Ambush Master
05-22-2004, 10:16
This from Stratfor.com:
Al Qaeda's Next Strike
By Fred Burton
Summary
Al Qaeda likely has a number of sleeper cells still embedded in
the United States, and logic dictates that Houston, Texas, is
high on their target list.
Analysis
In our last Terrorism Intelligence Weekly, Stratfor discussed
improvements in intelligence-gathering efforts that have aided
the ability of Western governments to predict or pre-empt
attacks. At the same time, however, the threat within the
continental United States -- where al Qaeda is likely to attempt
a major strike before the presidential elections -- also has
intensified. Logic dictates that Washington, New York, Dallas,
Houston or Austin, Texas, could be targeted in an attack that
quite possibly would involve a "dirty bomb."
Continuing with this line of reasoning, Houston appears to be the
most likely target.
Sleeper Cell Tactics
Concerns over the safety of U.S. citizens are legitimate. Well-
placed U.S. government counterterrorism sources have confirmed
the presence of al Qaeda "sleeper cells" within the country.
Although it is not known how many cells could be in place,
intelligence indicates that militant operatives are in place, to
be deployed for the next Sept. 11- or Madrid-style attacks.
Analysis leads us to believe that a cell could be in place in
Houston.
Sleeper cells are difficult to ferret out -- with profiles that
do not differ greatly from those of the rest of the public. Like
the Sept. 11 attackers, militant operatives do not hesitate to
violate Islamic custom by shaving, dressing and behaving so as to
blend into their temporary communities. As a group, they are
overwhelmingly male, they are typically physically fit, and they
often practice martial arts -- sometimes in formal school
settings. Their identities may be false, but not always.
However, it is their actions -- not their appearance, ethnicity
or religion -- that can expose sleeper cells and help
intelligence and law enforcement agencies to disrupt attacks.
First, these militant units are not totally independent: Courier
services are used to send money and orders to operatives, whose
leaders frequently have had contact with members of other cells.
If one operative is arrested, pocket litter and phone records can
lead authorities to other cells.
And there certainly are opportunities for arrests. Sleeper cells
fund some of their activities through credit card and financial
fraud, and members often use false identification documents.
Elements of these crimes are much easier than terrorism charges
to prove in court, which gives police and federal officials some
traction in disrupting attack planning. Other activities also
provide clues: The premier example, of course, is that the Sept.
11 team had to learn how to fly airplanes -- but more
universally, virtually all terrorist attacks follow a period of
eyes-on surveillance of the target.
At the tactical level, counterterrorism experts have observed
that members of al Qaeda's sleeper cells carry out many duties
within their units -- which increases the chances that an arrest
could throw off a planned attack. For example, analysis of past
attacks has revealed that the same members tasked with carrying
out preoperational surveillance for a strike also work on the
logistics and attack teams. Operationally, this places them at
greater risk than groups who use highly trained, specialized
cells for each function.
Moreover, a study of past al Qaeda attacks and training manuals
reveals that the group carries out extensive preoperational
surveillance. This renders militants vulnerable to detection by
countersurveillance teams, who could trail them back to the rest
of their cells -- the bomb-makers and attack teams. For
intelligence and law enforcement agencies, this is the best time
to pre-empt a terrorist attack: If one militant can be caught
conducting preoperational surveillance, the entire cell can be
uncovered and destroyed.
In the two-and-a-half years since the Sept. 11 attacks, the
efforts of the FBI and CIA to root out these cells have paid
dividends. FBI Director Robert Mueller asserts that federal
officials have disrupted dozens of planned attacks, and sleeper
agents have been uncovered and deported. However, we do not
believe that all of al Qaeda's sleeper cells have been identified
or crippled. In addition to pre-existing cells, al Qaeda also has
had plenty of time to infiltrate more operatives into the United
States.
In the span since Sept. 11, al Qaeda also has had opportunities
to conduct surveillance of its next target, plan out the attack
and fine-tune operational details. In the past, al Qaeda attacks
have occurred at a particular pace: Stratfor on several occasions
has noted a two- to three-year span between major actions by "al
Qaeda prime," interspersed with numerous, smaller strikes that
likely are carried out by affiliated groups, with or without al
Qaeda's support. Within those operations, there also are
predictable patterns of activity. The pre-operational
surveillance period is the most effective phase in which to
interrupt an attack -- but few law enforcement and corporate
security agencies have the expertise to take advantage of this
weakness.
Why Houston -- and How?
For the next major al Qaeda strike, preoperational surveillance
is likely under way.
The timing for an attack within the United States is nearly
perfect: while Americans are engrossed with Iraq, presidential
politics and the rising price of oil. Logic dictates that cells
are in place and awaiting a signal to act; as in the recent
attack in the Saudi city of Yanbu, operatives could have had time
to infiltrate the potential target, observing the lay of the land
and the routines of security forces.
