE, and allowed it to raise some 200,000 soldiers to fight and die from Monte Cassino to Arnhem, but at diplomatic conferences they shunned the Poles and acquiesced to Soviet plans. On July 6, 1945, the sham was ended and the US and UK withdrew their recognition. Poland would remain a Soviet vassal until 1989.

In 1954, the US refused to aid the beleaguered French forces at Dienbienphu.

Speaking of "working against," in 1956, the US did not merely refuse to support the UK, France and Israel, but actively worked with the Soviets, helping Nasser secure the benefits of his nationalization of the Suez Canal.

Also in 1956, the Hungarians rose up against the Communists. Soviet troops went in to suppress the uprising. Eisenhower said "I feel with the Hungarian people." John Foster Dulles said "To all those suffering under communist slavery, let us say you can count on us." What did we do? Well, Time did make the Freedom Fighter the Man of the Year for 1956.

In April 1975, the US abandoned its allies in South Vietnam. Also in 1975, Iran and the US abandoned Iraq's Kurds, whose uprising we had been supporting.

In February 1984, the US withdrew from Lebanon, leaving French and Italian troops behind. And to this day, US remembrances of of Beirut almost invariably fail to mention that the there were two simultaneous truck bombings that October 1983 morning. One took the lives of 241 American Marines, sailors and soldiers; the other took the lives of 58 French paratroopers.

In early 1991, we encouraged Iraqis to rise up against Saddam, hoping for a military coup that would get rid of the dictator but keep the dictatorship as a buffer against Iran. Taking us at our word, the Kurds in the north and Shi'ites in the south began a popular uprising. Fear of instability and Saudi opposition to Arab Shi'ite self-determination led us to abandon the rebels to Saddam's thugs.

In 1992, the US and Germany pushed forward recognition of the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the ensuing civil war, we gradually went from humanitarian aid to enforcing a no-fly zone to limited attacks on Serb positions, before finally deploying IFOR. Meanwhile, Britain, France and Canada had led an ineffective UN peacekeeping force that might have been more effective with a strong US presence (IFOR/SFOR's successes lend some credibility to this possibility).

In 1994, we abandoned Somalia, leaving the country and the UN force we had been part of to their fate, and rendering the sacrifice of our warriors for nought.

There is obviously more to many of these events than this summary. Its purpose is to point out that there are different perspectives on a number of events, even forgetting those of the rabid anti-Americans, anti-Westerners or anti-capitalists.

[NousDefionsDoc]

Yeah, I know we've left some people in a lurch at times. But we're always there for the really big ones that involve world domination. And I think this is one of those times.

I'm with you on Pax Americana. I really don't give a rat's ass if we have many allies or not. Shame to have to invade a country just because we need to stage or over fly their AO though.:D

[Airbornelawyer]

Originally posted by NousDefionsDoc
Yeah, I know we've left some people in a lurch at times. But we're always there for the really big ones that involve world domination. And I think this is one of those times.

I'm with you on Pax Americana. I really don't give a rat's ass if we have many allies or not. Shame to have to invade a country just because we need to stage or over fly their AO though.:D As far as I can recall, Austria was the only relevant country that prevented overflight during the Iraq war, invoking the neutrality provisions of its constitution. Belgium tried briefly, thinking it was being a good little lapdog of the axis of weasel, but found itself isolated as both France and Germany approved overflight and ground transport. The Irish opposition tried to invoke the neutrality card, but the Taoiseach pointed out that if Ireland affirmatively denied the US use of Shannon, that would be a violation of its neutrality.

And all those Arab countries whose support we supposedly failed to get - Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia most importantly - didn't seem to do much to hinder us.

Only Turkey presented a real obstacle, one which may have cost us lives. Saudi Arabia was a thorn over use of bases, but we had already factored in that contingency, so it was not an obstacle.

I do wonder what the quid pro quo was, though, of Russia allowing us to maintain a more or less permanent presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

[magician]

Fucking excellent thread.

Thanks, guys, for being smart motherfuckers.

[NousDefionsDoc]

Watch him AL, he's up to something when he starts that disarming "aw shucks" stuff. Desafiamos warned me about that. :munchin

[magician]

Sheesh.

