The Demise of the Green Berets

[That Guy v2.0]

I came across this today in the new edition of Soldier of Fortune. The title is from the article in the magazine. I was prepared to blow it off until I got to the end and saw who wrote it.

However the title as it originally appeared is called the Long Farewell written by MajGen Guest and was an editorial that appeared in "The Drop" in late 2007.

I thought it was interesting given other things that I had read or seen in various media about the shift at SOCOM from a DA approach to a UW/COIN approach. The highlight being MARSOC's mission being UW now. This duplication of effort is discussed below. Being pretty much in the dark as to why there seems to be no love lost between the SOCOM/JSOC crowd and SF I thought I would post this to see what the QPs here thought about MajGen Guest's analysis.

Link: http://www.veteransofspecialforces.org/Main/Archives/long_farewell.html
*************

For a glimpse into the future of Special Forces, check out the Capstone Concept for Special Operations. Or read using your Adobe Reader by clicking on HERE http://www.socom.mil/Docs/USSOCOM_CCSO_2006web.pdf : Read through it carefully. Can you find the words "Special Forces" anywhere? Or "Special Forces Group?" Can you find ODA? Or ODB? Or "Special Forces Battalion?"

You can't find these words. We can read that as a big signal that you won't be able to find Special Forces anywhere before very long. There are many other signals that the senior leadership in both USSOCOM and DA are working to do away with the Green Berets. The generals at USSOCOM and in the Pentagon have been blurring the distinctions between Special Forces and the SOF units (Rangers, JSOC, SEALS, Delta, et al.) for some time. We now see references to "Air Force Special Forces," "Navy Special Forces," and "Marine Special Forces" but we rarely see the term U. S. Army Special Forces. We do see "Army SOF," which only describes a grouping of forces, not a capability. We do see SF ODAs referred to as "Special Operations Detachments," another sad precursor of the future.

The Capstone Concept for Special Operations being developed for USSOCOM includes the concept "Global Expeditionary Forces," and all indications point to an intent to replace the SF Groups with this new concept. The organizational charts are changing, too, and the plans are for these Global Expeditionary Forces to work directly for USSOCOM worldwide in a JSOC-like configuration. The Security Assistance Force (SAF) concept, built around the Special Forces groups, has been discarded although the SAF is a much more streamlined and effective mechanism for utilizing U. S. Army Special Forces since the SAF is regionally oriented and works directly for the Combatant Commander.

Is this a ploy to be able to take the ODAs and use them operationally without going through the Group HQs, including the Group SFOBs? Since 1952, conventional headquarters have attempted to neutralize Special Forces Command and Control by treating the Group and Battalion HQs as non-operational administrative units that maintain ODAs in order that conventional units such as JSOC can cherry-pick them to use as support for their own missions. Reportedly, SF troops are already under the operational control of JSOC. JSOC is using the Green Berets for JSOC own ends, whether it is to gather intelligence for JSOC missions or whether it is to carry out "special missions" that (if successful) JSOC can take the credit for. You can imagine who will suck up the blame if such a "special mission" goes south.

How can Special Forces be neutralized in this way? If those who want to do away with the Green Berets are successful, they will need the full support of the senior leadership of the U. S. Army. Will they do away with the Special Forces Officers Branch? The Special Forces Warrant Officers Branch? The Special Forces NCO Career Management Fields? To date, we merely have the unusual spectacle of a relatively small unit (USSOCOM), however joint they may be, taking control of an entire United States Army branch.

Have they disestablished The United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School as a branch school and center of TRADOC? USASOC has already taken the Combat Developments capability out of the Special Warfare Center and made it a staff section of USASOC HQs. Bear in mind that this is the heartbeat of the Force Developments and Requirements Process, and therefore has a major say (if not the controlling say) in all future concept development, acquisitions, organization, and the supporting doctrine for Special Forces. This, in turn, impacts recruitment, promotions, training and equipping the Force, doctrinal studies and publications, and Concept Developments to support Special Forces. This also impacts U. S. Army Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs Concepts and Developments. Since this power node was moved from the Special Forces Center and School to USASOC, SWC is now a pygmy in the lineup of TRADOC schools. A harbinger of the future is the recent cut of 13 million dollars from the SWC budget.

Another indication that SWC’s position of leadership in the arena of Unconventional Warfare is disappearing is that on 27 June 2007 the USMC formally activated the Marine Special Operations School, with the stated intent of the USMC Senior Leaders that it will become "the premier FID and Unconventional Warfare University in the entire SOF community." See http://www.marsoc.usmc.mil

Approval from USSOCOM was required for this duplication of effort, as well as for the above-quoted statement. There can be no true duplication for many years, if ever. The culture of the USMC will be even less amenable to the necessities of working with, through, and by indigenous people than the culture of the conventional Army. The Marines are a world-class service and a superb fighting force but they are new to FID and new to Unconventional Warfare. Many a harsh lesson awaits them if they are going to try to replace the Green Berets. U. S. Army Special Forces has been increasing in proficiency and experience in Counterinsurgency, Foreign Internal Defense, Unconventional Warfare, and International Security Assistance Missions for more than a half century. Are the Marines willing to form up more than 300 Special Forces-type Operational Detachments, and take the slots out of their own hide? Why would USSOCOM leaders be willing for the USMC to start this effort from scratch when time is of the essence? Is USSOCOM willing to hand over the personnel authorizations currently supporting U. S. Army Special Forces to the USMC so they can become the premier FID and Unconventional Warriors of the future? Is somebody selling wolf tickets?

************

Going a step farther, a "Joint Special Operations University" has been established at Hurlburt Field by USSOCOM. Is there a Joint Infantry Operations University? Or a Joint Air Operations University? Why was Special Operations or Special Forces never integrated into the War Colleges and Service Schools? This would have been less expensive and much more effective. Instead of a few select special operators learning what they should already know, future leaders of the entire Armed Services would have learned about Counterinsurgency (CI), Unconventional Warfare (UW), and Foreign Internal Defense (FID) missions. As a result of this failure to integrate teaching about the core missions of Special Forces into the service schools, we are now seeing repeated failures by Army senior leaders in combat missions they do not understand. The poor performance of our senior leaders has betrayed and undercut the outstanding performance by American soldiers – Regulars, Reserves, and National Guard -- in our sustained effort in Iraq and Afghanistan.

For the past twenty years USSOCOM and DA Senior leaders have refused to integrate Special Forces Doctrine, Operational Concepts, and TTPs into the U. S. Army doctrine and operational concepts. Therefore, Special Forces concepts have not been taught at Leavenworth and in the War Colleges to future Army and Joint leaders. Now we have another generation of senior leaders who cannot distinguish between Counterinsurgency Principles & Operational Concepts and Unconventional Warfare Principles & Operational Concepts. They have buried their heads in the sand regarding the requirements of unconventional warfare for decades, and continue to do so. This will produce a continuing series of failures in missions involving Unconventional Warfare and Counterinsurgency. Is it any wonder that we find ourselves wringing our hands, hoping that General Petraeus will pull off his one-man show?

************

[That Guy v2.0]

continued:

In the USSOCOM Capstone Concept, the tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting Special Forces operations are turned on their heads. This developing concept speaks in terms of pulling everything back to CONUS and of deploying JSOCs in the same way as Carrier Battle Groups and Marine Expeditionary Units, instead of doing what has worked so well for so long for Special Forces. Look on pages 9 and 10 of the Capstone Concept, under "Global Expeditionary Force." While this concept would work for raids and other direct actions (such as JSOC, Rangers, Seals, and USAF Special Tactics Teams are trained to conduct), if USSOCOM attempts to steal the mission of Special Forces by using this model, they will merely create a Roving Gnome, who will soon be sending for backup. In short, the USSOCOM Capstone Concept totally ignores the demonstrated and historically successful Special Forces operational concept of working by, with, and through those we are helping.

As a result of more than fifty years of fine-tuning, each Special Forces Group now operates in its assigned region. Group HQs deploy joint combined exchange training teams, or JCETS, to enhance bilateral relations and interoperability with regional nations through military-to-military contact. These U. S. Special Forces JCETS establish long-term relationships with indigenous personnel. They work to improve regional unit combat skills and humanitarian requirements. They develop trust between host nations and the USA with a program tailored to meet specific needs as identified by Green Berets on the ground. This capability will disappear with the Green Berets, and no SOF "shock-and-awe" can replace it.

Conventional leaders such as the general officers at JSOC and USSOCOM do not like the idea of letting the mission develop as the situation unfolds. They think of that as an upside-down state of affairs. They are not comfortable with letting the ODA, far from home, establish the requirements of the operation. The only way they have been trained to lead is with the conventional, top-down, do-as-I-command leadership style. They may give lip service to the idea of getting feedback from subordinates, but they seldom practice it.

