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Thinking About the Unthinkable: A U.S.-Iranian Deal
March 1, 2010
Related Special Topic Pages
The Iranian Nuclear Game
U.S.-Iran Negotiations
Iraq, Iran and the Shia
By George Friedman
The United States apparently has reached the point where it must either accept that Iran will develop nuclear weapons at some point if it wishes, or take military action to prevent this. There is a third strategy, however: Washington can seek to redefine the Iranian question.
As we have no idea what leaders on either side are thinking, exploring this represents an exercise in geopolitical theory. Let’s begin with the two apparent stark choices.
Diplomacy vs. the Military Option
The diplomatic approach consists of creating a broad coalition prepared to impose what have been called crippling sanctions on Iran. Effective sanctions must be so painful that they compel the target to change its behavior. In Tehran’s case, this could only consist of blocking Iran’s imports of gasoline. Iran imports 35 percent of the gasoline it consumes. It is not clear that a gasoline embargo would be crippling, but it is the only embargo that might work. All other forms of sanctions against Iran would be mere gestures designed to give the impression that something is being done.
The Chinese will not participate in any gasoline embargo. Beijing gets 11 percent of its oil from Iran, and it has made it clear it will continue to deliver gasoline to Iran. Moscow’s position is that Russia might consider sanctions down the road, but it hasn’t specified when, and it hasn’t specified what. The Russians are more than content seeing the U.S. bogged down in the Middle East and so are not inclined to solve American problems in the region. With the Chinese and Russians unlikely to embargo gasoline, these sanctions won’t create significant pain for Iran. Since all other sanctions are gestures, the diplomatic approach is therefore unlikely to work.
The military option has its own risks. First, its success depends on the quality of intelligence on Iran’s nuclear facilities and on the degree of hardening of those targets. Second, it requires successful air attacks. Third, it requires battle damage assessments that tell the attacker whether the strike succeeded. Fourth, it requires follow-on raids to destroy facilities that remain functional. And fifth, attacks must do more than simply set back Iran’s program a few months or even years: If the risk of a nuclear Iran is great enough to justify the risks of war, the outcome must be decisive.
Each point in this process is a potential failure point. Given the multiplicity of these points — which includes others not mentioned — failure may not be an option, but it is certainly possible.
But even if the attacks succeed, the question of what would happen the day after the attacks remains. Iran has its own counters. It has a superbly effective terrorist organization, Hezbollah, at its disposal. It has sufficient influence in Iraq to destabilize that country and force the United States to keep forces in Iraq badly needed elsewhere. And it has the ability to use mines and missiles to attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf shipping lanes for some period — driving global oil prices through the roof while the global economy is struggling to stabilize itself. Iran’s position on its nuclear program is rooted in the awareness that while it might not have assured options in the event of a military strike, it has counters that create complex and unacceptable risks. Iran therefore does not believe the United States will strike or permit Israel to strike, as the consequences would be unacceptable.
To recap, the United States either can accept a nuclear Iran or risk an attack that might fail outright, impose only a minor delay on Iran’s nuclear program or trigger extremely painful responses even if it succeeds. When neither choice is acceptable, it is necessary to find a third choice.
Redefining the Iranian Problem
As long as the problem of Iran is defined in terms of its nuclear program, the United States is in an impossible place. Therefore, the Iranian problem must be redefined. One attempt at redefinition involves hope for an uprising against the current regime. We will not repeat our views on this in depth, but in short, we do not regard these demonstrations to be a serious threat to the regime. Tehran has handily crushed them, and even if they did succeed, we do not believe they would produce a regime any more accommodating toward the United States. The idea of waiting for a revolution is more useful as a justification for inaction — and accepting a nuclear Iran — than it is as a strategic alternative.
At this moment, Iran is the most powerful regional military force in the Persian Gulf. Unless the United States permanently stations substantial military forces in the region, there is no military force able to block Iran. Turkey is more powerful than Iran, but it is far from the Persian Gulf and focused on other matters at the moment, and it doesn’t want to take on Iran militarily — at least not for a very long time. At the very least, this means the United States cannot withdraw from Iraq. Baghdad is too weak to block Iran from the Arabian Peninsula, and the Iraqi government has elements friendly toward Iran.
Historically, regional stability depended on the Iraqi-Iranian balance of power. When it tottered in 1990, the result was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The United States did not push into Iraq in 1991 because it did not want to upset the regional balance of power by creating a vacuum in Iraq. Rather, U.S. strategy was to re-establish the Iranian-Iraqi balance of power to the greatest extent possible, as the alternative was basing large numbers of U.S. troops in the region.
