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McChrystal: More Forces or 'Mission Failure'
Top U.S. Commander For Afghan War Calls Next 12 Months Decisive
By Bob Woodward
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, September 21, 2009
The top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan warns in an urgent, confidential assessment of the war that he needs more forces within the next year and bluntly states that without them, the eight-year conflict "will likely result in failure," according to a copy of the 66-page document obtained by The Washington Post.
Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal says emphatically: "Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) -- while Afghan security capacity matures -- risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible."
His assessment was sent to Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates on Aug. 30 and is now being reviewed by President Obama and his national security team.
McChrystal concludes the document's five-page Commander's Summary on a note of muted optimism: "While the situation is serious, success is still achievable."
But he repeatedly warns that without more forces and the rapid implementation of a genuine counterinsurgency strategy, defeat is likely. McChrystal describes an Afghan government riddled with corruption and an international force undermined by tactics that alienate civilians.
He provides extensive new details about the Taliban insurgency, which he calls a muscular and sophisticated enemy that uses modern propaganda and systematically reaches into Afghanistan's prisons to recruit members and even plan operations.
McChrystal's assessment is one of several options the White House is considering. His plan could intensify a national debate in which leading Democratic lawmakers have expressed reluctance about committing more troops to an increasingly unpopular war. Obama said last week that he will not decide whether to send more troops until he has "absolute clarity about what the strategy is going to be."
The commander has prepared a separate detailed request for additional troops and other resources, but defense officials have said he is awaiting instructions before sending it to the Pentagon.
[...] A declassified version of the document, with some deletions made at the government's request, appears at washingtonpost.com.
McChrystal makes clear that his call for more forces is predicated on the adoption of a strategy in which troops emphasize protecting Afghans rather than killing insurgents or controlling territory. Most starkly, he says: "[I]nadequate resources will likely result in failure. However, without a new strategy, the mission should not be resourced."
'Widespread Corruption'
The assessment offers an unsparing critique of the failings of the Afghan government, contending that official corruption is as much of a threat as the insurgency to the mission of the International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, as the U.S.-led NATO coalition is widely known.
"The weakness of state institutions, malign actions of power-brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, and ISAF's own errors, have given Afghans little reason to support their government," McChrystal says.
The result has been a "crisis of confidence among Afghans," he writes. "Further, a perception that our resolve is uncertain makes Afghans reluctant to align with us against the insurgents."
McChrystal is equally critical of the command he has led since June 15. The key weakness of ISAF, he says, is that it is not aggressively defending the Afghan population. "Pre-occupied with protection of our own forces, we have operated in a manner that distances us -- physically and psychologically -- from the people we seek to protect. . . . The insurgents cannot defeat us militarily; but we can defeat ourselves."
McChrystal continues: "Afghan social, political, economic, and cultural affairs are complex and poorly understood. ISAF does not sufficiently appreciate the dynamics in local communities, nor how the insurgency, corruption, incompetent officials, power-brokers, and criminality all combine to affect the Afghan population."
Coalition intelligence-gathering has focused on how to attack insurgents, hindering "ISAF's comprehension of the critical aspects of Afghan society."
In a four-page annex on detainee operations, McChrystal warns that the Afghan prison system has become "a sanctuary and base to conduct lethal operations" against the government and coalition forces. He cites as examples an apparent prison connection to the 2008 bombing of the Serena Hotel in Kabul and other attacks. "Unchecked, Taliban/Al Qaeda leaders patiently coordinate and plan, unconcerned with interference from prison personnel or the military."
The assessment says that Taliban and al-Qaeda insurgents "represent more than 2,500 of the 14,500 inmates in the increasingly overcrowded Afghan Corrections System," in which "[h]ardened, committed Islamists are indiscriminately mixed with petty criminals and sex offenders, and they are using the opportunity to radicalize and indoctrinate them."
Noting that the United States "came to Afghanistan vowing to deny these same enemies safe haven in 2001," he says they now operate with relative impunity in the prisons. "There are more insurgents per square foot in corrections facilities than anywhere else in Afghanistan," his assessment says.
McChrystal outlines a plan to build up the Afghan government's ability to manage its detention facilities and eventually put all such operations under Afghan control, including the Bagram Theater Internment Facility, which the United States runs.
For now, because of a lack of capacity, "productive interrogations and detainee intelligence collection have been reduced" at Bagram. "As a result, hundreds are held without charge or without a defined way-ahead. This allows the enemy to radicalize them far beyond their pre-capture orientation. The problem can no longer be ignored."
McChrystal's Plan
The general says his command is "not adequately executing the basics" of counterinsurgency by putting the Afghan people first. "ISAF personnel must be seen as guests of the Afghan people and their government, not an occupying army," he writes. "Key personnel in ISAF must receive training in local languages."
He also says that coalition forces will change their operational culture, in part by spending "as little time as possible in armored vehicles or behind the walls of forward operating bases." Strengthening Afghans' sense of security will require troops to take greater risks, but the coalition "cannot succeed if it is unwilling to share risk, at least equally, with the people."
McChrystal warns that in the short run, it "is realistic to expect that Afghan and coalition casualties will increase."
He proposes speeding the growth of Afghan security forces. The existing goal is to expand the army from 92,000 to 134,000 by December 2011. McChrystal seeks to move that deadline to October 2010.
Overall, McChrystal wants the Afghan army to grow to 240,000 and the police to 160,000 for a total security force of 400,000, but he does not specify when those numbers could be reached.
[...]
McChrystal says the military must play an active role in reconciliation, winning over less committed insurgent fighters. The coalition "requires a credible program to offer eligible insurgents reasonable incentives to stop fighting and return to normalcy, possibly including the provision of employment and protection," he writes.
Coalition forces will have to learn that "there are now three outcomes instead of two" for enemy fighters: not only capture or death, but also "reintegration."
Again and again, McChrystal makes the case that his command must be bolstered if failure is to be averted. "ISAF requires more forces," he states, citing "previously validated, yet un-sourced, requirements" -- an apparent reference to a request for 10,000 more troops originally made by McChrystal's predecessor, Gen. David D. McKiernan.
A Three-Headed Insurgency
McChrystal identifies three main insurgent groups "in order of their threat to the mission" and provides significant details about their command structures and objectives.
The first is the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) headed by Mullah Omar, who fled Afghanistan after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and operates from the Pakistani city of Quetta.
"At the operational level, the Quetta Shura conducts a formal campaign review each winter, after which Mullah Omar announces his guidance and intent for the coming year," according to the assessment.
Mullah Omar's insurgency has established an elaborate alternative government known as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, McChrystal writes, which is capitalizing on the Afghan government's weaknesses. "They appoint shadow governors for most provinces, review their performance, and replace them periodically. They established a body to receive complaints against their own 'officials' and to act on them. They install 'shari'a' [Islamic law] courts to deliver swift and enforced justice in contested and controlled areas. They levy taxes and conscript fighters and laborers. They claim to provide security against a corrupt government, ISAF forces, criminality, and local power brokers. They also claim to protect Afghan and Muslim identity against foreign encroachment."
"The QST has been working to control Kandahar and its approaches for several years and there are indications that their influence over the city and neighboring districts is significant and growing," McChrystal writes.
The second main insurgency group is the Haqqani network (HQN), which is active in southeastern Afghanistan and draws money and manpower "principally from Pakistan, Gulf Arab networks, and from its close association with al Qaeda and other Pakistan-based insurgent groups." At another point in the assessment, McChrystal says, "Al Qaeda's links with HQN have grown, suggesting that expanded HQN control could create a favorable environment" for associated extremist movements "to re-establish safe-havens in Afghanistan."
