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View Full Version : Grunts to Rebuild Like SOF, Move Away From Bases: Mattis


JJ_BPK
02-21-2009, 18:13
Not sure I like the idea.

G Mattis is not augmenting SF,, He wants to turn everyone into SF..

More is not better..

If this is what SoD Gates had in mind,, I think we in trouble..

My $00.0002


This is from a new VENUE by our buddy Christian at DT.org, more squirrels looks for their nuts.. :eek:


By Greg Grant Thursday, February 19th, 2009 11:53 am
Posted in Policy

www.dodbuzz.com/2009/02/19/grunts-sof-fob-based-coin-must-end-mattis

Fighting two simultaneous counterinsurgency wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has placed enormous demands on the small number of elite Army Special Forces teams, known as Operational Detachment Alpha. So the Army and Marines plan to restructure and create many more small combat and advisory teams from existing conventional ground forces, says Marine Gen. James Mattis, Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command.

The military is dominant in conventional warfare and can best any opponent in high-intensity battle, but it’s not superior in irregular warfare, the types of wars the U.S. is most likely to fight in the future, Mattis said. The requirement for small combat and advisory teams, along the Special Forces model, is now a “national priority.” Mattis recently created a Joint Irregular Warfare Center, headed by a Special Forces officer, to guide the effort “to shift general purpose forces more into a special operations forces approach to fighting, without giving up conventional warfare.” Creating these small, deployable “high performing” teams for irregular warfare will require many more Army and Marines trained as advisors.

“We need more troops who are culturally adept, who are comfortable working outside mother Army, mother Marine Corps and able to work in small teams,” Mattis said, speaking Feb. 12, at a conference sponsored by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, in Washington, DC. Irregular wars are fought amongst the people, requiring American troops, “understand not just of the nature of the conflict, but the ‘human sea,’ to use Mao’s analogy, within which the enemy swims,” according to the “Joint Operating Environment,” a recent Joint Forces Command publication.

Mattis said in future irregular wars, the military must avoid the logistically demanding and often problem causing “heavy footprint,” where large numbers of troops are sent ashore and operate from massive bases, as in Iraq and Afghanistan. He prefers an expeditionary approach, using small advisory teams who live and work among the local people. It will require a “fundamental shift” in the approach to basing in foreign countries, “where not every troop has a big screen TV and eighteen entries on the menu that night and where they’re completely isolated from the local people.” He said the seabasing concept, where troops operate from large naval platforms located offshore, will be an important component of the new irregular warfare operating concept.

Mattis said greater partnering with foreign militaries will be how the U.S. fights irregular wars in the future; the advisory mission is a “growth industry.” Some point to the El Salvador model as the preferred model for counterinsurgency, where a small team of U.S., advisors, not more than 55, trained the El Salvadoran military to defeat a community insurgency in the 1980s. The problem is the military’s acute shortage of advisors able to train foreign militaries. That mission is one for which the Special Forces ODA teams were created and are well suited. Yet, those teams currently operate as commandos, pursuing high value terrorist targets and insurgent leaders around the world.

A number of voices have pushed for more Army and Marines to serve as advisors, yet those general purpose troops lack the specialized training, particularly cultural and language, found in Special Forces teams. Currently, the Army and Marines create temporary ad-hoc advisory teams, with troops thrown together from different units, a practice that is disruptive to existing units and fails to create small unit cohesion. John Nagl, president of the Center for a New American Security and one of the authors of the counterinsurgency manual, says the military must create an “advisory corps,” with large numbers of troops specifically trained in foreign languages and cultures.

General purpose troops in Iraq and Afghanistan typically operate in small units, since massing a battalion, or even a company, is rarely useful on a battlefield where the enemy avoids toe- to-toe fights against the high-firepower brought by the American military. Mattis wants troops to train how they fight, with focused training, including use of simulations and other training aids, on operating as small, self-sustaining units.