The decision to invade Iraq in 2003 assumed that once the Baathist regime was destroyed the United States would rapidly create a strong Iraqi government that would balance Iran. The core mistake in this thinking lay in failing to recognize that the new Iraqi government would be filled with Shiites, many of whom regarded Iran as a friendly power. Rather than balancing Iran, Iraq could well become an Iranian satellite. The Iranians strongly encouraged the American invasion precisely because they wanted to create a situation where Iraq moved toward Iran’s orbit. When this in fact began happening, the Americans had no choice but an extended occupation of Iraq, a trap both the Bush and Obama administrations have sought to escape.
It is difficult to define Iran’s influence in Iraq at this point. But at a minimum, while Iran may not be able to impose a pro-Iranian state on Iraq, it has sufficient influence to block the creation of any strong Iraqi government either through direct influence in the government or by creating destabilizing violence in Iraq. In other words, Iran can prevent Iraq from emerging as a counterweight to Iran, and Iran has every reason to do this. Indeed, it is doing just this.
The Fundamental U.S.-Iranian Issue
Iraq, not nuclear weapons, is the fundamental issue between Iran and the United States. Iran wants to see a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq so Iran can assume its place as the dominant military power in the Persian Gulf. The United States wants to withdraw from Iraq because it faces challenges in Afghanistan — where it will also need Iranian cooperation — and elsewhere. Committing forces to Iraq for an extended period of time while fighting in Afghanistan leaves the United States exposed globally. Events involving China or Russia — such as the 2008 war in Georgia — would see the United States without a counter. The alternative would be a withdrawal from Afghanistan or a massive increase in U.S. armed forces. The former is not going to happen any time soon, and the latter is an economic impossibility.
Therefore, the United States must find a way to counterbalance Iran without an open-ended deployment in Iraq and without expecting the re-emergence of Iraqi power, because Iran is not going to allow the latter to happen. The nuclear issue is simply an element of this broader geopolitical problem, as it adds another element to the Iranian tool kit. It is not a stand-alone issue.
The United States has an interesting strategy in redefining problems that involves creating extraordinarily alliances with mortal ideological and geopolitical enemies to achieve strategic U.S. goals. First consider Franklin Roosevelt’s alliance with Stalinist Russia to block Nazi Germany. He pursued this alliance despite massive political outrage not only from isolationists but also from institutions like the Roman Catholic Church that regarded the Soviets as the epitome of evil.
Now consider Richard Nixon’s decision to align with China at a time when the Chinese were supplying weapons to North Vietnam that were killing American troops. Moreover, Mao — who had said he did not fear nuclear war as China could absorb a few hundred million deaths — was considered, with reason, quite mad. Nevertheless, Nixon, as anti-Communist and anti-Chinese a figure as existed in American politics, understood that an alliance (and despite the lack of a formal treaty, alliance it was) with China was essential to counterbalance the Soviet Union at a time when American power was still being sapped in Vietnam.
Roosevelt and Nixon both faced impossible strategic situations unless they were prepared to redefine the strategic equation dramatically and accept the need for alliance with countries that had previously been regarded as strategic and moral threats. American history is filled with opportunistic alliances designed to solve impossible strategic dilemmas. The Stalin and Mao cases represent stunning alliances with prior enemies designed to block a third power seen as more dangerous.
It is said that Ahmadinejad is crazy. It was also said that Mao and Stalin were crazy, in both cases with much justification. Ahmadinejad has said many strange things and issued numerous threats. But when Roosevelt ignored what Stalin said and Nixon ignored what Mao said, they each discovered that Stalin’s and Mao’s actions were far more rational and predictable than their rhetoric. Similarly, what the Iranians say and what they do are quite different.
U.S. vs. Iranian Interests
Consider the American interest. First, it must maintain the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. The United States cannot tolerate interruptions, and that limits the risks it can take. Second, it must try to keep any one power from controlling all of the oil in the Persian Gulf, as that would give such a country too much long-term power within the global system. Third, while the United States is involved in a war with elements of the Sunni Muslim world, it must reduce the forces devoted to that war. Fourth, it must deal with the Iranian problem directly. Europe will go as far as sanctions but no further, while the Russians and Chinese won’t even go that far yet. Fifth, it must prevent an Israeli strike on Iran for the same reasons it must avoid a strike itself, as the day after any Israeli strike will be left to the United States to manage.