That is what I get for trying to be "nice" and "sincere."

Ok, dickhead. Thanks for being a large individual. It helps that I do not have to stoop to grab your nutsack.

Is that better?

:)

[NousDefionsDoc]

LOL - Aaah, balance restored.:D

[Airbornelawyer]

Originally posted by NousDefionsDoc
I don't consider the FFL as French. They are expendable to the French government and always have been. I doubt French policy makers count their casualties as "real".Originally posted by Airbornelawyer
You are also completely wrong about the Legion. It is an integrated part of the French Army... . The French armed forces are all-volunteer now. Sending Legionnaires off to foreign lands while French conscripts are undeployable is a thing of the past. Originally posted by Airbornelawyer
In Afghanistan, both ISAF and the CJTF have a lot of countries represented, but maybe a dozen have played a combat role. And only Canada, Britain, Italy and Romania have deployed conventional ground combat forces. The others have been SOF and close air support.I was thinking about the countries that sent SOF to the CJSOTF, especially TF K-Bar (UK, Denmark, Norway, Australia, New Zealand, Germany, Poland), as well as the general attitude toward soldiers generally, and SOF in particular, among policy makers, and it occurred to me that there is another way of looking at this. One the main reasons why many French opposed ending conscription in the 1990s (shared by opponents to ending the draft in the US), was the de-linking of the soldier from the people, which they saw as a return to the mercenary armies of the ancien regime. France under Napoleon created the modern (until recently) concept of the citizen army. As the chorus of La Marseillaise says:

Aux armes citoyens!
Formez vos bataillons,
Marchons, marchons!
Qu'un sang impur
breuve nos sillons.

To arms, citizens!
Form up your battalions
Let us march, Let us march!
That their impure blood
Should water our fields.

Nowadays, the situation may be not that the Legion is just like the rest of the French army, but that the rest of the French army is treated like the Legion - "expendable" as you noted, a tool of the policy makers.

You often see the same attitude here. There was a preference for volunteer regiments over state militias in the Mexican War and the Spanish-American War. And the Marine Corps was used as America's Legion in interventions all over the world. Smedley Butler, the most highly decorated American fighting man of all time, turned raging leftist because he perceived the Corps being turned into an adjunct of American corporations.

Remember then-UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright's remark to then CJCS GEN Colin Powell when he resisted sending US troops to the former Yugoslavia? "What’s the point of having this superb military that you’re always talking about if we can't use it?" In a recent Washington Post op-ed (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A56520-2004Jul16?language=printer), liberal columnist Michael Kinsley, who never served in the military, stated "A volunteer army could become a mercenary force operating at the president's whim." (to be fair, he also states that "a draft army, always at the ready, also encourages imperial whimsy."). And then there's Stan Goff, who we know did serve in the military and who wants to be the Smedley Butler of today, who wrote a recent article (http://rds.yahoo.com/S=2766679/K=army+mercenary+draft/v=2/SID=e/TID=E144_71/l=WS1/R=31/H=0/SHE=0/*-http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/040604_mercs.html) called: The Mercenary Variable - Outsourced Combat in Iraq. What Really Happened in Fallujah. Will Mercenaries Help Uncle Sam Beat a Draft?.

In a way, our search for allies, our emphasis on SOF, and our use of PMCs are all part of the same paradigm: a way to get more military manpower without domestic political accountability.

Germany sent the professionals of the KSK* into combat in Afghanistan, but its conscripts aren't going anywhere but on peacekeeping missions any time soon (and then only if they volunteer). And it's nice to talk about "New Europe" vs. "Old Europe," and a "coalition of the willing," but to a great extent, the Romanians, Bulgarians, Mongolians, Hondurans, Tongans and many others are in Iraq and Afghanistan less because of their commitment to the war against militant Islamist terrorists and more out of a desire to get in the US' good graces. Most are not as directly affected by this particular terrorist threat, and as we saw with Spain, when they do perceive a domestic cost, they bail out.


__________
* The Bundeswehr refers to the KSK operator as der stille Profi, "the quiet pro"; but Profi is also slang for prostitute.