In Unconventional Warfare, Counterinsurgency and FID Operations, U. S. Special Forces Groups are without peer. 5th Special Forces Group, led by then-COL John Mulholland, has the unique distinction of liberating a nation successfully with a Brigade-sized force. 5th SFG(A) took down the Taliban in Afghanistan and, until they were replaced by conventional forces and leaders, were doing just fine in making the Afghanis an important ally by using the SF model of working with, by and through the local people.

************

Compared to the lean organization of Special Forces, the USSOCOM model creates a bureaucracy with too many supervisors for too few workers, with the supervisors far away from the action. Money that would be better spent on the mission will be used for funding extra layers of chairborne supervisors. Worse, an unwieldy organization gets in the way of accomplishing the mission. The men on the ground have a much better feel for what they need to do and how best to do it, while the top-down bureaucratic rigidity frustrates more than it facilitates.

Will these newly created bureaucratic slots be filled with Special Forces officers and NCOs? What do you think? The conventional officers who have risen up to the highest ranks through their connections with JSOC, Delta, the Rangers, 160th Aviation, and the SEALs will be in charge. There is only one Special Forces officer (newly promoted) above the rank of Major General, so – once again – Special Forces is being decapitated and will be under the ultimate command of those who have never gone through selection and assessment, never attended the SFOC, never served a tour on an ODA, never served repeated assignments in a SFG(A).

The 2006 Version of the USSOCOM Capstone Concept that we can access online does not show the new organizational charts that are presently proposed for the Global Expeditionary Forces in the 2007 Capstone Concept. They are classified, but in the end there may be more than a dozen staff officers and NCOs for every soldier who will be assigned the mission on the ground. Reliable sources state that, even now, there are more than 130 (maybe as many as 160) U. S. Army E-9s in Army Special Mission Units assigned to JSOC. When that is compared with the 13 to15 E-9s in a Special Forces Group, it does tend to raise eyebrows. What are they doing? According to the reports, thirteen of them are packing parachutes.

This year, in April, USSOCOM put out a DVD celebrating its Twentieth Anniversary. It is about twenty minutes long. Even though Special Forces personnel make up the greatest part of the USSOCOM forces, the U. S. Army Special Forces are never once referred to in this DVD. Although Special Forces is the oldest force in USSOCOM and has been the USSOCOM workhorse since its inception not one Green Beret is to be seen in the montage of photographs. Colonel Banks is not mentioned in the historical overview, nor General Yarborough, nor General Healy. There is no reference to Colonel Bull Simons, Colonel Charlie Beckwith, nor General Joe Lutz. Yet without these men the path to the present day in United States "Special Operations" would be difficult to imagine. Most amazingly, the DVD made no reference to President John F. Kennedy who supported the establishment of Special Forces in 1961.

Will Special Forces exist ten or twenty years down the road? What can we do to insure the continuing contribution of the Green Berets?

***********

On 25 July the United States House of Representatives announced the forming of a commission to examine the roles and missions of the United States Armed Services. This may be our only chance to turn back the erosion of U. S. Army Special Forces and the exploitation of our SF soldiers. Each retired and each active duty Special Forces NCO and Officer can contact his elected representatives by letter, by fax, by telephone, and in person. We can:

--Express concern that the United States is in danger of losing a military capability that the U. S. Army Special Forces has been developing for more than fifty years.

Explain that the proved capability of U. S. Army Special Forces will not be replaced by the new concepts of USSOCOM, and that other Army units or other Services, such as the Marines, do not have the necessary training and experience to conduct sustained FID, Counterinsurgency, and Unconventional Warfare missions in the world-wide war on terrorism.

--Tell our elected representatives of personal experiences in working with host nation forces, and of personal experiences with hostile interference (past and present) on the part of conventional commanders who resent Special Forces.

--Ask if the Congress will particularly examine USSOCOM in order to determine which units are receiving funding, and how much, compared to which units are doing the work.

--Ask if the Congress will determine whether or not the senior leaders of the U. S. Army and of USSOCOM are actually qualified to conduct Unconventional Warfare, FID, and Counterinsurgency operations, or are they actually only qualified and experienced in conducting Direct Action operations?

--Ask each Member of Congress that you contact if he or she will personally serve as Champion for the Green Berets, and fight to preserve this one-of-a-kind national capability.

We have served our Nation and Special Forces. It is time to fight again, this time for the preservation of the Force. If we do not protest the poor stewardship of the U. S. Army and USSOCOM leaders concerning U. S. Army Special Forces and its unique capability, we will certainly see this capability diminish.

De Oppresso Liber.
Major General (R) James A. Guest

[Pete]

The writer was my Group commander.

I'll stop at that.

[optactical]

Anyone remember the scene in "The Jerk" where Steve Martin's character assesses the sniper trying to kill him is shooting at cans? This article reminds me of that. :confused:

[Sdiver]

Anyone remember the scene in "The Jerk" where Steve Martin's character assesses the sniper trying to kill him is shooting at cans? This article reminds me of that. :confused:

"He hates these cans !!!!"

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eXRM3lFRwRI

:D

[krod]

That article has been laying around in the TM room for about a week...

I guess everytime we do something I will make sure it makes the press so everyone knows and we can stop being the "grey" men.

[Jack Moroney (RIP)]

This article needs to be redefined and retitled from The Demise of the Green Berets to The Ineptitude of Senior Leadership. I find it very interesting that those that have suddenly found god created the legacies that now they see so clearly as flawed strategies. I can recall one of the contributors to this article once defining his goal to make SF the finest light infantry in the world-a bit shortsighted and way off the mark then and especially now. Those that now take up the pen thinking it is mightier than the sword would have better served us all by falling on their sword back when they were looking to their own agendas worried about where the pen would fall on their career progression. Just an observation.

[Ret10Echo]

This article needs to be redefined and retitled from The Demise of the Green Berets to The Ineptitude of Senior Leadership. I find it very interesting that those that have suddenly found god created the legacies that now they see so clearly as flawed strategies. I can recall one of the contributors to this article once defining his goal to make SF the finest light infantry in the world-a bit shortsighted and way off the mark then and especially now. Those that now take up the pen thinking it is mightier than the sword would have better served us all by falling on their sword back when they were looking to their own agendas worried about where the pen would fall on their career progression. Just an observation.

Would it seem that at some point the farm got sold and nobody told us?

[glebo]

This article needs to be redefined and retitled from The Demise of the Green Berets to The Ineptitude of Senior Leadership. I find it very interesting that those that have suddenly found god created the legacies that now they see so clearly as flawed strategies. I can recall one of the contributors to this article once defining his goal to make SF the finest light infantry in the world-a bit shortsighted and way off the mark then and especially now. Those that now take up the pen thinking it is mightier than the sword would have better served us all by falling on their sword back when they were looking to their own agendas worried about where the pen would fall on their career progression. Just an observation.


Very good, our senior leaders sold us out to the marines and air force, and navy and everyone else who has "spec ops" associated with it. Now they sit back and wonder "how did that happen?". Hell, we're just about handing them all our lesson plans and POI's from up here, even how we conduct selection. But lately it has slowed down a bit, hopefully someone got wise. I guess they figure they can take over 60 years experience and put their people through a course and VIOLA, we are "special"

I figured when they were a general, they'da had the gonads to put up a fight, now everyone wants to be "special"

Comes a time when we need to be a little more louder than the "Quiet Professional" no one hears who does not speak. Now I'm not talking down at the operational level, but our highers need to make themselves heard so "Special Forces" stays special, and not just special ops like everyone else.

just my .02 worth and my very humble opinion. But this subject just really ticks me off how we are getting sold out.

[magician]

In Unconventional Warfare, Counterinsurgency and FID Operations, U. S. Special Forces Groups are without peer. 5th Special Forces Group, led by then-COL John Mulholland, has the unique distinction of liberating a nation successfully with a Brigade-sized force. 5th SFG(A) took down the Taliban in Afghanistan and, until they were replaced by conventional forces and leaders, were doing just fine in making the Afghanis an important ally by using the SF model of working with, by and through the local people.



I have to say that this clause resonates for me.

Not that my opinion matters.

[Jack Moroney (RIP)]

Not that my opinion matters.

Why not? Your opinion matters to me.

