Warrior-Mentor
07-07-2009, 13:19
NightWatch (AFCEA.org)
July 6, 2009
Afghanistan-US
By John McCreary
The commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan has issued new combat orders intended to reduce Afghan civilian casualties, Reuters reported 6 July, citing an unclassified report describing the changes. General McChrystal said in the report that U.S. and NATO forces must make a shift away from conventional combat and toward winning Afghan support.
Some of the changes include new guidelines for air strikes that weigh the need for air support against the directive to avoid civilian casualties and excessive damage on residential compounds, and new training ordered for all U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan.
Comment: NightWatch has been following Afghanistan since 1979, literally since before the day the Soviets invaded. The notion of outreach to Pashtun tribal elders, imams and councils has always sounded eminently practical and reasonable to Westerners. The problem is that Pashtuns do not want outreach or even good “governance” – whatever that means. They are very clear that they want security and will be loyal to whoever provides it.
As for Coalition forces, the Pashtuns want them out of Afghanistan. They say so, openly. They do not need Coalition friendship, however, well intended. The window of openness to foreign forces closed five years ago, including to Arabs; the opportunity for good government closed with it.
Judging by the increase in the number of wounded Western soldiers in May, the reduction in air support has had the predictable effect of increasing Coalition losses. During May, 27 allied soldiers were killed and 58 wounded.
May 2009 was the second month of the Taliban summer offensive, which was just beginning to ramp up. May was the worst month for Western causalities since September 2008. In the seven-year history of the conflict, May 2009 ranks as the fourth bloodiest month.
In successful counter-insurgency operations, outreach and cultural sensitivity initiatives make a difference only after secure conditions have been restored, meaning that security problems have been reduced to the level that they can be managed by police or paramilitary police without the assistance of military combat forces.
Energy and resources devoted to making friends with Pashtun elders in Helmand are a waste of time unless accompanied by a guarantee of security for more than a few weeks. They will be loyal to whoever can provided reliable protection 24X7 for persons and property all the time. For now that is the Taliban.
More importantly, Pashtun elders will and do understand and interpret Coalition initiatives as short term dodges that implicitly admit the Coalition is not able to provide the security that commands their respect and loyalty. The Coalition is only the latest outside power to make promises that it cannot keep for more than a few months, not the first.
Security is what the Taliban offer in over 150 of Afghanistan’s 398 districts. Their leaders know the increased US and other Coalition forces are to help ensure the security of national elections in August. They can out wait them. Meanwhile, the reduction in air support exacts a high price in Allied casualties on the ground.
July 6, 2009
Afghanistan-US
By John McCreary
The commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan has issued new combat orders intended to reduce Afghan civilian casualties, Reuters reported 6 July, citing an unclassified report describing the changes. General McChrystal said in the report that U.S. and NATO forces must make a shift away from conventional combat and toward winning Afghan support.
Some of the changes include new guidelines for air strikes that weigh the need for air support against the directive to avoid civilian casualties and excessive damage on residential compounds, and new training ordered for all U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan.
Comment: NightWatch has been following Afghanistan since 1979, literally since before the day the Soviets invaded. The notion of outreach to Pashtun tribal elders, imams and councils has always sounded eminently practical and reasonable to Westerners. The problem is that Pashtuns do not want outreach or even good “governance” – whatever that means. They are very clear that they want security and will be loyal to whoever provides it.
As for Coalition forces, the Pashtuns want them out of Afghanistan. They say so, openly. They do not need Coalition friendship, however, well intended. The window of openness to foreign forces closed five years ago, including to Arabs; the opportunity for good government closed with it.
Judging by the increase in the number of wounded Western soldiers in May, the reduction in air support has had the predictable effect of increasing Coalition losses. During May, 27 allied soldiers were killed and 58 wounded.
May 2009 was the second month of the Taliban summer offensive, which was just beginning to ramp up. May was the worst month for Western causalities since September 2008. In the seven-year history of the conflict, May 2009 ranks as the fourth bloodiest month.
In successful counter-insurgency operations, outreach and cultural sensitivity initiatives make a difference only after secure conditions have been restored, meaning that security problems have been reduced to the level that they can be managed by police or paramilitary police without the assistance of military combat forces.
Energy and resources devoted to making friends with Pashtun elders in Helmand are a waste of time unless accompanied by a guarantee of security for more than a few weeks. They will be loyal to whoever can provided reliable protection 24X7 for persons and property all the time. For now that is the Taliban.
More importantly, Pashtun elders will and do understand and interpret Coalition initiatives as short term dodges that implicitly admit the Coalition is not able to provide the security that commands their respect and loyalty. The Coalition is only the latest outside power to make promises that it cannot keep for more than a few months, not the first.
Security is what the Taliban offer in over 150 of Afghanistan’s 398 districts. Their leaders know the increased US and other Coalition forces are to help ensure the security of national elections in August. They can out wait them. Meanwhile, the reduction in air support exacts a high price in Allied casualties on the ground.