Now consider the Iranian interest. First, it must guarantee regime survival. It sees the United States as dangerous and unpredictable. In less than 10 years, it has found itself with American troops on both its eastern and western borders. Second, it must guarantee that Iraq will never again be a threat to Iran. Third, it must increase its authority within the Muslim world against Sunni Muslims, whom it regards as rivals and sometimes as threats.
Now consider the overlaps. The United States is in a war against some (not all) Sunnis. These are Iran’s enemies, too. Iran does not want U.S. troops along its eastern and western borders. In point of fact, the United States does not want this either. The United States does not want any interruption of oil flow through Hormuz. Iran much prefers profiting from those flows to interrupting them. Finally, the Iranians understand that it is the United States alone that is Iran’s existential threat. If Iran can solve the American problem its regime survival is assured. The United States understands, or should, that resurrecting the Iraqi counterweight to Iran is not an option: It is either U.S. forces in Iraq or accepting Iran’s unconstrained role.
Therefore, as an exercise in geopolitical theory, consider the following. Washington’s current options are unacceptable. By redefining the issue in terms of dealing with the consequences of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, there are three areas of mutual interest. First, both powers have serious quarrels with Sunni Islam. Second, both powers want to see a reduction in U.S. forces in the region. Third, both countries have an interest in assuring the flow of oil, one to use the oil, the other to profit from it to increase its regional power.
The strategic problem is, of course, Iranian power in the Persian Gulf. The Chinese model is worth considering here. China issued bellicose rhetoric before and after Nixon’s and Kissinger’s visits. But whatever it did internally, it was not a major risk-taker in its foreign policy. China’s relationship with the United States was of critical importance to China. Beijing fully understood the value of this relationship, and while it might continue to rail about imperialism, it was exceedingly careful not to undermine this core interest.
The major risk of the third strategy is that Iran will overstep its bounds and seek to occupy the oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf. Certainly, this would be tempting, but it would bring a rapid American intervention. The United States would not block indirect Iranian influence, however, from financial participation in regional projects to more significant roles for the Shia in Arabian states. Washington’s limits for Iranian power are readily defined and enforced when exceeded.
The great losers in the third strategy, of course, would be the Sunnis in the Arabian Peninsula. But Iraq aside, they are incapable of defending themselves, and the United States has no long-term interest in their economic and political relations. So long as the oil flows, and no single power directly controls the entire region, the United States does not have a stake in this issue.
Israel would also be enraged. It sees ongoing American-Iranian hostility as a given. And it wants the United States to eliminate the Iranian nuclear threat. But eliminating this threat is not an option given the risks, so the choice is a nuclear Iran outside some structured relationship with the United States or within it. The choice that Israel might want, a U.S.-Iranian conflict, is unlikely. Israel can no more drive American strategy than can Saudi Arabia.
From the American standpoint, an understanding with Iran would have the advantage of solving an increasingly knotty problem. In the long run, it would also have the advantage of being a self-containing relationship. Turkey is much more powerful than Iran and is emerging from its century-long shell. Its relations with the United States are delicate. The United States would infuriate the Turks by doing this deal, forcing them to become more active faster. They would thus emerge in Iraq as a counterbalance to Iran. But Turkey’s anger at the United States would serve U.S. interests. The Iranian position in Iraq would be temporary, and the United States would not have to break its word as Turkey eventually would eliminate Iranian influence in Iraq.
Ultimately, the greatest shock of such a maneuver on both sides would be political. The U.S.-Soviet agreement shocked Americans deeply, the Soviets less so because Stalin’s pact with Hitler had already stunned them. The Nixon-Mao entente shocked all sides. It was utterly unthinkable at the time, but once people on both sides thought about it, it was manageable.
Such a maneuver would be particularly difficult for U.S. President Barack Obama, as it would be widely interpreted as another example of weakness rather than as a ruthless and cunning move. A military strike would enhance his political standing, while an apparently cynical deal would undermine it. Ahmadinejad could sell such a deal domestically much more easily. In any event, the choices now are a nuclear Iran, extended airstrikes with all their attendant consequences, or something else. This is what something else might look like and how it would fit in with American strategic tradition.
moutinman
03-01-2010, 21:44
In my humble opinion, this far underestimates the Israeli response. Don't forget the direct threat Iran has made to "wipe Israel from the face of the earth" In Israel's shoes: if you had the means, would you allow them (Iran) to develop nuclear weapons? We have all seen the willingness of Israel to do what they feel must be done.