[abnremf]

In the USSOCOM Capstone Concept, the tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting Special Forces operations are turned on their heads. This developing concept speaks in terms of pulling everything back to CONUS and of deploying JSOCs in the same way as Carrier Battle Groups and Marine Expeditionary Units, instead of doing what has worked so well for so long for Special Forces. Look on pages 9 and 10 of the Capstone Concept, under "Global Expeditionary Force."

This idea is out the window now. Somebody called bullshit apparently.

[magician]

Why not? Your opinion matters to me.

Thank you, sir.

I am really dismayed by these developments.

[Blueboy]

From my limited point of view, I can say that SF is very much in demand by Joint Force Commanders in all theaters. No one else can bring what we can to the battlefield.

What is missing is knowledge of and advocacy for SF at the highest levels.

What does TR think about all of this?

[The Reaper]

I agree that times have been better for us, as recently as 2002.

Some of the people contributing to the article were in key leadership positions when the problems were beginning and did not, IMHO, do all they could have for the future of the branch when they were in charge themselves.

There is a serious trend over the past 20 years in favor of Ranger and special mission units (and their leaderdship) with an increasing disregard for Special Forces personnel. Now everyone, from supply clerks to Marines are "Special". This has led to a serious imbalance in the SOF leadership, and a tendency towards supporting black ops, infil platforms, and DA/kinetic solutions over more humanistic, SF related resourcing and operations. How many SOCOM or USASOC CGs were SF branched officers with significant team time? Why can we not seem to get SF GOs beyond one or two stars? SF is the largest portion of USASOC, which is the largest component of SOCOM. We have more people deployed on a daily basis than the rest of SOF has assigned to them globally.

The impact of this is that while SF is in tremendous demand, we are not resourced accordingly, and our leadership is woefully ignorant in our employment. Hence the "housecleaner" remarks, prosecution of SF personnel doing their duties, and relegation of SF teams to support roles.

Just my .02 since you asked, YMMV.

TR

[Ret10Echo]

I know from experience in the SOCCE in B-H and Kosovo that the conventional forces I dealt with had no idea how to use S.F. (Use in this case is not necessarily the direct control of Special Forces detachments but the type of information and capabilities that could be provided) and they treated us with disdain (actual contempt in many cases). Watching them make the same errors because they didn't listen to what we had to say was painful. It would take several iterations of the "step on your crank" exercise before the senior staff would listen. Then the whole table was reset when the staff rotated.

[That Guy v2.0]

Does anyone think that MajGen Mulholland's promotion to 3 star and and command of USASOC will have a positive impact on the situation?

[mark46th]

As I said before- Time for Special Forces to get the hell away from SOC and back under the Department of Defense...It will probably take another Messiah to get that done but the search should be on for a pregnant virgin...

[incommin]

Is history kinda repeating......... I remember the same complaints many, many years ago. Commanders didn't understand SF and the missions for which it was trained. And then the draw down and reduction in the number of groups and personnel which led to cries of the demise of SF. SF has changed and will continue to change. But there is too much talent, skills, and expertise out there to consider anything like the death of SF.


my .02

Jim

[Richard]

Guys,

I always consider the source on things like this...and MG (Ret) Guest is neither one of my role models for an SF soldier nor a source I pay much attention to here. He came to us in 1/10th from a DAO assignment in Osterriech and proceded to break a leg on his first parachute jump. When he got out of the cast and could jump again he injured himself again. I then left for OCS and friends back in the 1/10th did not think much of him. However, he made O-6 on the backs of the quality of the teams there and was given command of the 5th SFG. His claim to fame as the 5th SFG CDR was in removing the gold and red stripes from the 5the flash...which pissed off a lot of people...and little else. Joe D could fill you in on that one. I was an ODA CDR in the 7th SFG at that time and the 5th SFG was not a very happy place to be. In a nutshell, Jim Guest's opinions are exactly that...his opinions and not much else. In light of the achievements of both SF and SOF over the last half of a century I cannot concur with his opinions on this issue. Period. MOO.

Richard's $.02 :munchin

[glebo]

Guys,

I always consider the source on things like this...and MG (Ret) Guest is neither one of my role models for an SF soldier nor a source I pay much attention to here. He came to us in 1/10th from a DAO assignment in Osterriech and proceded to break a leg on his first parachute jump. When he got out of the cast and could jump again he injured himself again. I then left for OCS and friends back in the 1/10th did not think much of him. However, he made O-6 on the backs of the quality of the teams there and was given command of the 5th SFG. His claim to fame as the 5th SFG CDR was in removing the gold and red stripes from the 5the flash...which pissed off a lot of people...and little else. Joe D could fill you in on that one. I was an ODA CDR in the 7th SFG at that time and the 5th SFG was not a very happy place to be. In a nutshell, Jim Guest's opinions are exactly that...his opinions and not much else. In light of the achievements of both SF and SOF over the last half of a century I cannot concur with his opinions on this issue. Period. MOO.

Richard's $.02 :munchin

Very well said, I was in 5th when he was Gp Cdr.

[SF_BHT]

I was in 5th during the Days of Guest..... I honestly think that if Joe D. was not there a lot of us would have quit...and gone to another group....or even SWC:confused:

[scubasam]

Just to put the first paragraph comments into perspective I conducted a word search for SEALs, Rangers and Delta and did not recieve any results either. The level and/or scope of the document is on a different level and not ment (I believe) to discuss individual units.

[TOMAHAWK9521]

After 50+ years, everyone else in the SOF community is attempting to reinvent the SF model. Evidently SF's model is the only successful model for counter-insurgencies and now the 'sexier' SOF outfits are scrambling to get a piece of the pie. NSW and MARSOC have started up their own language programs. We had a SEAL team visit us in our camp out in the desert the other day and were telling us about their FID partners.....since when do SEALs do fid-successfully?

[mark46th]

The old jealousy of Special Forces by other army units, Navy and Marines lives on. We can do what the SEALs do, we can do what Force Recon can do, we can do what the Rangers do. But none of them can deploy to a mission that is going to last 1 to 2 years, with little or no support from their home units. This is what makes SF unique in the Armed Forces. !2 of us, with little guidance can go to Bum F_ _ k, Egypt, take a local force, turn it into a cohesive fighting unit, multiply that force and expand the operation until the enemy government is overturned. No other U.S. force, NONE, can do that.

That is why we get crapped on from time to time and why we, as I have spouted before, need to get the hell out of SOC and back under the command of the Department of Defense....

Just my dos centavos worth...

[The Reaper]

The old jealousy of Special Forces by other army units, Navy and Marines lives on. We can do what the SEALs do, we can do what Force Recon can do, we can do what the Rangers do. But none of them can deploy to a mission that is going to last 1 to 2 years, with little or no support from their home units. This is what makes SF unique in the Armed Forces. !2 of us, with little guidance can go to Bum F_ _ k, Egypt, take a local force, turn it into a cohesive fighting unit, multiply that force and expand the operation until the enemy government is overturned. No other U.S. force, NONE, can do that.

That is why we get crapped on from time to time and why we, as I have spouted before, need to get the hell out of SOC and back under the command of the Department of Defense....

Just my dos centavos worth...

SOCOM is a joint command under the DoD.

TR

[mark46th]

Then we need to be detached from SOC.

[BobbyD]

I have just read MG (R) Guests article as taken from the Soldier of Fortune Magazine, and the comments made by my brothers in arms. I didn't know MG Guest when he was in 5th Group. I was in 7th Group at the time serving as a medic on ODA 751, and do remember him removing the Viet Nam colors from the 5th Group flash. It was, to say the least, disheartening and shameful. I met General Guest for the first time after I was appointed as a warrant officer, MOS 180A. I had been assigned to SWC as the manager for MOS 180A and had been given my major additional duty as force projection officer by, at that time, BG Guest. During my first briefing to him I presented him with a dismal projection of personnel in the enlisted ranks, warrant officer field and for captains. He asked me why we had these shortages and what he could do to fix the problem. I replied as follows;

enlisted: SOCOM does our in-service recruiting and 1) is not budgeted adequately, 2) SOCOM has an extremely small recruiting staff that is untrained as recruiters and cannot sufficiently canvass the worldwide army for the quality and caliber of personnel we need, 3) SOCOM recruiters cannot gain access to army posts as needed (some Post Commanders would simply say He*# No you can't come on my post and take my engineers, etc). Solution- Contract with USAREC to do all our in-service recruiting. They were budgeted, had cart blanche to any US Army installation and had people trained to recruit.

