View Full Version : MGEN Mike Flynn on Afghanistan
Just heard this interview on NPR of MGEN Flynn. Made sense to my sized brain anyway. The link may need time to develop the voice-over. They say it'll be ready by 0900 EDT, 13AUG2009.
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=111831745
His grasp of the voids that need to be filled in Afghanistan sound esp reasonable. Just not convinced we know enough about what the people there are willing to make sacrifices to gain. Maybe this is just the old Intel Officer rationalization for more per diem. :munchin
I heard him this morning, too - decent news piece - MG Flynn is the J2 for GEN McChrystal in Astan and they've known each other for awhile. Looks like the guy was one of the Jedi crowd which came out of Leavenworth - here's his bio up to accepting that posting when he was the J2 for the Joint Staff.
Major General Michael T. Flynn assumed duties as the Director of Intelligence, Joint Staff on 11 July 2008. Prior to serving in this capacity, he served as the Director of Intelligence, United States Central Command from June 2007. He also served as the Director of Intelligence for Joint Special Operations Command from July 2004 to June 2007, with service in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). Major General Flynn commanded the 111th Military Intelligence Brigade from June 2002 to June 2004. Major General Flynn served as the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, 18th Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina from June 2001 and the Director of Intelligence, Joint Task Force 180 in Afghanistan.
Major General Flynn graduated from the University of Rhode Island with a Bachelor of Science degree in Management Science and was commissioned through the ROTC program in 1981. Major General Flynn’s assignments include multiple tours at Ft Bragg, North Carolina with the 82d Airborne Division, 18th Airborne Corps, and Joint Special Operations Command, where he deployed for Operations URGENT FURY in Grenada and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti. He also has served with the 25th Infantry Division at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, the Joint Readiness Training Center at Ft Polk, Louisiana, and the Army’s Intelligence Center at Ft Huachuca, Arizona.
Major General Flynn is a graduate of the Intelligence Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the United States Army Command and General Staff College, the School of Advanced Military Studies, and the United States Naval War College. He has a Masters of Business Administration in Telecommunications from Golden Gate University, a Masters Degree in Military Arts and Sciences from the United States Army Command and General Staff College, and a Masters of Arts Degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the United States Naval War College.
His awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster), Legion of Merit (with Oak Leaf Cluster), Bronze Star Medal (with 3 Oak Leaf Cluster), Meritorious Service Medal (with 5 Oak Leaf Cluster), Joint Service Commendation Medal, Army Commendation Medal (with 4 Oak Leaf Cluster) and several service and campaign medals. Major General Flynn also has earned the Ranger Tab and Master Parachutist Badge, and the Joint Staff Identification Badge.
Richard's $.02 :munchin
Interesting piece in the U of Rhode Island alumni magazine on Mike and Charlie Flynn published just prior to MG Flynn's move to A-stan - Mike is on left in pic.
Richard's $.02 :munchin
Saluting A Family Legacy
Brothers Mike and Charlie Flynn, two of Helen and Charles Flynn’s nine children, shared bunk beds in the smallest bedroom of the rambunctious Flynn household in Middletown, R.I. Today, the URI ROTC graduates share the wide hallways of the Pentagon and a military legacy with their late father.
“Mike and Charlie were great friends and good athletes,” recalls Helen, noting both sons played sports. “Football, basketball, baseball, you name it. They both loved the water. They were lifeguards during the summers at Second Beach and later played water polo at URI. Being from such a large family, I think all the children learned to compete at an early age and gained the self-confidence needed to accomplish what they set out to do.”
Today Mike, a two-star Army general (major general) is the director of intelligence on the Joint Staff at the Pentagon. Brother Charlie, a colonel, recently commanded the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division in Iraq for 14 months as part of the surge of U.S. Forces. The command had him overseeing thousands of fighting infantrymen and women throughout Iraq. Upon Charlie’s return from Iraq, he was nominated and selected to be the senior executive assistant to the director of the Joint Staff at the Pentagon.
But we’re getting a little ahead of ourselves. Mike studied management science and remembers playing sports in Keaney Gym, especially swimming in the pools and playing ball in the intramural basketball leagues. Interested in the military since childhood, Mike joined the University’s ROTC program. He says he learned about organizations, innovation, and change in his senior level management courses while his ROTC training taught him about the principles of leadership.
Commissioned an Army second lieutenant the morning of his graduation in 1981, Mike became an intelligence officer, platoon leader, and then instructor in his early days. Promotions quickly followed.
