View Full Version : Afghan Strikes Broke Rules
And so it goes...;)
Richard's $.02 :munchin
U.S. Says Afghan Strikes Broke Rules, Orders Retraining
Peter Graff, Reuters, 20 Jun 2009
The United States will order all its troops in Afghanistan to undergo new training after concluding that pilots violated orders in air strikes last month that it accepts may have killed as many as 86 civilians.
In a long-awaited report, released six weeks after U.S. B1 bombers killed large numbers of civilians unleashing fury among Afghans, the Pentagon acknowledged that rules had not been followed, although it said the mistakes fell short of breaking the law.
The bombings took place on May 4 in western Afghanistan after a day-long battle that saw Afghan security forces ambushed by Taliban fighters and U.S. Marines come to their aid.
After nightfall, B1 bombers observed groups of people moving into two houses and a mosque. Pilots concluded they were fighters and bombed the buildings.
However, the report said pilots broke guidelines by striking without checking whether civilians were in the buildings.
The strikes, "while complying with the (laws of armed conflict) did not adhere to all of the specific guidance and Commander's Intent contained in the controlling directive," it said.
"Not applying all of that guidance likely resulted in civilian casualties."
While the report noted that U.S. investigators had concluded that about 26 civilians and about 76 fighters had died, it acknowledged the figures were imprecise and said the true civilian death toll would never be known.
But in the military's first public acknowledgement of Afghan accounts of much larger civilian tolls, the report noted that an Afghan human rights agency had concluded that 86 civilians had died and praised its findings as "balanced" and "thorough."
"NO IMMINENT THREAT"
The report, released by Central Command responsible for the wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq, said the military needed to refine its rules for using weapons in Afghanistan, which should be published in new "stand-alone documents."
"Once this guidance is published, units will need to conduct immediate training/re-training of all personnel in theater," it said.
The report supports accounts from Afghan villagers that the B1 bombings after dark occurred far from the battle zone.
One of the buildings, which the B1 flattened with two 2,000 lb (900 kg) bombs and two 500 lb bombs, was more than a kilometer away from where U.S. and Afghan government troops were taking intermittent fire.
The report accepted that pilots and ground controllers believed the groups of people they were observing were fighters who might mass for an attack. But it acknowledged they were not firing from the buildings at the time they were struck.
While U.S. rules of engagement are not public, a senior U.S. military official in Kabul said this week they generally prohibit striking buildings unless steps are taking to ensure no civilians are inside, or troops on the ground are taking fire from them.
"You can see from the video, no one was firing (from the buildings). There was no imminent threat," the official said. "There needs to be an imminent threat."
The report made no mention of the Taliban deliberately using civilians as human shields in the incident, an assertion that became the main emphasis of U.S. military statements about the bombings in the weeks after they took place.
The official acknowledged there was no firm evidence to prove the human shield allegation.
The bombings took place while Defense Secretary Robert Gates was on his way to Afghanistan to inform the commander of U.S. forces that he would be replaced. The new commander, General Stanley McChrystal, has said he will take new steps to reduce civilian casualties, which threaten Afghan support for the war.
The report faulted the public response, saying U.S. forces "must develop a more effective method" of communications.
It said the military needs to set up an investigative team headed by a general who could deploy to the scene of incidents involving suspected civilian casualties within two hours.
After the bombing last month, Afghan President Hamid Karzai went on U.S. television and called for an end to air strikes.
The report said it did not recommend a halt to close air support, especially when friendly forces were under fire.
"However, absent a direct or imminent threat, we must pursue a tactical approach that prioritizes avoidance of civilian casualties as a fundamental aspect of mission success."
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20090620/ts_nm/us_afghanistan_strikes_1
zuluzerosix
06-20-2009, 10:22
Yeah.....I am sure the enemy fights by the "rules." I am sure they have never violated any laws of land warefare.
Basenshukai
06-20-2009, 21:39
"However, absent a direct or imminent threat, we must pursue a tactical approach that prioritizes avoidance of civilian casualties as a fundamental aspect of mission success."
I don't see how this is any different from what we have already been trained to do.
However, the report said pilots broke guidelines by striking without checking whether civilians were in the buildings.
Perhaps the pilots should phone first. If there isn't an answer, then no civilians are home. :D
Eagle5US
06-21-2009, 08:29
I think this conclusion was forgone WELL before the investigation was even STARTED.
Our "foreign policy" now consists solely on acceptance of blame and issuing apologies for everything that could hurt anyone's feelings....except for American's feelings of course.:rolleyes:
Eagle
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090622/ap_on_re_as/as_afghanistan;_ylt=AkZ78CiwcRa3IKDoFo14GHEuQE4F;_ ylu=X3oDMTJ1OG5ubGc1BGFzc2V0Ay9hcC8yMDA5MDYyMi9hcF 9vbl9yZV9hcy9hc19hZmdoYW5pc3RhbgRjcG9zAzUEcG9zAzUE c2VjA3luX3RvcF9zdG9yaWVzBHNsawNuZXd1c2JhdHRsZXI-
New US battle rule: No fighting near Afghan homes
By JASON STRAZIUSO, Associated Press Writer Jason Straziuso, Associated Press Writer – Mon Jun 22, 2:34 pm ET
KABUL – The U.S. commander in Afghanistan will soon order U.S. and NATO forces to break away from fights with militants hiding among villagers, an official said Monday, announcing one of the strongest measures yet to protect Afghan civilians.
The most contentious civilian casualty cases in recent years occurred during battles in Afghan villages when U.S. airstrikes aimed at militants also killed civilians. American commanders say such deaths hurt their mission because they turn average Afghans against the government and international forces.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai has pressed U.S. forces for years to reduce civilian casualties, but his pleas have done little to stem the problem. The U.N. says U.S., NATO and Afghan forces killed 829 civilians in the Afghan war last year.
Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who took command of international forces in Afghanistan this month, has said his measure of effectiveness will be the "number of Afghans shielded from violence" — not the number of militants killed.
McChrystal will issue orders within days saying troops may attack insurgents hiding in Afghan houses if U.S. or NATO forces are in imminent danger, said U.S. military spokesman Rear Adm. Greg Smith.
"But if there is a compound they're taking fire from and they can remove themselves from the area safely, without any undue danger to the forces, then that's the option they should take," Smith said. "Because in these compounds we know there are often civilians kept captive by the Taliban."
McChrystal's predecessor, Gen. David McKiernan, issued rules last fall that told commanders to set conditions "to minimize the need to resort to deadly force."
