akv
01-21-2010, 11:12
Gentlemen,
George Friedman wrote an article last month about the challenge of building an Afghan defense force, and while acknowledging differences in situation, compared it to aspects of Vietnamization. I was curious if soldiers who actually served in Vietnam would agree that the ARVN failed not from lack of motivation but from enemy infiltration, or if this is just an academic's view? I also want to thank all of our vets past and present for their service.
Today, Obama faces similar dilemmas as Nixon. The United States cannot indefinitely provide security for the local government. The local government will have to provide security for itself. Indeed, the eventual U.S. withdrawal — in both Southeast Asia and Central Asia — was designed to put pressure on the local government to prepare to provide for itself and its citizens.
But the lesson for this president and this generation of policymakers lies in this question: Why did Vietnamization fail? It failed not for lack of motivation within the ARVN, though there were certainly cases of it. Nixon’s strategy failed because as the ARVN expanded it was increasingly penetrated by communist sympathizers and agents of North Vietnamese intelligence services, from the senior staff and command to the squad levels.
Now, this dynamic — which defeated Nixon’s strategy in Vietnam — will arise in Afghanistan. The expansion of the Afghan military provides an obvious opportunity for Taliban operatives and sympathizers — not easily distinguished from loyal troops — to enlist.
With such operatives in place, the Taliban will know of and avoid army units. Knowing that the Americans will withdraw, the rational strategy of the Taliban is reduce operational tempo, allow the U.S. forces to leave, then take advantage of superior intelligence and ability to disrupt Afghan forces internally and strike with offensives.
This is not an insoluble problem; it requires penetrating the Taliban in return. The United States attempted to do this in Vietnam but on balance that intelligence war went to the North Vietnamese. In Afghanistan today, in contrast, the United States has far more sophisticated, technical intelligencegathering capabilities than it did 40 years ago in Southeast Asia. But the United States lacks multiple layers of human intelligence.
And here is where the president’s strategy rests upon a crucial — and often unreliable — ally: Pakistan. The president mentioned Pakistan and the critical role it plays. Clearly he understands the lessons of Vietnam, and has made it clear that he expects Pakistan to engage and destroy Taliban forces on its territory, and deny Afghan Taliban supplies, replacements and refuge.
http://www.jdnews.com/articles/justify-70947-text-span.html
George Friedman wrote an article last month about the challenge of building an Afghan defense force, and while acknowledging differences in situation, compared it to aspects of Vietnamization. I was curious if soldiers who actually served in Vietnam would agree that the ARVN failed not from lack of motivation but from enemy infiltration, or if this is just an academic's view? I also want to thank all of our vets past and present for their service.
Today, Obama faces similar dilemmas as Nixon. The United States cannot indefinitely provide security for the local government. The local government will have to provide security for itself. Indeed, the eventual U.S. withdrawal — in both Southeast Asia and Central Asia — was designed to put pressure on the local government to prepare to provide for itself and its citizens.
But the lesson for this president and this generation of policymakers lies in this question: Why did Vietnamization fail? It failed not for lack of motivation within the ARVN, though there were certainly cases of it. Nixon’s strategy failed because as the ARVN expanded it was increasingly penetrated by communist sympathizers and agents of North Vietnamese intelligence services, from the senior staff and command to the squad levels.
Now, this dynamic — which defeated Nixon’s strategy in Vietnam — will arise in Afghanistan. The expansion of the Afghan military provides an obvious opportunity for Taliban operatives and sympathizers — not easily distinguished from loyal troops — to enlist.
With such operatives in place, the Taliban will know of and avoid army units. Knowing that the Americans will withdraw, the rational strategy of the Taliban is reduce operational tempo, allow the U.S. forces to leave, then take advantage of superior intelligence and ability to disrupt Afghan forces internally and strike with offensives.
This is not an insoluble problem; it requires penetrating the Taliban in return. The United States attempted to do this in Vietnam but on balance that intelligence war went to the North Vietnamese. In Afghanistan today, in contrast, the United States has far more sophisticated, technical intelligencegathering capabilities than it did 40 years ago in Southeast Asia. But the United States lacks multiple layers of human intelligence.
And here is where the president’s strategy rests upon a crucial — and often unreliable — ally: Pakistan. The president mentioned Pakistan and the critical role it plays. Clearly he understands the lessons of Vietnam, and has made it clear that he expects Pakistan to engage and destroy Taliban forces on its territory, and deny Afghan Taliban supplies, replacements and refuge.
http://www.jdnews.com/articles/justify-70947-text-span.html