The third is the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin insurgency, which maintains bases in three Afghan provinces "as well as Pakistan," the assessment says. This network, led by the former mujaheddin commander Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, "aims to negotiate a major role in a future Taliban government. He does not currently have geographical objectives as is the case with the other groups," though he "seeks control of mineral wealth and smuggling routes in the east."
Overall, McChrystal provides this conclusion about the enemy: "The insurgents control or contest a significant portion of the country, although it is difficult to assess precisely how much due to a lack of ISAF presence. . . . "
The insurgents make money from the production and sale of opium and other narcotics, but the assessment says that "eliminating insurgent access to narco-profits -- even if possible, and while disruptive -- would not destroy their ability to operate so long as other funding sources remained intact."
While the insurgency is predominantly Afghan, McChrystal writes that it "is clearly supported from Pakistan. Senior leaders of the major Afghan insurgent groups are based in Pakistan, are linked with al Qaeda and other violent extremist groups, and are reportedly aided by some elements of Pakistan's ISI," which is its intelligence service. Al-Qaeda and other extremist movements "based in Pakistan channel foreign fighters, suicide bombers, and technical assistance into Afghanistan, and offer ideological motivation, training, and financial support."
Toward the end of his report, McChrystal revisits his central theme: "Failure to provide adequate resources also risks a longer conflict, greater casualties, higher overall costs, and ultimately, a critical loss of political support. Any of these risks, in turn, are likely to result in mission failure."
Josh Boak and Evelyn Duffy contributed to this report.
A redacted version of the assessment can be found here:
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf
[hat tip: Mudville Gazette]
Ret10Echo
09-21-2009, 06:22
The U.S. keeps "squeezing the balloon". Zero and the Administration (civil) went for what seemed like an easy win in Afghanistan. Relieved pressure on Iraq, increased pressure in A-stan. :eek:
Right now there are a bunch of unqualified 20-somethings in the White House, with ipods in their ears trying to play "Jeopardy" with the troop-levels as they currently are and find out what to revise the mission to.
This, of-course will be followed by a multi-city campaign tour selling the "new" vision as the best thing ever.
Who leaked this report to Woodward? Doubt it came from the General's staff. Probably not something from the 20-somethings iPhone-implanted bong-heads, either. And, why Woodward and not via the House or Senate liberal pickle-heads? Methinks the leak was a decision from the highest levels of the WH and intended to allow our Dear Leader to show his involvement to study the issues, blah, blah, blah.
Material that provides a Commanding Gneeral's opinion about any aspect of the theater is sensitive stuff, and the leaking of it to the media is criminal. Has it happened before/will it happen again? Probably. And it should be prosecuted. Playing politics with the lives of soldiers is the vile practice we should have learned from history to avoid.
Who was it that leaked this stuff to Woodward? Who made the decision?
Just wondering. :munchin
The Reaper
09-21-2009, 10:11
So what is the opinion of the COIN experts that have been there? Will more conventional troops help or hurt the situation?
It will depend on what they are used for.
TR
Surf n Turf
09-21-2009, 16:34
McChrystal to resign if not given resources for Afghanistan
Looks like the blogs have already taken up the issue.
I wonder if we finally have a GO who means what he says, and says what he means.
SnT
Within 24 hours of the leak of the Afghanistan assessment to The Washington Post, General Stanley McChrystal's team fired its second shot across the bow of the Obama administration. According to McClatchy, military officers close to General McChrystal said he is prepared to resign if he isn't given sufficient resources (read troops) to implement a change in direction in Afghanistan
Read more: http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2009/09/mcchrystal_to_resign_if_not_gi.php#ixzz0RmbIkePf
greenberetTFS
09-21-2009, 22:27
It will depend on what they are used for.
TR
This is the response to what to do to "Win" the war in A-Stan................;)
It will depend on what they are used for.
Showing the civilian populace that it is in their best interest to support us and our policies (us being US and the Afghan government) rather than the Taliban and AQ.
Making our HN leadership look good.
Using Afghan forces when interacting with the populace.
Taking time to drink chai with the local leadership, repeatedly over several months, and work with them on projects to make them look good. Then you start asking them for things, quietly.
Help your friends.
Saying please and thank you when appropriate.
Not busting into every store to find caches, unless every store has one.
Paying when you break something.
The tool for surgery is a scalpel, not a sledgehammer.
You look for networks, and attack key personnel only if you cannot co-opt them.
You close the borders.
Not firing in the vicinity of women, children, and non-combatants with area effect weapons.
Keep the rock and roll with everything you have, to include air strikes, when you are in a defensive location, or out in the boonies.
If you have to hit someone, you swoop in under cover of darkness, hit the house you are after, the specific room you need to, with a minimum of fanfare, and grab the guy and get out without his family even knowing you are there.
Consider that we are about the third or fourth occupiers in the last 100 years, and those before us all failed.
Think about it like this. A potentially hostile force has invaded the U.S. under the guise of providing military assistance. A bunch of them drive from the next state to descend on your neighborhood looking for the resistance and their support. They bust into your store, and trash it. They break down the door to your house, and rough you up in front of your wife and kids before groping them and slapping them around. They do not speak your language, and use collaborators as translators. Their U.S. lackeys ransack your house, and take your personal possessions for their own. Then they leave, having seized your cash, crops, gun collection, son, and a few of the prominent citizens from your neighborhood, like your mayor, the teachers, the veterans, etc. They kill a couple of dozen of your neighbors, friends, and family, only a few who were actual Taliban supporters. Does this make you more likely to support the government that they have helped establish? Doesn't matter if the above actually happened as described, or not. Perceptions are everything. did you ever see "Red Dawn"?
That is the point we seem to have lost, unfortunately, especially the Marines.
That is the difference between a quiet, professional special operations force, who do this for years at the time, and guys who just claim the name for a few months.
This isn't just a poster:
SOF Imperatives
Understand the operational environment
Recognize political implications
Facilitate interagency activities
Engage the threat discriminately
Consider long-term effects
Ensure legitimacy and credibility of Special Operations
Anticipate and control psychological effects
Apply capabilities indirectly
Develop multiple options
Ensure long-term sustainment
Provide sufficient intelligence
Balance security and synchronization
TR
Makes sense to me......;)
Big Teddy
This offers a pretty good summary of the current situation and major issues affecting any COAs.
Richard's $.02 :munchin
In Afghanistan Assessment, a Catalyst for Obama
NYT, 22 Sep 2009
President Obama could read the grim assessment of the Afghanistan war from his top military commander there in two possible ways.
He could read Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal’s report as a blunt and impassioned last-chance plea for a revamped counterinsurgency strategy bolstered by thousands more combat troops to rescue the beleaguered, eight-year mission.
Or he could read it as a searing indictment of American-led NATO military operations and a corrupt Afghan civilian government, pitted against a surprisingly adaptive and increasingly dangerous insurgency.
Either way, General McChrystal’s 66-page report with the deceptively bland title “Commander’s Initial Assessment” is serving to catalyze the thinking of a president — who is keenly aware of the historical perils of a protracted, faraway war — about what he can realistically accomplish in this conflict, and whether his vision for the war and a commitment of American troops is the same as his general’s.
Mr. Obama faces a deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan, growing opposition to the war at home from Democrats and a desire to put off any major troop decision while he still needs much political capital to pass major health care legislation in Congress.
But even as the president expresses skepticism about sending more American troops to Afghanistan until he has settled on the right strategy, he is also grappling with a stark reality: it will be very hard to say no to General McChrystal.
Mr. Obama has called Afghanistan a “war of necessity,” and in the most basic terms he has the same goal as President George W. Bush did after the Sept. 11 attacks, to prevent another major terrorist assault.
“Whatever decisions I make are going to be based first on a strategy to keep us safe, then we’ll figure out how to resource it,” Mr. Obama said Sunday on CBS’s “Face the Nation.”
