What Would You Do? — Interdiction in Afghanistan

[Richard]

What now, Dai-uy?

Richard

In war, combat leaders have to determine how much risk to their own troops they should accept to prevent the death of innocent noncombatants.

In this case, a combat leader has to make a split-second decision. Did he do the right thing?

The mission

In March 2002, at the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) headquarters in Afghanistan, Lt. Cmdr. Tom Reynolds, USN, a SEAL officer in charge of the SEALs assigned to the JSOTF during Operation Enduring Freedom, was summoned by JSOTF Operations Officer Lieutenant Colonel Thompson to talk about a mission they had just received. A vehicle convoy — typically Toyota Land Cruiser-type SUVs and/or compact pickup trucks — of al-Qaida and Taliban terrorists was expected to be moving down a road about 70 miles south the next morning, apparently trying to escape from Afghanistan into Pakistan. Intelligence indicated ongoing allied operations were putting significant pressure on al-Qaida and Taliban forces in southeast Afghanistan, making local al-Qaida and Taliban movements and operations more and more difficult. The enemy already had realized that allied aircraft routinely targeted vehicles moving at night, so now they were seeking to blend in with the normal daytime traffic. It appeared the Taliban and al-Qaida were having some success escaping into Pakistan by blending in with the stream of refugees coming out of Afghanistan.

Intelligence sources also indicated the terrorists normally put their heavily armed men in lead vehicles as an armed reconnaissance element, while the leadership and their personal armed guards would follow some distance behind, maintaining communications with the lead vehicles about any problems they encountered. Also, and particularly worrisome, were indications that the terrorists probably were carrying Man-portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), specifically Soviet-era SA-7 shoulder-fired missiles, which are particularly effective against helicopters, especially during daylight when helicopters are easy to spot.

The mission was to interdict the convoy, capture (if possible), and kill (if necessary) any suspected members of al-Qaida or the Taliban they might encounter.

Thompson already had contacted Maj. Mark Wyatt, XO of an Army H-47 helicopter squadron, who would look at the mission with Reynolds and his men. The land forces component commander wanted the mission concept in two hours. Reynolds knew he had limited time to plan, rehearse, and review contingencies with his team. Tight timelines had become standard, but Reynolds and his team were fully aware of the increased risk they assumed when they had less time to prepare.

Recent tragedy

The risks of rapid planning had become evident in an ugly incident two days earlier. Overhead surveillance had seen armed men around a walled compound, and corroborating intelligence had indicated this compound would be used for a meeting of high-level Taliban officials. A precision-guided missile was launched and struck the main building of the compound when the meeting was scheduled to take place. Reynolds and his men went into the compound minutes after the missile struck to gather any intelligence that remained, capture and treat any wounded, and determine whether any of the dead or wounded were key Taliban or al-Qaida leaders.

When they arrived, they discovered the dead had been noncombatants — farmers and their families who were living in the compound. They found personal firearms that virtually all rural Afghanis carry for protection. Reynolds and his men were shaken by the gruesome results of this miscalculation: elderly people, farmers, women, and children with no apparent connection to the enemy were dead. After determining that there was no exploitable intelligence, Reynolds and his men returned to base, and he reported to his superiors what had happened, including his dismay at the mistake.

The plan

Reynolds and his team worked out a plan. There would be a total of three helos: Wyatt would be the lead helo pilot for the mission, and Reynolds would be in Wyatt’s helo (chalk one). Chalks two and three would carry the rest of the SEALs and be led by Reynolds’ assistant officer in charge and platoon chief, respectively. They talked through the contingencies with the pilots, went over the map, and had the intelligence crew coordinate with a Navy P-3 aircraft doing overhead surveillance.

A difficult part of the mission was to interdict the convoy in such a way as to surprise the occupants of the vehicles, and offering the opportunity for them to surrender without putting Reynolds’ men at risk. “Capture if possible, kill if necessary” always is tricky; it frequently requires a split-second decision and a clear indicator of hostile intent as well as an intuitive sense of threat.

They would be taking off at 6:45 a.m. the next day and flying to a point near the road where they would loiter at a low altitude, visually and audibly sheltered from the road by the mountains, and wait for a cue from a P-3 watching the road. When the P-3 saw the convoy, it would notify the helos and vector them to the vehicles on the road. The helos then would move in under the cover of the mountains and surprise the convoy, quickly determine whether to take the vehicles under fire or, if in doubt, land and put the SEALs on the ground and let them make the final determination. The helos would be available to provide cover fire or extraction, as required.

