From NWC professor...

[Ret10Echo]

Let's Have Flexible Armed Forces

By MACKUBIN THOMAS OWENS

During the 1990s, the U.S. defense debate was dominated by those who argued that advances in technology, particularly information technology, had revolutionized military affairs and changed the nature of warfare. Under former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, this view -- now called transformation -- came to characterize U.S. military planning. Based on the example of the 1991 Gulf War, advocates of transformation argued that our technological edge would allow American forces to identify and destroy targets remotely, defeating an adversary at low cost in casualties.
Though the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have largely discredited staunch transformation advocates, a heated debate still rages about the shape of the future U.S. military. One side, the "Long War" school, argues that Iraq and Afghanistan are characteristic of the protracted and ambiguous wars America will fight in the future. Accordingly, they say, the military should be developing a force designed to fight the Long War on terrorism, primarily by preparing for "small wars" and insurgencies.

Critics -- often labeled "traditionalists" or "conservatives" -- concede that irregular warfare will occur more frequently in the future than interstate war. But they conclude that such conflicts do not threaten U.S. strategic interests in the way large-scale conflicts do. They fear that the Long War school's focus on small wars and insurgencies will transform the Army into a constabulary force, whose enhanced capability for conducting stability operations and nation-building would be purchased at a high cost: the ability to conduct large-scale conventional war.
This debate is relevant to all Americans, since its outcome has implications for both national security policy and civil-military relations. It raises two related questions. First, given its global role, can the U.S. afford to choose one path and not the other? And second, to what extent should military decisions constrain policy makers? In other words, can military doctrine and structure be left strictly to those in uniforms?
The danger of choosing one military planning strategy to the exclusion of the other is illustrated by the Eisenhower administration's "New Look" defense policy of the 1950s. The New Look, which made long-range nuclear air power the centerpiece of force structure, resulted in severe strategic inflexibility, namely the inability to respond to threats at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict. As a result, adversaries developed asymmetric responses to America's dominant nuclear capability -- "peoples' wars" and "wars of national liberation." The deficiencies in the New Look strategy led to its replacement in the 1960s by the strategy of "flexible response." This called for a capability to address threats from nuclear war to conventional war and insurgencies, such as the one in Vietnam.
The shortcomings of the New Look strategy can be laid at the feet of the elected president, since the resulting strategic inflexibility was his responsibility. But when the military makes force structure decisions that constrain our national leadership, it becomes an issue of foreign policy as a whole, as evidenced by U.S. policy post-Vietnam.
Badly bruised by Vietnam, the U.S. Army concluded that it should avoid irregular conflict in the future and focus on "real" wars, that is, large-scale conventional combat. Thus in the 1970s, the Army discarded the doctrine for small wars and counterinsurgency that it had reluctantly developed for Vietnam. Class time devoted to counterinsurgency at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth was reduced substantially. And the Army's focus on real wars led its leadership to resist committing Army units to military operations other than war during the post-Cold War era.
In Today's Opinion Journal

More significantly, Gen. Creighton Abrams, Army chief of staff from 1972 to 1974, made a far-reaching force structure change during his tenure that seriously limited executive power. Concerned about the lack of public support for the Vietnam War, he shifted most of the Army's combat service support function to the reserve component, which meant that even the smallest commitment of army units during a contingency would require a call-up of reserves.
By law, the military is responsible for deciding how to fight -- organizing strategy, training units, and developing doctrine. But the military owes civilian leaders the capability to advance U.S. interests against the entire spectrum of conflict. This, as we see from looking back at the past few decades, is essential for healthy civil-military relations today.
As far as strategy is concerned, the reality is that both Long War and conventional capabilities are necessary. Preparing only for what appears now to be the most likely conflict -- the Long War option -- may very well make conventional war more likely in the future. In addition, the ability of the U.S. to advance its global interests requires that it maintain command of the global commons: sea, air and space. The Long War option is not sustainable without such control.
Future warfare is likely to be hybrid in character, possessing interlocking elements of both conventional and irregular warfare. Under such conditions, strategic flexibility must be the watchword for U.S. military and policy makers.