But McChrystal's orders will be more precise and have stronger language ordering forces to break off from battles, Smith said. The order should have the effect of reducing the use of airstrikes, mortars and artillery in villages.
McChrystal, who took command one week ago, has already given the order to commanders in northern and eastern Afghanistan he has met with. The four-star general will meet with commanders in the south and west in coming days. Soon after the visits are completed, the new directive will be formalized, Smith said.
In the most recent civilian deaths case, a May 4-5 battle between U.S. and Afghan forces and militants in western Farah province killed dozens of civilians. A U.S. report last week said U.S. forces killed an estimated 26 civilians. However, Karzai's government says 140 were killed, while an Afghan human rights group says the number is about 100.
"This new policy shows that they've really taken on board the fact of the matter in Afghanistan — that you lose the war if you lose the people," said Sarah Holewinski, the executive director of the Washington-based Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict. "I was heartened by McChrystal's remarks last week stating that, and am now further heartened to see that he's backing those statements up with policies to protect civilians. This is what we've wanted all along."
Still, she said the policy has potential drawbacks, specifically that once Taliban fighters learn of the directive, civilian homes will be the perfect place to seek cover.
Holewinski noted the policy will still allow troops to use airstrikes when they are in danger.
Smith said McChrystal will address in the coming months how U.S. and NATO forces are deployed around the country, and forces could be withdrawn from remote regions in order to concentrate troops around population centers.
In the latest violence, a suicide bomber on a motorbike killed seven civilians Monday when he drove into the center of an eastern Afghan city and set off explosives.
The bomber detonated explosives on his motorbike in front of Khost city's electric power headquarters and then explosives on his body a few minutes later, said Kuchi Naseri, a spokesman for the governor of Khost province. The Interior Ministry said seven people were killed.
The target of the attack was unclear. There were no military or police nearby, Naseri said, but the later blast may have been planned to hit police or officials rushing to the scene. Another 30 people in the area were wounded, he said.
In southern Kandahar province, another suicide bomber killed three Afghan soldiers in an attack on a convoy of troops inspecting a highway bridge for explosives, said Zadi district Police Chief Niaz Mohammad Serhadi.
In eastern Nangarhar province, an explosion at a weapons cache killed a 6-year-old boy and wounded 20 others, police said.
___
Associated Press writers Amir Shah in Kabul and Noor Khan in Kandahar contributed to this report.
My comments...
This seems like the starting of our boys having their hands tied behind their backs. There comes a point where collateral damage just happens.
Next thing you know, we'll be paying war reparations for all the dead civilians from WWII when we firebombed Dresden... and all the millions of kids that they may have had, and their kids, etc.. :munchin
.
zuluzerosix
06-23-2009, 08:48
We're done. Now they have a safe haven.
""But if there is a compound they're taking fire from and they can remove themselves from the area safely, without any undue danger to the forces, then that's the option they should take," Smith said. "Because in these compounds we know there are often civilians kept captive by the Taliban."
"McChrystal's predecessor, Gen. David McKiernan, issued rules last fall that told commanders to set conditions "to minimize the need to resort to deadly force."
Then why stay in Afganistan if this is how we are going to fight?
greenberetTFS
06-23-2009, 10:01
We're done. Now they have a safe haven.
""But if there is a compound they're taking fire from and they can remove themselves from the area safely, without any undue danger to the forces, then that's the option they should take," Smith said. "Because in these compounds we know there are often civilians kept captive by the Taliban."
"McChrystal's predecessor, Gen. David McKiernan, issued rules last fall that told commanders to set conditions "to minimize the need to resort to deadly force."
Then why stay in Afganistan if this is how we are going to fight?
ZZ6,
WTF,are we doing in Afganistan if this is how we are going to fight for their nation? :mad:
Big Teddy :munchin
zuluzerosix
06-24-2009, 10:12
I think it is wrong. Dead wrong. These guys can spring a far ambush then run into a village and hide behind civillians. As I read the article US Forces can't persue them? It's just plain wrong. You should be able to chase them anywhere, IMHO. Anywhere. They can die where they hide for all I care.
But see, you all (SF) unlike our enemies, will fight anyone, any place, anywhere and any time. These new rules seem to take away some of that ability.
It's just my humble opinion that if that out government is going take away some of your tools and give the enemy safe havens then what's the point?
I guess I am showing my frustration.
Serious question: why bother staying? Why not just leave? That way, we wouldn't create any casualties at all.
Sounds like a change from the "no fire zones" of the 60's
to the "no fire zone, unless you think you should fire".
I think we can deal with that with little impact on our current operations. Just a matter of timing.
This ROE is like an enormous, 400ft-tall neon sign with a massive stack of Marshall amplifiers announcing at bone-crushing volume, "WE HAVE NO TRUE RESOLVE TO WIN!"
I'm speaking about our country, not our troops.
We continue to get away with so many of these inefficient and ineffective methods only because we are so big and powerful. Once we are torn down a little more from within, our half-hearted ROEs will cost us severely.
This is a disheartening development.
We have to press them hard to create any momentum. When we stall and dance around like this, our enemies ALWAYS capitalize on it and exploit the opportunity to recover.
Israel knows better. Their backs are to the sea, so they have nowhere else to run to. They do what works because they must. If only we would do the same.
Take the scenario from the movie, Munich. We should be conducting a world-wide, eradication campaign just like that, but on a much, much wider scale.
The hadj are recruiting quickly all over the world. They're multiplying like rats. Even South America is popping up with infested areas. SouthEast Asia is growing more saturated with them every day. Europe is being taken over. We've got them here in the U.S. planning in mosques and recruiting while benefiting from our ignorant and naive "tolerance." We've got North Korea and Iran rattling their sabers at us. Russia and China are sitting back, hoping for the worst for us, assisting our enemies where plausible deniability allows. Meanwhile, we're still half-assing it in Afghanistan, refusing to follow the root cause of all this into an ungoverned region of Northern Pakistan...
Is it just me, or are we miserably failing to conduct total war as if our country depends on it?
This ROE is like an enormous, 400ft-tall neon sign with a massive stack of Marshall amplifiers announcing at bone-crushing volume, "WE HAVE NO TRUE RESOLVE TO WIN!"
Is it just me, or are we miserably failing to conduct total war as if our country depends on it?
Didn't you hear Michael Jackson died.
blue02hd
06-26-2009, 08:31
"However, absent a direct or imminent threat, we must pursue a tactical approach that prioritizes avoidance of civilian casualties as a fundamental aspect of mission success."