warrant officers: We were 200 warrant officers short! Authorized 330 and had 130 on hand. I explained to him that we were so short because we couldn't approve the applicants that we had, there just were not sufficient numbers of enlisted men in the ranks who met the established selection criteria. At the time, warrant officer applicants for MOS 180A had to have three of the five CMF 18 MOS's, one of which had to be 18F, SF O&I, they had to speak at least one foreign language at the 2/2 level, be Static Line Jumpmaster qualified and be an E-6 or above. Additional credit was to be given to those NCO's that were HALO or SCUBA qualified. Recommendation- Realistically set the selection criteria to reflect the qualifications of the force.

captains: I don't recall the exact number of captains we were short but it was tremendous. We had just stood up 1st Group and were looking at the 3rd if my memory serves me correctly. We were so short that many teams were non deployable because they had no captains. Some of you ghosts of the past will remember those teams. I explained to BG Guest that there were two major problems associated with our captain shortage. The first occurred when the young captain went to his Infantry Commander and told him he wanted to serve a tour in Special Forces. One of two things happened. The Commander talked (threatened) him out of applying to SF or used the young officer to round out his senior rater profile. If it was the latter the officers career was ruined. It doesn't take long for the drums of the conventional army to telegraph this data to the world of young captains. The second problem with our captain shortage was the need for captains to get branch qualified. Let's say that five captains completed Special Forces Training and were assigned to an ODA. We were lucky to keep them for a year. They had to leave Special Forces and take a company command under their respective branches. Command of an ODA didn't branch qualify them. We would be lucky to see these men again before they were an 0-4 or 0-5! Talk about a lack of continuity! Recommendation- Special Forces as a Branch. Bring our officers in as captains, branch qualify them here and keep them forever.

I'm not going to bore you all with a blow by blow on all these issues. Suffice it to say that USAREC did take our in-service recruiting and I did re-set the selection crireria for MOS 180A. BG Guest sent me to brief the Chief of Staff, US Army, Gen Carl Vuono on Special Forces as a branch. Gen Vuono wanted to have all the MACOM Commanders views on the subject before he made a decision on the subject. I hoped a plane, went to Hawaii, briefed MG Bagnell and then on to Korea to breif LTG Livsey. Both were in support. After several more briefings we took the comments back to Gen Vuono. The rest is history.

I say all of this just to support MG (R) Guest and to say that regardless of his past imperfections, he is an ally. He loves Special Forces and each and every one one of us, past and present. I hope I haven't set anyones hair on fire by anything I've written, that is not the intent. Perhaps, just perhaps, I've provided a little history to the subject line.

Keep the faith,

BobbyD

[Jack Moroney (RIP)]

Perhaps, just perhaps, I've provided a little history to the subject line.

You give Guest more credit than he deserves. While he may have supported you in your efforts it was Dickie Potter that took this ball and ran with it; Scotty Crerar laid the ground work for 180As and fought for it.

[SF_BHT]

[QUOTE=BobbyD;211382] Perhaps, just perhaps, I've provided a little history to the subject line./QUOTE]

You give Guest more credit than he deserves. While he may have supported you in your efforts it was Dickie Potter that took this ball and ran with it; Scotty Crerar laid the ground work for 180As and fought for it.

X2

Guest had his own personal agenda and it never was the long term future of SF as we saw it.. He did what he thought Big Army wanted and behind that he advanced his agenda. He was not a good steward for SF.

[stanley_white]

Would anyone here agree that the reason MARSOC / NSW / Whomever is trying to get in the FID business is because there aren't enough Special Forces Soldiers to meet all of the current FID requirements in both theaters?

At my level I don't know how many SF Groups, MARSOC FID, MITT Teams etc are running around each theater doing what jobs.

Obviously if the world were perfect Special Forces Soldiers would be handling all of those duties due to their higher level of training and experience. However, in this imperfect world it seems as though the force is being resturctured in order to meet a present need.

Thoughts?

[Razor]

In my admittedly narrow, second or third-hand view, I think that there probably is plenty of fight out there for everyone in the job, and more. However, I don't believe that throwing insufficient resources at the problem is the answer. This is not to say that I believe individual Marines (or sailors, or airmen, or whoever) aren't capable of performing the task. I do feel though that they aren't receiving adequate training, don't have the correct command environment and support, and won't be allowed to build the requisite experience to become truly effective at the job. Sending someone to a crash course and then calling them a FID/COIN trainer does not magically give them the skills, knowledge and experience they need to perform to standard, unless of course we gut the standard to match inadequate performance.

You can't make up for a lack of qualified doctors by putting philosophers through a semester of high school A&P and expect qualitative results; why would this situation be any different?

[stanley_white]

You can't make up for a lack of qualified doctors by putting philosophers through a semester of high school A&P and expect qualitative results; why would this situation be any different?

I am in total agreement with you.

What would be a solution?

The reason I am asking is I get into a similar discussion with folks routinely where I work -- mostly with the Cold Warriors. They always complain about "hiring all these kids" and "putting them through minimal training" and "lowering standards to meet wartime needs" and believe me I agree with them.

However, at the end of the day we are at war and someone needs to go handle things.

In your situation the best option we all agree is to send Special Forces Soldiers but it seems there simply aren't enough thus the operational need forces someone less qualified or new to the game to be sent i.e MARSOC / NSW / MITT etc.

If it comes to throwing a less qualified person into the mix to work on the problem versus nobody because the Special Forces Soldier is preoccupied which is the better option?

As messed up as Rumsfeld was one quote he said that I agree with was "You go to war with the army you have." I think we all agree that the idea of pausing the war to properly train / produce Special Forces Soldiers isn't workable but someone has to be sent to do the job / something has to be done.

[Jack Moroney (RIP)]

What would be a solution?

I think if you analyze what it takes to do these missions and compare what each of these organizations brings to the fight you should be able to answer your own question and draw a logical conclusion. There was an interesting bit today in one of the military early birds that mentioned that there was a MARINE handing out christian coins to muslim folks in theater-that sort of should give you an indication.

I also am not so sure that it is a shortage of SF as much as it is the proper utilization of the SF we have. I am working on cleaning up an oral interview I gave to USASOC in December 2000 and I am amazed at some of the predictions I made and what I saw then and what is occurring today-I wish I was as accurate in my stock portfolio. The same utilization problems I noted then exist today, such as sending, in the late 90s, 28 A-teams to essentially train two battalion of a host nation's infantry when all it really should have taken was a good SF company-and even that is a little overkill.

[The Reaper]

I am in total agreement with you.

What would be a solution?

The reason I am asking is I get into a similar discussion with folks routinely where I work -- mostly with the Cold Warriors. They always complain about "hiring all these kids" and "putting them through minimal training" and "lowering standards to meet wartime needs" and believe me I agree with them.

However, at the end of the day we are at war and someone needs to go handle things.

In your situation the best option we all agree is to send Special Forces Soldiers but it seems there simply aren't enough thus the operational need forces someone less qualified or new to the game to be sent i.e MARSOC / NSW / MITT etc.

If it comes to throwing a less qualified person into the mix to work on the problem versus nobody because the Special Forces Soldier is preoccupied which is the better option?

As messed up as Rumsfeld was one quote he said that I agree with was "You go to war with the army you have." I think we all agree that the idea of pausing the war to properly train / produce Special Forces Soldiers isn't workable but someone has to be sent to do the job / something has to be done.

I have to respectfully disagree.

I have seen many situations where sending the wrong forces, conventional or SOF, made things worse. Some times, catastrophically worse.

I think it all comes back to the SOF Truth in my sig line. Accept the fact that we started this war without lack adequately resourced SOF, largely due to inattention and other priorities, even within SOCOM.

I believe that we should work to recruit, select, and train as many qualified SF personnel as possible WHILE MAINTAINING THE STANDARDS.

Prioritize the critical SF missions and develop a sustainable plan to service those requirements as long as the need requires.

Increase resourcing and force structure for the future that we can grow into over time rather than trying to surge and create them in short order. The resulting numbers of sub-standard soldiers who inevitably slip through the crack in a surge will cause us more problems than the personnel shortages would have. Lock these changes into the POM for the out years and beyond to prevent the roller coaster effect we have experienced over the years.

Determine the best method to retain experienced SF NCOs, warrants, and officers and create a path of success that rewards our troops adequately (financially, promotions, assignments, education, etc.) to cause them to want to continue to serve until they are at or beyond retirement age.

Select competent SF leaders who will focus primarily on men and mission, rather than careers, and who possess the intestinal fortitude to tell the Boss the truth, however painful or ugly. If your CO or CG doesn't have the moral courage to put his career on the line with his leadership (to include terminating), how can he be trusted to make the right decision with your life? We have all served under both types of commanders. Unfortunately, making it from Colonel to BG seems to require far too much careerism and politics over competency and courage. The number of good SF commanders who have actually spent time on an ODA and spent their careers in SF while making General officer is very low.