Mr. Owens is a professor at the Naval War College and editor of Orbis, the journal of the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

[Sigaba]

FWIW, I respectfully disagree with Professor Owens's characterization of President Eisenhower's New Look. First, 'massive retaliation,' the threatened use of strategic nuclear weapons against the Soviet homeland was designed to inspire uncertainty in the Kremlin just far how America would go to protect its interests. This top down approach to deterrence leveraged Eisenhower's experience as a general. Eisenhower had taken one of the largest risks in the history of warfare by authorizing OVERLORD, it was reasonable to assume that he might take similar risks as the American president. As it was widely believed that the Kremlin was the focal point of international communism, it was not inconceivable that if the Soviets feared annihilation then they'd keep their surrogates in line.*

Second, massive retaliation was but one component of the New Look. The New Look de-emphasized armed force in favor of covert operations by the CIA, diplomatic efforts by State, and an elaborate concerted public diplomacy offensive that is still coming to light.** Additionally, Eisenhower leveraged America's advantages in intelligence gathering technology to keep a watchful eye on the Soviet's strategic forces.

Third, I do not agree with Colonel Owens's implication that the New Look was a bankrupt strategy because it was no longer viable by 1960 and because it was not suited for countering emerging 'national liberation' movements. In regards to the latter, the New Look was not designed with that objective in mind--its central goal was to deter communist aggression. As Colonel Owens himself points out, "[s]trategy relates ends or the goals of policy (interests and objectives) to the limited means available to achieve them."*** In regards to the former, the world experienced dynamic change between 1952 and 1960. With the possible exception of War Plan ORANGE and maybe NSC-68 (depending upon one's view of George Kennan's subsequent disavowal of the interpretation of that document), no American strategy had a longer shelf life than the New Look.

I also differ with Colonel Owens on the efficacy of President Kennedy's "flexible response." As John Lewis Gaddis argues in Strategies of Containment, "flexible response" was a symmetrical strategy that left it to America's adversaries to chose the time, place, and means of conflict. The New Look's asymmetry had left those options to America. Moreover, as Ingo Trauschweizer points out in his recent study of the army during the Cold War, America's ambivalence towards unconventional warfare was not ameliorated by the 'flexible response' because neither Kennedy nor Johnson articulated clearly the role of UW in national strategy. I would add that the New Look foreshadowed the concept of 'escalation dominance' that would form the cornerstone of America's strategic planning during the Reagan administration (most notably, the navy's Maritime Strategy).

Finally, as I'd fall into the category of a "conservative" in the RMA debate, I would point out that an emphasis on the 'long war' not only risks America's capability in a conventional war but by turning the army into a constabulary force in and of itself constitutes a dire risk to the American army's conventional branches. Since 1924,the use of the American army as a constabulary force during the mid to late nineteenth century has been painted as the army's 'dark ages' in American military historiography. While this interpretation is overdue for renewed debate (William Tecumseh Sherman wrote with a shaky hand--his papers are un-indexed and underutilized), a re-examination of this period will still reveal an army suffering the consequences of its constabulary duties well into the twentieth century.

_________________________________________
* Academics of all stripes still debate hotly the nature of international communism during the Cold War. Recently, Mark Moyar has offered convincing evidence that Ho Chi Minh was a willing servant of the Kremlin's interests and not the leader of a national liberation movement as many have argued. Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
** Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (University Press of Kansas, 2006).
*** Mackubin Thomas Owens, "Strategy and the Strategic Way of Thinking," Naval War College Review 60:4 (autumn 2007): 112. This elegant essay which highlights the contributions of Sir Michael Howard to the study and practice of strategy is available here (https://portal.nwc.navy.mil/press/Naval%20War%20College%20Review/2007/Essay%20by%20Owens%20Autumn%202007.pdf).

[Peregrino]

Sigba - Wonderful academic argument. What does it have to do with the "bottom line"?

As far as strategy is concerned, the reality is that both Long War and conventional capabilities are necessary. Preparing only for what appears now to be the most likely conflict -- the Long War option -- may very well make conventional war more likely in the future. In addition, the ability of the U.S. to advance its global interests requires that it maintain command of the global commons: sea, air and space. The Long War option is not sustainable without such control.
Future warfare is likely to be hybrid in character, possessing interlocking elements of both conventional and irregular warfare. Under such conditions, strategic flexibility must be the watchword for U.S. military and policy makers.

He's using what you (apparently) consider flawed arguments to advance a thesis that we have to look at a balanced approach to meet national security requirements. Do you disagree with his conclusion? What can he do to advance his argument? What points should he have made to support his contention for a balanced military? Yes, I'm giving you a hard time. By focusing on the details, and overlooking the intent, I think you've missed the mark. His intended audience was/is political and military policy makers. Does his argument effectively address that audience (fair warning - they/we don't think like academics)?

[6.8SPC_DUMP]

It's interesting to imagine what new technologies the Military will develop/implement.