Just my thoughts.....
incarcerated
03-02-2010, 17:08
From an otherwise poor article at The Kansas City Star:
http://www.kansascity.com/2010/02/21/1763529_p2/war-game-shows-how-attacking-iran.html
War game shows how attacking Iran could backfire
By WARREN P. STROBEL
McClatchy Newspapers
….This recent war game conducted at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, part of the Washington-based Brookings Institution, a center-left think tank, appears to dampen hopes for a simple solution to Iran's real-world nuclear challenge.
The lesson is "once you start this, it's really hard to stop it," said Kenneth Pollack, a former White House and CIA official who oversaw the simulation….
….The Brookings war game was one of three simulations regarding Iran's nuclear program conducted in December. The other two, at Harvard University and Tel Aviv University, reportedly found that neither sanctions nor threats dissuaded Tehran from its suspected nuclear weapons ambitions….
Iran did not retaliate directly against the United States or U.S. troops in Iraq or Afghanistan. But it struck back at Israel, then attacked Dharan in eastern Saudi Arabia, then began mining the Straits of Hormuz….
ultimately, though it sounds crazy, I think Iran is a much more rational, secular country then it is thought to be. Certainly, it's no worse then Saudi Arabia, who through Wahabiism, has created the modern terrorist. No 9/11 hijackers came from Iran etc... Though I do think iran is crazy, and certainly the largest state sponsor of terror, it would benefit us greatly to try and bring them into our sphere of influence and use them to disrupt our real strategic enemies of Russia and china. Keep your friends close ... then again, i dont really know what im talking about.
incarcerated
03-08-2010, 23:46
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3859810,00.html
Ashkenazi in US to discuss Iran sanctions
IDF chief expected to stress need for united front on punitive measures against Tehran in meetings with White House, Pentagon officials
Yitzhak Benhorin
Published: 03.08.10, 22:38
Israel News
WASHINGTON – IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Gabi Ashkenazi arrived in Washington for an official visit Monday.
Ashkenazi, who will meet with Pentagon officials and congressmen, is expected to reiterate Israel's stand regarding the necessary sanctions on Iran.
Ashkenazi met with Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy shortly after arriving in DC. He is also scheduled to meet with US Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice, White House National Security Advisor James Jones and Senator John McCain....
In other meetings, Ashkenazi will address the issue of arms smuggling from Iran to Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas.
Ashkenazi and his wife, Ronit, are expected to join Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen and his wife, Deborah, for breakfast on Tuesday
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http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE62712920100308?type=marketsNews
Trafigura, Vitol stopping Iran gasoline sales-sources
Mon Mar 8, 2010 10:52am EST
By Simon Webb and Luke Pachymuthu
DUBAI/SINGAPORE, March 8 (Reuters) - Oil trading firms Trafigura and Vitol are stopping gasoline sales to Iran, industry sources said on Monday, joining a growing list of suppliers that have halted sales under threat of U.S. sanctions.
U.S. politicians are working on legislation to slap sanctions on suppliers of fuel to Iran to increase pressure on the Islamic Republic to halt uranium enrichment. Western powers accuse Tehran of using its atomic programme to develop weapons, while Iran says it needs nuclear electricity.
"The field of suppliers is narrowing, and Iran is getting squeezed," a Middle East oil trader said.
The Financial Times reported on Monday that Trafigura and its rival Vitol had halted supply to Iran. Privately-owned Trafigura has its main offices in Amsterdam [ID.nLK595640]. Independent oil trader Vitol is based in Switzerland.
Vitol decided to stop participating in new tenders to supply Iran at the start of the year, the company said in a statement e-mailed to Reuters. It was completing existing spot supply deals that were made before the start of the year, it added.
Trafigura executives were unavailable for comment on whether they had made a similar decision to Vitol to honour existing supply deals.
Trafigura and Vitol will join international oil major BP (BP.L), Glencore and Reliance Industries (RELI.BO) among suppliers that have stopped selling fuel to Iran. The U.S. legislation would penalise firms that also have operations in the United States.
DELIVERIES
Shipping data obtained by Reuters showed that Vitol was unloading gasoline from the vessel NS Parade at Iran's port of Bandar Mahshahr on Monday. The ship was carrying 34,000 tonnes, or just under 300,000 barrels, of motor fuel.
The shipment was part of "previous tenders or agreements that were concluded prior to a change of direction", the company said. "We decided not to take part in tenders at the start of the year."
Shipping data also showed vessels chartered by Trafigura discharging cargoes in Iran in February.
Analysts say Iran would always find traders to sell it fuel even if larger, established oil firms and trading houses stop sales. Still, the smaller list of suppliers means Tehran would have to pay higher prices for the fuel, analysts and traders say.