I don't see how this is any different from what we have already been trained to do.
I have to whole heartedly agree with Bas on this. I really do not see how this will effect the way teams are conducting business now. (Unless things are drastically changed since I was there, but I'll let ya know because I am headed back soon). Many of us who have served in OIF, OEF, or both have lost a friend or two to unobserved fires. I do not need to name names or dates. It happens, it sucks, we learn our lessons and move on. Friendly, enemy or civilian, smart bombs don't care. As an 18E I saw friendly air was just as much of a threat as were IED's, and when we could hear air above us while working I was immediately on the net and trading ID's to remove any doubt from a fast movers crew that was juggling any number of issues from the relative safety of their cockpit. Safe guards are established for a reason and should not be disreguarded lightly. It is not how we conduct business nor should we.
Should we have "called"? We do it all the time through soft knocks, etc. BUT, I am not one to ever second guess a call made from another soldier on the ground, so in this case I do not know, nor will I pretend to. Based on the fall out though, we can make our own decision on how effective those JDAMS were and learn whatever lesson we choose.
ZZ6, I can understand your frustration, but the game is not over by any means as you may suggest. UW is not a game won by counting bodies, especially if there are civilians in that count. Our mentors have stressed this over and over, and I expect nothing has changed. I mean honestly, what makes us different from those we are trying to defeat if at the end of the day we burn the house down and forget who we are there for, and why? If a person simply wants to kick doors and spray, maybe this isn't the site he needs to be following.
I personally don't want to be responsible for any harm to a noncombatant, regardless of his nationality, religion, or whatever.
From my arm chair thousands of miles away I see this as a self inflicted wound. I personally would like to see a policy that reinforces the safety procedures that HAS and DOES keep QP's and our G's safe when we are working because guess what? At night from the air, we can look just like the guys we are fighting.
I mean honestly, what makes us different from those we are trying to defeat if at the end of the day we burn the house down and forget who we are there for, and why? If a person simply wants to kick doors and spray, maybe this isn't the site he needs to be following.
I personally don't want to be responsible for any harm to a noncombatant, regardless of his nationality, religion, or whatever.
I personally would like to see a policy that reinforces the safety procedures that HAS and DOES keep QP's and our G's safe when we are working because guess what? At night from the air, we can look just like the guys we are fighting.
Sissy footing around never won any war. Ever. Forget who we're there for? Who do you think we're there for? We're there because we got kicked directly in the jimmy on our own soil. As for blue on blue, that's a matter of tactical air/ground coordination, not of theater ROEs that give the enemy unnecessary refuge. Nobody likes having an air asset drop ordnance on you when you're trying to get it done. That's universal. However, that needs to be cleaned up at the theater level with who's working which areas. Other than that, the pilots have to coordinate closely with the operators on the ground. We always briefed face-to-face with our air assets whenever possible, to prevent that issue. More can be done to eliminate friendly fire before we make a sweeping, theater-wide ROE that gives our enemy a serious break to exploit.
Only when we seriously press them without letting up, can we EVER hope to bring them to a breaking point. They know we'll eventually leave, just like every other invader has, because that place sucks. We're not there for the Afghan people. That's a fact. We're there to put an end to the threat from that region. As long as we tip toe around, they'll exploit the weaknesses in our strategy and maintain their resistance.
If you're looking for a solution that doesn't involve killing, I'd suggest a PR campaign that decreases their ability to recruit faster than we can kill them. We still haven't been able to break the code on that simple and glaring problem.
Of course, that's just my own personal observation, but I've seen enough to have strong feelings about it.
...Of course, that's just my own personal observation, but I've seen enough to have strong feelings about it.
Sawman;
Many people post on this board. blue02hd made a post followed by yours. Remembering what this site is about, blue02hd's opinion carries far more weight than yours.
Remember that.
Pete
Sawman;
Many people post on this board. blue02hd made a post followed by yours. Remembering what this site is about, blue02hd's opinion carries far more weight than yours.
Remember that.
Pete
Pete,
What are you basing that comment on?
I'm a decorated combat veteran with a significant background. I remain operational in multiple theaters.
Here's a snapshot of my tactical background, remembering much of who I am can't be posted for obvious reasons:
www.tacticalinsider.com
I find your comment offensive, and in this case entirely unnecessary. It's just a discussion on events. So, WTF?
If you think you're spanking a scared young boy, you'd be mistaken. However, if you can't tolerate my participation in this discussion, just say it and I'll spend my time more productively elsewhere.
~SAWMAN
greenberetTFS
06-26-2009, 11:20
Pete,
What are you basing that comment on?
I'm a decorated combat veteran with a significant background. I remain operational in multiple theaters.
Here's a snapshot of my tactical background, remembering much of who I am can't be posted for obvious reasons:
www.tacticalinsider.com
I find your comment offensive, and in this case entirely unnecessary. It's just a discussion on events. So, WTF?
If you think you're spanking a scared young boy, you'd be mistaken. However, if you can't tolerate my participation in this discussion, just say it and I'll spend my time more productively elsewhere.
~SAWMAN
Sawman,
Respectfully, Speaking from our side of this board(and myself only)..... :) This is a QP site,your BIO is very impressive,but have you noticed none of us QP's have a BIO to begin with,we don't advertise what we have done. ;)
Big Teddy :munchin
What are you basing that comment on?
The fact thank you and Blank Frank would get along just peachy.
What blue02hd said most every QP understood. What you said every QP also understood.
SF is different from the rest of SOF.
Pete
Who speaks more than just 5.56
The fact thank you and Blank Frank would get along just peachy.
What blue02hd said most every QP understood. What you said every QP also understood.
SF is different from the rest of SOF.
Pete
Who speaks more than just 5.56
7.62 speaks louder but
Winning hearts and minds so the hearts and minds kill the bad guys is prefered and lasts longer.
blue02hd
06-26-2009, 12:15
We're not there for the Afghan people. That's a fact. We're there to put an end to the threat from that region.
If you're looking for a solution that doesn't involve killing, I'd suggest a PR campaign that decreases their ability to recruit faster than we can kill them. We still haven't been able to break the code on that simple and glaring problem.
Of course, that's just my own personal observation, but I've seen enough to have strong feelings about it.
Mr. Sawman, I promise you I have personal observations that have led to my feelings on this as well. Playing Whack-A-Mole with terrorists gets old after a while if you cannot understand the how or why to end the game.