For short term I imagine developments in ground vehicles for transportation of small groups of Troops in rocky/mountainous/sand conditions like in Afghanistan. Also, something of a jet/chopper hybrid for fast mountain navigation and unloading Troops more effectively. Hopefully we will see a Hummer replacement not as susceptible to IED's. It's worrying to think we might not have the resources to mass produce what ever may come.

Obama wants to ban space weapons. I'm for that, but I doubt China will be, if they can gain military superiority over us. It seems like the natural progression of military long term.

[Sigaba]

Sigba - Wonderful academic argument. What does it have to do with the "bottom line"?

He's using what you (apparently) consider flawed arguments to advance a thesis that we have to look at a balanced approach to meet national security requirements. Do you disagree with his conclusion? What can he do to advance his argument? What points should he have made to support his contention for a balanced military? Yes, I'm giving you a hard time. By focusing on the details, and overlooking the intent, I think you've missed the mark. His intended audience was/is political and military policy makers. Does his argument effectively address that audience (fair warning - they/we don't think like academics)?

Sir--

I think your analysis of my post is valid and your questions are fair.

My understanding of Colonel Owens's intent is that he wants armed forces capable of conducting conventional and irregular operations because he sees future conflicts as a hybrid of what he calls short wars and long wars. Owens also argues that when military planners do not take a broader approach to policy issues they can constrain the national leadership's ability to respond to a changing strategic environment. For what it is worth, I agree with both of these points.

My disagreement with Owens's piece have two components. The first centers around his use of historical examples to illustrate his argument. This discomfort stems from a long running dialog over multi-disciplinary and the lessons of history among historians and political scientists. Colonel Owens is a distinguished political scientist. As such, he uses a case study approach to make an apples to apples comparison between the New Look and flexible response to determine that the former was a bit sour when compared to the latter. By comparing the two apples, Colonel Owens seeks to empower his audience in selecting the next apple. He is also suggesting which apple to pick.

As your analysis points out, my focus on examples risks looking at the trees at the expense of the forest. Generally speaking, historians are better at looking at trees than forests and more comfortable splitting hairs. I am uncomfortable with apple to apple comparisons. As history is the study of change over time, I prefer that a comparison between different policies is rooted in an in-depth discussion of those policies in their respective contexts.

In my opinion, the comparison is not between two different apples but between an apple and a banana. By studying each in their own context, one can develop a sense of their individual strengths and weaknesses in their own terms. This approach would allow policy makers to understand how the New Look and the flexible response reflected not only the differing strategic environments of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations but also how consideration of domestic politics influenced the formulation of those policies. In my view, this approach enables policy makers to understand that the best option may not be another apple or another banana but a hybrid of the two or an entirely different fruit altogether.

The second component of my discomfort centers around my longstanding misgiving over academics acting as advocates. It is my view that the public good would be better served if individual scholars avoided public advocacy. Americans of all stripes regularly take academics to task for indoctrinating students rather than educating them (teaching students what to think rather than teaching students how to think). This practice of indoctrinating students--a festering, self-inflicted wound that educators continue to pick--has greatly compromised public faith in many academic professions. As a result, well-researched, lucid, sophisticated contributions to our collective understanding of matters of importance are frequently dismissed out of hand because a scholar fails a litmus test. Too often, scholarly works are judged by their dust jacket when they should be evaluated by their footnotes and bibliography. I think academics should provide the intellectual resources and tools that are used to build public and national security policy but leave the building to the policy makers themselves.

Additionally, since public intellectuals frequently communicate their views through shorter pieces, succinctness frequently comes at the expense of nuance. This trade off is problematic for three reasons. First, because it is through nuance that a learned scholar will deliver his most profound argument.* Second, brevity can lead to an under appreciation of an issue's complexity. For example, in his piece, Colonel Owens summarizes the debate over the revolution in military affairs into two opposing schools and suggests a synthesis of the two (a la Hegel). Yet, Owens touches on no fewer than nine other areas of scholarly inquiry that are equally heated and some that are more pressing. In presenting a road map towards a balanced military force, Colonel Owens does not suggest ways to navigate these issues.

The third reason addresses your question about 'the bottom line.' We live in an age when more and more Americans receive and digest information in sound-bites, news flashes, blog postings, wikis, and RSS feeds. Professionals are not immune to this dynamic. They must often rely on opinion pieces in broadsheets like the Wall Street Journal, reviews, executive summaries, committee findings, briefings, meeting minutes, memoranda, and synopses. Each of these forms of communication have their value in transmitting information but are these compacted forms of communication the ideal methods for the type of deliberation that Colonel Owens is asking?