“We’re not going to put the cart before the horse and just think by sending more troops we’re automatically going to make Americans safe,” he said.
The White House expects General McChrystal’s request to be not just for American troops but for NATO forces as well. This week, the White House is sending questions about his review back to the general in Kabul, Afghanistan, and expects to get responses by the end of next week.
Senator Carl Levin, a Michigan Democrat who heads the Armed Services Committee, said in an interview Monday that he wants to know how the uncertainty surrounding the recent Afghan elections and a plan to reintegrate Taliban fighters into Afghan society could affect General McChrystal’s troop request.
Mr. Obama has had only one meeting so far on the McChrystal review, but aides plan to schedule three or four more after he returns from the Group of 20 summit meeting in Pittsburgh at the end of this week.
Aides said it should take weeks, not months, to make a decision. “The president’s been very clear in our discussion that he’s open-minded and he’s not going to be swayed by political correctness one way or the other,” Gen. James L. Jones, the national security adviser, said in an interview. “Different people are going to have different opinions, and he wants to hear them, but at the end of the day, he’s going to do what he thinks is the right thing for the United States and most especially for the men and women who have to respond to his orders.”
Senior officers who work with General McChrystal say he was surprised by the dire condition of the Afghan mission when he assumed command in June.
His concerns went beyond the strength and resilience of the insurgency. General McChrystal was surprised by the lack of efficient military organization at the NATO headquarters and that a significant percentage of the troops were not positioned to carry out effective counterinsurgency operations.
There was a sense among General McChrystal’s staff that the military effort in Afghanistan was disjointed and had not learned from the lessons of the past years of the war.
“We haven’t been fighting in Afghanistan for eight years,” said one officer. “We’ve been fighting in Afghanistan for one year, eight times in a row.”
In his assessment, General McChrystal also portrayed a more sophisticated Taliban foe that uses propaganda effectively and taps into the Afghan prison system as a training ground.
Taliban leaders based in Pakistan appoint shadow governors for most provinces, install their own courts, levy taxes, conscript fighters and wield savvy propagandists. They stand in sharp contrast to a corrupt and inept government.
And Taliban fighters exert control not only through bombs and bullets. “The insurgents wage a ‘silent war’ of fear, intimidation and persuasion throughout the year — not just during the warmer weather ‘fighting season’ — to gain control over the population,” the general said in his report.
Administration officials said that the general’s assessment, while very important, was just one component in the president’s thinking.
Asked on CNN on Sunday why after eight months in office he was still searching for a strategy, Mr. Obama took issue. “We put a strategy in place, clarified our goals, but what the election has shown, as well as changing circumstances in Pakistan, is that this is going to be a very difficult operation,” he said, referring to the Afghan election. “We’ve got to make sure that we’re constantly refining it to keep our focus on what our primary goals are.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/22/world/asia/22strategy.html?partner=rss&emc=rss
Utah Bob
09-22-2009, 13:09
I think the Presidential Seal should have a waffle instead of an eagle in it. :rolleyes:
And under the political big top - if you'll direct your attention to this ring...:confused:
Richard's $.02 :munchin
A D.C. Whodunit: Who Leaked And Why?
Ben Smith, Politico, 22 Sep 2009
Bob Woodward’s Monday-morning exclusive on a 66-page report from Gen. Stanley McChrystal to President Barack Obama about Afghanistan policy was a rite of passage for the new administration: the first major national security leak and a sure sign that the celebrated Washington Post reporter has penetrated yet another administration.
White House officials greeted the leak with a grimace, but none suggested they’d begin a witch hunt for the leaker. Woodward is famous for his access to the principals themselves — he recently traveled to Afghanistan with National Security Adviser James Jones — and leak hunters couldn’t expect with confidence that they’d find themselves disciplining just an undisciplined junior staffer.
But inside the White House and out, the leak touched off another familiar Washington ritual: speculation about the leaker’s identity and motives.
This is a capital parlor game that, for the Obama administration, has some dire implications. Unless the West Wing somehow orchestrated an elaborate head fake — authorizing what looks at first blush like an intolerable breach of Obama’s internal deliberations — the Woodward story suggests deeper problems for a new president than a bad news cycle.
Woodward — like other reporters, only more so — tends to shake loose information when he can exploit policy conflicts within an administration. There is now a big one over a critical national security decision, along with evidence that some people who ostensibly work for Obama feel they can pressure him with impunity. It took several years within former President George W. Bush’s administration before deep personal and policy fissures became visible.
So who did it?
The simplest theory — and one most administration officials Monday were endorsing — is that a military or civilian Pentagon official who supports McChrystal’s policy put it out in an attempt to pressure Obama to follow McChrystal’s suggestion and increase troop levels in Afghanistan.
But not everyone in Washington is a believer in Occam’s razor, so all manner of other theories flourished.
There are believers in the reverse leak, in which the leak itself is meant to damage McChrystal’s position by inducing White House anger at the general. There’s the fake leak, in which the White House may have been trying to back itself into a corner. A former government official with ties to the Pentagon said the talk in the building was that a senior military official had given it to the reporter for his book on the Obama White House — not realizing it could end up in print sooner.
“That places the ball clearly in the president’s court,” former Clinton Defense Secretary William Cohen said, noting that Obama had already publicly placed his trust in McChrystal’s judgment.
“It’s an effort — whether by [McChrystal] or by somebody in the Pentagon or maybe the White House — to say, ‘You’ve asked the military to give you not what you want to hear but what you have to know. Now it’s up to you as commander in chief to decide if you think you have a better idea.’”
The leak is a shot across the bows, he said, of Vice President Joe Biden and of leading congressional Democrats who oppose a buildup in Afghanistan.
Another Clinton veteran with experience in national security matters was not so sure, however, that Obama wasn’t helped by a piece that lays the public ground for an inevitable troop escalation. “This thing has to have some airing and consideration by the public — so in the tactical sense, there’s a benefit to considering it,” the official said.
But some said all this speculation may be overthinking the matter. Many people in Washington, after all, are motivated by personal vanities as much as by policy convictions.
“It’s most likely someone who has or is cultivating a personal relationship with Bob Woodward and positioning himself to look good in Woodward’s next book,” said Matt Bennett, vice president at the Democratic-leaning think tank Third Way, echoing the views of many inside government and out.
The history of Woodward sources portrayed as heroes is long, including the likes of Colin Powell and, for a time, George W. Bush. But Woodward’s take on the Bush administration also changed dramatically with time, and some portrayed positively in his early books were savaged in the later ones.
Whatever the motive, the appearance of McChrystal’s report makes it more difficult for Obama to defer, through an extensive series of consultations, a decision over which side he will take in a debate over the recommendation of adding more soldiers and civilians to a more robust mission with the goal of giving Afghanistan — perhaps for the first time — a strong, functioning central government. The release follows a letter from a range of Obama’s usual critics — from neoconservative foreign policy thinkers to former Alaska Gov. Sarah Palin and Bush adviser Karl Rove — pressing Obama to follow just that policy.
“The Pentagon hasn’t changed and there are a lot of people within the Pentagon who understand the strategic use of the leak,” said Heather Hurlburt, executive director of the Democratic-leaning National Security Network. One possibility you have to look at is this being leaked by someone who is in league with the neocon assault on Obama, where anything short of ‘all in’ is framed as weak and a defeat.”
In the larger sense, the document’s contents are completely unsurprising — McChrystal’s views were widely known, and the assessment just spells them out. But giving the document to a brand name like Bob Woodward, who has a flair for the dramatic, ensures big play in The Washington Post and broad pickup by other media.