At first Mike wasn’t sure he wanted to make the military his career, “but after meeting and getting to know some of the best people, leaders, and families we have in our country, you can’t help but want to be around people like this all the time,” he says. “Plus it’s very exciting.”
A glance at the multiple medals gleaming on his uniform tells you Mike really is top brass. Among his decorations and badges are the Defense Superior Service Medal and the Legion of Merit, both with Oak Leaf Clusters. While his Bronze Star has three oak leaf clusters, his Meritorious Service Medal has five. He is most proud of his Jumpmaster wings indicating that he has achieved advanced rating as a paratrooper. But that’s just the beginning.
As director of intelligence for the Joint Staff, Mike reports directly to Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mike is responsible for all intelligence, counterintelligence, planning, warning, and intelligence analysis for the chairman and the Joint Staff and in support of our combatant commands.
On the home front, Mike married his high school sweetheart, Lori Andrade. They have been a team for more than 27 years. “Lori has been a steady presence in the lives of thousands of soldiers and their families during my numerous deployments and has played the role of not only mom, but dad, coach, teacher, and at times, taxi driver for our two sons, Michael and Matt, as well as for hundreds of other children. She’s always willing to volunteer her time for others,” Mike says.
Charlie studied business marketing, became recording secretary and president of Fiji (Phi Gamma Delta) and following Mike’s example, joined ROTC. “It looked like fun, and I thought that maybe I could learn a few things,” he says.
He did. After graduating in 1986 and being commissioned a second lieutenant, Charlie pursued infantry leadership training and climbed the chain of command. He served in the 75th Ranger Regiment, as chief of operations for the 25th Infantry Division, and as battalion commander of the 2-504 Parachute Infantry Regiment. He spent well over a year in Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom before assuming his current position at the Pentagon. Like Mike, Charlie works in support of Adm. Mullen.
Charlie claims his wife, Kathleen, has accomplished more than he ever will. With 13 family moves in 22 years (and doing it with three kids), she has done the heavy lifting with schools, work, sports, and clubs while maintaining her career as a neo-natal ICU nurse for the past 23 years. She deals with the houses, the cars, and the taxes, volunteering for everything, and doing it essentially without him around, particularly with the war.
The brothers are part of a larger band of military brothers. Mike, who prefers cheap cars and pizza, and Charlie, who prefers Hawaiian shirts and flip-flops, never miss a chance to meet whenever possible. The two ran into each other in Balad, Iraq in April 2004—at the height of the war—for a quick salute and embrace. Both had overlapping assignments to Fort Bragg, N.C., between 2005 and 2007 and lived next door to each other. Both agreed that they actually saw the other more in Iraq than in their own backyards.
Mother Helen, who spent 20 years traveling as the wife of a soldier before returning to Rhode Island, calls her sons “the daring young men in the military” with a chuckle. She says she does worry about them, particularly when they are out of the country in Iraq or Afghanistan, “but I think we all ought to be concerned about terrorism around the world, especially after 9/11,” she says. “Besides, I know Mike and Charlie are pursuing what they enjoy doing, and I know we are all safer for their service to our country.”
http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.uri.edu/quadangles/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/capstone-07-0411.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.uri.edu/quadangles/features/saluting-a-family-legacy/&usg=__PjopuLzzmywPXOyPRX_u754DmRQ=&h=300&w=450&sz=87&hl=en&start=39&tbnid=hg1VYH-u7F1BnM:&tbnh=85&tbnw=127&prev=/images%3Fq%3DMajor%2BGeneral%2BMichael%2BT.%2BFlyn n%26gbv%3D2%26ndsp%3D20%26hl%3Den%26safe%3Doff%26s a%3DN%26start%3D20
With credentials like that he should be DCIA, although he's probably too smart to take that job! Would applaud seeing military experience in that position again.
69harley
08-13-2009, 13:14
As a LTC he was my senior rater and battalion commander, I thought he was a nice guy but he never struck me as being very insightful, but did come across as being very risk adverse.
Prior to him taking command at Bragg, he was the senior intel OC at JRTC and seemed to be always pushing the party line (intel) against us (Long Range Surveillance). Instead of evaluating us he was more into pushing his own agenda. Most of us did not like him. I am not surprised he has risen so high.
69harley - were you there when we cabled his HMMWV to a tree and sent out an emergency call to "India 6" while he was sleeping? Funny as all hell. I was "Bravo 02" at the time.