Just my .02, YMMV.

TR

[stanley_white]

Thank you Gentlemen for your replies.

Your opinions are valued and eye opening.

-Stan

[RB]

This article has been passed around for a year now with no basis in fact.

It is an effort by MARSOC to solicit funds for a 'new command' and nothing more. Guest had been paid by the Marine 'SpecOps' command to write this article because they were standing up a new unit meant to rival, or attempt to, the US Army Special Forces.

It's all about money, gentleman, and MARSOC is searching. Guest never earned the respect of the men under him, as attested to on this thread by quite a few BTDT's, and his paper supporting the developement of MARSOC as a possible 'replacement' to USSF is just a testament to who the man really is and where he came from.

Soldier of Fortune is promulgating the story to sell copy.......no more, no less.

We're not going anywhere, and to get spun up about a non-story is to allow yourself to believer the propaganda spewed by 'the right'......

The recent MARSOC 'incident' in A-stan didn't aid their cause.

http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2007/05/marine_marsoc_070505/

This should be the main story.

:rolleyes:

[PenguinRunway]

I'm glad to see a little light shown on the topic. I am ignorant and got sucked into the article, fearing that the only thing I've ever wanted this badly was going to vanish. I realize I have far less invested than the QPs, but it was still unnerving. I've only spent one day here and learned far more than anywhere else I've searched for the past year. I've gained tremendous respect for this profession. Glad to see Guest's word and motives confirmed as tainted.

[Defender968]

Select competent SF leaders who will focus primarily on men and mission, rather than careers, and who possess the intestinal fortitude to tell the Boss the truth, however painful or ugly. If your CO or CG doesn't have the moral courage to put his career on the line with his leadership (to include terminating), how can he be trusted to make the right decision with your life? We have all served under both types of commanders. Unfortunately, making it from Colonel to BG seems to require far too much careerism and politics over competency and courage. The number of good SF commanders who have actually spent time on an ODA and spent their careers in SF while making General officer is very low.

Just my .02, YMMV.

TR

TR I'm not trying to hijack the thread by any means, I'm just curious about how you feel the Army could discourage this type of careerism. (If it's an inappropriate place admins please move or delete) though I hope it’s not as bad in the Army, I have seen the Air Force become more and more stricken with careerism, and it sickens me. In the AF the powers that be continue to propagate careerism by promoting dirt bag brown nosers who don't rock the boat, often times at least IMO because the powers that be simply don't want to do the hard work to get rid of bad officers. My last squadron commander on active duty was a complete POS, unwilling to step up as a commander and say no when his people were asked to do downright illegal stuff. As if that wasn't bad enough he himself would break rules to try to get ahead in his own career, he berated a young airmen to get an inappropriate look at the stratification on his OPR before it was signed (big no no) and these are just a couple of the many examples of his misbehavior, his O-6 commander knew he was a problem (to the point the retention of troops in his squadron was only around 40%), but instead of doing anything about it his O-6 simply pushed to send him to Air Command and Staff college (to get him out of the squadron) which effectively was a promotion. In any case it would appear from your post that this type of careerism exists in the Army to some extent.

I've seen in my own career from personal experience in the AF that if you do the right thing, push/fight for your people, and call the baby ugly when it's necessary you become very unpopular with many senior officers especially when your honestly reveals a problem that is within their power to correct, or when it creates a little extra work to make a broken system work, or worst of all when it speaking the truth about an issue reveals a senior officers flaws/errors (behind closed doors of course). Doing so often will have a positive effect on the troops involved and the mission at hand but I don't think it has any effect on the chain of command. My frustration is that if the senior offices don't change and get rid of bad officers below them the system will continue to propagate careerism. So my question is how does one go about effecting change under these circumstances, knowing that the officers who do the right thing will most likely not be promoted into positions to make the cultural changes that are needed.

Again not meant to be a thread hijack, I don't know if the Army situation is similar to the AF situation but this is something I've been spending allot of time thinking about and I've wondered if the other services suffer from the same problems as the AF.

[Jack Moroney (RIP)]

So my question is how does one go about effecting change under these circumstances, knowing that the officers who do the right thing will most likely not be promoted into positions to make the cultural changes that are needed. .

Never underestimate the power of an NCO:lifter

[CDRODA396]

I originally posted this over at another forum and it didn’t generate as much discussion as there has already been here. I do feel that SF is at a critical cross roads right now. We sewed up our importance back in the fall of ’01, but now Big Army doesn’t quite know what to do with us, and we (our senior leadership) aren’t doing a good job of voicing that we are being improperly utilized and what it is we should be doing.

I think we blew the golden opportunity thrown our way in early '02 and are now not sitting as pretty as we'd like to think. 5th Group was thrown at a problem in the fall of ’01, until the big brass could figure out a plan and move enough forces to execute it, only no one told 5th Group that, so off they went. Word is in the Pentagon there were Generals yelling’ and cussing’ and screaming for someone to stop “them Cowboys” when Kandahar and Kabul fell, but Rumsfeld told them to shut the fuck up!

Since then however, I believe we've slowly allowed ourselves to become marginalized, pushed out to the periphery of the fight (at least in Big Army's eyes) until the Big Army can figure out what to do with us.

I don’t know about Iraq, but over in OEF, we have been ushered out to Fire Bases in what is akin to a more traditional Cavalry role (economy of force operations). As of the end of our most recent rotation (May this year), we don’t even own any terrain now, all of the Firebases are owned by a Conventional Force Commander. The guys will tell you all they are really doing is Movement to Ambush, and they're tired of it. Hell, before long you'll be able to say traditional “Armor Cav” role, as the fielding of the MRAP is in full swing, but the relative merits for, and/or against that are a whole other discussion.

Approval of a CONOP based on the ODA’s assessment of the situation and development of their own intelligence are rare. They are mostly Top Driven and rarely a well thought out, comprehensive plan that supports the ODA’s long term engagement plan for their area.

The Army and Marines are, or have, taken over our Bread and Butter, FID, and are now the ones doing the living with, training, cultural awareness thing with the "Indig" while we drive around the countryside waiting to get hit. Right now in OEF, there are no more Host Nation forces working directly with our guys. If we want the HN support, they have to go coordinate with the MiTT for theirs. Hell even the fleet Navy and Air Force are getting a piece of the action. Both have FID training/cultural awareness courses and are offering up troops to augment PRT’s and MiTT’s.

To a degree its our fault...back in the early 70's Bldg 4 ripped the proponency for Counter-Insurgency away from the JFK Center and then let it sit for years without capturing the valuable lessons learned from Vietnam, and then when we found ourselves smack dab in the middle of one, instead of turning to the Subject Matter Experts, SF, it took Big Army what, three, four years to capture in writing and publish what SWC has been teaching for decades? And since Big Army wrote the book, you know the Big Army is going to run the fight, even though 5th Group did just fine before Big Army (XVIII ABC) showed up in mass in June of '02.

Right now, training and advising, host nation building, etc., is viewed as the critical component of the “Long War,” not only in both ongoing AOR's, but as part of preparation of the battlefield for future fights...remember the "Long War" will be far from over when we are done, pulled out, win, whatever you call it in Iraq and Afghanistan.

So right now all the other Services see it and are chomping' at the bit to get a "piece of the action" to ensure future relevance. All the while, we are dead set on kicking in doors and shooting people in the face. Not to say that isn’t good shit, but that should not be our sole purpose, if you want to do that, and that alone, take the long walk, there is a very good element that does that very well.

Kicking in doors is a component if you will, of FID, but if you are doing it (FID) right, it’s not long before the Host Nation Forces are doing the kicking. In mid '02, 1/3 opened up the Training Academy in Kabul with a grand plan to turn out X number of trained and equipped Afghan Army troops and soon we'd be done and Karzi able to stand on his own. That rotation wasn’t even over before over half the Teams assigned to training were out roaming the battlefield, and the 10th Mountain was ear-marked to take the whole thing over. OUR mission given up as quickly as we could so we could go out and shoot people...which again, I'm all for, but we are the FID SME's, cultural experts, world class instructors, aren’t we?

We should have been running that Academy, and as part of the Graduation Exercise, running live combat patrols, then the Teams would still be getting their killing on, but by now, there would be a far more competent, cohesive Afghan National Army to take over the countries internal security issues.

There are some that would argue we are also violating three of OUR SOF Truths...Quality is better than Quantity. Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced, and Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur.