Do you even read what you post? That "PR" campaign is exactly what I am referring to. We call it Unconventional Warfare/ Counter Insurgency, and even Foriegn Internal Defense here on this site. But take heart, there IS killing that goes on, we just prefer to kill bad guys. (In the bigger picture Mr. Sawman, the new ROE's will not effect you or your contract jobs anytime soon. ) If you want to return to service and offer advice professionally on how to solve the very issues you have addressed then by all means, I'm sure your experience will be welcomed. Until then I have to say that your last post exemplifies exactly my point: Unobserved fires "because we can" is wrong wrong wrong. That is a fact. You see Mr. Sawman, we have to hit the RIGHT moles, not just anything that goes bump in the night. After all Mr. Sawman, according to your BIO, that bump in the night could have been YOU.
Good luck with your contracts.
UW's a complex, lengthy, multi-task concept which is rarely understood or appreciated by any but those who have the skills and wherewithall to practice it, and - ummmmm - thought about jumping into this but decided to just save my breath - y'all who understand know what I'm saying - and the rest... ;)
Richard's $.02 :munchin
Guys, I'm a busy man. I initially took this to be a forum with mature operators who could tolerate other thoughts, experiences and ideas. From the way this thread has gone, I've got to say I've developed a different observation.
If you want other operators to join in the future, at least listen to their perspective. This thread got downright childish, with guys apparently feeling like they had to run to their buddy's defense to save him, or assumptions that you were talking to a spammer, or who knows what.
I work with other SF'ers, Force Recon and SEALs. I'm accustomed to discussions from various perspectives. I think that's not only healthy, but enlightening. That doesn't seem to be the case here.
If you read back through what I was saying, I was expressing frustration that our strategy in Afghanistan isn't all out and it provides our enemies opportunity to exploit the provided refuge against us.
I don't see this is a typical counter-insurgency, where hearts and minds is the intended strategy, like it rightfully is in other circumstances. Why? Because we didn't go to rescue them from an opressor. We supposedly went there to kick the asses out of those who attacked us! Should hearts and minds still be a significant consideration? Absolutely, and for obvious reasons that we all understand. Should we be careful in minimizing collateral damage? Always. However, if we would pull out the big hammer and pulverize our enemies into rapid submission, collateral damage wouldn't be such an obstacle the way it's becoming now, with things crawling along at such a carefully metered pace. We're getting bogged down. We've got other enemies watching closely. We need to win quickly and re-stage.
I don't mind that guys disagree on the "how to" win this war. I think we all agree that we love our country and we want this war won. What I don't have time for is the drama that's developed here.
All the best to you guys,
~SAWMAN out.
....If you want other operators to join in the future, at least listen to their perspective. .....
You were listened to and your perspective noted.
Your perspective is one that many in the Military have.
Pete
I don't see this is a typical counter-insurgency, where hearts and minds is the intended strategy, like it rightfully is in other circumstances. Why? Because we didn't go to rescue them from an opressor. We supposedly went there to kick the asses out of those who attacked us! Should hearts and minds still be a significant consideration? Absolutely, and for obvious reasons that we all understand. Should we be careful in minimizing collateral damage? Always. However, if we would pull out the big hammer and pulverize our enemies into rapid submission, collateral damage wouldn't be such an obstacle the way it's becoming now, with things crawling along at such a carefully metered pace. We're getting bogged down. We've got other enemies watching closely. We need to win quickly and re-stage.
Your world-view on this one is rather naive, shallow, and - therefore - ultimately fatally flawed. I have no doubt you are competent at what you do - it shows in your point-of-view - but pol-mil analyses and strategic thinking is apparently not as strong a skill set. You might consider working on them. ;)
In the meantime, keep up the good work - and thanks for listening.
Richard's $.02 :munchin
As I review the dialog, I wonder if I might ask several (probably naive) questions.
1) Given the religion and culture of the area, and the values implied by that, is winning hearts and minds a hard problem that requires a lot of time and effort? Given the cultural gap, can it really work?
2) If we suppose that global GDP (economic growth) is neutral or mildly negative for an extended period, and given the population growth in the areas of interest (2.6% annually LINK (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/AF.html) ), then it seems likely that the young population (17.6 years median age) would continue to live in profound poverty (currently, GDP is $800 per person). Will this tend to drive them into the radical madrassas, and hence make the problem worse? (I notice they have had strong economic growth over the last several years. But if this is due to U.S. aid, then it may be vulnerable if our economy shrinks.)
3) Since I'm one of those who don't really grasp the concepts of UW/FID, are there any simple introductory texts that might guide me?
Of course, if any of these are inappropriate subjects, my apologies in advance.
blue02hd
06-26-2009, 14:02
I am now glad I didn't say anything about Charlie Sheen.
greenberetTFS
06-26-2009, 14:57
I am now glad I didn't say anything about Charlie Sheen.
blue02hd,
I concur,he's got to have a tough time having to live with that........:rolleyes: God bless our "Duke"......;)
Big Teddy :munchin
Since I'm one of those who don't really grasp the concepts of UW/FID, are there any simple introductory texts that might guide me?
A couple you might find interesting:
Chasing Ghosts: Unconventional Warfare in American History - John J. Tierney, Jr. I haven't read this one - yet - but it looks as if it's a good overview of UW offered from a particulary American point-of-view.
Total Resistance (Der totale Widerstand: Eine Kleinkriegsanleitung für Jedermann) - Hans von Dach. For serious study - this was an official Swiss manual for resistance to enemy occupation of their country (presumably in a Soviet general occupation of all central Europe) that was issued in 1957-1958. It offers a crash course in irregular resistance by ordinary civilians, rather than a plan for resistance by defeated soldiers operating as guerrillas within their homeland. It notably presumes a form of irregular resistance involving nothing beyond rifles, hand grenades, and mines that very much resembles the Iraqi insurgency. There are various editions of the book, ranging from 64 through 287 pages, and it contains advice on how to defend Switzerland through stay-behind guerrilla warfare in case of an enemy invasion with information on how to organize small "armies" and resistance groups, and explains the operative, tactical, technical and psychological basics of guerrilla warfare; how to build-up, organize and command a guerrilla force; how to build-up and command a civilian resistance movement; and methods of suppressing and combating guerrilla warfare. Views of the book as an obsolete legend due to today's technological standards - because it studies old cases like the German Wehrmacht occupying Warsaw and the Soviet intrusion into Prague and Budapest - have been pretty much disproven by the recent situations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and the RPI. One flaw - if you can call it that - is the book only addresses how to organize a local resistance and not how to deter the occupation of a whole country. If you get serious, this is a book I'd recommend - if you can find one.