“This leak would, by all appearances, be the act of someone who supports an increase in troop strength and resources,” said Kevin Kellems, a communications director for former Vice President Dick Cheney, who noted that “the power of Woodward going on page A1 is exceptional” in its ability to dictate to wire services and cable outlets, a vanishing power of the newspapers. “This is the act most likely of a civilian who is an advocate of this position and believes they were right to do this because lives were at stake.”
Third Way’s Bennett, whose group backs a bigger commitment in Afghanistan, said he thought the document would do McChrystal’s position more harm than good.
“It’s not going to pressure the president to go the way they want him to go,” he said. “It’s going to annoy people in the White House, and that’s never a good idea.”
Others argued that the White House itself benefits from the leak.
“It’s a helpful thing to have out in the ether for the White House,” said Dan Senor, a former spokesman for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, who said the report would help beat back criticism on the left. “I think the White House wants to convey how much pressure they’re under from the military,” he said, adding that he wouldn’t speculate on the source of the leak.
Others simply welcomed the fact that the leak might force a quicker decision on an urgent question.
“It at least, for the first time, gives people a tangible picture of what the recommended options are, and it to some extent forces the issue,” said Anthony Cordesman, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies who has been critical of an Afghan buildup. “The tendency in the White House is to try and slip this until health care and possibly the economy are taken care of, but nobody has that kind of time.”
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0909/27414.html
“This leak would, by all appearances, be the act of someone who supports an increase in troop strength and resources,” said Kevin Kellems
I can't help thinking it's someone who wants to force a withdrawal.
Team Sergeant
09-22-2009, 16:26
I can't help thinking it's someone who wants to force a withdrawal.
Or simply put Gen McChrystal want the former ACORN "Community Organizer" to shit or get off the pot.
Give them what they need or fold.
Surf n Turf
09-22-2009, 16:41
I can't help thinking it's someone who wants to force a withdrawal.
nmap,
I disagree.
I think that the “leak(s)” was/were orchestrated to force Øbama to make a decision to supply the necessary tools that HIS hand picked General, on the ground, needs to win the war.
If Øbama blinks, he catches the wrath of the public, and maybe a withdrawal.
If Øbama supports General McChrystal, then we have a situation where we are finally providing our military with the equipment and manpower to fight and to win a conflict.
In either case, we don’t, once again, put the Military in a NO-WIN situation.
SnT
When I hear the voice(s) of wisdom, I pay attention.
Thank you both, Team Sergeant and Surf n Turf. I can see your point.
Surf n Turf
09-22-2009, 17:19
Or simply put Gen McChrystal want the former ACORN "Community Organizer" to shit or get off the pot.
Give them what they need or fold.
I think Team Sergeant and I said the same thing, only he said it more succinctly. :D
SnT
And so it goes...;)
Richard's $.02 :munchin
Will McChrystal Quit?
Robert Dreyfuss, The Nation, 22 Sep 2009
Yesterday morning, at a meeting of the neoconservative Foreign Policy Initiative, a former top US military officer suggested that General Stanley McChrystal might resign from his post if President Obama doesn't go along with his pending request for more troops for Afghanistan.
Brig. Gen. Mark T. Kimmitt, a former Bush administration official and Centcom officer, in answer to a question from the panel's moderator, said that he hoped that the differences between the White House and its generals didn't escalate to such a dramatic level. But, he said, if Obama doesn't give McChrystal the resources he needs, then the four-star general might quit. "Most commanders would offer their resignation" if they perceive that the commander-in-chief isn't giving them what they need, he said. In that case, McChrystal might have to say: "I'm not capable of doing it. Maybe somebody else is."
At the conclusion of the panel, I asked Kimmitt about his comments, and he emphasized that he isn't predicting that McChrystal might quit. McChrystal, he said, is presenting Obama with three choices: a maximum option, that would involve up to 40,000 more troops, a middle option, and a low option. Under all three, Kimmitt said, McChrystal believes that he can do the job. On the other hand, if he doesn't get the low option, probably something like an additional 15,000 troops, the general might consider quitting.
Needless to say, the resignation of McChrystal, who's been elevated to near-hero status by the Republican right, would be a frontal challenge to the White House. So far, in a sign that the White House isn't playing patsy for the military, the administration has resisted bringing McChrystal back to Washington to testify, Petraeus-style, before Congress. And they've downplayed the significance of McChrystal's role, saying that his input is just one of many sources that are providing information to the White House as it considers the next phase of its failing Afghanistan strategy.
At least one report today suggests that Obama might refuse to support additional forces in Afghanistan, instead relying on targeted Predator-type attacks on Al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan and Pakistan:
"President Barack Obama's strategy against al-Qaida may shift away from more troops in Afghanistan and toward more drone strikes against terrorist targets.
"As the war worsens in Afghanistan, Obama could steer away from the comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy he laid out this spring and toward a narrower focus on counterterror operations.
"Two senior administration officials said Monday that the renewed fight against al-Qaida could lead to more missile attacks on Pakistan terrorist havens by unmanned U.S. spy planes. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because no decisions have been made."
The Wall Street Journal reports today that the administration has ordered McChrystal to delay submitting his call for more forces:
"The Pentagon has told its top commander in Afghanistan to delay submitting his request for additional troops, defense officials say, amid signs that the Obama administration is rethinking its strategy for combating a resurgent Taliban."
And the paper adds:
"One senior administration official involved in Afghan policy acknowledged that the White House and Gen. McChrystal's headquarters may not yet be on the same page on the way forward in Afghanistan.
"But the official said Mr. Obama needs to take a much broader view than the Afghan commander when deciding whether to send more forces.
"'Stan McChrystal is not responsible for assessing how we're doing against al Qaeda,' said the senior administration official. 'He's not assessing how the Pakistani military is doing in its counterinsurgency campaign. That's not his job. So Stan's report is a very important input into this overall strategy, but it's not the only input.'"
The New York Times, in its news analysis piece today, notes that McChrystal is a potent force:
"Even as the president expresses skepticism about sending more American troops to Afghanistan until he has settled on the right strategy, he is also grappling with a stark reality: it will be very hard to say no to General McChrystal."
But, like the Journal, the Times notes:
"Administration officials said that the general's assessment, while very important, was just one component in the president's thinking."
It's clear that, for Obama at least, the catastrophic election in Afghanistan is a game-changer. Now, not only is the US fighting an uphill battle in Afghanistan, but it's fighting on behalf of an obviously corrupt, unrepresentative government that is hardly a model of democracy.
In fact, however, no democracy will be unfolding in Afghanistan anytime soon. As we exit, we'll have to leave that country to the tender mercies of its warlord-ridden, tribal based fiefdoms, including the pro-Taliban ones, and let them fight it out. As I've written before, Obama will have to sit down with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan, and ask them to use all their influence with the Taliban to get them to make a deal, at least one that excludes Al Qaeda from the mix. They'll have to sit down with Russia, India and Iran to get them to persuade their friends and allies, including the non-Pashtun Afghans that made up most of the Northern Alliance, to cut a deal with the pro-Taliban Pashtuns. And it will have to bring China into the package, too. It's a huge and complex diplomatic undertaking, and it will require the United States to give each of those countries some concessions in other areas, a price that they can extract for cooperating with Washington on its Afghan exit.
http://www.thenation.com/blogs/dreyfuss/475977/will_mcchrystal_quit
TOMAHAWK9521
09-22-2009, 22:50
After reading TR’s response about more conventional troops going to A-Stan “It will depend on what they are used for”, it reminded me of a conversation I had with a family member of mine who is currently over there.
Last Saturday, I got a call from one of my nephews who is with the 82nd working PSD for the RC-East in Kabul. It's his third tour, but this time instead of being a regular squad leader in the MPs he's doing PSD work for senior ranking officers and/or CSMs.
