Ret10Echo
09-01-2009, 05:30
Hayden: CIA assassination program 'would be valuable'
September 1, 2009 - 5:00am
WASHINGTON - The ability to kill dangerous terrorists through a CIA assassination program other than missile strikes would be of value to the United States, former CIA Director Michael Hayden tells WTOP.
"Without confirming or denying what the nature of the program is, the fact that three different directors over the course of seven years returned to the issue, I think you'd have to say, 'Yes, it was valuable,'" Hayden says.
As new details about the program emerge, there are still more questions than answers. One of those questions is whether Vice President Dick Cheney ordered the CIA to keep quiet about the program.
"I was never directed by the vice president, as some have alleged about this program, not to brief this or frankly anything else to Congress. If Congress feels that we should have told them more about this program, my only response would be that this program didn't meet a threshold for me to even brief inside the Executive Branch," Hayden says.
Although it has yet to acknowledge a role in a series of controversial missile strikes, the CIA is credited with successfully eliminating a significant number of government-labeled "high-value-targets," believed to occupy senior positions in al-Qaida.
Since 2007, hundreds of suspected terrorists have been killed in more than four dozen missile strikes the U.S. is believed to have launched inside Pakistan. Among those confirmed dead are some of al-Qaida best connected and talented explosives experts, recruiters and facilitators.
The Taliban recently lost its charismatic leader Baitullah Mehsud to a strike.
High Profile Terrorists Killed in Missile Strikes in Pakistan Since August 2008:
Khalid Habib (veteran combat leader and operations chief involved with plots to attack the West; deputy to Shaikh Sa'id al-Masri, al-Qaida's No. 3)
Rashid Rauf (mastermind of the 2006 transatlantic airliner plot)
Abu Khabab al-Masri (al-Qaida's most seasoned explosives expert and trainer, and the man responsible for its chemical and biological weapons efforts)
Abdallah Azzam (senior aide to Sheikh Sa'id al-Masri)
Abu al-Hassan al-Rimi (led cross-border operations against coalition forces in Afghanistan)
Abu Sulaiman al-Jaziri* (senior external operations planner and facilitator)
Abu Jihad al-Masri (senior operational planner and propagandist)
Usama al-Kini (marriott hotel attack planner and listed on the FBI's terrorist most wanted list)
Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan (involved in the attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania)
Abu Sulaiman al-Jaziri* (senior trainer and external operations plotter)
Baitullah Mehsud (leader of the Pakistani Taliban)
* Two different people
But al-Qaida's top leadership is still at large and that, for current intelligence community officials who asked to remain anonymous, validates the need to look at other options for capturing or killing them.
The assassins program never got the traction it need to go operational, Hayden says.
"{The operational status} was very, very difficult to achieve as different approaches were tried and discarded. The activity went dormant for a while and then people were reminded that indeed we'd want to have this capacity and other ideas were surfaced."
Current CIA Director Leon Panetta killed the program in late June after being briefed of its existence and potential problems with the program.
A part of the problem for the agency has been its relationship with the Department of Defense:
"In tracking and targeting al-Qaida's leadership, Senior U.S. intelligence community officials have conceded that the line separating Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and DOD intelligence activities has blurred, making it more difficult to distinguish between the traditional secret intelligence missions carried out by each. They also have acknowledged that the U.S. Intelligence Community confronts a major challenge in clarifying the roles and responsibilities of various intelligence agencies with regard to clandestine activities," according to a July 6, 2009 report prepared by the Congressional Research Service for members of Congress.
Questions remain about the assassins program, and media reports revealing the CIA hired security contractor Blackwater to support the program point out that the blurred lines between DOD and CIA are not the only problems.
Apparently, relationships between some former CIA personnel and Blackwater were very close. The door appears to be open for further inquiry from Congress about why members of Congress never heard more about this program.
The CIA describes the program as "on-again-off-again" and "never operational."
And that's the main reason Hayden says he never talked about it with Congress.
"I never talked to the president about this. I never talked to the vice president about this. I never talked to the national security adviser about this or the national security adviser's deputy about this. That's kind of the batting order of folks with whom you generally have these kinds of discussions," Hayden says.
But, Hayden says, considering nature of the threat, there was some merit to the idea.
"It has been described as this one continuous seven-plus-year program. I think, more accurately, over the course of seven years, three different directors, three different attempts, three different offices within the agency took a crack at developing a capacity that everyone agreed we'd want to have," Hayden says.