Gutes lesen. ;)
Richard's $.02 :munchin
Thank you, Sir. I just ordered Total Resistance from Amazon...
Taking the invitation at face value.
Take the scenario from the movie, Munich. We should be conducting a world-wide, eradication campaign just like that, but on a much, much wider scale.
The hadj are recruiting quickly all over the world. They're multiplying like rats. Even South America is popping up with infested areas. SouthEast Asia is growing more saturated with them every day. Europe is being taken over. We've got them here in the U.S. planning in mosques and recruiting while benefiting from our ignorant and naive "tolerance." We've got North Korea and Iran rattling their sabers at us. Russia and China are sitting back, hoping for the worst for us, assisting our enemies where plausible deniability allows. Meanwhile, we're still half-assing it in Afghanistan, refusing to follow the root cause of all this into an ungoverned region of Northern Pakistan...
Is it just me, or are we miserably failing to conduct total war as if our country depends on it?
Sissy footing around never won any war. Ever. Forget who we're there for? Who do you think we're there for? We're there because we got kicked directly in the jimmy on our own soil. ....
Only when we seriously press them without letting up, can we EVER hope to bring them to a breaking point. They know we'll eventually leave, just like every other invader has, because that place sucks. We're not there for the Afghan people. That's a fact. We're there to put an end to the threat from that region. As long as we tip toe around, they'll exploit the weaknesses in our strategy and maintain their resistance.
<<SNIP>>
If you think you're spanking a scared young boy, you'd be mistaken. However, if you can't tolerate my participation in this discussion, just say it and I'll spend my time more productively elsewhere.
Guys, I'm a busy man. I initially took this to be a forum with mature operators who could tolerate other thoughts, experiences and ideas. From the way this thread has gone, I've got to say I've developed a different observation.
If you want other operators to join in the future, at least listen to their perspective. This thread got downright childish, with guys apparently feeling like they had to run to their buddy's defense to save him, or assumptions that you were talking to a spammer, or who knows what.
I work with other SF'ers, Force Recon and SEALs. I'm accustomed to discussions from various perspectives. I think that's not only healthy, but enlightening. That doesn't seem to be the case here.
If you read back through what I was saying, I was expressing frustration that our strategy in Afghanistan isn't all out and it provides our enemies opportunity to exploit the provided refuge against us.
<<SNIP>>
I don't mind that guys disagree on the "how to" win this war. I think we all agree that we love our country and we want this war won. What I don't have time for is the drama that's developed here.
Since the Vietnam War, we civilians have, by and large, disenfranchised ourselves from informed debate over military affairs. Because of this dynamic, we civilians are increasingly reliant upon thoughtful, balanced analysis from those armed service professionals who offer expert opinions based upon their character, training, experiences, and intellect.
Sometimes, the process of selecting whom to trust, which opinions to take seriously, which to regarded lightly, or which to give no regard at all can be quite difficult.
Sometimes, an expert analyst will make it easy, even if such is not his intent.
Sometimes, the process of selecting whom to trust, which opinions to take seriously, which to regarded lightly, or which to give no regard at all can be quite difficult.
A particularly cogent point. I have an impression that we civilians need to educate ourselves on quite a number of things, including some rudiments of military doctrine and policy. Perhaps on some of the terminology as well.
Sometimes I feel like an undergraduate taking his first course in calculus who has stumbled upon the math department chair and a couple full professors discussing the finer points of n-dimensional manifolds.
I suspect that developing any ability to discern quality will take quite a bit of time and effort, along with some serious reading.
And, as long as I'm wondering...I wonder if the civilian society is prepared to support a serious eradication campaign. Whatever the merits of the approach (and I'm certainly not qualified to assess that!), I wonder how much support it has within the arena of public opinion. But then, I also wonder if the public has the patience to sustain a hearts and minds approach.
A particularly cogent point. I have an impression that we civilians need to educate ourselves on quite a number of things, including some rudiments of military doctrine and policy. Perhaps on some of the terminology as well.
Sometimes I feel like an undergraduate taking his first course in calculus who has stumbled upon the math department chair and a couple full professors discussing the finer points of n-dimensional manifolds.
I suspect that developing any ability to discern quality will take quite a bit of time and effort, along with some serious reading.
And, as long as I'm wondering...I wonder if the civilian society is prepared to support a serious eradication campaign. Whatever the merits of the approach (and I'm certainly not qualified to assess that!), I wonder how much support it has within the arena of public opinion. But then, I also wonder if the public has the patience to sustain a hearts and minds approach.
MOO, we civilians are not acquitting ourselves particularly well in civil-military relations. We spend time and money developing our fantasies about war and warriors (through mass popular culture). But how much effort do we invest in developing our knowledge of war and warriors?
This dynamic is cartwheeling along the path towards the fetishistic militarization of American civilization at the expense of an informed understanding of the country's martial heritage.
I do not believe that military historians (broadly conceived to include all aspects of warfare) have done a good job at correcting this imbalance. It is very difficult to close the gap between the most approachable works on war (narratives) and the most reflective works on war (monographs). That gap needs to be addressed.
The field also needs to revisit its relationships with two core audiences: the armed services themselves and that segment of the popular audience known affectionately (sometimes) as "buffs" (amateur historians). Although both constituencies play vital roles as consumers and producers of military history, their influence has contributed to a process in which led many military historians have paid less attention to political, intellectual, cultural, and methodological changes in the historical profession than they might have.
By the time the consequences of this lapse were realized, it was too late. This is to say that the left's current prominence in the Ivory Tower was not inevitable.
How now can this process be reversed? I do not know. I do think that the military historian as political editorialist / social critic at large is not the way to go. The craft is still paying the price for S.L.A. Marshall and Stephen Ambrose.
incarcerated
06-27-2009, 00:57
Sig,
Our civilian ignorance is not a gap that can be addressed by academia, any more than it can by Hollywood.
I would also submit to you that universal conscription is a requirement of a healthy society.
Since I'm one of those who don't really grasp the concepts of UW/FID, are there any simple introductory texts that might guide me?
Here are a couple on the recommended reading list of the Army CofS.
For WO1-CW 3, and Company Grade Officers (2LT - CPT):
Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. New York: Praeger, 2005. [originally published in 1964] This classic work, written at the height of Communist insurgencies in the 1960s, remains as relevant today as it was decades ago. Galula, a French officer, distilled and refined the lessons being learned the hard way in Greece, Algeria, Southeast Asia, and other regions torn apart by revolution in order to provide a guide for future conflicts.