France's Total (TOTF.PA), Malaysia's state oil firm Petronas [PETR.UL] and Kuwait's Independent Petroleum Group are among firms that continue to supply Iran, traders said.
A Total spokesman declined to comment on Monday as to whether the company may take a similar decision to Vitol and Trafigura. The volumes Total supplies were small, he added.
Iran is the world's fifth-largest oil exporter but lacks sufficient refinery capacity to meet domestic gasoline needs, forcing it to import up to 40 percent of requirements.
The country spends billions of dollars each year covering its shortfall through purchases on the international market and then subsidising the gasoline at the pump. Its motor fuel is among the world's cheapest.
The Islamic Republic has taken measures to restrict consumption and has rationed the fuel. The government plans to begin phasing out subsidies this year, part of a wider move to save up to $100 billion annually from subsidies on fuel, gas, power, water, food, health and education.
Iran also tested last year emergency measures to produce gasoline from petrochemical plants. Iran's oil minister said at the time the move showed the potential limitation of any sanctions on fuel suppliers to Iran.
Analysts said the measures could only serve as a short-term solution to lack of supplies due to the high cost of production from petrochemical plants and the impurity of the fuel produced.
Iran's purchases of gasoline from abroad for February were about 23 percent higher than the 2009 average, at more than 150,000 bpd, Reuters data showed. [ID:nLDE60U015]
"The companies don't feel it is worth it to carry on fuel trading with anymore," said IHS Global Insight Middle East Energy analyst Samuel Ciszuk.
"Political pressure from the United States and its European allies are starting to make an impact and deter fuel trading with Iran." (Additional reporting by Jonathan Saul in London, Muriel Boselli in Paris and Alejandro Barbajosa in Singapore; Editing by Sue Thomas and Keiron Henderson)
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http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/09/world/middleeast/09briefs-Iran.html
Iran: Budget With Cuts Is Approved by Parliament
By REUTERS
Published: March 8, 2010
Parliament approved President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s 2010-11 budget on Monday, state radio reported, but some lawmakers criticized the plan, saying planned cuts in subsidies could set off runaway inflation. A senior official has said the government projects revenues of about $60 billion in the new fiscal year, which begins March 21, resulting in a $6 billion deficit. The budget would phase out subsidies on food and energy, which analysts say could send inflation spiraling back to 30 percent or more and lead to a repeat of rioting seen in 2007.
moutinman
03-09-2010, 10:04
it would benefit us greatly to try and bring them into our sphere of influence and use them to disrupt our real strategic enemies of Russia and china.
Do you know the last time we tried to bring Iran "into our sphere of influence"? And how did that work out? (hint; it was 1952 and our actions then arguably set the conditions that led to the 9/11 attack) I don't see this as a realistic approach to the problem.
Not saying I have the solutions, but we can avoid repeating mistakes of the past. One thing I would like to see as a non-interventionist type approach to foreign policy. This coupled with a break from foreign oil dependency would solve a great deal of our problems....in my humble opinion.
Just my thoughts.....
incarcerated
03-09-2010, 23:33
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1155181.html
Iran maneuvering Israel in a show of nuclear strength
By Avigdor Haselkorn
Last update - 21:40 09/03/2010
The central mystery in the Middle East nowadays has little to do with the hit on a Hamas agent in Dubai but with Iran's actions. On February 14, in the presence of IAEA inspectors, Iran moved nearly all its stockpile of low-enriched nuclear fuel to an above-ground plant that Tehran declared will be used to re-enrich the fuel to 20 percent purity. As a result roughly 4,300 pounds of low-enriched uranium now sits vulnerable to destruction from an air attack or even a fire.
U.S. analysts, it was reported, have offered a number of theories for the baffling move ranging from baiting Israel to strike, and thus alleviate Iran's domestic crisis, to a technical screw up. Others speculated Iran is engaged in some sort of diplomatic brinkmanship. By threatening to turn its entire uranium stockpile into near-bomb-grade fuel Tehran hopes to force the United States to reopen negotiations on its terms.
There is, however, another possibility. Accordingly, Iran has concluded that the danger of an Israeli preemption of the Iranian program has been neutralized. Between Israel's fears of the responses from Iran and its allies and Washington's stern objections to an Israeli military undertaking the probability of an attack is virtually nonexistent, or so Tehran may now believe.
