TSA fails to notice firearm in carry on luggage...

[Ryanr]

http://www.gadling.com/2010/01/14/tsa-fails-to-detect-gun-at-montana-airport-may-be-replaced-by/

Oops.

The gun belonged to an "unidentified man", who was honest enough to notify the cabin crew when he noticed his error. As is normally the case, the plane returned to the gate, and was delayed for over an hour while the TSA did their job (again).

[Sten]

also on that site....

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-511677/Probe-launched-air-stewardess-performs-topless-mid-air-striptease-captain.html

An investigation has been launched after a video of a topless French air stewardess performing a sexy striptease for the captain while the plane was flying was leaked on to the internet.

Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-511677/Probe-launched-air-stewardess-performs-topless-mid-air-striptease-captain.html#ixzz0cdbVlzG1


Fracking lucky pilots.

[Utah Bob]

I'm shocked! Shocked!:rolleyes:

[Ret10Echo]

Dropped that little dinger in to the discussion this morning: :p

http://professionalsoldiers.com/forums/showthread.php?t=25892

I have adopted that thread as the "BEST OF TSA" location. One stop shopping for all the thrills, spills and excitement....

[HowardCohodas]

Considering the thousands of people that fly EVERYDAY its not surprising somthing like this has happened. Makes me wonder how many slipped through the cracks we don't know about.

Do a simple thought experiment. Consider an environment where the guardians are truly motivated to keep out dangerous stuff. An environment where searches are permitted to be far more invasive than permitted by the TSA. You probably think the protected environment might be pristine. Now think of the contraband that enters all prisons.

The TSA is primarily theater and is there to permit ghd airline industry to survive by convincing the masses it is mostly safe to fly. And it is, as you are more likely to be hit by lightening than suffer an attack while flying.

[Ret10Echo]

Actually I used to work as a correctional officer ie prison guard. Long story short no matter how motovated and alert you are you can not catch everything. Our lives depended on catching the contraband. We did strip searches at times and still some stuff would slip through. No matter what system you set up there will always be a way around it, things will be missed or equiptment will break down. That is just the reality. People that want 100% of the contraband and weapons to be found are not based in reality.

For a determined adversary there will always be a "workaround". Any adjustments will be temporarily successful.

HOWEVER....I believe that an organization with a budget of $7.8 Billion dollars should be 100% effective at stopping the casual tourist who mistakenly places a contraband item in their carry-on.

Because if that is OK for them to wander through what I consider to be a very cursory inspection, then why are we wasting our taxpayer dollars on this charade? (Or in Howard's term...the theatre of security....all show...no go)

But I guess in our Windows-based society, failure is completely acceptable now.

[HowardCohodas]

For a determined adversary there will always be a "workaround". Any adjustments will be temporarily successful.

HOWEVER....I believe that an organization with a budget of $7.8 Billion dollars should be 100% effective at stopping the casual tourist who mistakenly places a contraband item in their carry-on.

Because if that is OK for them to wander through what I consider to be a very cursory inspection, then why are we wasting our taxpayer dollars on this charade? (Or in Howard's term...the theatre of security....all show...no go)

But I guess in our Windows-based society, failure is completely acceptable now.

In spite of the huge budget, much of which is devoted to technology or experiments in new technology, the TSA job is primarily one where people are the critical success factor. The TSA jobs are constructed so that they are primarily mind numbing and low paid. Not a good environment for pride and success.

Does anyone else remember that the pre 9/11 TSA duties were handled by a contractor who did the job more successfully (as shown by testing) and with better paid employees. They were just not sufficiently politically connected.

With regards to Windows, I feel your pain. However full disclosure requires me to tell you that my daughter and her husband are managers at Microsoft in Redmond. Boy, could I tell you stories, but... ;)

[Ret10Echo]

In spite of the huge budget, much of which is devoted to technology or experiments in new technology,

As is the current case with the body imaging/scanning systems,, but I believe certain aspects of technology development are handled elsewhere within DHS.

the TSA job is primarily one where people are the critical success factor. The TSA jobs are constructed so that they are primarily mind numbing and low paid. Not a good environment for pride and success.

Also a recipe for disaster when you connect the aforementioned technology with the numb-mind....the interpretation and translation of any sort of image or other sensors is horribly lacking. The firearm in question was probably missed because it did not look like a pistol that Wiley Coyote would carry, nor did it have big red letters on it "GUN"

Does anyone else remember that the pre 9/11 TSA duties were handled by a contractor who did the job more successfully (as shown by testing) and with better paid employees. They were just not sufficiently politically connected.

PLEASE...no more contractors at DHS....the 1:80 ratio is getting out of hand.