Anyway, he and I were discussing the conditions over there and he pretty much echoed my sentiments that I voiced in a diatribe on another thread about how the military installations in both theaters are overloaded with dead weight and oxygen thieves collecting paychecks and all the luxuries made available to accommodate them. My nephew informed me that things are changing in A-Stan. It turns out my nephew works with the detail that surrounds Gen McChrystal from time to time and informed me that Gen McChrystal has no love for the excessive and useless FOBBIT populations.
According to my nephew, the general walked into a FOB coffee shop and found it occupied by several military personnel. I don't know what the ranks were but my nephew said they were generally staff personnel from various branches and units. This was at 11:00 local. McChrystal went from this person to that asking very politely what they were doing there. He received a range of answers, none that justified their attendance. McChrystal suggested to them that perhaps they should probably be on their way and get back to work. Now, a smart person would have detected the general's attempt at making a subtle hint and made a hasty exit but a good number of them evidently scored low on the ASVAB. Gen McChrystal got to the door and turned around and very uncharacteristically ripped into everyone sitting in the cafe. I'm not clear on the specific volume, terms or vernacular employed but the message was readily received by all and the place emptied.
The follow-up has been that McChrystal has been counting heads on the units located on the FOBs and if he finds them excessive and/or worthless in the mission they are supposed to be doing, he has them shipped home. That being said, I hope the administration pays attention to the details in the general’s choice of troops to send over rather than just sending a generic assortment from the 570th Mess Kit Repair.
Surf n Turf
09-23-2009, 13:48
Wonder who is going to stand up, on principle, and say -- NO WAY.
If they don't supply more troops, those already there are more endangered
If they supply more troops, the "left" will go crazy.
In either case, don't even try to blame this FUBAR exercise on the Military.
SnT
Gates unsure on more Afghanistan troops
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has not decided whether he agrees with the assessment of his top commander in Afghanistan that more troops are needed, the Pentagon said on Wednesday.
Gates's uncertainty underscored the intensity of the debate within the Obama administration over how to move forward, and put a spotlight on what some congressional critics see as a rift between some of the nation's top military and civilian leaders as U.S. public opinion has turned against the war.
President Barack Obama, who has described himself as a "skeptical audience" when it comes to sending more troops, has launched a broad review of his six-month-old counterinsurgency strategy. Officials said the White House was considering options besides a large increase in the number of troops.
"His view, ultimately, on more troops is still a work in progress," Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell said of Gates. "He has not come to a final determination on what he believes to be the best way forward."
http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE58M5FD20090923?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews&rpc=22&sp=true
ZonieDiver
09-23-2009, 13:51
Wonder who is going to stand up, on principle, and say -- NO WAY.
If the events during the Viet Nam War are any indicator, no active duty officer over the rank of LTC. :mad:
greenberetTFS
09-24-2009, 02:03
greenberetTFS,
Your assessment is very good. In fact.........absolutely on the money, IMO.
Although complicated, the stakes are at an all time premium and you pointed out the best way through it.
I see a last oppurtinity, and a N.A. Continental distraction, if we have a go at it your way. Can be done. Borders and surrounding regional and world activity will be worth watching. I am watching. Excellent thought greenberetTFS.
Once again this is the point where I state what shalt and forever be stated by me:
If the US Army SF was allowed to do, from day #1, what they do oh so well, we would not be in this predicament.
I've received several PM's basically approving "my comments" on A-Stan,they are not mine........:( TR responded to a question I asked him several months ago on what we need to do in A-Stan since what we've done so far is not working and "HE" responded with that in depth answer.....,.:confused: Please review my post and see his last initials as TR/quote/ at the end of "HIS" post which I copied to respond to his original short post.......;)
Big Teddy :munchin
I would defer to folks with military experience on General McChrystal's request, but as a civilian he comes across as a smart, tough, experienced soldier who is quite willing to tackle this job. He has asked for and should receive the tools he needs to succeed. Perhaps I'm naive, but it seems he is on the right track, since the recent spike in Taliban attacks seems designed to inflict a high number of US casualties, and bring the human cost issue to the forefront while Oba-Mao decides.
Admiral Stockdale once said, a leader has to have the "hard heart" needed to make the correct decision, even if it is unpopular or costly in lives. I think Obama's 180 on Afghanistan stems from fears it will escalate, turn into his Vietnam and hurt his re-election chances, ignoring the dire risk we face going forward by conceding a haven for the Taliban.
I think we have seen this movie before...
Barack Obama furious at General Stanley McChrystal speech on Afghanistan
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/barackobama/6259582/Barack-Obama-furious-at-General-Stanley-McChrystal-speech-on-Afghanistan.html
".........................A military expert said: "They still have working relationship but all in all it's not great for now."
Some commentators regarded the general's London comments as verging on insubordination.
Bruce Ackerman, an expert on constitutional law at Yale University, said in the Washington Post: "As commanding general, McChrystal has no business making such public pronouncements."
He added that it was highly unusual for a senior military officer to "pressure the president in public to adopt his strategy".
Relations between the general and the White House began to sour when his report, which painted a grim picture of the allied mission in Afghanistan, was leaked. White House aides have since briefed against the general's recommendations................................"
NMAP, you just lost a couple jars of preserved black-eyed peas and jalapenos. I got another family to feed, should they find themselves on this side of the state.
Yikes! Fortunately, I'll bring some toys that will help us acquire more. ;)
To make a simple observation, one might ask. What are we doing right, what are we doing wrong? What is the enemy doing that is hurting our efforts? What can we do to correct? Can we win force on force? Can we recruit spies as they have?
I know this is simplfying much broader issues.
Anyone dare guess the General who first said, "We could have won the Vietnam War in any given two week period".
Not making a comparision between the two, just thinking similarities when we consider, "securing the local populace", "nation building", or "fighting the enemy".
Negative my brother. We will have plenty. Your aggression is coming out. Sounds like you are thinking with an empty stomach.:p
Actually, I'm thinking of culture, of cultural change, and of the implications. You may recall that I have mentioned Diamond's book Collapse. Among other things he examines two cultures - one, the Norse Greenland colony, and the other, Easter Island. Each offers a glimpse of some possibilities - and, ultimately, will tie into Wet Dog's points.
Both the Greenland colony and Easter island were small, isolated societies. It seems likely that everyone knew everyone else, and that everyone was related to everyone else. In the Greenland case, the global climate got cooler, shortening the growing season. In the case of Easter Island, the inhabitants cut down the trees such that they couldn't build boats to exploit the good (but distant) fishing areas. So each society faced famine.
The Norse all died. Every man, woman and child. Not by violence; rather, the evidence shows that they quite literally starved to death in the cold. As the less productive farms ran out of food, they went to their more prosperous neighbors. The neighbors shared what they had. The trend continued until everyone ran out of food. They didn't make it.
In contrast, the Easter Islanders fragmented into warring bands. The population declined by 95%. They appear to have engaged in cannibalism. However, they survived.
These two societies may offer a basis for reflection on what might happen in our own society, and on what anyone with a safe-haven might face. Who does one welcome in - and who gets turned away? There are no easy answers.
But on the underlying issue, isn't it interesting how the culture determines what people do? And how it can lead to very different outcomes.
To make a simple observation, one might ask. What are we doing right, what are we doing wrong?
Afghanistan has never been successfully occupied since Alexander. The British empire failed, and so did the Soviets. Granted, they got help from us in the fight against the USSR, but I suspect they're getting supplies from someone somewhere now. The Soviets (according to my very limited understanding) tried to change the culture and sought to "build socialism". It didn't work.
The Taliban appear (if news reports are to be believed) to have momentum right now. So the other side can point to the track record and suggest that the U.S. will suffer the same fate as all the others. Perhaps this is the reason for General McChrystal's desire to implement a troop surge - to change the perception of momentum.