For Senior NCOs, CW4-CW5, Field Grade Officers (MAJ - COL):
Birtle, Andrew J. U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2006. This study is a well written, authoritative account of U.S. Army counterinsurgency, nation building, and stability operations during the turbulent decades that followed World War II. The book not only describes the evolution of doctrine for overseas politico-military actions but also evaluates how that doctrine fared under such diverse circumstances as the occupation of Germany, the Greek Civil War, the intervention in Lebanon, and the war in Vietnam. Contemporary soldiers will find much food for thought by learning how their predecessors coped with the multifaceted challenges posed by politico-military operations.
For Senior Leaders above Brigade Level (COL - GEN):
Habeck, Mary. Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007. In this primer on a small splinter group of Islan, Habeck traces the current of Islamic thought that eventuated in jihadism from an early-fourteenth-century scholar and the eighteenth-century founder of the harshly restrictive Islam predominant in Saudi Arabia to four twentieth--century figures who inspired a host of radical reactionary organizations, including Hamas and al-Qaeda. Habeck's purpose is to reveal jihadism. So doing, in considerable detail and with admirable clarity, she contributes one of the most valuable books on the ongoing Middle East--and world--crisis. This is an important book for all leaders as we attempt to understand our enemy.
Huntington, Samuel. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Touchstone, 1996. The late renowned Harvard Social Scientist Samuel Huntington warns of the increasing threat of renewed conflicts originating in countries and cultures that base their traditions on religious faith and dogma. Moving past the issues of race and nationality as sources of future conflict, he cites the growing influence of a handful of major cultures--Western, Eastern Orthodox, Latin American, Islamic, Japanese, Chinese, Hindu, and African--in current struggles across the globe. His study underlines the importance of cultural awareness in dealing with crises throughout the globe and its importance in implementing effective policies and programs on the ground.
Strassler, Robert., ed. The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War. New York: Free Press, 1998. This is an annotated new translation of the classic Greek historian's account of the war between Athens and Sparta fought between 431 B.C. and 404 B.C. It has explanatory footnotes and appendixes on war and society in 5th century B.C. E. Greece that does much to place the war in its context. The Peloponnesian War is not only an excellent chronicle of ancient warfare, but also a thoughtful dissertation on the relationship between politics and war, government and empire, and the strong and the weak. It should be in every soldier or diplomat's bookshelf.
Richard's $.02 :munchin
I would also submit to you that universal conscription is a requirement of a healthy society.
Like the People's Democratic Republic of Korea? :confused:
Richard's $.02 :munchin
No one wants to work with a conscript soldier. Better to offer reward for service like the right to run for political office. I wonder if congress would vote for that law lol.
Defender968
06-27-2009, 11:53
No one wants to work with a conscript soldier. Better to offer reward for service like the right to run for political office. I wonder if congress would vote for that law lol.
Would never happen, then they would actually have to SERVE, as opposed to just sucking on the public teat as they do in D.C., congress serving :rolleyes:...my ass!
Sig,
Our civilian ignorance is not a gap that can be addressed by academia, any more than it can by Hollywood.
In regards to the latter, what about Frank Capra's Why We Fight and Saving Private Ryan for which Spielberg was honored by the Department of Defense?
In regards to the former, then why do the armed services work with academic historians so that the latter can produce official histories and hold conferences and then make those histories and the papers delivered at those conferences publicly available?
incarcerated
06-27-2009, 12:50
Like the People's Democratic Republic of Korea? :confused:
Richard's $.02 :munchin
No, not NK; I was thinking more like Israel, or post-war America in the ‘50s. Although there have been times in the past where I would have sworn that I worked for Kim Jong Il. Everyone should have skin in the game. Not a realistic possibility though.
incarcerated
06-27-2009, 12:58
In regards to the latter, what about Frank Capra's Why We Fight and Saving Private Ryan for which Spielberg was honored by the Department of Defense?
In regards to the former, then why do the armed services work with academic historians so that the latter can produce official histories and hold conferences and then make those histories and the papers delivered at those conferences publicly available?
The movies are great, and we should study military history, especially life long civilians like myself. But they will never close the gap. Our knowledge will always be incomplete. We will never see the elephant.
No, not NK; .... or post-war America in the ‘50s..... Everyone should have skin in the game. Not a realistic possibility though.
Everybody loves to remember the draft and the Army of the 40's and 50's.
Thousands of great soldiers were also drafted and fought in the 60's.
But the 60's also brought the Hippies and draft protests. Demonstartions on colleges and in the street, draft card burnings, Hell no We won't go, Make love, not war, etc, etc.
You can have 98 fine upstanding soldiers who were drafted but the other two who hate the Army will cause more problems than they are worth.
Just say "NO" to a draft.
I was thinking more like Israel, or post-war America in the ‘50s There are quite a few on this board, who had served during the post war America, you've mentioned. Many have served when the ASN carried prefix such as U.S., E.R. N.G and R.A.
And, admittedly there were those conscripts that had distinguished themselves, even some that had been awarded the Nations highest award. But, for the most part the "everyday" conscript was just passing time till his commitment was up.
We will never see the elephant. THIS is why the author Roger Moore was made to attend the SFQC, by Gen. Yarboough before he could write the book "THE GREEN BERETS".
There is definitely a lot of history to be learned on this site. There is also a lot of History Makers on this site.
The movies are great, and we should study military history, especially life long civilians like myself. But they will never close the gap. Our knowledge will always be incomplete. We will never see the elephant.
Well said. (FWIW, your reference to the Mexican-American War is sublime.;))
A question: how might we, as life-long civilians, best contribute to the discussion of matters national defense?
Just as patients should not tell doctors how to perform in a surgical theater, I think there are areas where our opinions do more harm than anything else.
But what about the discussions before hand?
Since I'm one of those who don't really grasp the concepts of UW/FID, are there any simple introductory texts that might guide me?
Some may find this web-site from the CAC of interest on this topic - here's a sampling of topics/authors:
Counterinsurgency Reader II - Special Edition 2008
America’s Frontier Wars: Lessons for Asymmetric Conflicts - Congressman Ike Skelton suggests how to overcome the threat of asymmetrical warfare by examining yesteryear’s battles to develop strategies and tactics for tomorrow’s conflicts.
Developing a National Counterinsurgency Capability for the War on Terror - John Hillen Ph.D., The Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, calls for a COIN strategic framework that incorporates all the instruments of national power.
Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won - LTC Conrad C. Crane Ph.D. (USA Retired) on how the United States has rarely accomplished long-term policy goals after any conflict without an extended U.S. military presence to ensure proper results from the peace.
Linking Doctrine to Action: A New COIN Center-of-Gravity Analysis - COL Peter R. Mansoor and MAJ Mark S. Ulrich, USA, on a new tool from the Army/Marine Counterinsurgency (COIN) Center can help bridge the gap between COIN doctrine and real results on the ground.
Using Occam’s Razor to Connect the Dots: The Ba’ath Party and the Insurgency in Tal Afar - CPT Travis Patriquin, USA, on how Saddam Hussein positioned loyal Ba’athists in Tal Afar to neutralize political and ethnic enclaves to support the insurgent forces in the city.
Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and the Indirect Approach - COL Gregory Wilson, USA, Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines offers a template for how to succeed in counterinsurgency.
A Model Counterinsurgency: Uribe’s Colombia (2002–2006) versus FARC - Thomas A. Marks Ph.D. on how President Uribe and a dynamic cast of military reformers has now neutralized Colombia's longstanding insurgency.
Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point - MAJ Neil Smith and COL Sean MacFarland, USA, on the “Anbar Awakening”—what some have called the “Gettysburg of Iraq”—resulted from the careful application of multiple lines of operation, among them the deliberate cultivation of local leaders.
Addendum: Anbar Awakens - COL Sean MacFarland, USA, a major player in the Anbar Awakening recalls how joint-force cooperation led to the turnaround in Ramadi.
Commander’s Assessment: South Baghdad - LTC Ross A. Brown, USA, a former squadron commander discusses his unit’s year in Iraq and lists his 11 commandants for winning the COIN war in South Baghdad.
Fighting “The Other War”: Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan, 2003–2005 - LTG David W. Barno, USA Retired, the former commander of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan offers his assessment of operations in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban.
Combating a Modern Insurgency: Combined Task Force Devil in Afghanistan - COL Patrick Donahue and LTC Michael Fenzel, USA, two principals describe how Combined Task Force Devil employed a balanced strategy of kinetic, non-kinetic, and political actions to quiet eastern Afghanistan during OIF VI.
Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance - GEN David H. Petraeus, USA, talks on the essential tasks necessary for successful COIN.
(cont'd) http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/repository/MilitaryReview_2008CRII08310001-MD.xml
Richard's $.02 :munchin
incarcerated
06-27-2009, 14:36
A question: how might we, as life-long civilians, best contribute to the discussion of matters national defense?
You're already doing it.
Richard recommended this book. I read it 2-3 years ago and it really opened my eyes to a lot I had no idea of and exposed my near total ignorance of the issues. For the novice wanting a good foundation on the Islamists, I really thought it was a great book. Warning, when in discussions with people who have no idea about the terrorists, some of your new found knowledge make cause them to look at you like you're an idiot. Didn't bother me. I found the book at the local Barnes and Noble.
Here are a couple on the recommended reading list of the Army CofS.
Thank you very much! I've downloaded the Military Review PDF, so I should have some engaging reading to do. Hopefully, I'll have a better understanding of some of the issues.
But they will never close the gap.
Belatedly, I've realized a clarification may be in order.
By "gap" I mean specifically the difference between how historians writing for a general audience discuss various aspects of war and how historians writing for historians discuss war.
As an example, I would point to James McPherson's Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (1988). Since its publication, this Pulitzer Prize-winning book has reached a wide audience and propelled McPherson onto the short list of the most prominent (if not eminent nor influential) historians of his generation. Moreover, continue to reach a wide audience among American readers, this magisterial work has become what historians refer to as the "standard work" on the topic.*
Despite the books many strengths, it is flawed as a work of military history. For example, James McPherson minimizes the importance of Antoine-Henri Jomini.
Many Jominian “principles” were common-sense ideas hardly original with Jomini: concentrate the mass of your force against fractions of the enemy’s; menace the enemy’s communications while protecting your own; attack the enemy’s weak point with your own strength, and so on.
McPherson is correct in pointing out that it is unlikely that Jominian theory influenced Civil War strategy directly (i.e. that he was read widely by the officers in the respective armies). Nevertheless, his cavalier regard for “common-sense ideas” unbalances his analysis of operations. For instance, he constantly shreds Federal and Confederate generals for not following obviously correct courses of action (read, for not doing what McPherson would have done, and what Generals William T. Sherman and Ulysses S. Grant eventually did)—in an obviously modern war.:confused:
McPherson seems unmindful of the fact that the nature of the American Civil War, the military effectiveness of the combatants and the acumen of their commanders are among the most intensely contested subjects in military historiography.**
While a member of the general public may learn of these issues (and many others) from continued pursuit of his interest in the Civil War, those taking an academic's approach to the topic may never see the other side of the forest. They may never realize that the history of the Civil War (the war in the context of American history) is distinctly different--but no more important--from the military history of the Civil War (how the war fits into American and European military history).
The impact of this disconnect means that academic historians might have gotten a head start on framing and addressing some of the big questions that have occupied the profession's attention the last fifty years had they been in closer contact with their brethren who study war. Had military historians played a more prominent role in some of these projects, the tenor of the ensuing debate may have been tempered by their presence. At the very least, more members of the profession would have realized the validity of a core assumption of military historians: what happens on the battlefield during a war shapes a country when that war ends.
Indeed, McPherson's conclusion that contingency (chance) plays a pivotal role in shaping history is, to return the jab, is a "common sense" notion to anyone who has envisioned General Eisenhower listened to the weather forecasts as he pondered arguably the most pivotal decision in the history of the Western world.
_________________________________________________
* That is, if one is going to read but one book on a subject, read "the standard work." (Then again, if you're preparing for quals, you're technically responsible for all of them.:confused::eek:)
** James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, vol. 6 in The Oxford History of the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). The quote is on page 332, for an example of his views on strategy, see 416.
For a more informed interpretation of Jominian theory, see John Shy “Jomini,” in Peter Paret, et al., eds., Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986),143- 185. Shy damns Jominian theory for its author’s willing distortion of historical evidence; ambiguous terms like “interior lines of communications” that lent the theory to banalities; reductionist distortions that discounted politics, technological change, and different types of conflict; and overly prescriptive. Yet, Shy points out that most of Jomini’s critics “failed to distinguish between a theory of systems and a theory of principles. Principles were guides to action, not infallible mathematical calculations. The specific application of principles would vary with the thousand changing physical and psychological factors that made war ‘a great drama’“ (154). For an examination of the Civil War through the lens of Jominian theory, see Richard E. Beringer, Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William N. Still, Jr., Why the South Lost the Civil War (Athens and London: Georgia University Press, 1986).