I worked for COL (then MAJ) Flynn in Hawaii. Outstanding leader and hell of a runner as I remember him. Also one to chew my ass for hitting him every time we stopped with my long whip antenna when I was his RTO. :D
"SPC xxxxx, you hit me with that F***'en antenna one more time I'm gonna star jumper you until you puke!!" :o
Had the pleasure of briefing and interacting with MGEN Flynn while deployed. Very charismatic about the daunting task ahead of him. Never one to discard advice regardless of rank. A humble and smart man at this point I believe. If he was once risk averse, I never caught that, but he is now a General Officer. What risk mitigation requires his attention? Don't crush me, just don't know that he'd be that deep in the weeds at this point.
With the current leadership in Afghanistan, great things can be accomplished. Only time will tell in this generational fight.
In my opinion, things like this make me smile. Families at war together, making a difference and giving credit to the family for their sacrifices. Yes, these two get a bit more attention since they are fairly senior in rank, but they'd be quick to point out others that are just like them, and at some stage of their careers just like they once were. I remember Kathleen just as he describes, smart and full of energy supporting the family, the unit and herself when we left home for our tropical trips.
69harley
08-18-2009, 10:02
69harley - were you there when we cabled his HMMWV to a tree and sent out an emergency call to "India 6" while he was sleeping? Funny as all hell. I was "Bravo 02" at the time.
I think I remember that event. Then Maj Flynn was not a friend of LRS. It seemed we were equally at war with the OPFOR as we were with the Intel OCs. Maj Flynn would always grill us during our brief backs about wearing our K-Pots. Our SOP was to not wear K-Pots, but it seemed as though our entire mission success depended on us wearing them. Later when LTC came to be our Bn commander, a simple M-4 zero range, wake in the morning, PT, chow, load trucks, shoot went from a low/medium risk to a high risk event. Good grief. You cannot imagine the pain of trying to maintain HALO PL1 when he was in command, or a night maneuver range. Incredibly risk adverse. I think he viewed the LRS detachment as something that was there to assist his intel teams. He actually had a plan to use LRS teams as security for IW.
My call sign was Phantom 22
Yup - that's him!! "Bob C" (who himself later became India 6) and I had some great laughs over some of the antics. We'll have to have a beer next time I get back to Bragg.
Ret10Echo
01-05-2010, 07:05
Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevent in Afghanistan
Publication Type: Working Papers
Publication Date: 01/04/2010
Author(s): Major General Michael T. Flynn, Captain Matt Pottinger, Paul D. Batchelor
This report critically examines the relevance of the U.S. intelligence community to the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. The authors - Major General Michael T. Flynn, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence in Afghanistan; his advisor Captain Matt Pottinger; and Paul Batchelor, Senior Advisor for Civilian/Military Integrations at ISAF - argue that because the United States has focused the overwhelming majority of collection efforts and analytical brainpower on insurgent groups, the intelligence apparatus still finds itself unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which U.S. and allied forces operate in and the people they are trying to protect and persuade.
Quoting General Stanley McChrystal, the authors write that "Our senior leaders - the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, Congress, the President of the United States - are not getting the right information to make decisions with ... The media is driving the issues. We need to build a process from the sensor all the way to the political decision makers."
This report is the blueprint for that process. It describes the problem, details the changes, and illuminates examples of units that are "getting it right." It is aimed at commanders as well as intelligence professionals in Afghanistan, the United States and Europe.
http://www.cnas.org/node/3924
The U.S. intelligence community has fallen into the trap of waging an anti-insurgency campaign rather than a counterinsurgency campaign. The difference is not academic. Capturing or killing key mid-level and high-level insurgents – anti-insurgency – is without question a necessary component of successful warfare, but far from sufficient for military success in Afghanistan. Anti-insurgent efforts are, in fact, a secondary task when compared to gaining and exploiting knowledge about the localized contexts of operation and the distinctions between the Taliban and the rest of the Afghan population. There are more than enough analysts in Afghanistan. Too many are simply in the wrong places and assigned to the wrong jobs. It is time to prioritize U.S. intelligence efforts and bring them in line with the war’s objectives.
Employing effective counterinsurgency methods is not an option but a necessity. General McChrystal routinely issues distinct orders and clear guidance on the subject. When he states, “The conflict will be won by persuading the population, not by destroying the enemy,” it is not just a slogan, but an expression of his intent. Too much of the intelligence community is deaf to these directions – this must be remedied, and now. The General’s message must resonate throughout the entire community – top to bottom.
