Hammock
09-17-2009, 20:30
Admiral Eric T. Olson, Commander USSOCOM
Remarks to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy
17 September 2009
Thank you Mr. Levitt for the kind introduction. I am honored to have this opportunity to speak to you today . . . My remarks today will follow a simple progression. First I will cover the basics of the United States Special Operations Command. My second topic is USSOCOM’s role in the current operating environment. Finally, I will talk about the future environment and how I see USSOCOM posturing for success. At the end of my remarks, I look forward to an informal dialogue with you on your observations of how these topics relate to American foreign policy in the Near East.
Let’s begin with a brief history of how USSOCOM came to be and the basic architecture and functions of the command, a “SOCOM 101” of sorts. The Department of Defense activated the United States Special Operations Command on April 16th, 1987 at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. This new unified command was created as directed by the Nunn-Cohen amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act of 1986, as a follow-on to the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. Congress mandated that a four-star command be established to prepare Special Operations Forces to carry out assigned missions and, if directed by the President of Secretary of Defense, to plan for and conduct special operations.
Title 10 of the United States Code defines USSOCOM’s authorities and responsibilities as both a force providing and operational headquarters. USSOCOM is provided a dedicated Major Force Program budget and specific acquisition authorities similar to a military department or a defense agency.
Before the September 11th, 2001 attacks on the United States, USSOCOM’s primary focus was on its supporting command mission of organizing, training, and equipping joint special operations forces and providing fully capable forces to support the geographic combatant commanders (Central Command, European Command, Pacific Command, etc), and US Ambassadors and their country teams.
The President expanded USSOCOM’s responsibilities in 2004 and then slightly modified them in 2008 so that USSOCOM is now the combatant command responsible for synchronizing the Department of Defense’s planning for global operations against violent extremist organizations and networks. Note that I said synchronize “planning,” not synchronize “operations.” Conducting operations remains the primary responsibility of geographic combatant commanders in each of their respective areas of responsibility. USSOCOM receives, reviews, coordinates, and prioritizes all DOD plans that support the global campaign against terrorists and their networks, and then makes recommendations to the Joint Staff regarding force and resource allocations to meet global requirements.
There are 12 capability areas that have been specifically assigned to USSOCOM. They are referred to as the SOF core activities. It is not meant to imply that we are the only ones who do them, but there are tasks within each of these activity areas that are peculiar to Special Operations Forces. These activities are: Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance, Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, Civil Affairs Operations, Counterterrorism, Psychological Operations, Information Operations, Counter Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Security Force Assistance, Counterinsurgency, and other Activities specified by the President or Secretary of Defense. This list includes expected ones such as direct action and counterterrorism, but there are two that I will highlight because they, and your understanding of them, are important to our current operations. The first is Unconventional Warfare.
Unconventional Warfare is commonly misunderstood to be the opposite of conventional warfare. In fact Unconventional Warfare is strictly and doctrinally defined as those operations that are conducted through and with surrogates and paramilitary counterparts to destabilize a hostile or illegitimate government. The fundamental requirement of unconventional warfare is to stimulate and support an indigenous group that lacks the capability to challenge the hostile government on its own.
[remainder of remarks in attached PDF file]
Remarks to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy
17 September 2009
Thank you Mr. Levitt for the kind introduction. I am honored to have this opportunity to speak to you today . . . My remarks today will follow a simple progression. First I will cover the basics of the United States Special Operations Command. My second topic is USSOCOM’s role in the current operating environment. Finally, I will talk about the future environment and how I see USSOCOM posturing for success. At the end of my remarks, I look forward to an informal dialogue with you on your observations of how these topics relate to American foreign policy in the Near East.
Let’s begin with a brief history of how USSOCOM came to be and the basic architecture and functions of the command, a “SOCOM 101” of sorts. The Department of Defense activated the United States Special Operations Command on April 16th, 1987 at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. This new unified command was created as directed by the Nunn-Cohen amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act of 1986, as a follow-on to the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. Congress mandated that a four-star command be established to prepare Special Operations Forces to carry out assigned missions and, if directed by the President of Secretary of Defense, to plan for and conduct special operations.
Title 10 of the United States Code defines USSOCOM’s authorities and responsibilities as both a force providing and operational headquarters. USSOCOM is provided a dedicated Major Force Program budget and specific acquisition authorities similar to a military department or a defense agency.
Before the September 11th, 2001 attacks on the United States, USSOCOM’s primary focus was on its supporting command mission of organizing, training, and equipping joint special operations forces and providing fully capable forces to support the geographic combatant commanders (Central Command, European Command, Pacific Command, etc), and US Ambassadors and their country teams.
The President expanded USSOCOM’s responsibilities in 2004 and then slightly modified them in 2008 so that USSOCOM is now the combatant command responsible for synchronizing the Department of Defense’s planning for global operations against violent extremist organizations and networks. Note that I said synchronize “planning,” not synchronize “operations.” Conducting operations remains the primary responsibility of geographic combatant commanders in each of their respective areas of responsibility. USSOCOM receives, reviews, coordinates, and prioritizes all DOD plans that support the global campaign against terrorists and their networks, and then makes recommendations to the Joint Staff regarding force and resource allocations to meet global requirements.
There are 12 capability areas that have been specifically assigned to USSOCOM. They are referred to as the SOF core activities. It is not meant to imply that we are the only ones who do them, but there are tasks within each of these activity areas that are peculiar to Special Operations Forces. These activities are: Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance, Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, Civil Affairs Operations, Counterterrorism, Psychological Operations, Information Operations, Counter Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Security Force Assistance, Counterinsurgency, and other Activities specified by the President or Secretary of Defense. This list includes expected ones such as direct action and counterterrorism, but there are two that I will highlight because they, and your understanding of them, are important to our current operations. The first is Unconventional Warfare.
Unconventional Warfare is commonly misunderstood to be the opposite of conventional warfare. In fact Unconventional Warfare is strictly and doctrinally defined as those operations that are conducted through and with surrogates and paramilitary counterparts to destabilize a hostile or illegitimate government. The fundamental requirement of unconventional warfare is to stimulate and support an indigenous group that lacks the capability to challenge the hostile government on its own.
[remainder of remarks in attached PDF file]