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View Full Version : Drugs, Thugs and Heroin - Bankrolling AQ and Taliban


abc_123
06-03-2009, 19:24
Video presentation by Gretchen Peters, author of New America Foundation on the new book Seeds of Terror: How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and al Qaeda and Doug Farah author of Merchant of Death: Money, Guns, Planes, and the Man Who Makes War Possible. Have not watched it all but will at some point so I wanted to post it in case someone has the time an inclination to watch this now.

http://www.newamerica.net/events/2009/drugs_thugs_and_cash

Over 90% of the world's heroin comes from Afghanistan, and 60% of Afghanistan's GDP comes from poppy trade. With nearly 70,000 American troops set to be in Afghanistan by the summer, most in the poppy-infested south and east of the country, the linkages between drugs and militant financing are more in the spotlight than ever. Emmy-nominated former Associated Press and ABC News reporter Gretchen Peters spent five years traveling to the deepest reaches of the treacherous border between Pakistan and Afghanistan to research her "stunning" new book, Seeds of Terror: How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and al Qaeda.

Join us as Peters and Douglas Farah, author of a critically acclaimed book on the international weapons trade, Merchant of Death: Money, Guns, Planes, and the Man Who Makes War Possible, discuss the region's narcotics trade, precariously placed at ground zero in the "war on terror", and the relationship between Afghan drugs, thugs, and money.

Copies of Seeds of Terror will be available for purchase.

Start: 05/21/2009 - 3:30pm
End: 05/21/2009 - 5:00pm
New America Foundation
1899 L Street, NW Suite 400
Washington, DC, 20036
United States

Richard
06-03-2009, 21:40
Lots of good info here - stopping a $4-500B business producing 92% of a world's product is a tough proposition.

INTERPOL

http://www.interpol.int/default.asp

Richard's $.02 :munchin

abc_123
06-04-2009, 04:56
Lots of good info here - stopping a $4-500B business producing 92% of a world's product is a tough proposition.

INTERPOL

http://www.interpol.int/default.asp

Richard's $.02 :munchin

I'm trying to wade through the articles/general traffic comparing the Afghan issues and those that Colombia has been dealing with. Much back and forth that Plan Colombia is a model for how we should be moving forward in Afghanistan.

While there are similarities to the situation there are many differences. I am not sure that a direct comparison is possible.

The Reaper
06-04-2009, 08:47
I'm trying to wade through the articles/general traffic comparing the Afghan issues and those that Colombia has been dealing with. Much back and forth that Plan Colombia is a model for how we should be moving forward in Afghanistan.

While there are similarities to the situation there are many differences. I am not sure that a direct comparison is possible.

I agree.

Colombia, cocaine production, and the Colombian people are sufficiently different that I see few parallels.

Afghanistan is not Colombia, or Iraq. Lessons learned are fine, but cookie cutter applications are a poor substitute for sound analysis and problem solving.

TR

SF_BHT
06-04-2009, 09:02
I agree.

Colombia, cocaine production, and the Colombian people are sufficiently different that I see few parallels.

Afghanistan is not Colombia, or Iraq. Lessons learned are fine, but cookie cutter applications are a poor substitute for sound analysis and problem solving.

TR

Well our government is not doing Sound Analysis..... Cops vs Taliban/AQ is not ever going to solve the problem but they are going forward with that type of option.

Just read that DEA is going forward with expanding the office in Kabul from a small office to a Full Division with an SES in-charge. All I can say is I hope they bring a bunch of BB's. Cops vis warlords/Taliban/AQ is not the way to go. DoD does not want to do LEO opns like Drug interdiction but in that environment the only people that can effectively do this is DoD. I predict that it will go just like Snow Cap..... As soon as the 1st BB is filled they will pull out.

abc_123
06-04-2009, 10:18
Well our government is not doing Sound Analysis..... Cops vs Taliban/AQ is not ever going to solve the problem but they are going forward with that type of option.

Just read that DEA is going forward with expanding the office in Kabul from a small office to a Full Division with an SES in-charge. All I can say is I hope they bring a bunch of BB's. Cops vis warlords/Taliban/AQ is not the way to go. DoD does not want to do LEO opns like Drug interdiction but in that environment the only people that can effectively do this is DoD. I predict that it will go just like Snow Cap..... As soon as the 1st BB is filled they will pull out.

We were not doing sound analysis and thinking holistically when we defined the roles/missions of the ANA and ANP which led, IMO to some less than smart decisions on basing strategy (centralized vs. decentralized, locations etc.), MTOE, equipment fielding and training. Lots of things leave me scratching my head, that's for sure.

abc_123
06-04-2009, 11:28
I agree.

Colombia, cocaine production, and the Colombian people are sufficiently different that I see few parallels.

Afghanistan is not Colombia, or Iraq. Lessons learned are fine, but cookie cutter applications are a poor substitute for sound analysis and problem solving.

TR

Here is what NATO is saying on the "Lesson's Learned" front...

http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue3/english/art1.html

I cut out some of the article to skip to the "lessons learned part"

Lessons learned
In Colombia, although the process for the consolidation of territorial control is still in its initial phase, we have been able to identify some important lessons. These are not only useful to us in improving our own efforts, but may contribute to other similar efforts in places like Afghanistan.

Friction. The military historian Clausewitz spoke of 'friction in war' to explain the enormous difference between planning war on paper and executing war on the ground. Colombia has also experienced 'friction' in inter-agency coordination, both between civilian and military agencies and between different civilian agencies. In practice, coordination is a continuous process of negotiation between agencies, each one attempting to retain the greatest degree of independence.
Never abandon a region. Once troops reach a zone, they must remain for the duration of the consolidation process
Opportunity dilemma. Finding the right balance between military and social effort remains difficult. Our experience has shown that without minimum security conditions, social efforts are fruitless. For that reason, the first advance is military.

Military criteria must continue to be the genesis of the consolidation. Selecting regions for consolidation must be based on a military strategy that will destabilize enemy plans and positions. So the military must establish the first strategy for consolidation which can be supported later by social activities.

Never abandon a region. Once troops reach a zone, they must remain for the duration of the consolidation process. Otherwise criminal groups will return to take reprisals against the population and generate greater mistrust of the state.

Align efforts with international cooperation. In Colombia, different international cooperation agencies support the consolidation effort. In practice, these agencies don't always act with the same interests. So it is essential to coordinate and align the activities of local (state) agencies with international cooperation agencies. And it is clearly highly important to maintain international political and economic support for the consolidation process.

Break the cycle of mistrust. In regions where terrorist groups have traditionally exercised influence, the arrival of state organizations is often greeted with profound mistrust by the people. This hostile reception in turn generates mistrust on the part of the state, meaning the initial phase of consolidation takes place in a climate of suspicion. The primary task of the consolidation effort is to break this cycle of mistrust - largely by embarking on a series of confidence-building measures.

But the most important and underlying lesson learned in the Colombian case is that security cannot be an end in itself. Security must always be a means for maintaining the governability of the state, producing well-being and fostering social progress. Colombian armed forces can only gain the upper hand against terrorism if we create the necessary conditions to guarantee an effective state presence and social development in our communities.

Those involved in consolidating territorial control in complex threat environments like Colombia or Afghanistan should share experiences and expertise on a regular basis, otherwise ungoverned spaces will continue to breed terrorism and crime.
Juan Manuel Santos is the national Minister of Defence of Colombia, taking up the post in July 2006. He has previously served as the country's Minister for Foreign Trade, as well as working for the United Nations.