If we look at the Pipeline right now, I fear, but can’t say for certain that the Mass Production of us is ongoing. The only capitalization on our early success is our growth... just a few years ago, we totaled 6000 give or take in the Active Component Groups, and now we are trying to increase by a battalion+ a year, over the next five years, which what that really amounts to is we are trying to increase the force by roughly 2500 in five years, while simultaneously sustaining the normal attrition of the current force, and all the while fighting a Global War.

SWC has almost totally revamped the Q to increase through-put, and say they have maintained quality, but the instructors I know and have talked to would probably be willing to have a professional discussion on the merit of that statement. I don’t know if the standard has been lowered or not, but it seems as though something has to have given, or will give very shortly if we are to man the growing force over the next five years.

According to some calculations, as of today, MFF and CDCQ cannot at maximum output, adequately man the current force, and as a new battalion grows each year, there is no accompanying growth of these two schools. SWC says they are at maximum output and with the exception of attrition, can and are going to meet the needs of the force. All of the projections based on current allocations and success rates say otherwise, but the Pipeline has priority, and is going to maintain priority for some time.

On top of the possibility that the standard may be suffering in the Schoolhouse, in MY OPINION, the turnover of personnel is killing the quality of the force. In the old days, you would hear Team Sergeants all the time talk about "Building a Team," how the Team Leaders were "Transients" and it was commonplace for a Team Sergeant, and the Warrant, to be on a team for five, six or more years...now the Team Sergeants come and go as fast as Team Leaders, two years and move out...even the SR/JR NCO's are getting about three years before the long arm of SWC reaches out and grabs them. This might be more of a problem here (FBNC) due to being so close to SWC's flagpole, and it being an intra-post PCS, I can’t say for sure. Some of the turnover is the willing, moving out of the Groups to somewhere to take a "Break" after five rotations, and that is understandable, but it is still impacting the force.

[CDRODA396]

THE FUTURE….

When the National Command Authority sits down at the table and someone throws a mission folder on it and they pick it up, if it’s a Direct Action, one unit immediately comes to mind, No Brainer. If it’s an underwater infill to plant mines on the hull of a ship, or take down a gulf oil rig, one unit comes to mind, easy. If its surgical bomb strike in downtown Mog, the call is plain. But right now, what is it that we, SF, immediately come to mind when it’s dropped on the desk?

Until recently Special Forces had five primary missions: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, and direct action. Not to long ago, two new missions, information operations and counter-proliferation were added to the mix. With the exception of UW, someone else can claim expertise equal to or greater than ours, and claim that their specialization at it makes them better than our “Jack of all trades” approach. Doesn’t make it true, but the argument can be made. Regardless, we don’t own sole responsibility for anyone of them, except UW.

Even UW doesn’t have the relevance it should. Even after the success of 5th Group in OEF, UW didn’t play near as important a roll in OIF as it could have. In the north, there was a much larger, better organized and motivated force, the Peshmerga, than you had in the Northern Alliance in AStan. Despite this resource, the mission in the north was to FIX even though a couple of key strategic targets lay just across the Green Line, Mosul and Kirkuk. Eventually these two cities were claimed by forces from the North, but more to keep the Kurds from raping them, especially the oil facilities at Kirkuk, than as pre-planned combat objectives.

And with UW, we all understand that it’s a long term commitment, built upon long term relationships and trust. Yet we rotate in/out of theater right now quicker than the conventional army. And when we rotate back in, there’s no guarantee the same team will be at the same location, or if it’s the same team, the same personalities will still be on the team. So the first part of every Transition of Authority is spent rehashing the same feeling out period. Right about the time a Team gets a handle on the personalities and players in an area, its time to start handing things over to their replacement.

So what needs to happen..? I Believe, we need to cut sling load on both OEF and OIF and let Big Army, the Air Force, Marines and the Navy have all the Counter-Insurgency/FID they can stand.

In my opinion, SF’s focus as a Force, that thing that immediately comes to the NCA’s mind when they see the requirement, should be the next fight, not the current one. Once the invasion is over, if Big Army wants FID and the Counter-Insurgent fight, give it to them, and let SF get busy preparing the future battlefields.

Each geographic region has a potential future fight, the Horn of Africa comes to mind, as does Indonesia, there are many. But we should be doing a combination of things to set the conditions for quick success once we get around to picking where is next, ....building strong relationships with those countries we feel will be allies, building "information" on those we don’t, training the Armies of those we see as futures ally’s NOW, not after we run off whomever the enemy is....

I BELIEVE the early successes in OEF were achieved years before, with Teams going abroad on JCETs, and building rapport building skills, interpersonal skills, cultural skills, and war fighting skills, and all of which came into play when 5th Group Teams infilled way back in '01.

One article I read stated that “THE GREEN BERETS GREATEST CONTRIBUTION TO THE CAMPAIGN IN AFGHANISTAN CAME TWO YEARS BEFORE THE TERRORIST ATTACKS.” In 1999 President Bush’s Middle East envoy Anthony Zinni—then the four-star Marine general also responsible for the former Soviet republics in Central Asia—directed his Special Operations Forces in the words of Brig. Gen. Frank Toney, Jr., to use their “military-to-military peacetime engagement techniques to open up |the new Asian nations] for training with U.S. forces.” At a time when U.S. businesses and many diplomats viewed the region as a dangerous place best left to its own devices, Army Special Forces teams were conducting training missions in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, where they developed personal relationships that remain critically important in that part of the world.

When war came, the Uzbeks immediately offered their assistance. American transport aircraft were touching down on their soil barely a week after September 11, and a major base was quickly established at Khanabad, 130 miles north of the Afghan border. By mid-November the Tajiks had made available three bases from which offensive operations could be launched (of which the Pentagon chose one), and they were soon followed by the Kyrgys. Special Forces’ familiarity with each nation’s culture and topography, along with the mutual trust developed between the Central Asian and American soldiers, allowed combat operations to be conducted with stunning rapidity and effect.

We should be re-honing these skills while providing the Combatant Commander the necessary information NOW, to ensure victory LATER when ever the NCA gets around to getting it done. Right now we're just driving around the battlefield waiting for the next IED.

I also believe the longer we continue to work under a CJTF, they will continue to marginalize us until we are so far away from the center of gravity, or even main effort, that the argument, "what do we need them for anyway," will soon follow...and the Big Army will have an answer, and it scares me.

[Jack Moroney (RIP)]

THE FUTURE….

Good piece. I thought I was reading something I had just finished writing about earlier times. I gave an oral interview about some of my observations to USASOC in December 2000 and shared some of the very concerns you brought up as fact that I predicted as possibilities. I am very sorry that my predictions were correct and it concerns me that no one is listening.

[Scimitar]

ONE
From what I have seen so far of Mother Army, she is most definitely suffering from 'Corporate Syndrome'; where the organism is so big that often important information / valid opinion just doesn’t get to the right person at the right time.
i.e. It taking four years to implement a valid COIN model in OIF.
i.e. Mother Army’s general misuse of USASF
i.e. The general lack of understanding conventional COs have of SOF units and the benefits they bring to the battlefield.
i.e. SOCOMs apparent misunderstanding of what it takes to do real UW/FID brought on by a lack of SF in command positions (Doesn’t congress promote generals = ability to influence).

TWO
USASF is one of those rear organizations, where a large number of individuals stay in close contact with the ‘going ons’ of the regiment even after retirement. Many of you still have friends in high places who will listen.


So here's my question, as an organization do we have a proactive, cohesive, non Army, lobbying initiative. I as a civilian have already experienced what a well thought out, properly marketed idea can achieve with Mother Army. If it is packaged right I believe she will listen.

Bad example I know, but look at the Gay lobby initiative, not since the civil rights movement has a minority made so much ground against general consensus. Something like 99% of homosexuals vote, where as little as 50% of heterosexuals vote; are we voting or standing by? (Not that I'm calling every other SOF gay).

With good planning and execution you retired warriors could still make a marked difference. Aren’t we the best at taking a small force (us) and making a big mess? Surely we could bring that skill and experience to bear on a different battlefield; the battle for the Regiment.

Where is the SFA in all this?

Thoughts?


Scimitar
(Disclaimer: By 'Us' I mean 'You' ;) )

[The Reaper]

TWO
USASF is one of those rear fraternities....

I'm not sure I like the sound of that.

TR

[CDRODA396]

I'm not sure I like the sound of that.

TR

I'm thinking...and hopeing he meant "rare!"

[JJ_BPK]

Originally Posted by Scimitar

TWO: USASF is one of those rear fraternities....TR

I'm gonna take WAG,, he ment to say rare ??


