akv
10-01-2009, 11:51
Granted this is coming from a civilian and Israeli perspective, I thought folks here still might find the transcript of interest.
October 2009
Israel and Iran – an Assessment
Author: Alon Ben-David, Military Analyst
(alonb@10.tv)
The showdown with Iran over its nuclear program is about to reach the critical moment: within the next year it will be decided whether Iran will be allowed to continue developing nuclear capabilities or will be forced to desist. Since the June Presidential elections through the recent exposure of the clandestine nuclear facility in Qom, the Iranian regime's position has deteriorated both internally and internationally. Although Iran remains defiant and is still determined to pursuit its nuclear ambitions, it is now facing a firm international coalition convinced in the need to prevent the Islamic Republic from obtaining nuclear weapons. Israel, which in the last years began adapting to the idea it might be left alone to face Iran, is now encouraged by the determination of the US and EU powers to stop Iran. Yet, Israel continues to maintain and improve its military options against Iran, but those will not be considered before spring 2010.
How far is Iran from getting the bomb?
In order to become a nuclear power, Iran needs three elements: fissile material, the actual nuclear device, and the means to deliver it (missiles, fighter aircraft). While there is no dispute that Iran possesses both the ability to produce fissile material and the missiles to deliver a nuclear warhead, there is an ongoing controversy between intelligence agencies on whether Iran is already developing the actual weapon.
Missiles: Iran has been anything but shy in displaying its ballistic missile capabilities, currently covering a 2,000 km range and with a potential of extending it to 4,000 km, which will place all of Europe within their reach. The recent missiles – the Shahab-3, Ghadr-1 and Sejil-2 – were all designed to accommodate nuclear warheads.
Fissile material: under the surveillance cameras of the IAEA, the centrifuges at Iran's uranium enrichment facility in Natanz produce 3kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU) per day. So far, Iran has amassed 1,500kg of LEU, which, by a matter of a decision, could be fed again into the centrifuges and turned into 30kg of high-enriched uranium, more than enough for making one nuclear bomb.
Despite initial setbacks, during the last year Iran had mastered the technology of uranium enrichment and now has all the know-how to produce the fissile material.
The weapon: there is no doubt that Iranian engineers began sketching the Iranian bomb years ago. Some of their drawings and calculations were obtained by intelligence agencies and delivered to the IAEA. There is, however, a disagreement whether the "weapon group" – the body that designs the actual bomb - continues working. Israeli Mossad, UK MI6 and German BND claim they do – US intelligence agencies assess that the work on the actual bomb had ceased in 2003 and hasn't renewed since. Based on all that, intelligence estimates on when Iran could produce its first nuclear bomb vary from 2010 to 2015. It could be, however, that Iran will choose to continue amassing fissile material and remain a screw-turn away from making an actual bomb.
Could negotiations dissuade Iran?
For the first time, the masters of brinkmanship from Tehran are facing a powerful international coalition, resolved to reach a decisive outcome from the negotiations and willing to move to harsher sanctions, should the negotiations fail. Among the P5+1, the US, UK, France and Germany hold a tight unified position, while Russia is still reluctant and China is not a partner in this effort. Therefore, there is no credible threat of UN Security Council sanctions against Iran. Still, the threat of US and EU sanctions is quite deterring for Iran, and the powers will allow the negotiations to continue until December, before considering moving to sanctions. Weakened by the exposure of the Qom facility and the internal strife, Iran realizes it will have to make some concessions in order to avoid facing exacerbated sanctions. Yet, it has no intention of giving up its nuclear ambitions. The coming months will show an Iranian veil dance: entering the negotiations fully covered, while indicating it is willing to take off a veil or two, as long as it gets to keep some veils on by the end of the dance. In other words, Iran will be willing to accept a compromise of some international monitoring on its nuclear program as long as it will be allowed continue developing it. The unknown here is how strong is the resolution of the Western powers to completely shut down the Iranian program. Such a compromise may appear attractive to the US, as it could be presented as an achievement of Obama's policy of 'engagement'. However, without practically experiencing stronger sanctions, Iran will not back down.
What are Israel's options?
Loyal to its tradition of preventing neighboring countries from obtaining nuclear weapons, Israel will closely follow the negotiations with Iran, while continuing to prepare its military option. For the past decade, Israel, along with other partners, has been operating covertly to delay the progress of Iran's nuclear program. Indeed, Iranian scientists have met with a long series of technical difficulties that prolonged their efforts to create an efficient uranium enrichment facility. However, Iran has overcome most of these difficulties and it appears that clandestine operations could no longer significantly delay the program. In the past, Israel was able to deny neighboring countries from developing nuclear capabilities by destroying their facilities in a single air strike. However, Iran has learned the lessons from Israel's attack on the Iraqi reactor in 1981 and on the Syrian reactor in 2007, and has dispersed its nuclear facilities in multiple locations, burying many of them under ground.