I cannot help but wonder if our underlying problem is that we are attempting to change the culture in a short time - with anything less than a generation representing a short time. For example, the U.S. seems to support a more benign treatment of women and girls - but this represents a deep change within the culture. If it worked, we could create a schism in the society which would weaken the enemy. However, until it works, the effort seems likely to stimulate opposition.
It occurs to me that this connects with Warrior-Mentor's thread about negativity LINK (http://www.professionalsoldiers.com/forums/showthread.php?p=287424#post287424) which considers the problem of cultures. If the fundamental tenets of the culture - not just Islam, but the overall culture of Afghanistan and its people - support (and have successfully supported) resistance, then perhaps that environment requires fundamental and permanent change. The culture as it is would require transformation into something else. Or, more pointedly, destruction of the existing culture would eliminate the soil from which the Taliban grow.
I know of only one model that seems to have worked - China in Tibet. It seems to have combined massive occupation with colonization, thus steadily eroding and diluting the existing culture. While probably not practical for us in Afghanistan, it may illustrate the magnitude of the task.
And, as always, if I've made fundamental errors, I welcome correction.
..., Both the Greenland colony and Easter island were small, isolated societies. It seems likely that everyone knew everyone else, and that everyone was related to everyone else. In the Greenland case, the global climate got cooler, shortening the growing season. In the case of Easter Island, the inhabitants cut down the trees such that they couldn't build boats to exploit the good (but distant) fishing areas. So each society faced famine.
The Norse all died. Every man, woman and child. Not by violence; rather, the evidence shows that they quite literally starved to death in the cold.
Afghanistan has never been successfully occupied since Alexander.
I would like to add and not in any order; that the Greenland Colony failed, because they actually thought they could settle the region. Kinda like taking two Panda Bears and putting them in the NYC Zoo. If Greenland was used only as a shipping port for points further west, the Greenland Colony would still be there.
Today, Greenland, imports most of it's goods, only exporting it's limited natural resources, but wait, that was my point.
Alaxander the Great, was successful in conquering Afghanistan, but he left before he could really occupy, I'll say he was lucky. In fact he made alliances with local tribal leaders giving large saleries from other campaigns in order to keep the peace. Alexander never intended on staying, all he wan't was passage. Culturally, Alexander had more in common with Afghanistan then either the Russians, British or Americans. Alexander represented, absolute rule, strength and power. Something the locals could appreciate. Today, Afghanistans represents in an odd way, national pride, but I don't see them sending any number of teams to compete in Rio, Brazil.
The Russians invaded, I believe for one reason and one reason only, they needed warm water ports. Afghanistan was simply a stepping stone to that end. Russia would have been successful if they had made trade with the locals much like Alexander, and not change cultures or ideals.
Colonies for the most part fail. The Norse, only a small percentage thought the settlement would work. Most of their culture never attempted the colony. Most married other "northern" tribes, Celts, Swede/Vikings, German, Irish, etc.
I know what Alexander would do today. He would export all women to other lands, creating a "barren land" that would die in 20-40 years. Elliminating any chance of occupation, by anyone.
WD
Afghanistan has never been successfully occupied since Alexander. The British empire failed, and so did the Soviets.
Respectfully, I think the Mongols basically went in took over and ruled Afghanistan with characteristic efficiency and brutality. To be fair I don't see us obliterating entire cities or pouring molten gold down Taliban Chieftains throats...
I would like to add and not in any order; that the Greenland Colony failed, because they actually thought they could settle the region. ................
At the time of the first settlements they could "settle the area." Greenland was established during the Medieval warm period that lasted from about 800-1300. The last written record from Greenland was from 1408.
The Norse who settled on the Greenland Coast transplanted their agriculural society to the area. During the warm period that and trade with the east worked well.
With the coming cold the grazing was reduced and trade with the east slowed. The Greenlanders failed to change with the times, shrank into smaller communities and died out.
There were native cultures near the Norse folks but they failed to learn from them and switch to a sea related community or to suppliment their agricultural life with sea produce. A study of the later trash piles show very little ocean related bones compared to land animals.
Dozer523
10-07-2009, 10:38
NMAP
Awesome references. Jared Diamonds Collapse and the companion Guns Germs and Steel (imo way, more better) offer quite a bit to this discussion. Another book along the same lines I recommend is 1491. (The year BEFORE Columbus)
Dozer523
10-07-2009, 10:57
After According to my nephew, the general walked into a FOB coffee shop and found it occupied by several military personnel. I don't know what the ranks were but my nephew said they were generally staff personnel from various branches and units. This was at 11:00 local. McChrystal went from this person to that asking very politely what they were doing there. He received a range of answers, none that justified their attendance. McChrystal suggested to them that perhaps they should probably be on their way and get back to work. Now, a smart person would have detected the general's attempt at making a subtle hint and made a hasty exit but a good number of them evidently scored low on the ASVAB. Gen McChrystal got to the door and turned around and very uncharacteristically ripped into everyone sitting in the cafe. I'm not clear on the specific volume, terms or vernacular employed but the message was readily received by all and the place emptied.
TOM this post is not meant to question or in anyway disrespect your nephew. But, I offer a little context having been assigned to Camp Eggers. Andd my money say this probably happened at the Green Bean down by the ClamShell next to the Internet cafe and the free weight gym and the library (provided they put it BACK where it was before some idiot moved it). Camp Eggers operates 24 hours a day. Lots of shift work. There are few places where staffers can sit and discuss (vs breif). The Green Bean is the only place with couches! And, at least when I was there, it was the Stamtische. I suspect more gets accomplished in the Green Bean then in the cramped offices.
Yes, I'm sure it was dramatic. I'll bet I might've taken my cafe'americano and Stars and Stripes (BTW I was the guy who left the LA Times lyin' around) and done the crossword, crypyogram and Suduko in my little bitty conex room. Nah. . .
Glad it didn't turn into a slapping incident.
Although our country has turned upside down, culturally speaking, there are still a few million damb fine Americans that will govern the future.
I would contend that fully 90% - about 270,000,000 people - are, by and large, perfectly nice folks who want to lead a good life and have no desire to hurt anyone. And at least 50% - 150,000,000 or so - would, I think, qualify as "good people".
But you see, Rangertab1 - it isn't about their merit as people, nor mine, nor anyone else's. It is about the external forces which may drive their behavior - and that of billions of other perfectly nice people. Therein lies the problem.
If you're interested, perhaps we could start a new thread on the subject. Please PM me if you'd like to do that.
The Reaper
10-07-2009, 11:47
90% of the nice Americans are about 72 hours from reverting to savages.
Take away electricity, clean water, flush toilets, comms, wheels, a full cupboard, a universally accepted currency, and stores full of things to buy and watch what happens within days.
See Katrina for examples.
TR
greenberetTFS
10-07-2009, 13:35
TOM this post is not meant to question or in anyway disrespect your nephew. But, I offer a little context having been assigned to Camp Eggers. Andd my money say this probably happened at the Green Bean down by the ClamShell next to the Internet cafe and the free weight gym and the library (provided they put it BACK where it was before some idiot moved it). Camp Eggers operates 24 hours a day. Lots of shift work. There are few places where staffers can sit and discuss (vs breif). The Green Bean is the only place with couches! And, at least when I was there, it was the Stamtische. I suspect more gets accomplished in the Green Bean then in the cramped offices.
Yes, I'm sure it was dramatic. I'll bet I might've taken my cafe'americano and Stars and Stripes (BTW I was the guy who left the LA Times lyin' around) and done the crossword, crypyogram and Suduko in my little bitty conex room. Nah. . .
Glad it didn't turn into a slapping incident.
The L.A. Times crossword is for sissy's.......:p Try doing the N.Y. Times crossword with a pen and not a pencil with an eraser.....:rolleyes: Dozer,everytime I think your right up there with the BIG guys you let me down......:(
Big Teddy :munchin
90% of the nice Americans are about 72 hours from reverting to savages.