Although Stratfor believes that strikes could be carried out
against multiple targets of opportunity, certain factors --
including time and al Qaeda's targeting criteria -- lead us to
conclude that Houston, Texas, is near the top of the list. Not
only is it home to much of the nation's oil infrastructure, which
carries significant economic implications, but it also is a city
of 5 million people -- and the home of former President George
H.W. Bush. A strike here would lend a personal nature to the
attack that would send a clear message across the desk of
President George W. Bush.
In our view, the strike would be sophisticated and spectacular.
It likely would involve either a dirty bomb deployed within the
city, or a conventional attack against oil infrastructure,
carried out on the scale of Sept. 11.
In this case, we believe a truck bomb is the most likely delivery
mechanism -- perhaps a stolen delivery van, helping to mask the
driver's intentions. This scenario was discussed by a sleeper
cell in New York City before the first World Trade Center attack
in 1993, and al Qaeda has shown a tendency to return to previous
attack plans. The assailants might use a ramming car to break
through perimeter fences while either shooting or running over
security guards. However, it also is feasible that they could use
legitimate company identification cards in order to slip past the
guards. Once near the target, the explosive would be detonated,
killing the attack team.
A truck bombing would succeed in taking out only a small portion
of an oil complex, whereas a stolen or hijacked airplane could
cause much greater damage. At an oil processing facility, this
type of strike would have a psychological impact on the American
public -- creating a smoky explosion that would be broadcast far
and wide.
Strikes against supertankers also are plausible. Al Qaeda and
Osama bin Laden recognize that oil drives the U.S. economy.
Returning again to proven tactics, they could choose to strike at
platforms in the Houston Ship Channel -- much like the successful
strikes against the French tanker Limburg and the USS Cole, and
the failed attempt against the USS The Sullivans.
This scenario is a classic asymmetrical operation: The sleeper
cell, roused to activity, will operate as a military unit and
will overcome the immediate response by police or security
forces. A short time is all the militants will need. Because it
is asymmetrical, the strike will target and overcome security
forces at their weakest point. It would be over before a strong
response could be mounted.
This forecast is not cheerful, but if corporate security forces
can learn new skills -- quickly -- that allow them to disrupt
attacks early in the surveillance stage, this outcome could be
thwarted.
Al Qaeda's Next Strike
By Fred Burton
Summary
Al Qaeda likely has a number of sleeper cells still embedded in
the United States, and logic dictates that Houston, Texas, is
high on their target list.
Analysis
In our last Terrorism Intelligence Weekly, Stratfor discussed
improvements in intelligence-gathering efforts that have aided
the ability of Western governments to predict or pre-empt
attacks. At the same time, however, the threat within the
continental United States -- where al Qaeda is likely to attempt
a major strike before the presidential elections -- also has
intensified. Logic dictates that Washington, New York, Dallas,
Houston or Austin, Texas, could be targeted in an attack that
quite possibly would involve a "dirty bomb."
Continuing with this line of reasoning, Houston appears to be the
most likely target.
Sleeper Cell Tactics
Concerns over the safety of U.S. citizens are legitimate. Well-
placed U.S. government counterterrorism sources have confirmed
the presence of al Qaeda "sleeper cells" within the country.
Although it is not known how many cells could be in place,
intelligence indicates that militant operatives are in place, to
be deployed for the next Sept. 11- or Madrid-style attacks.
Analysis leads us to believe that a cell could be in place in
Houston.
Sleeper cells are difficult to ferret out -- with profiles that
do not differ greatly from those of the rest of the public. Like
the Sept. 11 attackers, militant operatives do not hesitate to
violate Islamic custom by shaving, dressing and behaving so as to
blend into their temporary communities. As a group, they are
overwhelmingly male, they are typically physically fit, and they
often practice martial arts -- sometimes in formal school
settings. Their identities may be false, but not always.
However, it is their actions -- not their appearance, ethnicity
or religion -- that can expose sleeper cells and help
intelligence and law enforcement agencies to disrupt attacks.
First, these militant units are not totally independent: Courier
services are used to send money and orders to operatives, whose
leaders frequently have had contact with members of other cells.
If one operative is arrested, pocket litter and phone records can
lead authorities to other cells.
And there certainly are opportunities for arrests. Sleeper cells
fund some of their activities through credit card and financial
fraud, and members often use false identification documents.
Elements of these crimes are much easier than terrorism charges
to prove in court, which gives police and federal officials some
traction in disrupting attack planning. Other activities also
provide clues: The premier example, of course, is that the Sept.