___________________________________
* In Owens's case, that argument is that America needs to reconsider its reliance on the work of Sir Halford Mackinder in its formulation of grand strategy.

[Surf n Turf]

Sigaba,
Some additional information to throw into your discussion – sourced from Small Wars Council –
The discussion on abumuqawama blog is between Col Gentile and “Looking Glass” (about ½ way down the second reference url page). I think that both threads are thrashing out the “long War” vs COIN / asymmetrical warfare discussion, and where we are heading.
Looking Glass is of the opinion that we are at a stage where Big Army can’t spell COIN.
Both sites provide a good discussion
SnT


http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6585
http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com/2009/01/gian-gentile-versus-abu-muqawama-round.html

[Sigaba]

Sigaba,
Some additional information to throw into your discussion – sourced from Small Wars Council –
The discussion on abumuqawama blog is between Col Gentile and “Looking Glass” (about ½ way down the second reference url page). I think that both threads are thrashing out the “long War” vs COIN / asymmetrical warfare discussion, and where we are heading.
Looking Glass is of the opinion that we are at a stage where Big Army can’t spell COIN.
Both sites provide a good discussion
SnT


http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6585
http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com/2009/01/gian-gentile-versus-abu-muqawama-round.html

Sir--

Thank you for the links.:D

[Peregrino]

Sigba - I acknowlege your argument; and still think you're concentrating on the trees to the exclusion of the forest. I need to research COL Owens a little more to be sure but my gut tells me he's a soldier masquerading as an academic, not a true academic in the sense you describe. Your advocacy for "dispassionate academic purity" (forgive me for the crude paraphrase) and the assumption that COL Owens should hold himself to that standard overlooks the reality of military educational institutions that draw upon former Soldiers/SMs for portions of their faculty. I know COL (Ret) Hy Rothstein who is also NPG faculty personally, and cannot imagine him failing to advocate if he saw that as his duty. Nor can I imagine any other Soldier of similar background withholding a professional (NTM a strongly worded personal - ) opinion. Not to disparage the real academics who also contribute to the students educational experience (NPG has a reputation for a distinguished faculty), but I think you're trying to do a direct comparison of apples and bananas. Put on your anthropology hat and look at COL Owens from the perspective of a tribal culture with a warrior tradition. He's a former leader, someone who's earned the right to advocate (within his area of competence) to the audience at whom he's directed his monograph. He has been "the man in the arena" and he's entitled to have some dirt under his fingernails.

Your comment about sound bites(bytes) is cogent and I will conceed COL Owens is taking a direct approach and glossing over nuances; however, I don't think the lack rises to the level of concealing his argument or detracting from his conclusion. I wish my library wasn't still in boxes (recent move and no bookcases yet), I'm good with concepts, lousy with details. I've got a book about .ppt presentations that references the Colombia disaster and the briefings that failed to accurately convey the risks to the decision makers. Fascinating case study. Something I see regularly at work. The critical component of the briefings was the gradual elimination of pertinent data as the audience went higher up the food chain and the failure of the engineers who prepared the brief to make a clear cut recommendation. (Typical bureaucracy - can't blame anybody if nobody will take a position!) COL Owens may have "abbreviated" the supporting data but he does make a clear recommendation, one that can be supported with the available information. Refuting the recommendation might require some more work but shouldn't decision makers do some of their own thinking every now and then?

[Sigaba]

Peregrino--

Sir, thank you for your comments. You've given me a lot to think about.:lifter Especially your observation that I'm "trying to do a direct comparison of apples and bananas."

I understand that I may be hoping for a type of disinterestedness that may not benefit the armed forces who collectively take a utilitarian approach to history and other disciplines.

[Peregrino]

Peregrino--

Sir, thank you for your comments. You've given me a lot to think about.:lifter Especially your observation that I'm "trying to do a direct comparison of apples and bananas."

I understand that I may be hoping for a type of disinterestedness that may not benefit the armed forces who collectively take a utilitarian approach to history and other disciplines.

No Sir - Thank YOU, for providing me with some light entertainment and an opportunity to expose you to a "slightly" different mindset. Don't condemn the "utilitarian approach". When our chosen profession has so many areas that require mastery, why waste valuable effort on something that isn't useful? Utilitarian is just conservation of resources/effort. We can work hard, or work smart (and I'm lazy by preference!). Now I can put up the nerf bat and go back to lurking with a real club. :D