Take away electricity, clean water, flush toilets, comms, wheels, a full cupboard, a universally accepted currency, and stores full of things to buy and watch what happens within days.
See Katrina for examples.
TR
Your numbers are high NMAP. Start the new thread fore I forget what I am thinking.
I'm eager to say any thoughts you have on the scenario at LINK (http://www.professionalsoldiers.com/forums/showthread.php?p=287748#post287748)
frostfire
10-07-2009, 20:59
I would contend that fully 90% - about 270,000,000 people - are, by and large, perfectly nice folks who want to lead a good life and have no desire to hurt anyone. And at least 50% - 150,000,000 or so - would, I think, qualify as "good people".
But you see, Rangertab1 - it isn't about their merit as people, nor mine, nor anyone else's. It is about the external forces which may drive their behavior - and that of billions of other perfectly nice people. Therein lies the problem.
If you're interested, perhaps we could start a new thread on the subject. Please PM me if you'd like to do that.
90% of the nice Americans are about 72 hours from reverting to savages.
Take away electricity, clean water, flush toilets, comms, wheels, a full cupboard, a universally accepted currency, and stores full of things to buy and watch what happens within days.
See Katrina for examples.
TR
As usual, TR beat me to it and go straight to the point.
As the saying goes, "the true measure of a man is how he treats someone who can do him absolutely no good." Most folks are good people when life is nice and gooey. Why woudn't they: Seek pleasure, avoid pain. Under duress (and extreme stress), true character shows up. This won't apply to QP's, but I think the rest of us should attempt to evaluate our character, and establish a baseline to improve upon by exposing ourselves to (hopefully controlled) stress, be it psychological, emotional, physiological, and so on. To toughen the mind, and developing intestinal fortitude, so to speak. When things really go south, not only you want to be around dependable/competent people, you want yourself first, to be dependable.
“You gain strength, courage, and confidence by every experience in which you really stop to look fear in the face. You must do the thing you think you cannot do. Then you are able to say to yourself, 'I lived through this horror. I can take the next thing that comes along.”
~Eleanor Roosevelt
At the time of the first settlements they could "settle the area." Greenland was established during the Medieval warm period that lasted from about 800-1300. The last written record from Greenland was from 1408.
The Norse who settled on the Greenland Coast transplanted their agriculural society to the area. During the warm period that and trade with the east worked well.
With the coming cold the grazing was reduced and trade with the east slowed. The Greenlanders failed to change with the times, shrank into smaller communities and died out.
There were native cultures near the Norse folks but they failed to learn from them and switch to a sea related community or to suppliment their agricultural life with sea produce. A study of the later trash piles show very little ocean related bones compared to land animals.
That's a very interesting point. Could have the two cultures ultimately survived independently of other influences? Even with adapting to changing climate conditions, animal migration, diverse food sources, etc. I would think they could have if land was consistanly being made available to support an ever increasing population. Could they have remained a culture unique unto themselves, or is "inter-marriage" part of natural selection. Many have speculated why the Anasazi Indians "just" disappeared. I dare venture, they simply moved.
Dozer523
10-07-2009, 22:31
The L.A. Times crossword is for sissy's....... Try doing the N.Y. Times crossword with a pen and not a pencil with an eraser..... Dozer,everytime I think your right up there with the BIG guys you let me down......:(
Big Teddy I let you down, again.:( Oh Teddy it's worse then you imagine. I did the puzzles in the STARS AND STRIPES! :eek: (I DID do all three, though)
charlietwo
10-08-2009, 00:23
It turns out my nephew works with the detail that surrounds Gen McChrystal from time to time and informed me that Gen McChrystal has no love for the excessive and useless FOBBIT populations.
Tomahawk-- Thank you for that post... this is a problem that always got to me. Nice to see McChrystal is proactive and not solely a political creature.
...I hope the administration pays attention to the details in the general’s choice of troops to send over....
This has a familiar tone, from the movie "300", when the Senators asked the King/General where he was going. He simply said he was going for a "walk".
I tell ya, he'll turn the coffee shop into a shooting range because his wife won't let him have one at home.
I pulled this off the Small Wars Journal:
One brigade commander, Col. Michael Howard, is on his fourth tour in Afghanistan and understands it like few others. Still, there are pieces of this war that stop him cold. One of them is government corruption. "It's a cancer without a cure in Afghanistan, and if we don't come up with a cure, it will cause us to fail,'' Howard told me last month, biting off his words angrily.
This - to me - is a worrisome statement - as it was an issue which proved to be one of the major underlying problems of our entire Vietnam strategy - of the RVN not having a duly elected and functioning government, supported by and supportive of its people.
Richard
An oped piece from Jerry Hogan, a former SF Officer and retired LTC, who writes for local area papers - the LTs point-of-view is worth noting.
Richard
It’s Really Pretty Simple
Jerry Hogan, The Military View, 7 Oct 2009
And the argument goes on! Sitting on one side of the table are the President and his civilian advisors trying to understand military operations so they can make a decision on what the US should do about Afghanistan going forward. On the other side sit the military Generals and Admirals who have devoted their lives to studying and fighting wars. They think they know what should be done and they are arguing their case to convince the civilians of their proposed strategy.
So on one hand you have a group that really doesn’t understand the military ways of doing things but must face the political consequences if they decide wrong. On the other hand, you have a group that understands the military implications, but with the conservative nature of their profession, to insure against failure and to also consider the unknowns of war, they are arguing for a force and a strategy that probably has lots of safeguards and built in reserves if they are wrong.
So what do we the American people do to understand the issue?
It’s really pretty simple if you ask a grunt Lieutenant who has been living on the ground in Afghanistan for the last year, humping an 80-pound rucksack, carrying 60 pounds of body armor, drinking 30 bottles of water a day, and trying to survive and keep his men in one piece and alive until their tour is up. As he puts it, “there can only be one strategy that wins in Afghanistan: contain Pakistan, secure the population, the US Army and Marines need to get out of the Forward Operating Bases (FOB) and put small units no larger than Platoon size (about 40 men) out to mutually supporting positions among the population. Stop worrying about the MRPS (Mine Resistance Ambushed Protection vehicle) and other awful boondoggles that have no place in Afghanistan. Empower junior leaders by giving them battlespace (area of operations they will be responsible for with their forces) and holding them accountable for what happens in it. Right now there is no cohesive COIN (Counter Insurgency) strategy, no unity of command, no unity of effort and the focus is on the Taliban. This is backwards: secure the population and render the Taliban a moot point.”
He makes sense.
The big issue is Pakistan. It is a rogue Moslem nation with a new unsettled government. Their President was forced to resign from the Presidency after he first was forced to resign as head of the armed forces. The current President is the husband of a former Prime Minister who was thrown out of the country for corruption, allowed back in to run for PM, and then killed during the campaign less than two years ago. Her husband took her place in the race against another former PM who was also thrown out for corruption and allowed to come back into the country so he too could run for PM. The husband won the election and when the President resigned, he moved up.
While the military has always been the stabilizing force in the country, with the removal of the military president, there is uncertainty if this stabilization will remain. The country is one of nine countries of the world that has nuclear weapons. While they have been under the control and supervision of the military, because of the influence of the extremist Moslem groups in Pakistan, there is question as to the ability of the military to continue to safeguard the weapons if the government were to fall. More and more of the strict Sharia Law is becoming part of the everyday Pakistan life and continued pressure is being put on the government to adopt even more of this life style. The fear is that migrating extremists coming from Afghanistan into Pakistan to avoid the American and NATO forces will take control of the country turning it into a sanctuary for displaced Afghanistan Taliban and Al Queda terrorist fighters. With this occupation comes control of the government and then control of the nuclear weapons. And that is the West’s worst nightmare…Nuclear Weapons in the hands of terrorists.