Looking at the size of the Israel air force, the range between Israel and Iran (1,500 km) combined with the dispersal of Iran’s nuclear program makes it clear that Israel’s capabilities to destroy the whole of the Iranian nuclear program are very limited. Any military operation would aim to merely delay the Iranian program in several years. Should such operation will be launched and generate a direct Iranian response, Israel is prepared to go into a campaign against Iran, which will try to demonstrate to Iran the high costs of continuing with the nuclear program. Such a campaign will aim not only at Iran's nuclear facilities, but also at infrastructure and regime targets. Israel is capable of inflicting considerable damage on Iran, but that would trigger a painful Iranian response, either directly against Israel or through its proxies: Hizbullah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. A military operation will also have enormous costs in international legitimacy and could expose US forces in the region to an Iranian retaliation. That is why Israel will launch a military operation against Iran only as a genuine last resort.
Does Netanyahu have the legitimacy to act against Iran?
There is a wide consensus that crosses most political parties that Israel could not tolerate a nuclear Iran. There is also a common understanding that if Iran obtains nuclear weapons, it will trigger a swift nuclear arms race in the region, starting with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which will make life unbearable for Israel. Prime Minister Netanyahu was one of the pioneers that pointed to the threat of an Iranian bomb back in the 1990s, when the idea was still considered science fiction. In private conversations, Netanyahu speaks on preventing Iran from getting the bomb as his historical mission. That perception of emissary will be moderated by a more hesitant Defense Minister and a military establishment which is far from being trigger-happy. The US has, so far, been strictly against any Israeli operation and refused to grant Israeli fighter aircraft the permission to cross US-controlled airspace in the Gulf on their way to Iran. Unlike the case of Syria in 2007, there is very low likelihood that the Obama Administration will endorse an Israeli strike on Iran. Despite all that, if faced with undisputable proof that Iran is about to have a nuclear weapon – Netanyahu will act, rising above any ordinary political considerations. He will be supported by Israeli public opinion and opposition leader, Tsipi Livni, who might even join his government. His dilemma will become much more complex if Iran will be allowed by the international community to continue its program under inspection. In any case, Israel will not interfere with the diplomatic efforts in the coming months and will not consider a military option before spring 2010, when weather conditions would again permit an air strike.
Bottom line: the Israeli motto of "keeping all options on the table" reflects an authentic willingness to act forcefully in order to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. There are limitations to Israel's military capabilities vis-à-vis Iran, but it is still capable of causing considerable damage to Iran's nuclear program and delaying it in several years. However, recognizing its limited military capabilities and considering the almost certain Iranian response, Israel would prefer that other forces will act to stop Iran’s nuclear program and will consider a military strike against Iran only if all else fail.
October 2009
Israel and Iran – an Assessment
Author: Alon Ben-David, Military Analyst
(alonb@10.tv)
The showdown with Iran over its nuclear program is about to reach the critical moment: within the next year it will be decided whether Iran will be allowed to continue developing nuclear capabilities or will be forced to desist. Since the June Presidential elections through the recent exposure of the clandestine nuclear facility in Qom, the Iranian regime's position has deteriorated both internally and internationally. Although Iran remains defiant and is still determined to pursuit its nuclear ambitions, it is now facing a firm international coalition convinced in the need to prevent the Islamic Republic from obtaining nuclear weapons. Israel, which in the last years began adapting to the idea it might be left alone to face Iran, is now encouraged by the determination of the US and EU powers to stop Iran. Yet, Israel continues to maintain and improve its military options against Iran, but those will not be considered before spring 2010.
How far is Iran from getting the bomb?
In order to become a nuclear power, Iran needs three elements: fissile material, the actual nuclear device, and the means to deliver it (missiles, fighter aircraft). While there is no dispute that Iran possesses both the ability to produce fissile material and the missiles to deliver a nuclear warhead, there is an ongoing controversy between intelligence agencies on whether Iran is already developing the actual weapon.
Missiles: Iran has been anything but shy in displaying its ballistic missile capabilities, currently covering a 2,000 km range and with a potential of extending it to 4,000 km, which will place all of Europe within their reach. The recent missiles – the Shahab-3, Ghadr-1 and Sejil-2 – were all designed to accommodate nuclear warheads.
Fissile material: under the surveillance cameras of the IAEA, the centrifuges at Iran's uranium enrichment facility in Natanz produce 3kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU) per day. So far, Iran has amassed 1,500kg of LEU, which, by a matter of a decision, could be fed again into the centrifuges and turned into 30kg of high-enriched uranium, more than enough for making one nuclear bomb.
Despite initial setbacks, during the last year Iran had mastered the technology of uranium enrichment and now has all the know-how to produce the fissile material.
The weapon: there is no doubt that Iranian engineers began sketching the Iranian bomb years ago. Some of their drawings and calculations were obtained by intelligence agencies and delivered to the IAEA. There is, however, a disagreement whether the "weapon group" – the body that designs the actual bomb - continues working. Israeli Mossad, UK MI6 and German BND claim they do – US intelligence agencies assess that the work on the actual bomb had ceased in 2003 and hasn't renewed since. Based on all that, intelligence estimates on when Iran could produce its first nuclear bomb vary from 2010 to 2015. It could be, however, that Iran will choose to continue amassing fissile material and remain a screw-turn away from making an actual bomb.