September 1, 2009 - 5:00am
WASHINGTON - The ability to kill dangerous terrorists through a CIA assassination program other than missile strikes would be of value to the United States, former CIA Director Michael Hayden tells WTOP.
"Without confirming or denying what the nature of the program is, the fact that three different directors over the course of seven years returned to the issue, I think you'd have to say, 'Yes, it was valuable,'" Hayden says.
As new details about the program emerge, there are still more questions than answers. One of those questions is whether Vice President Dick Cheney ordered the CIA to keep quiet about the program.
"I was never directed by the vice president, as some have alleged about this program, not to brief this or frankly anything else to Congress. If Congress feels that we should have told them more about this program, my only response would be that this program didn't meet a threshold for me to even brief inside the Executive Branch," Hayden says.
Although it has yet to acknowledge a role in a series of controversial missile strikes, the CIA is credited with successfully eliminating a significant number of government-labeled "high-value-targets," believed to occupy senior positions in al-Qaida.
Since 2007, hundreds of suspected terrorists have been killed in more than four dozen missile strikes the U.S. is believed to have launched inside Pakistan. Among those confirmed dead are some of al-Qaida best connected and talented explosives experts, recruiters and facilitators.
The Taliban recently lost its charismatic leader Baitullah Mehsud to a strike.
High Profile Terrorists Killed in Missile Strikes in Pakistan Since August 2008:
Khalid Habib (veteran combat leader and operations chief involved with plots to attack the West; deputy to Shaikh Sa'id al-Masri, al-Qaida's No. 3)
Rashid Rauf (mastermind of the 2006 transatlantic airliner plot)
Abu Khabab al-Masri (al-Qaida's most seasoned explosives expert and trainer, and the man responsible for its chemical and biological weapons efforts)
Abdallah Azzam (senior aide to Sheikh Sa'id al-Masri)
Abu al-Hassan al-Rimi (led cross-border operations against coalition forces in Afghanistan)
Abu Sulaiman al-Jaziri* (senior external operations planner and facilitator)
Abu Jihad al-Masri (senior operational planner and propagandist)
Usama al-Kini (marriott hotel attack planner and listed on the FBI's terrorist most wanted list)
Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan (involved in the attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania)
Abu Sulaiman al-Jaziri* (senior trainer and external operations plotter)
Baitullah Mehsud (leader of the Pakistani Taliban)
* Two different people
But al-Qaida's top leadership is still at large and that, for current intelligence community officials who asked to remain anonymous, validates the need to look at other options for capturing or killing them.
The assassins program never got the traction it need to go operational, Hayden says.
"{The operational status} was very, very difficult to achieve as different approaches were tried and discarded. The activity went dormant for a while and then people were reminded that indeed we'd want to have this capacity and other ideas were surfaced."
Current CIA Director Leon Panetta killed the program in late June after being briefed of its existence and potential problems with the program.
A part of the problem for the agency has been its relationship with the Department of Defense:
"In tracking and targeting al-Qaida's leadership, Senior U.S. intelligence community officials have conceded that the line separating Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and DOD intelligence activities has blurred, making it more difficult to distinguish between the traditional secret intelligence missions carried out by each. They also have acknowledged that the U.S. Intelligence Community confronts a major challenge in clarifying the roles and responsibilities of various intelligence agencies with regard to clandestine activities," according to a July 6, 2009 report prepared by the Congressional Research Service for members of Congress.
Questions remain about the assassins program, and media reports revealing the CIA hired security contractor Blackwater to support the program point out that the blurred lines between DOD and CIA are not the only problems.
Apparently, relationships between some former CIA personnel and Blackwater were very close. The door appears to be open for further inquiry from Congress about why members of Congress never heard more about this program.
The CIA describes the program as "on-again-off-again" and "never operational."
And that's the main reason Hayden says he never talked about it with Congress.
"I never talked to the president about this. I never talked to the vice president about this. I never talked to the national security adviser about this or the national security adviser's deputy about this. That's kind of the batting order of folks with whom you generally have these kinds of discussions," Hayden says.
But, Hayden says, considering nature of the threat, there was some merit to the idea.
"It has been described as this one continuous seven-plus-year program. I think, more accurately, over the course of seven years, three different directors, three different attempts, three different offices within the agency took a crack at developing a capacity that everyone agreed we'd want to have," Hayden says.