Rules of engagement

Before submitting his mission plan, Reynolds went to see Colonel Smith, the JSOTF commander, to discuss his perspective for this mission. With the tragedy of the recent mission still on his mind, Reynolds wanted to know how certain the intelligence reports were, and whether the rules of engagement had changed. The rules of engagement define the circumstances under which lethal force can be used and the restrictions in the use of that force. Smith said he understood the intelligence to be quite reliable and the rules of engagement hadn’t changed: If the vehicles they encounter demonstrate hostile intent by displaying or firing weapons, they are legitimate targets. Smith said the reason higher headquarters wanted the JSOTF to send helos and SEALs to do this mission, instead of targeting the convoy from a distance, was to try to avoid repeating the mistake from two days ago. That said, Smith reminded Reynolds that his tactics must account for the desire to bring back prisoners if at all possible, without unduly risking the lives of any of his men. Smith also reiterated to Reynolds that the rules of engagement gave him all the guidance he needed.

That was what Reynolds wanted to hear. He believed the rules of engagement, as they currently stood, made sense and gave him and his team the latitude to exercise their professional judgment to complete the mission and stay alive.

Mission day

Early the next morning, the SEALs embarked the H-47s, and after all systems checked out and the pilots had established communications with the P-3, they took off and headed for the designated loiter point. After about 40 minutes of flight time, they arrived at the point, again checked in with the P-3, and began flying in low, slow circles far enough away from the road so as not to be heard, yet close enough to respond quickly when called by the P-3.

Reynolds had been through this drill many times before. Sitting in the helo with a headset on, he waited for the call. He mentally walked through the plan for the operation and its various contingencies: how they would make their approach to the convoy, how quickly they would have to determine threat level and response. How far back would the trail vehicle be with the so-called leaders? Would they stumble upon one of the key Taliban or al-Qaida leaders? Did they really have SA-7s?

(cont'd)

[Richard]

Interdiction in Afghanistan(cont'd)

Approximately 20 minutes after arriving at the loitering point, Reynolds heard on the headset that the P-3 had spotted what appeared to be the target convoy: two pickup trucks traveling together followed about a mile back by another pickup truck. It would be about 20 minutes before the vehicles reached Reynolds and the helo pilots. After discussing it briefly with Wyatt, Reynolds shared this information with the SEAL leading petty officer (LPO) in his helo, and the LPO alerted the rest of the SEALs.

Wyatt continued to get information from the P-3. The convoy was moving toward the interdiction point. After about 10 minutes, the P-3 crew advised Wyatt it was time to leave the loiter position and begin moving toward the road. Reynolds advised his LPO, and the LPO passed the information on to the men in the helo.

As the helos approached the interdiction point, they stayed very low to the ground to minimize the chance that the sound of their approach would travel over the mountains and alert the convoy. At about two minutes out, the P-3 passed on some disturbing news. “We’ve lost the trail vehicle. We haven’t seen it for several minutes — last we saw it was about three miles back. It might be masked by the mountains between us and them. But two vehicles are on final route into your target zone and will be there in a couple of minutes.”

Reynolds quickly considered the possibility of his helo flying through the mountains searching for the trail vehicle while chalks two and three took care of the lead vehicles. There was no telling where that vehicle could be or what it could be doing. Even though the primary target was the leadership in the trail vehicle, with this new uncertainty, Reynolds did not want to take off on a potential wild-goose chase splitting his force.

He told Wyatt he wanted to keep all three helos together until they had a better idea what they were up against, or at least until the P-3 found the third vehicle. Wyatt agreed and told chalks two and three the plan had changed and that they would stay together and all hit the lead vehicles. The helos then started their climb up and over the final hill that lay between them and the road — and presumably the two lead vehicles. Reynolds made sure the SEALs in chalks two and three received the word. Everyone in the helos was on full alert.

As they flew over the summit of the hill, they saw two pickup trucks approaching from the north about 500 feet below them. The helos came over the crest of the hill and headed directly toward the vehicles at full speed. Reynolds looked for any sign of hostility from the occupants in the back of the pickup truck. Both vehicles stopped, and men got out and started running when they saw the helos. Reynolds and the left-door gunner both saw weapons and muzzle flashes and immediately began firing. The second helo picked up the lead vehicle and started firing. Reynolds saw more muzzle flashes and men fall but no sign of anyone setting up to fire an SA-7. The helos passed the vehicles flying fast and low and putting out a huge volume of fire. The men who had left the trucks were scrambling in chaos, some firing at the helos, several of them falling victim to the fire coming from the door gunners.

As Reynolds’ helo was turning to circle the vehicles and make an approach from the other side, he said on the headset to Wyatt, “I think they’ve got this under control. Let’s go find the trail vehicle. What do you think?”

“Roger,” Wyatt responded. “I’ll advise chalk two to take control here,” at which point he pulled up out of the pattern and told the pilot of chalk two that he and Reynolds were detaching to go look for the other vehicle.