Mattis said he recently met with Army Chief Gen. George Casey, Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James Conway and Special Operations Commander Adm. Eric Olsen, to discuss the “division of labor” in advisory missions. “Where we need people to build relationships, that’s going to be a Special Forces kind of job… where we want to just go in and train people in marching, basic marksmanship, first aid, small unit tactics, the general purpose forces will pick up most of those.”

Defense Secretary Robert Gates is determined to “rebalance” the military by shifting focus and resources to irregular warfare. Mattis said the irregular war concept, which includes preparing to fight hybrid enemies, is a useful “magnet” to pull the military out of its conventional war mindset. “We don’t want U.S. forces to be dominant and irrelevant,” he said.

Basenshukai
02-21-2009, 19:24
I'm not worried about this because it will simply not work. It takes us selecting personnel, training them and then, if they make it, assigning them into SFODAs in order to make them even remotely qualified to do the UW/FID job properly. Then, it will take an individual operator a few years in an SFODA to become the consumate warrior-teacher that makes us America's number one UW/FID force. So, yeah, this will get its trial. Some money will get pushed this way and that way and some Soldiers will get some interesting training. But, in the end, the decision-makers will realize that when you can't fail at UW/FID, you need to send in an SFODA, period. Remember GEN Shinzeki's transformation of the Army? The concept began when he viewed the flexibility of SOF and thought that the entire Army should be able to mirror that performance. Then, the black berets were tranferred from the Rangers to the conventional side. We were all appalled and worried about what this would mean for us. Other than changing out headgear, it didn't really hurt the Rangers' ability to maintain their mission profile and it really didn't even affect SF either. With the necessity to tighten our budgets at a National level, I don't see any programs that will only add additional cost to DoD being approved, or maintained for too long anyway if they don't already have a proven track record of effectiveness.

Richard
02-21-2009, 19:35
Sounds a lot like a return to the advisory role of the district and regional advisors to the RF/PFs et al. We'll be hearing about strategic hamlets next. And so it goes... ;)

Richard's $.02 :munchin

LR27
02-21-2009, 20:20
The SOF Truths are pretty applicable here.


Quality is better than quantity

Special operations cannot be mass produced

Competent special operations forces cannot be created after emergencies occur

I think it is important for our conventional forces to be culturally adept and linguistically skilled, but by no means should they conduct FID/UW.

swpa19
02-22-2009, 06:00
We'll be hearing about strategic hamlets next. And so it goes...



Like the song says: "Everything OLD is NEW again".

Dozer523
02-22-2009, 07:41
Ever see the movie The Incredibles?
Remember this line?
SYNDROME/BUDDY: I'll give them heroics. I'll give them the most spectacular heroics they've ever seen! And when I'm old and I've had my fun, I'll sell my inventions so everyone can be superheroes! Everyone can be super! And when everyone's super, [laughs maniacally] no one will be.
SSDD

Richard
02-22-2009, 09:48
Ever see the movie The Incredibles?
Remember this line?
SYNDROME/BUDDY: I'll give them heroics. I'll give them the most spectacular heroics they've ever seen! And when I'm old and I've had my fun, I'll sell my inventions so everyone can be superheroes! Everyone can be super! And when everyone's super, [laughs maniacally] no one will be.
SSDD

I thought that was the motto for MARSOC. How did The Few, The Proud, The Incredibles get permission to use it? [laughs maniacally] :rolleyes:

Richard's $.02 :munchin

f50lrrp
02-22-2009, 10:20
As Richard stated above...it has happened before.

In Vietnam we had first the MAAG and later MACV. They made an attempt to advise the RVN Armed Forces with mixed results. The Advisors were at first not trained to advise. Later the Special Forces offered the Military Advisory Training Assistance (MATA) Course at Smoke Bomb Hill at Fort Bragg. Students in this course spent five months learning about obsolete weapons (WWII Vintage), tactics, culture and language. This was followed by another three months of intensive language training at Biggs Army Airfield (Fort Bliss, TX).

The MATA course drew on senior enlisted soldiers and Marines who had already served at least a tour in SVN. Neither it nor the efforts of DLI recognized that the students weren't motivated to be advisors.

mac117
02-22-2009, 11:11
it is amazing how we remain the greatest nation on the planet when we are so incapable of learning from our mistakes.....but we manage to hold that slot!