So that’s the BIG problem when you debate a strategy for Afghanistan. All of the rest is how do you keep this from happening.
Our efforts over the last eight years have produced poor results. We have been able to oversee a free election, but now the world, and the Afghans, recognizes the winner of that election as being corrupt so that he cannot gain the respect and control of his country. We have been able to drive the Taliban into the hills and caves and across the border into Pakistan, but we have not been able to stop the movement back and forth between Afghanistan and Pakistan. For a long time the Taliban would only have limited engagements with the US and NATO forces, but now we are seeing more and larger scale attacks from the Taliban. Bombings are becoming more common in the cities and the Talban are growing in both strength and scope of action against US and NATO forces.
While Iraq has a very centralized governmental structure, Afghanistan has a very decentralized culture, life style, and physical structure. What worked in Iraq may not work in Afghanistan. But for any strategy to work, it must be one that involves the civilian population…you simply cannot kill all the bad guys; you must have the support of the people.
And that is what they are saying in Washington and that is what the grunt Lieutenant that spent the last year in Afghanistan is saying…”You have to protect the people, get them involved and make the victory their victory.”
How many additional US forces will it take to do this? I don’t know, but the choices are clear…either put sufficient forces in-country to insure TOTAL victory, or get out now. There will be no half-victory in Afghanistan and Pakistan!
I pulled this off the Small Wars Journal:
This - to me - is a worrisome statement - as it was an issue which proved to be one of the major underlying problems of our entire Vietnam strategy - of the RVN not having a duly elected and functioning government, supported by and supportive of its people.
Richard
Very disturbing is an understatement. What bothers me, I truly believe there is no one person who is advising the President on this. With enough, if any Military experience. I heard CNN talking about VP Bidens recommendation. Excuse me, but WTF over.....Biden!.
American troops in Afghanistan losing heart, say army chaplains
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/Afghanistan/article6865359.ece#
Look for this drum beat to pick up.
bravo22b
10-08-2009, 08:16
American troops in Afghanistan losing heart, say army chaplains
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/Afghanistan/article6865359.ece#
Look for this drum beat to pick up.
My old company commander, who I have a great deal of respect for, is the Brigade CDR for the unit in this article. I wonder what he would have to say about this.
If (and I do mean IF) this is an accurate representation of how these soldiers feel, one has to wonder where the feeling like there is no clear mission flows from, the unit leadership or the CINC?
I pulled this off the Small Wars Journal:
This - to me - is a worrisome statement - as it was an issue which proved to be one of the major underlying problems of our entire Vietnam strategy - of the RVN not having a duly elected and functioning government, supported by and supportive of its people.
Richard
One of my coworkers is deployed to Kabul right now as a Logisitcs Mentor for one of the Afghan Generals. She stated he is a very good guy, but tired of pounding his head against the wall. They are trying to revamp their supply system so that it is more transparent. But there are so many people that don't want the transparnecy because then they can't steal, graft, etc... The General knows he is swimming up stream and will never make any inroads and is just frustrated. So you have a small group fighting an entire culture of corruption, because they know their country can't move ahead without doing it, but the true powers that be, support the corruption.
Last week I got a follow on email from her stating that her mentoree, and all the other Afghan GOs that showed any thought to ending the corruption were summarily dismissed, and replacements were there by that afternoon. I haven't heard how the new batch is working out......
Warrior-Mentor
10-08-2009, 09:58
Here's his actual remarks (see attched).
Last week I got a follow on email from her stating that her mentoree, and all the other Afghan GOs that showed any thought to ending the corruption were summarily dismissed, and replacements were there by that afternoon.
Not surprising.
I have seen this happen at Battalion level with S-3s / S-2s / Company Commanders in order to retard the units conduct of effective targeted offensive operations as mentored by their advisors. In the particular case that I am remembering, the personnel shuffle was also accompanied by a redrawing of the Bn's operational area which also prevented it from conducting any sort of independent operations targeting the major "bad guy" areas without first coordinating and gaining permission from the same Chain of Command that replaced all the good officers and redrew the operational boundaries in the first place. :rolleyes:
WWTHD?* ;)
Richard
*What Would Tom Highway Do?
Team Sergeant
10-09-2009, 09:29
So now they have found "Government corruption", good for them, maybe they are now on the road to "civilization".
IMO Afgan government corruption should be the last of our concerns.
They live in mud huts as they have for thousands of years. They believe in a radical ideology where no-one but they are "right". They pray five times a day to a meteorite. They are world's biggest heroin dealer and see nothing wrong with that. When not farming heroin they are fighting someone/anyone. They have not added one positive idea, suggestion, export, art, etc etc to humanity since their discovery and we think we can beat them?
Here's a thought, in order to be "beat" you first need something to lose......
Please enlighten me and tell me what the people of Afghanistan have to lose?
What's that quote, "When you have nothing, you have nothing to lose."
After you're done with that please tell me what we're going to "win"?
And we call the people of Afghanistan simple-minded.....;)
Warrior-Mentor
10-09-2009, 12:17
Enclosed is a Letter from the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Chariman Ike Skelton. Rep Skelton prides himself as being a military historian - he has a recommended reading list that's over 100 books long and I've watched him chew a 3 star's ass for know knowing his military history (he deserved to have his asss chewed).
So here's a heavy hitter in the Democratic Party who actually knows something about military history (as opposed to Joe Biden) telling the President to listen to GEN McChrystal.
Read his assessment for yourself.
CJFarris
10-13-2009, 12:57
edit: nevermind
Obama hand picks a General and sends him to Afghanistan and says "Tell me what you need."
Almost two months ago the General said "More Troops."
Now we get.....
" White House Casts Doubt on Afghan Reliability"
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2009/10/18/us/politics/AP-US-US-Afghanistan.html?_r=1
".....''I don't see how President Obama can make a decision about the committing of our additional forces or even the further fulfillment of our mission that's here today without an adequate government in place or knowledge about what that government's going to be,'' said Sen. John Kerry, D-Mass....."
Obama and the D's are going to play Hide the Sausage for a year or so then pull the plug and blaim it on the Afghan government.
So Sen. Kerry, who will be the "last man"?
I suspect the real problem is not General McChrystal, or the troops, or the importance of the area geopolitically. Rather, it is a matter of costs and priorities.
In terms of costs, the budget has expanded, likewise the deficit - and projections suggest the high, trillion-plus deficits will continue for some time. Less optimistic (IMO, more realistic) projections anticipate deficits well over the trillion mark for a decade, coupled with anemic growth. But the current administration has given abundant evidence that it seeks increased social spending. This hints at the possibility that both the Pentagon budget and the war in Afghanistan will attract the attention of those who seek funding for their pet projects.
In that light, let us consider this:
The Pentagon pays an average of $400 to put a gallon of fuel into a combat vehicle or aircraft in Afghanistan.
LINK (http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/63407-400gallon-gas-another-cost-of-war-in-afghanistan-)
Whatever the merits of General McChrystal's position, I think his arguments are likely to be trumped by other considerations. And, if I may say so, if I were a U.S. asset in the area I would be more than a little afraid right now.
All MOO, YMMV.
Dozer523
10-18-2009, 17:43
Obama hand picks a General and sends him to Afghanistan and says "Tell me what you need."
Almost two months ago the General said "More Troops."
Obama and the D's are going to play Hide the Sausage for a year or so then pull the plug and blaim it on the Afghan government.
So Sen. Kerry, who will be the "last man"? Well, a request for 60,000 to 80,000 more trigger pullers is probably not exactly what POTUS or SECDEF was expecting from a guy who came from a SOF organization.