With regards to Windows, I feel your pain. However full disclosure requires me to tell you that my daughter and her husband are managers at Microsoft in Redmond. Boy, could I tell you stories, but... ;)

I'm just glad my automobiles and my firearms do not have the "Designed for Windows" logo on them.....:D

[HowardCohodas]

I didn't say it was ok, I said some people are going to slip through. I don't like the mentality of depending on someone elso to protect me through their screening. I am sure everyone here is familar with the term defense in depth. IMHO TSA does not really do that. They do not have security where it is needed most, on the planes. 3-4 guys with submachine guns on an flight, now THAT is a deterrant. The TSA people with rifles in the airport, that is a deterrant. Bomb sniffing dogs, that is a deterrant. Some bored unarmd 300 lb 55 year old woman looking at an x-ray machine is a small challange to many. I know the SF community has a saying. People are more important than equiptment. That is so true in this case, yet they are talking about throwing more money at the problem and buying more hitech gee whizz equiptment.

IMO, being permitted to carry my 45fs and my 380 BUG aboard would be a good deterrent. :D

I agree about being self reliant. It's one of the concepts I try to reinforce in the CCW classes I teach. In addition to the handguns mentioned, I EDC at least four (4) different tools on my person to enhance my self-defense/self-reliance profile. These four tools go with me on the plane.

I'm also a private pilot (single-engine land, not current) but I doubt I could fly the plane. ;)

[Ret10Echo]

I didn't say it was ok, I said some people are going to slip through. I don't like the mentality of depending on someone elso to protect me through their screening. I am sure everyone here is familar with the term defense in depth. IMHO TSA does not really do that. They do not have security where it is needed most, on the planes. 3-4 guys with submachine guns on an flight, now THAT is a deterrant. The TSA people with rifles in the airport, that is a deterrant. Bomb sniffing dogs, that is a deterrant. Some bored unarmd 300 lb 55 year old woman looking at an x-ray machine is a small challange to many. I know the SF community has a saying. People are more important than equiptment. That is so true in this case, yet they are talking about throwing more money at the problem and buying more hitech gee whizz equiptment.

I suppose an important point to consider/make a determination on is at what stage of the passenger flow should all threats or anomalies be detected?

IMO, once the threat is inside the airframe you have failed. You could have a 105 mounted in the passenger cabin it would not matter once the door closes.

Any level of depth must be employed prior to the jetway.

YOMV

[HowardCohodas]

I suppose an important point to consider/make a determination on is at what stage of the passenger flow should all threats or anomalies be detected?

IMO, once the threat is inside the airframe you have failed. You could have a 105 mounted in the passenger cabin it would not matter once the door closes.

Any level of depth must be employed prior to the jetway.

YOMV

Reread the thought experiment about attempts to keep contraband out of prison. Your strategy must be capable of handling things as they are, not as you wish them to be. Things as they are could be improved, but will never be as you wish them to be.

Reality is a tough mistress. :rolleyes:

[Ret10Echo]

Reread the thought experiment about attempts to keep contraband out of prison. Your strategy must be capable of handling things as they are, not as you wish them to be. Things as they are could be improved, but will never be as you wish them to be.

Reality is a tough mistress. :rolleyes:

Reality is an equalizer..;) but we plan for that.

The point I make is that there are those that intentionally seek to bypass or subvert the system (the prison contaband example), then there is the "accidental" violator.....as was apparently the case with the gentleman in Montana. Based upon his voluntary admission of possessing the handgun we assume he had unintentionally violated/compromised the "system".

Of course there may have been some malicious intent in trying to expose the flaws in the screening process. That is not apparent in the reports.

We can also assume that there were no efforts on his part to conceal the weapon...yet the "system" failed to detect the presence of the firearm. The failure was fundamental in that respect. This was not a sophisticated attempt but a very basic course of fire.

Of course it may have simply been a case of a TSA screener who scored low on the visual acquity portion of the acceptance exam.

All of this ties into the various discussions concerning the intent, purpose, hiring, training and monitoring of our so-called domestic security.

[Ryanr]

...then there is the "accidental" violator.....as was apparently the case with the gentleman in Montana.

Yeah, that's the thing that gets me -- he apparently wasn't even TRYING to conceal the weapon and it made it through just fine. It doesn't seem to bode well for deterring those individuals that are trying hard to beat the system.

[HowardCohodas]

I'm troubled by most of this discussion because I believe it misses relevant points.

All attempts at screening will fail. The only relevant point of discussion is cost vs. benefit. Costs include more than money such as inconvenience, loss of privacy, loss of liberty, etc.
The key to success for the terrorist is launching a sufficient number of attempts to overcome the current level of effectiveness of screening. We have been lucky that the ability to coordinate and launch such an attach has been significantly diminished since 9/11 because of the communication required.
Fear of being caught has no relevance to any strategy aimed at those who are committed to die in their attempt. Many tactics that are suggested and worse, implemented, by those who fear death are risible. I'm sure I am not writing anything surprising to the Quiet Professionals here.
Some attempts at attacking us will succeed. This is inarguable. Preparation may yield more useful results than adding the last increment of prevention.