The first element in this Iranian assessment, which dismisses the chances of an Israeli attack, must be linked to the new weapons in the hands of Hezbollah. After all, while Israel is supposedly threatening pinpoint attacks on Iranian nuclear targets, the country's enemies can target not only most of Israel's key strategic installations but have openly adopted a strategy of indiscriminate rocket attacks on Israeli cities. Moreover, the recent statements by some of the leaders of the regional radical axis that for the first time openly promised a theater-wide war in case Israel attacks must be seen as another component in Iran's growing conviction that its enriched uranium cache is safe wherever it is located.
The second element in Iran's confident assessment of an American ban on any military action is the seemingly endless procession of U.S. emissaries who have either arrived already in Israel, or are slated to, ostensibly to warn Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu against "surprising" Washington. Tehran fully understands that the last thing President Barack Obama wants is a third front on top of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
By publicizing its move Iran in effect threw down a gauntlet, fully expecting Israel not to pick it up and thus lose credibility and standing vis-à-vis its enemies. Israel's inaction would be the final confirmation of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah's longtime thesis that -despite having a nuclear weapon and the strongest air force in the region - it is weaker than a spider's web. The Mullahs expect that Israel's display of impotence will elevate the status of Iran and pay handsome dividends both domestically and internationally.
Even if it was not originally conceived as such, by now Tehran must see the vulnerable storage of its enriched uranium as a test of Israel's power and credibility. While former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein often resorted to a strategy of "burning the bridges behind him" to convey his commitment (for instance in 1990, he confirmed some of Iraq's missile capability "so you [Arab brothers] will find no Iraqi excuses when they fail to respond forcefully" to any aggression), Iran is seeking to "burn the bridges" behind Israel.
This has indeed put Israel in a serious strategic bind. If Israel acts, it risks the wrath of America, not to mention the likely response from Iran and its allies. If it does not act, it will be for all to see that Nasrallah's "spider web" thesis is alive and well. At the very minimum, Israel could face new attacks from the likes of Hamas and Hezbollah. At worst, the likelihood of a full-scale war would increase dramatically. Indeed, such is Tehran's new confidence that it is reportedly seeking to instigate another conflict on Israel's northern border to divert Western powers from their efforts to impose tougher sanctions on Iran.
The breakdown of Mr. Obama's policy vis-à-vis Iran is in full view. For if this analysis is correct the next step is surely a formal Iranian decision to build the bomb.
The ball is now squarely in Israel's court
.
Avigdor Haselkorn is the author of The Continuing Storm: Iraq, Poisonous Weapons and Deterrence (Yale University Press)
incarcerated
03-10-2010, 02:00
In my humble opinion, this far underestimates the Israeli response.
Given this,
http://www.professionalsoldiers.com/forums/showpost.php?p=319528&postcount=2
I suspect that these are a very early part of that response…
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1155416.html
Mishaps galore as Israel tries to welcome U.S. Vice President
By Barak Ravid, Haaretz Correspondent
Last update - 03:46 10/03/2010
U.S. Vice President Joe Biden's visit to Jerusalem Tuesday was not free of embarrassing moments.
The first occurred at the President's Residence, at the start of a meeting between Biden and President Shimon Peres. The plan called for brief remarks, which usually means a few minutes. But Peres spoke for no less than 25 minutes.
Throughout the speech, the vice president sat in his chair waiting for his turn to say something. American reporters and others present at the scene said the whole thing was very embarrassing, because, as one put it, Peres "gave a whole speech, going from one subject to another."
Many of those present were shifting uncomfortably in their chairs, the sources said, while Peres' aides exchanged worried looks and passed notes to each other….
Another embarrassing incident occurred at the Prime Minister's residence, when Benjamin Netanyahu wanted to give a symbolic gift to Biden - a framed document giving the details of several trees planted in Jerusalem in memory of the vice president's mother, who was a great supporter of Israel.
But when Netanyahu handed the document to Biden, he discovered that the glass face had shattered, and shards flew all over. "I wanted to give you broken glass," Netanyahu quipped, reacting quickly: He took the document from the frame, wrote a dedication and signed it with a pen that Biden loaned him….
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http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/7410845/Joe-Biden-condemns-Israels-plan-to-build-1600-homes-on-disputed-land.html
Joe Biden condemns Israel's plan to build 1,600 homes on disputed land
Published: 6:31AM GMT 10 Mar 2010
Israel's controversial announcement that it had approved construction of 1,600 new apartments coincided with Mr Biden's arrival in the country for a round of meetings with Israeli officials.
In a strongly-worded statement, Mr Biden criticised the decision to announce the plan during his visit.
"The substance and timing of the announcement, particularly with the launching of proximity talks, is precisely the kind of step that undermines the trust we need right now," he said.