Could negotiations dissuade Iran?
For the first time, the masters of brinkmanship from Tehran are facing a powerful international coalition, resolved to reach a decisive outcome from the negotiations and willing to move to harsher sanctions, should the negotiations fail. Among the P5+1, the US, UK, France and Germany hold a tight unified position, while Russia is still reluctant and China is not a partner in this effort. Therefore, there is no credible threat of UN Security Council sanctions against Iran. Still, the threat of US and EU sanctions is quite deterring for Iran, and the powers will allow the negotiations to continue until December, before considering moving to sanctions. Weakened by the exposure of the Qom facility and the internal strife, Iran realizes it will have to make some concessions in order to avoid facing exacerbated sanctions. Yet, it has no intention of giving up its nuclear ambitions. The coming months will show an Iranian veil dance: entering the negotiations fully covered, while indicating it is willing to take off a veil or two, as long as it gets to keep some veils on by the end of the dance. In other words, Iran will be willing to accept a compromise of some international monitoring on its nuclear program as long as it will be allowed continue developing it. The unknown here is how strong is the resolution of the Western powers to completely shut down the Iranian program. Such a compromise may appear attractive to the US, as it could be presented as an achievement of Obama's policy of 'engagement'. However, without practically experiencing stronger sanctions, Iran will not back down.
What are Israel's options?
Loyal to its tradition of preventing neighboring countries from obtaining nuclear weapons, Israel will closely follow the negotiations with Iran, while continuing to prepare its military option. For the past decade, Israel, along with other partners, has been operating covertly to delay the progress of Iran's nuclear program. Indeed, Iranian scientists have met with a long series of technical difficulties that prolonged their efforts to create an efficient uranium enrichment facility. However, Iran has overcome most of these difficulties and it appears that clandestine operations could no longer significantly delay the program. In the past, Israel was able to deny neighboring countries from developing nuclear capabilities by destroying their facilities in a single air strike. However, Iran has learned the lessons from Israel's attack on the Iraqi reactor in 1981 and on the Syrian reactor in 2007, and has dispersed its nuclear facilities in multiple locations, burying many of them under ground.
Looking at the size of the Israel air force, the range between Israel and Iran (1,500 km) combined with the dispersal of Iran’s nuclear program makes it clear that Israel’s capabilities to destroy the whole of the Iranian nuclear program are very limited. Any military operation would aim to merely delay the Iranian program in several years. Should such operation will be launched and generate a direct Iranian response, Israel is prepared to go into a campaign against Iran, which will try to demonstrate to Iran the high costs of continuing with the nuclear program. Such a campaign will aim not only at Iran's nuclear facilities, but also at infrastructure and regime targets. Israel is capable of inflicting considerable damage on Iran, but that would trigger a painful Iranian response, either directly against Israel or through its proxies: Hizbullah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. A military operation will also have enormous costs in international legitimacy and could expose US forces in the region to an Iranian retaliation. That is why Israel will launch a military operation against Iran only as a genuine last resort.
Does Netanyahu have the legitimacy to act against Iran?
There is a wide consensus that crosses most political parties that Israel could not tolerate a nuclear Iran. There is also a common understanding that if Iran obtains nuclear weapons, it will trigger a swift nuclear arms race in the region, starting with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which will make life unbearable for Israel. Prime Minister Netanyahu was one of the pioneers that pointed to the threat of an Iranian bomb back in the 1990s, when the idea was still considered science fiction. In private conversations, Netanyahu speaks on preventing Iran from getting the bomb as his historical mission. That perception of emissary will be moderated by a more hesitant Defense Minister and a military establishment which is far from being trigger-happy. The US has, so far, been strictly against any Israeli operation and refused to grant Israeli fighter aircraft the permission to cross US-controlled airspace in the Gulf on their way to Iran. Unlike the case of Syria in 2007, there is very low likelihood that the Obama Administration will endorse an Israeli strike on Iran. Despite all that, if faced with undisputable proof that Iran is about to have a nuclear weapon – Netanyahu will act, rising above any ordinary political considerations. He will be supported by Israeli public opinion and opposition leader, Tsipi Livni, who might even join his government. His dilemma will become much more complex if Iran will be allowed by the international community to continue its program under inspection. In any case, Israel will not interfere with the diplomatic efforts in the coming months and will not consider a military option before spring 2010, when weather conditions would again permit an air strike.
Bottom line: the Israeli motto of "keeping all options on the table" reflects an authentic willingness to act forcefully in order to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. There are limitations to Israel's military capabilities vis-à-vis Iran, but it is still capable of causing considerable damage to Iran's nuclear program and delaying it in several years. However, recognizing its limited military capabilities and considering the almost certain Iranian response, Israel would prefer that other forces will act to stop Iran’s nuclear program and will consider a military strike against Iran only if all else fail.