11 team had to learn how to fly airplanes -- but more
universally, virtually all terrorist attacks follow a period of
eyes-on surveillance of the target.
At the tactical level, counterterrorism experts have observed
that members of al Qaeda's sleeper cells carry out many duties
within their units -- which increases the chances that an arrest
could throw off a planned attack. For example, analysis of past
attacks has revealed that the same members tasked with carrying
out preoperational surveillance for a strike also work on the
logistics and attack teams. Operationally, this places them at
greater risk than groups who use highly trained, specialized
cells for each function.
Moreover, a study of past al Qaeda attacks and training manuals
reveals that the group carries out extensive preoperational
surveillance. This renders militants vulnerable to detection by
countersurveillance teams, who could trail them back to the rest
of their cells -- the bomb-makers and attack teams. For
intelligence and law enforcement agencies, this is the best time
to pre-empt a terrorist attack: If one militant can be caught
conducting preoperational surveillance, the entire cell can be
uncovered and destroyed.
In the two-and-a-half years since the Sept. 11 attacks, the
efforts of the FBI and CIA to root out these cells have paid
dividends. FBI Director Robert Mueller asserts that federal
officials have disrupted dozens of planned attacks, and sleeper
agents have been uncovered and deported. However, we do not
believe that all of al Qaeda's sleeper cells have been identified
or crippled. In addition to pre-existing cells, al Qaeda also has
had plenty of time to infiltrate more operatives into the United
States.
In the span since Sept. 11, al Qaeda also has had opportunities
to conduct surveillance of its next target, plan out the attack
and fine-tune operational details. In the past, al Qaeda attacks
have occurred at a particular pace: Stratfor on several occasions
has noted a two- to three-year span between major actions by "al
Qaeda prime," interspersed with numerous, smaller strikes that
likely are carried out by affiliated groups, with or without al
Qaeda's support. Within those operations, there also are
predictable patterns of activity. The pre-operational
surveillance period is the most effective phase in which to
interrupt an attack -- but few law enforcement and corporate
security agencies have the expertise to take advantage of this
weakness.
Why Houston -- and How?
For the next major al Qaeda strike, preoperational surveillance
is likely under way.
The timing for an attack within the United States is nearly
perfect: while Americans are engrossed with Iraq, presidential
politics and the rising price of oil. Logic dictates that cells
are in place and awaiting a signal to act; as in the recent
attack in the Saudi city of Yanbu, operatives could have had time
to infiltrate the potential target, observing the lay of the land
and the routines of security forces.
Although Stratfor believes that strikes could be carried out
against multiple targets of opportunity, certain factors --
including time and al Qaeda's targeting criteria -- lead us to
conclude that Houston, Texas, is near the top of the list. Not
only is it home to much of the nation's oil infrastructure, which
carries significant economic implications, but it also is a city
of 5 million people -- and the home of former President George
H.W. Bush. A strike here would lend a personal nature to the
attack that would send a clear message across the desk of
President George W. Bush.
In our view, the strike would be sophisticated and spectacular.
It likely would involve either a dirty bomb deployed within the
city, or a conventional attack against oil infrastructure,
carried out on the scale of Sept. 11.
In this case, we believe a truck bomb is the most likely delivery
mechanism -- perhaps a stolen delivery van, helping to mask the
driver's intentions. This scenario was discussed by a sleeper
cell in New York City before the first World Trade Center attack
in 1993, and al Qaeda has shown a tendency to return to previous
attack plans. The assailants might use a ramming car to break
through perimeter fences while either shooting or running over
security guards. However, it also is feasible that they could use
legitimate company identification cards in order to slip past the
guards. Once near the target, the explosive would be detonated,
killing the attack team.
A truck bombing would succeed in taking out only a small portion
of an oil complex, whereas a stolen or hijacked airplane could
cause much greater damage. At an oil processing facility, this
type of strike would have a psychological impact on the American
public -- creating a smoky explosion that would be broadcast far
and wide.
Strikes against supertankers also are plausible. Al Qaeda and
Osama bin Laden recognize that oil drives the U.S. economy.
Returning again to proven tactics, they could choose to strike at
platforms in the Houston Ship Channel -- much like the successful
strikes against the French tanker Limburg and the USS Cole, and
the failed attempt against the USS The Sullivans.
This scenario is a classic asymmetrical operation: The sleeper
cell, roused to activity, will operate as a military unit and
will overcome the immediate response by police or security
forces. A short time is all the militants will need. Because it
is asymmetrical, the strike will target and overcome security
forces at their weakest point. It would be over before a strong
response could be mounted.
This forecast is not cheerful, but if corporate security forces
can learn new skills -- quickly -- that allow them to disrupt
attacks early in the surveillance stage, this outcome could be
thwarted.