"We must build an atmosphere to support negotiations, not complicate them," he added, warning that "unilateral action taken by either party cannot prejudge the outcome of negotiations."
Although ministry officials said the announcement was procedural and unconnected to the visit, a top aide to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claimed he had been blindsided by the news. Mr Netanyahu tried to contain the damage at a late-night dinner with Mr Biden, but it was too late and Mr Biden issued his statement after the dinner….
incarcerated
03-10-2010, 13:12
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703701004575113280633313178.html?m od=googlenews_wsj
Shell Stops Gas Sales to Iran
BUSINESS
MARCH 10, 2010, 9:33 A.M. ET
By BENOIT FAUCON
LONDON—Royal Dutch Shell PLC said Wednesday it is no longer selling gasoline to Iran, the latest oil company to make such a move during threats of tougher sanctions against the Islamic republic.
"Shell is not currently selling gasoline to Iran," a company spokesman said. He declined to comment on whether it was related to sanctions against Iran.
Shell's move comes as a number of Western oil companies have decided to stop trading with Iran as international pressure bites deeper into its oil and gas industry. Traders Vitol Holding BV and Glencore International AG, historically key fuel-oil suppliers to Iran, recently decided to halt sales of gasoline to the country.
The Islamic republic's refining expansion has been hindered by decades of sanctions, and it depends on imports for about 40% of its refined products consumption....
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http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1154660.html
Facing new sanctions, Iran admits oil shortages
By Reuters
Last update - 18:14 07/03/2010
A senior Iranian oil official said Sunday that increased gasoline rationing imposed late last year has failed to reduce domestic demand, an acknowledgment that reflects the OPEC nation's economic struggles as it faces possible new sanctions.
Farid Ameri, the head of Iran's National Distribution Oil Products Company, said gasoline consumption had remained unchanged this year despite a 20 percent cut in fuel rations since December.
"To meet the shortage, we need to import 22 million liters per day of gasoline and nine million liters of gasoil per day," Ameri was quoted as saying on Shana, the Oil Ministry's Web site.
Since December, Iranian drivers have had an 80 liter allotment of gasoline per month at a subsidized price of 1,000 rials - or about 10 cents per liter. Any volume over that costs roughly four-times the subsided price.
Previously, each car received 100 liters per month.
Iran is home to the world's second largest proven reserves of conventional crude and produces about 4.2 million barrels of oil per day. But a lack of refining capacity means that it produces roughly 44 million liters of gasoline per day - around only two-thirds of its of daily demand. Tehran must import more than 5 million gallons to meet its daily needs.
The imports, coupled with the subsidy program, are a heavy drain on the state budget, which relies on oil sales for around 80 percent of its revenues.
Iran's parliament has approved a bill submitted by Ahmadinejad aimed at phasing out the subsidies and distributing the money directly to the neediest Iranians - a populist measure which some analysts say will only serve to sharply boost inflation that some analysts say is already hovering around 20 percent. Official reports put the inflation at about 12 percent....
Im reading a book by robert baer titled "the devil we know" all about Iran, and our history with them. Balancing that info with stratfor's opinions, I honestly think that we dont have much of a choice with Iran. Israel might force us into an attack or conflict of some kind, but hopefully we can find a covert way to deal with some of this. In the end, being wrapped up with afghanistan and iraq, and having a need to stabilize both countries, we are going to have to sit down with Iran at some point. Unless of course the Iraqi shiite population develops a very strong sovereign identity, and resists Iranian influence. then, all of a sudden the tables turn in our favor. Heres to hoping Iran looses it's standing in Iraq, and is put back on the defensive.
moutinman
03-11-2010, 11:15
I agree that we do not need another front to fight on. Our plate is full right now, even if we pull out of IZ on the time line established by POTUS, we will be busy for the foreseeable future. In my opinion, Iran is a very unstable nation right now that is on the verge of a revolution. All the precursors are there, it's just a matter of if there is a trigger that sets it off. The one thing I'm not sure about is the impact of increased sanctions. Traditionally our sanctions may give us a little short term pressure, but the long term second and third order effects are very detrimental for us. Sanctions give a country (Iran in this case) the ability to hold America up as the great evil that is responsible for the current plight. It gives a country the ability to shift blame away from their leadership and onto America for pushing their country into the troubles they face. This helps unify a country against us and gives extremist recruiters great ammunition. There are numerous recent examples of our short sited foreign policy biting us in our collective third point of contact, I just hope this doesn't prove to be another.