The format of intelligence products matters. Commanders who think PowerPoint storyboards and color-coded spreadsheets are adequate for describing the Afghan conflict and its complexities have some soul searching to do. Sufficient knowledge will not come from slides with little more text than a comic strip. Commanders must demand substantive written narratives and analyses from their intel shops and make the time to read them. There are no shortcuts.
A single-minded obsession with IEDs, while understandable, is inexcusable if it causes commanders to fail to outsmart the insurgency and wrest away the initiative. “A military force, culturally programmed to respond conventionally (and predictably) to insurgent attacks, is akin to the bull that repeatedly charges a matador’s cape – only to tire and eventually be defeated by a much weaker opponent,” General McChrystal and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan Command Sergeant Major Michael T. Hall recently wrote.20 “This is predictable – the bull does what comes naturally. While a conventional approach is instinctive, that behavior is self-defeating.”
Some interesting points to be considered.
And so it goes...;)
Richard's $.02 :munchin
I have nothing but respect for Gen. McChrystal. But I wonder why this report, as others commissioned by him, is published in the public domain and outside the chain of command. Is McChrystal the knowing cat’s paw for the Jedi knights surrounding Gen. Petraeus? Does it go all the way to the SecDef?
Consider . . .
“But more intriguing to me is the fact that that Flynn released this report through the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), the plugged-in think tank that has furnished some of the top talent for the Obama administration. As I’ve argued here before, a select group of think tanks has become the preferred conduit for the Afghanistan command to present its views inside the Beltway. One think tank — CNAS — seems to occupy a place of particular importance. Shadow Pentagon, anyone?”
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/01/spies-like-us-top-intel-officer-says-spooks-should-act-like-journos/
Most will remember a similar tactic used in the run up to the President’s decision on the number of troops to surge in Afghanistan. In that case, someone leaked McChrystal’s recommendation to Bob Woodward. The General’s report was published in the Washington Post and framed the entire debate.
“It is becoming pretty clear that General Stanley McChrystal may be engaged in a calculated strategy to break the military's chain of command and publicly try to force the Obama administration to accede to his demands for a massive troop escalation in Afghanistan. McChrystal deviously leaked his report calling for an escalation to the media before handing it to his bosses, then publicly complained that he hadn't gotten enough face time with his commander in chief, then gave a speech to the international media -- in a foreign country, no less -- pressuring the White House to do exactly what he wants and rejecting the idea of a different strategy.”
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-sirota/mcchrystals-assault-on-th_b_309634.html?view=print
And finally . . . is Obama’s strategy the one that is being implemented?
“‘It's an open issue,’ a senior Pentagon official said last week.
Nearly a month after Obama unveiled his revised Afghanistan strategy, military and civilian leaders have come away with differing views of several fundamental aspects of the president's new approach, according to more than a dozen senior administration and military officials involved in Afghanistan policy, all of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations.
Members of Obama's war cabinet disagree over the meaning of his pledge to begin drawing down forces in July 2011 and whether the mission has been narrowed from a proposal advanced by McChrystal in his August assessment of the war. The disagreements have opened a fault line between a desire for an early exit among several senior officials at the White House and a conviction among military commanders that victory is still achievable on their terms.”
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/25/AR2009122501923_pf.html
I believe the General is focusing like a laser on his mission. Perhaps this is what we call unrestricted warfare?
:munchin
Snaquebite
01-06-2010, 11:59
I worked with then, Maj. Flynn, when I was assigned to the 18th Abn Corps G-3 as the SOCOORD SGM. He impressed me then as an out ot the box thinker for a conventional officer. This is an interesting paper. While many of the points made are "normal" for SF, it makes a statement as to where we need to be as a fighting force regarding intel analysis.
http://www.cnas.org/node/3924
This report critically examines the relevance of the U.S. intelligence community to the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. The authors - Major General Michael T. Flynn, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence in Afghanistan; his advisor Captain Matt Pottinger; and Paul Batchelor, Senior Advisor for Civilian/Military Integrations at ISAF - argue that because the United States has focused the overwhelming majority of collection efforts and analytical brainpower on insurgent groups, the intelligence apparatus still finds itself unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which U.S. and allied forces operate in and the people they are trying to protect and persuade.