Dozer523
02-23-2009, 13:44
it is amazing how we remain the greatest nation on the planet when we are so incapable of learning from our mistakes.....but we manage to hold that slot! Maybe because greatness is more a result of how the plan is executed rather then how the plan is written.

Pete
02-23-2009, 14:02
...Later the Special Forces offered the Military Advisory Training Assistance (MATA) Course at Smoke Bomb Hill at Fort Bragg. Students in this course spent five months learning about obsolete weapons (WWII Vintage), tactics, culture and language. .......

Which I would assume had something to do with the MATA mile area and VC Vilage on the south and southeast edges of the Smoke Bomb Hill area?

By 1974 the wooded area was just known as the MATA Mile area.

csquare
02-23-2009, 14:09
This is just a ploy to tap into different pots of money. If you can say your unit is Special Operations Capable or you have a platoon/ company that is specialized in FID/UW, then that unit can be funded by someone else.
But it won't work. And it isn't currently working under the cover of AdHoc MiTT teams downrange.

Wait... the Good Idea Fairy just whispered in my ear.... Let's start this at the "grass root" level with girl scouts. Instead of selling cookies in front of Wal-Mart, they conduct basic UW/FID training with all the locals walking thru the door. Maybe the same GIF was whispering in that GO's ear too?

redleg99
02-23-2009, 16:54
I believe that up until Vietnam, FID was something the big Army regularly got involved with.
It seems like it was only afterwards that they got out of that business entirely, and handed it over to SF – probably because of some of the lessons learned.

Here’s a good history of our Army doing FID:

Advising indigenous forces : American advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador

http://comarms.ipac.dynixasp.com/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=1CD5U28618288.66824&profile=carlcgsc&source=~!comarms&view=subscriptionsummary&uri=full=3100001~!317790~!3&ri=5&aspect=subtab209&menu=search&ipp=20&spp=20&staffonly=&term=Ramsey,+Robert+D.,+1946-&index=PAUTHOR&uindex=&aspect=subtab209&menu=search&ri=5

Richard
02-23-2009, 18:01
Here's another one; looks like some interesting reading. FWIW-I knew Greg Banner in the 5th SFG and ACSCMO-21st TAACOM; last I saw him he was a BDE Advisor with the MILGRP-ELSAL.

Advice for advisors : suggestions and observations from Lawrence to the present
-Ramsey, Robert D.


Twenty-seven articles / T.E. Lawrence -- The nationbuilder : soldiers of the sixties / Captain Richard A. Jones -- American advisors overseas / Edward C. Stewart -- The district advisor / Captain James F. Ray -- Advisor and counterpart / Colonel Bryce F. Denno -- Advising the advisor / Major irving C. Hudlin -- Senior officer debriefing report / Major General John H. Cushman -- Some advice for the prospective advisor / Major David L. Shelton -- After action report, 2d Milzone OPATT chief / Major Gregory T. Banner -- Rebuilding the Iraqi Army / Major Mike Sullivan -- The role of the American advisor / Major O. Kent Strader -- Training Iraqi forces / Major David H. Marshall -- Marine foreign military advisors: the road ahead / Lieutenant Colonel Andrew R Milburn and Major Mark C. Lombard -- The American military advisor and his foreign counterpart: the case of Vietnam / Gerald C. Hickey.

http://comarms.ipac.dynixasp.com/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=12O543289Q434.69207&profile=carlcgsc&source=~!comarms&view=subscriptionsummary&uri=full=3100001~!317793~!2&ri=3&aspect=subtab209&menu=search&ipp=20&spp=20&staffonly=&term=Ramsey,+Robert+D.,+1946-&index=PAUTHOR&uindex=&aspect=subtab209&menu=search&ri=3

Sweetbriar
02-23-2009, 22:07
Mattis' speech in streaming video. The points discussed here are about 30 minutes in to about the 35 minute mark.

FPRI (http://www.fpri.org/multimedia/20090212.jointwarfare21stcentury.html)