As the H-47 turned a corner in the valley, Reynolds saw what looked like a truck full of people stopped on the side of the road about 200 yards ahead to the right. The right-door gunner had a clear shot, and he quickly swung his mini-gun and took aim. But Reynolds quickly realized no one was running from the truck, and he thought he saw someone in the truck — possibly a woman — hold something up high as if to display it to the helo. He grabbed the door gunner and yelled, “No!” and held his fist in front of the door gunner’s face to signal him to stop. The door gunner was confused but followed the order and didn’t shoot. The helo continued toward the truck, and Reynolds looked for signs of hostile intent but noticed this was different from the other vehicles. No one left the truck. No one ran for cover. But, it was difficult to tell whether these people were armed or not, given the speed and approach angle of the helo.

The helo flew past the truck so close that the people in the bed of the truck were ducking from the rotor wash. Reynolds saw that he was right — he’d seen a woman, and she appeared to be holding a baby. He didn’t see any weapons or anyone displaying hostile intent. Reynolds told Wyatt to circle around and land in front of the vehicle, far enough away to be safe but close enough for the SEALs to quickly envelope the vehicle, clarify the situation, and take appropriate action.

The helo flared and landed fast. The SEALs quickly debarked out the rear ramp, and the H-47 took off. The SEALs patrolled to the vicinity of the pickup truck and observed the passengers not moving. Reynolds signaled to the passengers to move away from the pickup truck and had his team search the truck and its passengers. They determined they were neither Taliban nor al-Qaida leaders, and there was no evidence that they had any connection to them. Either intelligence had been wrong or the situation had changed since the source had reported it.

Reynolds realized that he had narrowly avoided making a tragic mistake. He still was worried about a possible trail vehicle and called Wyatt to ask him if he had any other information. But there was no information.

Reynolds then got on the radio with the SEALs who were on the ground at the site of the two lead vehicles. They already had debarked the helos and taken control of the site with no resistance and were inspecting the dead and wounded. All were male and had been carrying weapons. Eight were dead, three wounded were being treated, and the SEALs had taken two unscathed prisoners. This was all good news.

Reynolds then had his LPO direct the civilians to sit down and remain where they were. They still were sitting on the ground away from their pickup truck when the SEALs were picked up by the helo and flown to join their teammates at the site of the two lead vehicles.

The aftermath

Smith heard that his helo pilots believed Reynolds had taken undue risk during their operation. He knew he needed to get the story directly from his two commanders. He called Wyatt and Reynolds into his office, and Smith indicated that he understood there was some disagreement about how the operation had been conducted.

Wyatt said: “Sir, we could have all been killed and lost the bird. We were a sitting duck. We’re real lucky Tom was right, because if he’d been wrong, we would have a lot of dead Americans and this war would look a lot different right now.”

“Sir, he’s right — we could have all been killed — if I’d been wrong,” Reynolds said. “But I wasn’t. I was in charge. And I was right. I made the call based on what I saw and what I sensed, and I stand by it. It was clearly the right thing to do. We knew we were at risk, but we still have to do the right thing.”

“Right, Tom, but all the indicators were there that these were bad guys, and you didn’t know, and my guys and yours were sitting ducks for several seconds, and that put not only all of us, but potentially the whole focus of everything we’re doing here, at risk,” Wyatt argued. “Can you imagine what this task force would be doing right now if those had been bad guys [and] we had taken an SA-7 right down the throat? I don’t want to kill innocent people either, but if you had been wrong, nobody, I mean nobody, would forgive you. And we’d all be dead.”

“Mark, it just didn’t feel right, and, we saw no hostile intent,” Reynolds argued.

“We didn’t have time to see hostile intent, Tom!” Wyatt said. “When we took off after that third vehicle, my understanding was that we were going hunting. We knew we had flushed the bad guys, and at that point, we were in a gunfight. When we came around that bend in the road, it was either them or us. When you stopped my gunner, and I didn’t hear the guns, I figured it was us. I expected a flash and whoosh and then lights out.”

“You two calm down, and come back and see me when you get your stuff squared away,” interrupted Smith. Smith knew he was the one who had to take responsibility for risk, and if there was something unclear about the situation, he needed to resolve it. “I’m going to have to think about this and talk to the lawyers.”

Wyatt and Reynolds left Smith’s office and agreed to get together in a couple of hours, after they had sorted out the other details from their mission.

As Reynolds walked back to where his men were working, he thought about what Wyatt had said. He had gambled and won, but he had bet the whole farm — not just his farm, but the lives of everyone else in the helo as well as the future capability of the Special Operations Task Force.

http://www.moaa.org/serv_prof/serv_prof_ethics/serv_prof_ethics_2009/serv_prof_ethics_090602.htm

[alfromcolorado]

No matter what one does there will be self doubting questions after the fact.

In this case I would hope I would do the same as this commander.

The mentality that everyone in Afghanistan is the enemy produces more enemies to fight. If we had less negative incidents, who knows, but we might have more effective intelligence to make less negative incidents.

If we are going to consider everyone the enemy then we need to get busy... Didn't work for the Russians. I think we will get the same results.