For the historiographic debate on the war's essential nature and military operations during the conflict, see Jay Luvaas, The Military Legacy of the Civil War: The European Inheritance, Modern War Studies, ed. Theodore Greiss (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953; Modern War Studies reprint, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1988); Russell F. Weigley The American Way of War, Macmillan Wars of the United States, ed. Louis Morton (1973; paperback edition, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), 92-163; Weigley, “American Strategy from Its Beginnings through the First World War,” Peter Paret, et al., eds., Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 418-436; Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1983); Richard E. Beringer, et al., Why the South Lost the Civil War; Herman Hagerman, The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare: Ideas, Organization, and Field Command (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988); Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989); Charles Royster, The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991); Archer Jones, Civil War Command and Strategy (New York: The Free Press, 1992); Joseph T. Glatthaar, Partners in Command: The Relationship Between Leaders in the Civil War (New York: The Free Press, 1993); Stig Förster and Jorg Nagler, eds., On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification, 1861-1871, Publications of the German Historical Institute (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
Although not a work of military history, one ignores at one's peril Drew Gilpin Faust, Mothers of Invention: Women of the Slaveholding South in the American Civil War, The Fred W. Morrison Series in Southern Studies (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). Steven Hahn raises issues that may blow the doors off of how historians look at nineteenth century America (especially the political boundaries of slavery and how they shaped the Civil War) in The Political Worlds of Slavery and Freedom, The Nathan I. Huggins Lectures (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2009), pp. 1-114.
A recent exchange may have a similar effect not only on the military history of the Civil War but on the U.S. Army as well. See Donald Stoker, "There Was No Offensive-Defensive Confederate Strategy," and Joseph G. Dawson III, "Jefferson Davis and the Confederacy's 'Offensive-Defensive'" and their rebuttals to each other in "Forum: Confederate Military Strategy in the U.S. Civil War," in The Journal of Military History, 73:2 (April 2009): 517-613.
While one could argue that many of these works appeared after McPherson’s, a careful reading of his bibliographic essay suggests that he simply used older works on the war rather than finding out what were the more current trajectories of investigation. That is, McPherson seems not to have consulted military historians and asked what aspects of the war were they studying. In fact, McPherson dismisses Hattaway and Jones’s work as an expansion of Benjamin Thomas and Harold Hyman, Stanton: The Life and Times of Lincoln’s Secretary of War (1962). See McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 873-877.
bailaviborita
06-29-2009, 16:23
1) Given the religion and culture of the area, and the values implied by that, is winning hearts and minds a hard problem that requires a lot of time and effort? Given the cultural gap, can it really work?
One might argue instead of "hard" it is vastly complex and bordering on impossible. I've also heard many argue lately that given our culture, short-term policies, and economic problems it can't really work- if what we have in mind is nation-building- which prior to 9/11 was anathema to most conservatives.
2) If we suppose that global GDP (economic growth) is neutral or mildly negative for an extended period, and given the population growth in the areas of interest (2.6% annually LINK (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/AF.html) ), then it seems likely that the young population (17.6 years median age) would continue to live in profound poverty (currently, GDP is $800 per person). Will this tend to drive them into the radical madrassas, and hence make the problem worse? (I notice they have had strong economic growth over the last several years. But if this is due to U.S. aid, then it may be vulnerable if our economy shrinks.)
I am wondering myself how long we can sustain borrowing money from China and giving it to Afghanistan.
3) Since I'm one of those who don't really grasp the concepts of UW/FID, are there any simple introductory texts that might guide me?
I'd recommend COIN subjects- the new COIN manual would be one (3-24: available on-line). THat will show you what the U.S. military thinks about insurgencies and how to combat them. A counter view would be COL Gentile's articles, Andrew Bacevich's works, or mcdougal's Promised Land, Crusader STate. They would argue (I think) that we've defined COIN too closely to "nation-building" and instead should rely more on soft power and very limited COIN military objectives that have nothing to do with building nations, but instead focus on direct and immediate threats to our security. They question the prevailing wisdom that we can or should do "full-spectrum" ops or that we can do a "whole of government" approach and create a functioning democracy out of scratch. Nagl-lovers they are not.
As for this subject- I think it is a "new" strategy coming out of the Center for A New AMerican SEcurity. David Kilcullen's book on The Accidental Guerilla and Michelle Flournoy's connection there- as well as John Nagl- all seem to point to it being one of the places that the new Afghanistan strategy has emerged from.
Will be interesting to see if it is successfully implemented- since they have been trying to go that way anyway since at least early 2008. There seem to be some interesting personalities there now that might disagree on how to best run things.
... the Center for A New American Security
I'd be interested to know what members of this BB think of that organization.
(No, I'm not bitter because it is yet another think tank that, based upon my research, doesn't seem to feature historians. Not even a little.)
Well, maybe a little.
(No, I'm not bitter because it is yet another think tank that, based upon my research, doesn't seem to feature historians. Not even a little.)
Well, maybe a little.
But Sigaba - hadn't you heard? We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality.
So we don't need historians, now, do we? :D (I'm kidding, Sigaba, just kidding.)
Besides, historians might remind us of the price of hubris.
I am wondering myself how long we can sustain borrowing money from China and giving it to Afghanistan.
Or, for that matter, even borrowing it for ourselves. China is pushing hard for a non-dollar reserve ( LINK (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124616719675965215.html) ).
If this occurs, and if we find ourselves incurring non-dollar denominated debt, then we take the same horrific risk taken by Eastern Europe. We place ourselves in a position of vulnerability to an economic first strike.
I'd recommend COIN subjects- the new COIN manual would be one (3-24: available on-line). THat will show you what the U.S. military thinks about insurgencies and how to combat them. A counter view would be COL Gentile's articles, Andrew Bacevich's works, or mcdougal's Promised Land, Crusader STate. They would argue (I think) that we've defined COIN too closely to "nation-building" and instead should rely more on soft power and very limited COIN military objectives that have nothing to do with building nations, but instead focus on direct and immediate threats to our security. They question the prevailing wisdom that we can or should do "full-spectrum" ops or that we can do a "whole of government" approach and create a functioning democracy out of scratch. Nagl-lovers they are not.
Thank you, Sir.