This report is the blueprint for that process. It describes the problem, details the changes, and illuminates examples of units that are "getting it right." It is aimed at commanders as well as intelligence professionals in Afghanistan, the United States and Europe
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/AfghanIntel_Flynn_Jan2010_code507_voices.pdf
Good to hear Major General Flynn is well regarded in the QP community. He must have had a green light from his boss, and looks like his boss's boss, for the uniquely effective distribution. This report is really an arrow in the heart of the problem.
Although publication of the report is not without criticism from some of the "old folks back in DC" who are naturally appalled.
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/08/the_flynn_report_iii_a_spy_generation_gap
Flynn and McChrystal used the internets to cut through stifling and ineffective bureaucracy.
Gates Endorses Critique of Military Intelligence in Afghanistan
http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/Gates-Endorses-Critique-Military-Intelligence-Afghanistan-07Jan10--80946077.html
"U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has endorsed a stinging critique of military intelligence efforts in Afghanistan written by the top U.S. and NATO military intelligence officer in the country. In a paper published this week, Major General Michael Flynn orders major changes to the way his operation works."
key graph, "military intelligence efforts in the country over the past eight years have been 'token and ineffectual,' and have not provided commanders or senior leaders the information they need. It says the current intelligence gathering and analysis processes 'fail to advance the war strategy and, as a result, expose more troops to danger over the long run.'
"The paper's authors . . . say it should be considered a directive to his subordinates on how they should reform their operations. Among the orders - send more analysts into the field and gather more information about the Afghan people, rather than focusing almost exclusively on insurgent groups. The paper says until now, many military intelligence units have been 'deaf' to the population-centered approach the new Afghanistan commander, General Stanley McChrystal, has ordered."
MGEN Flynn's unclass PPT made its way into the public domain. Seems like McChrystal's team is the only one with their hair on fire. Obama didn't bite. So where does that lead us?
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/01/afghan-insurgency-can-sustain-itself-indefinitely-top-us-intel-officer/
The Taliban not only has the “momentum” after the most successful year in its campaign against the United States and the Kabul government. “The Afghan insurgency can sustain itself indefinitely,” according to a briefing from Major General Michael Flynn, the top U.S. intelligence officer in the country. “The Taliban retains [the] required partnerships to sustain support, fuel legitimacy and bolster capacity.”
And if that isn’t enough, Flynn also warns that “time is running out” for the American-led International Security Assistance Force. “Regional instability is rapidly increasing and getting worse,” the report says.
Since General Stanley McChrystal took over as top commander in Afghanistan, there have been a series of dark appraisals about the state of the war. In August, McChrystal warned of an “urgent need for a significant change to our strategy and the way that we think and operate.” A report recently obtained by NBC News said Afghanistan’s security forces won’t be ready to fight the Taliban for years — if ever. Earlier this week, Flynn issued a white paper complaining that “eight years into the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. intelligence community is only marginally relevant to the overall strategy.”
But Flynn’s December 23rd presentation on the “State of the Insurgency: Trends, Intentions and Objectives” may be the gloomiest public assessment of the war yet. The “loosely organized” Taliban is “growing more cohesive” and “increasingly effective.” The insurgents now have their own “governors” installed in 33 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. And the “strength and ability of [that] shadow governance increasing,” according to the presentation. The Taliban’s “organizational capabilities and operational reach are qualitatively and geographically expanding.”
Hatfield's and McCoy's - feuding amongst themselves until the 'governement' shows up - then they join forces to expel a common enemy - once the common enemy is gone, they go back to feuding...until they begin marrying between the families and the feud ends - guess it isn't only an American tradition. :rolleyes:
And so it goes...
Richard's jaded $.02 :munchin
Just want to bump this thread just to tell people to re-read this paper.. Great reading for INTEL guys and others as well!!!
Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevent in Afghanistan
www.cnas.org/.../AfghanIntel_Flynn_Jan2010_code507_voices.pdf
medic&commo
10-20-2012, 10:27
Went to link posted, got a "page not found".
Anyone else have that problem?
m&c
Went to link posted, got a "page not found".
Anyone else have that problem?
m&c
I don't know what happen.. it was there before.. Funny.
Thanks BKKMAN
mark46th
10-22-2012, 09:04
When I started reading this, it sounded identical to intel assessments in SE Asia back in the day. Doesn't intel training have a "Lessons Learned" block of instruction?
When I started reading this, it sounded identical to intel assessments in SE Asia back in the day. Doesn't intel training have a "Lessons Learned" block of instruction?
You're assuming MI uses the same definition for the word "intelligence" that we do...
Richard :munchin