[Arctic]

I await the day all carry on baggage will be a thing of the past and everything will be checked. In order to enter the “sterile” zone within an airport you must undergo a strip and cavity search thereafter you will don an orange jumpsuit and paper socks. When you board the plane and take your seats instead of buckling your seat-belt you’ll be shackled securely to the floor, for your own protection of course. Finally the meal and drinks you were hoping would tide you over on your long flight will be served to you in plastic sippy cups. All along you tell yourself it’s a luxury and that it’s ok because you’re paying for the privilege to fly.

The security debate is bad for the people… it plays right into the hands of airlines looking to up their bottom line. Following the Christmas bombing attempt you saw several airlines cut the # of bags you could take as carry on hiding it behind the security threat scare tactic.

Ideally if you want to stop planes being used as mediums for terror I suggest rebuilding the planes themselves, attempting to defeat every method of bringing explosives on board is impossible. Building a better plane able to withstand an explosive blast is a much better idea. The screening prevents large obvious explosives from getting aboard, so build a plane that can handle a small scale explosion. Instead of one massive cabin for passengers individually separate out the classes between blast proof bulkheads that maintain the pressurization if another section fails. Think A-10 the sky bus version…

Just my ramblings tho.. sorry :(

[HowardCohodas]

I await the day all carry on baggage will be a thing of the past and everything will be checked. In order to enter the “sterile” zone within an airport you must undergo a strip and cavity search thereafter you will don an orange jumpsuit and paper socks. When you board the plane and take your seats instead of buckling your seat-belt you’ll be shackled securely to the floor, for your own protection of course. Finally the meal and drinks you were hoping would tide you over on your long flight will be served to you in plastic sippy cups. All along you tell yourself it’s a luxury and that it’s ok because you’re paying for the privilege to fly.


Sound like a good plot for a movie. Oh wait. Someone beat you to it. Con Air (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0118880/)

[goat]

I work for the TSA, and I have heard some stories similar to this which have not made the press to my knowledge.

[HowardCohodas]

I work for the TSA, and I have heard some stories similar to this which have not made the press to my knowledge.

In what kind of position?

Because I check firearms in my luggage when I fly, I frequently get to talk with the TSA people who examine my stuff in detail. I've had lots of good conversations with them about guns, my unique way of packing and safeing them, and other subjects which can cause my wife to panic about not making the plane on time. One TSA guy personally escorted us through the rest of security because my wife had lost her only form of photo-ID when we were in Seattle.

[HowardCohodas]

Rereading this thread it occurred to me that I was privileged to have some experiences that inform my frequently caustic remarks about the efficacy of TSA inspection. I thought some idea of that background in this area may help in understanding some of my conclusions such as "TSA inspection is theater."

In one of my previous careers I was a manager of a group in the research center of a Fortune 500 mechanical components manufacturer. I set up the visual inspection applications laboratory where we investigated visual inspection, its limitations and the possibilities of computer assistance.

We had a good understanding of the economic and effectiveness trade-offs between 100% inspection and sampled inspection. Of course, we prioritized economics over politics to inform our decisions. TSA policy is not consistent with any analysis we ever did.

At the moment, I can't locate the report of an experiment done by others that I frequently used in presentations to senior management. In the report was a discussion of an exquisitely simple but dramatic demonstration of the limitations of humans to detect things that should not be there. The experiment consisted of removing black balls from a black and white ball mix (black/white for maximum contrast) on a conveyor as the balls passed by the inspector. Then a second station was added down line to pick up the black balls that were missed by the first inspector. The "errors" that made it passed the two serial inspection stations would frighten us tasked with preventing bad components from getting into our customer's production. Furthermore, it illustrated the even adding a third and forth station still resulted in black balls coming off the end of the line. It was not all altruistic. Tort lawyers always wait in the wings.

The limitation of human-only visual inspection should inform the TSA process, but I doubt that it will. Even more importantly, the incredible capability of human pattern recognition is still far superior to any ability of us clever software engineers have ever been able to produce.

Other experiments where the contrast was not as dramatic, or the "clutter" factor was high also had interesting results. Understanding these factors make it easy to "hide in plain sight" stuff that even the best TSA inspectors would likely miss.

Now, don't you feel better about the TSA's ability to protect you? :eek:

[goat]

I work at a checkpoint, so I don't deal with checked baggage. Overall the TSA is extremely inconsistant from airport to airport and even checkpoint to checkpoint in the same airport.

[Trip_Wire (RIP)]

They were probably to bust stealing stuff out of the carry-ons to notice a handgun. ;)