Just my thoughts.....
agree completely. Sanctions never seem to work, they just buy time. However, I'm not so sure about the Iranian revolution thing, I wouldn't hold your breath. I think the government there has become less of a revolutionary theocracy, and more of a military dictatorship, run principally by the Revolutionary Guards. Even, if there were a revolution, i'm not sure much would change, It certainly wouldnt become a democracy in my opinion. It would become a different kind of enemy, still seeking weapons and influence. I think that Iran is on the verge of regaining some of it's old persian empire status. It will become the strongman of the Middleast for a while. With Saddam's Sunni army gone and no longer able to hold back the Shia, I think Iran, with support from shia Iraq, Syria, Lebanon (hezbollah), and palestine (hamas) is going to try and become the biggest player, in a land they view as being "their Neighborhood" anyway. My belief, welcome to a world where China wants our power, Russia wants their power back, Iran becomes legitimately Powerful, and Brazil competes for influence in our hemisphere :eek:. Then again, that's just my limited view of things
The Lebanese army command believes major military operations in the forthcoming war between Israel and Hezbollah will begin in the western Bekaa Valley, according to STRATFOR sources. The army command believes the Israelis will pursue Hezbollah as far as Hirmil at the northern end of the valley. The Lebanese army also reportedly is aware that Iranian missiles continue to reach Hezbollah from Syria. Iranian planes unload missiles at the airport in Aleppo, Syria, after which they are shipped to the Bekaa.
A team of missile experts from Iran’s elite military unit, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, led by an Iranian colonel reportedly arrived in Lebanon about three weeks ago. The team examined Hezbollah missile sites in the western Bekaa Valley and supervised the installation of additional missile silos and concrete bunkers. Iran also reportedly will begin a new cycle of guerrilla warfare training in al-Shara near the Lebanese-Syrian border.
Meanwhile, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), a pro-Syrian left-wing faction opposed to the mainstream ruling Palestinian Fatah movement, is said to have mobilized 4,000 highly trained fighters outside the large PFLP-GC military base in Qusaya, Lebanon. At present, the troops at are stationed on the Syrian side of the border, but they could enter Qusaya’s perimeter in a matter of minutes. The Lebanese army reportedly is aware of the arrival of eight additional tanks to Qusaya.
STRATFOR sources report that Hezbollah and the PFLP-GC are coordinating their military plans. Moreover, at Damascus’ insistence, the Iranians allegedly have instructed Hezbollah to treat the PFLP-GC as its equal.
The Syrians hope the PFLP-GC will be able to prevent the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) from reaching the Beirut-Damascus highway. An IDF advance into the Bekaa would put Damascus within just a few hours of Israeli forces. As the Syrians do not want to become embroiled in Israel’s next war with Hezbollah, they are therefore preparing the PFLP-GC to fight a proxy war on Syria’s behalf.
moutinman
03-12-2010, 11:07
With regards to a revolution in Iran, I'm not saying one is imminent, only that the conditions are there. I'm not talking of a military coupe, I speak of a movement led by the youth of a nation that are tired of being dragged into precarious situations by tyrannical leadership. And I still think the Israeli's will act first against Iran if there is a perceived threat.
Interesting info about Iran helping prepare LH for pending action. LH is a formidable opponent.
And for your fears of the shifting of world powers....it's justified. We must get out in front of the next generation of economic growth, which I feel will be green energy. If we can stay in front of this it has the potential of ridding our dependence on foreign oil (minimize the Middle East's power and money) and give us a new frontier of science and industry that will keep our position in the world secure....if our foreign policy doesn't totally alienate the rest of the world in the mean time.
incarcerated
03-14-2010, 01:44
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE62C1D220100313
Iran arrests 30 over U.S.-linked cyber ring: report
Sat Mar 13, 2010 1:13pm EST
TEHRAN
(Reuters) - Iran has arrested 30 people suspected of belonging to a U.S.-linked cyber network gathering information on Iranian nuclear scientists and sending people abroad for training, a news agency reported on Saturday.
It said the group sought to recruit people through the Internet for training in Iraq with the People's Mujahideen Organization, a leftist exile group which launched attacks on the Islamic Republic from Saddam Hussein's Iraq
"Thirty people were arrested in connection with an organized American cyber war network via a series of complex security measures in the field of information technology and communications," the Fars news agency said.
Tehran's general and revolutionary court said one of the group was linked to an outlawed sect -- a reference to the Baha'i religious minority, the agency said.
"Among the charges against this network are creating an intelligence gathering network, including identification of the country's nuclear scientists and staging illegal demonstrations and encouraging the public to take part in them after the presidential elections," it said....