Roget's II: The New Thesaurus
Main Entry: rare
Part of Speech: adjective
Definition: Far beyond what is usual, normal, or customary.
Synonyms: exceptional, extraordinary, magnificent, outstanding, preeminent, remarkable, singular, towering, uncommon, unusual

[Scimitar]

Um...S**T...sorry gents,

A little hung over, Mondays my day off you know.

I guess I took the gay analogy a little too far. ;-)

Any thoughts or G2 on the idea

Scimitar

[Go For Broke]

I think that one big issue in this whole discussion on the marginalization of SF FID is the use of the term "Combat" FID, and I think it is tied to our focus on named operations.

When SOCOM thinks FID, it is thinking SF (majority), then it is thinking NSW / AFSOC, and finally MARSOC. Do those organizations (NSW / AFSOC) do FID things better than us? The answer is not a clear yes or no. Well, unless someone knows of an SF team somewhere that can teach the HN to fly aircraft, conduct base operations / maintenance, repair boat engines, conduct riverine patrols, etc :D

Unfortunately, because of the focus of the U.S. on events in the CENTCOM AOR right now, much of the preparation for / prevention of future wars goes unnoticed (as it probably should be). Having spent the last 9+ months here in the "intellectual center of the Army" (where is the ROTFLMAO icon?) and talking with guys I have not seen since the Q Course, they are unaware of the numerous events that we (SF & other SOF) conduct globally. I do feel that we, SF, need to let others know that we are doing this stuff, hence our value, unfortunately if we are doing our job properly the media never finds out.

I do have to give the Marines credit though, they are great salesmen. They can really package a product, market it, reap the profits, and then ask themselves, "OK...so how do we do this now?" If you look closely at their MARSOC capabilities brief (available if you google it) - some of their "Marine" pictures feature guys wearing BDUs, conducting FID with HN forces - oh, and the pics were taken AFTER the Marines had switched to the digital cammies (again, marketing - "original concept by the U.S. Marines...umm, after the Canadian Forces...umm, I forgot to mention that the U.S. Army experimented with a primitive version of it in the 1970's" (and yes, they do admit that it is not a Marine but rather a Army SF guy conducting the FID training, but only after you call them on the pic - because you recognize the guy as someone you once threw out of a Cessna in flight :D)

Just my humble $0.02

V/R,

[USANick7]

I can not think of a time in history where SF wasn't under siege from CF. It appears that the only time we are permitted to do our Jobs the way God and Aaron bank intended is when we are protected on high by some politician or another.

President Kennedy, and then remaining members of his staff during portions of the Johnson admin.

During the 80's it was the "SOF Mafia" in congress

During the GWOT it was Rumsfeld.

After Afghanistan I think allot of SF guys assumed that the case had been made and that it was no longer an issue.

That has not turned out to be the case. CF is just as hot, if not more so to control us.

Unless we find another politician with enough clout and understanding of the importance of "division of labor" in warfare, I think we are in for some hard times.

I cannot belive how much time I spend making power point slides.

[mark46th]

As I said before Nicky7- There is still a lot of professional jealousy at work against SF.

[LongTabSigO]

I was in 5th during the Days of Guest..... I honestly think that if Joe D. was not there a lot of us would have quit...and gone to another group....or even SWC:confused:

Remembering those days myself, I'd say that this is a very accurate assessment. I seem to remember there also being a significant degree of angst associated with missions in Lebanon being given to the crew at Devens.

[Box]

this trip I heard a field grade officer say (I didnt just 'hear' him say it, he said it TO me)
"The col. may write my OER, but I work for the BCT commander"

Now call me crazy but that attitude at the field grade level scares the shit out of me

[dennisw]

In the 2008 issue of The Year in Special Operations published by faircountmediagroup there is an article about the Special Forces Association. In the article entitled, The Brotherhood - The Special Forces Association Supports the SF Community by Amy P. MACK, she interviews retired SGM Ron McCan who states that one of the purposes of SFA is being a sounding board or mouthpiece to air any problems that active duty members might bring to them. "We help bring up issues to the command for active duty guys that are not in a position to do so. For example, we seem to have a problem getting our general officers promoted beyond a two-star level. When our A-teams go overseas under their own command, they go in and do their job as force multipliers. But it frustrates active duty guys to then have a conventional force commander come in and lay out a completely different mission. The things they have just done to build the rapport with the indigenous people have been blown, and then we've lost their trust and we are back to square one again."

I believe SFA folks should be applauded for their efforts. However, it is disappointing that the folks on active duty believe they are unable to air their grievances in the current political atmosphere without suffering retribution of some kind.

[Jack Moroney (RIP)]

"The col. may write my OER, but I work for the BCT commander"

The lad ought to be happy he never worked for me, I would have fired his ass. Who rates him should be immaterial but he should never lose track that he works for his troops to ensure that they can accomplish the tasks assigned.

[LongTabSigO]

this trip I heard a field grade officer say (I didnt just 'hear' him say it, he said it TO me)
"The col. may write my OER, but I work for the BCT commander"

Now call me crazy but that attitude at the field grade level scares the shit out of me

I'm missing the context under which this was uttered.

[LongTabSigO]

In the 2008 issue of The Year in Special Operations published by faircountmediagroup there is an article about the Special Forces Association. In the article entitled, The Brotherhood - The Special Forces Association Supports the SF Community by Amy P. MACK, she interviews retired SGM Ron McCan who states that one of the purposes of SFA is being a sounding board or mouthpiece to air any problems that active duty members might bring to them. "We help bring up issues to the command for active duty guys that are not in a position to do so. For example, we seem to have a problem getting our general officers promoted beyond a two-star level. When our A-teams go overseas under their own command, they go in and do their job as force multipliers. But it frustrates active duty guys to then have a conventional force commander come in and lay out a completely different mission. The things they have just done to build the rapport with the indigenous people have been blown, and then we've lost their trust and we are back to square one again."

I believe SFA folks should be applauded for their efforts. However, it is disappointing that the folksactive duty believe they are unable to air their grievances in the current political atmosphere without suffering retribution of some kind.

The idea of SFA remains sound. However, it is undergoing some significant angst as the old guard and the new generation are not seeing the SFA the same way. (There's also some more mundane buffoonery, but I'll not air that here.)

SFA has no way of promoting the cause of the SF Regiment to the power brokers that can put the right people in higher leadership positions; they are not physically situated, nor appropriately populated with senior enough leaders, to credibly do that. So questions of SOF command and control are not going to be solved by telling the SF Command CG something I'm positive he already knows.

SGM McCann is a great American and recognizes that the Association is off azimuth. However, there are significant differences of opinion, between groups of well-intentioned SFers, on whether the National Leadership understands the scope of the problem and is, therefore, applying the appropriate fixes. Following the logic of the complaints aired in the article, SF National HQ should either be in Tampa, lobbying USSOCOM, or in DC lobbying the Service Chiefs, the JCS and/or Congress.

Also, the jury is out as to how well SFA is getting the SF story out. Consider this: This forum (Professional Soldiers) touts itself as the largest presence of US Army Special Forces on the Internet. SFA theoretically already should be the largest since being SF is the main requirement for membership. It's a fair bet that the membership rolls of the two forums differ more than they agree.

I'm not sure the SFA is, right now, the instrument of choice.

[Stryker1A]

The lad ought to be happy he never worked for me, I would have fired his ass. Who rates him should be immaterial but he should never lose track that he works for his troops to ensure that they can accomplish the tasks assigned.

Well said, Sir. The problem with alot of young ambitious officers is that they lose site of our role...Simply put, "To serve our soldiers and make sure they all have the adequate equipment and training to accomplish the mission". Sometimes you will take a few sable round for your NCOs and troops, but more than 50% of the time, they will keep you from looking like a horse's behind.

I feel that USASF is an essential asset that we have, but because of the lack of knowledge of their capabilities/lack of marketing/media coverage people in the public and higher command just don't know what it is you guys do. I was train by USASF soldiers in the mountains in Garmesh, GE back in 1993 in preparation for my deployment to the mountains of Macedonia. The driver's training and the cold weather training to this date is some of the best training I ever had! It would be a travesty to even mention the "down-sizing" or question the necessity of the SOF meaning USASF. The QP's are an excellent train force that can be utilized anywhere in the world at a moments notice to acheive a decisive victory using minimal resources and force.

This is essentially epitamizes the goal of every military operation..."Victory through minimal resources and minimal force!"

SCOUTS OUT!!-STRYKER1A

[Razor]

Sometimes you will take a few sable round for your NCOs and troops...

Have you guys added fur coats to your Cav ensemble? ;)

[Stryker1A]

Have you guys added fur coats to your Cav ensemble? ;)

Ordered mine last week, waiting for it to come FedEx. They are most excellent used in a cold weather field environments where blending into the urban community is essential to survival. I even heard they were making them standard issue for USASF. And don't forget our big P.I.M.P. gold chains too!LOL!!

The sad part of the matter is, I deployed with a support unit to Germany for training a few years ago for my secondary enlisted MOS and we had weekend offduty. Lo and behold when we all ensembled to go downtown in Frankfurt, GE...it was a D_M FOOL actually wearing a fur coat, a thick A_S gold chain, and a pimp hat!! I thought it was a practical joke, but he seriously wore the crap out!OMG!! It took all I had not to laugh in his face at how ridiculous he looked and the simple fact is, that is what gives Americans a bad name when we are in other countries acting as Ambassadors. Absolutely RIDICULOUS!!

Thanks for busting my chops, Razor! YOU keep me on my toes, brother!!Ha!ha!

SCOUTS OUT!-STRYKER1A

[The Reaper]

Ordered mine last week, waiting for it to come FedEx. They are most excellent used in a cold weather field environments where blending into the urban community is essential to survival. I even heard they were making them standard issue for USASF. And don't forget our big P.I.M.P. gold chains too!LOL!!

The sad part of the matter is, I deployed with a support unit to Germany for training a few years ago for my secondary enlisted MOS and we had weekend offduty. Lo and behold when we all ensembled to go downtown in Frankfurt, GE...it was a D_M FOOL actually wearing a fur coat, a thick A_S gold chain, and a pimp hat!! I thought it was a practical joke, but he seriously wore the crap out!OMG!! It took all I had not to laugh in his face at how ridiculous he looked and the simple fact is, that is what gives Americans a bad name when we are in other countries acting as Ambassadors. Absolutely RIDICULOUS!!

Thanks for busting my chops, Razor! YOU keep me on my toes, brother!!Ha!ha!

SCOUTS OUT!-STRYKER1A

Pardon me, but your lieutenantness is showing.

SABOT, treadhead, not SABLE. As in High Velocity Armor Piercing-Discarding Sabot. You cav and tanker guys should know that.

That was Razor's point, I believe.

TR

[CDRODA396]

Pardon me, but your lieutenantness is showing.

SABOT, treadhead, not SABLE. As in High Velocity Armor Piercing-Discarding Sabot. You cav and tanker guys should know that.




"Gunner, Sable, Tank!...From my closet, ON THE WAY!!!" RMAOL!!!:D

[Stryker1A]

Pardon me, but your lieutenantness is showing.

SABOT, treadhead, not SABLE. As in High Velocity Armor Piercing-Discarding Sabot. You cav and tanker guys should know that.

That was Razor's point, I believe.

TR

APFSDS (Armoured Piercing Fin-Stabilised Discarding Sabot) ammunition is a type of anti-tank round. It uses kinetic energy to penetrate armoured vehicles, and is often referred to as a KE round....

I had always spelled it Sable round instead of SABOT round which is the correct spelling! Okay...that is quite embarassing...as most of us spelled it and pronounced it that way. Thanks...Knowledge GAIN already. In the future I will try to listen a little more than speak...that way my Lieutenantness does not show so much! :-)

SCOUTS OUT!-STRYKER1A

[Razor]

That was Razor's point, I believe.

Too subtle, perhaps? :cool:

LT Stryker, are you from the Commonwealth? "Armoured", "Stabilised"...you didn't copy that info from a Brit website to impress us, did you? ;)

[gagners]

I had always spelled it Sable round instead of SABOT round which is the correct spelling! Okay...that is quite embarassing...as most of us spelled it and pronounced it that way.
SCOUTS OUT!-STRYKER1A

We would have been ridiculed right out of AOB for saying "Sable". :cool: That's a car...

Maybe your grammar could use an MRS update :D... (how's that for treadhead talk, TR???)

[Stryker1A]

Too subtle, perhaps? :cool:

LT Stryker, are you from the Commonwealth? "Armoured", "Stabilised"...you didn't copy that info from a Brit website to impress us, did you? ;)

How did you ever guess that, Razor...I ddin't put that down in my profile? Hmmm...Well, considering that the commonwealth is one of the only fully capable Strker Brigades of it's nature and abilities at this current juncture...I would credit that guess to keen observation and experience. OUTSTANDING JOB!

Pasted and copied the info from Wikipedeai.com!LOL!! That's where I get all my up-to-date training and technical knowledge from. Great for righting WARNOs and OPORDs too!!LOL!!

YOU stay safe, Razor...Thanks brother.

SCOUTS OUT!-STRYKER1A

[The Reaper]

How did you ever guess that, Razor...I ddin't put that down in my profile? Hmmm...Well, considering that the commonwealth is one of the only fully capable Strker Brigades of it's nature and abilities at this current juncture...I would credit that guess to keen observation and experience. OUTSTANDING JOB!

Pasted and copied the info from Wikipedeai.com!LOL!! That's where I get all my up-to-date training and technical knowledge from. Great for righting WARNOs and OPORDs too!!LOL!!

YOU stay safe, Razor...Thanks brother.

SCOUTS OUT!-STRYKER1A

You might search for Wikipedia on PS.com and see what the staff here think of your source.

As far as your comments to Razor, there is a fine line between humor and disrespect. You being to be who you claim to be is unsubstantiated, as far as we know. You could easily be a Commonwealth member, or Taliban, for that matter.

Tread lightly.

TR

[Razor]

LT Stryker, "Commonwealth" here refers to the United Kingdom and its Commonwealth partners, such as Canada, Australia and other countries that use non-US english spelling, not US state designations. This, however, is moot given the wikipedia explanation.

Keep up with your practice in "righting" orders; "wronging" one could be a painful command experience.

[Stryker1A]

You might search for Wikipedia on PS.com and see what the staff here think of your source.

As far as your comments to Razor, there is a fine line between humor and disrespect. You being to be who you claim to be is unsubstantiated, as far as we know. You could easily be a Commonwealth member, or Taliban, for that matter.

Tread lightly.

TR

The Reaper:

Okay, now that is just insulting, Sir. A taliban...commonwealth member....Pennsylvania is referred to as a Commonwealth state. That is what I thought Razor was referring to. NOW, I don't mind being jossled or teased a bit. I don't mind even being a target because I've been that most of my life. I have done everything that people said I could not. I have never failed at any military school or task I have tried. NOT because I am that good, but because I have properly prepared for my class or the enemy. I had no intention of offending Razor and I sincerely hope, Razor knew I was joking. If one of my NCOs or peers walked up to me and said what Razor said to me, I would smile and make a joke back. There is a line, WE must maintain, but as long as that line is not crossed...I don't mind being teased a bit.

I am proud of my Cavalry heritage....when I finish Airborne and Ranger school which I already have orders for the beginning of next year, I will still be proud of my Cavalry heritage. I am already in contact the CO fo B Co. 3/20 SFG(Airborne)...I can give you his name and HE will verify who I am and the fact that I will be doing SFSA and SFQS immediately after my Ranger school next year, so I can make the 2011 Afghanistan deployment. Any verificaton you need of who I am, no problem. YOU can check me out in Sidpers, MILPO, and talk to a large list of names I can supply you with that will swear that I am one of the most squared away Lieutenants(O1E) they have every seen.

I am okay with joking around, TR, but when you insuld me as a soldier and furthermore disrespect me as an officer, that is not cool. I have went through hell, just like most of you to earn all the 15+ ribbons, combat patches, and the gold bar I am wearing on my head which I EARN the hard way...OCS!!!

If you don't want me to post, that is fine, Sir. I am just trying to make a few friends here and hopefully get a little guidance. I have a few of my fellow Ranger Officers mentoring me for RIP and Ranger school. Thought this would be a great site to make a few more friends and follow each other through our careers. That is what I like about the uniform...the brotherhood. It is not about the tabs....the medals...even though that garners respect...It is about being part of a sacred brother started in blood by many before us.

So I ask, Are WE soldiers? Are we brothers? IF not, then WHAT ARE WE?

Stryker1A
2LT, AR, USAR, PAARNG

P.S.-Razor, IF I offending you in anyway as TR has stated, I truly apologize as a soldier and as an officer. When you made your joke about my strong Cavalry heritage making fun of over a century old tradition of the Order of the Spur...I took it, just as you intended...A JOKE! I hope you did the same...Thanks. I mean no disrespect to the site and humbly apologize to all I have offended...I am sorry. Goodbye.

[magician]

LT, sit the fuck down and shut up. Your situational awareness sucks.

You do not know whom you are addressing, and believe me, if you did, you would be sitting quietly against the wall, honored to be there.

If that sticks in your craw, go back to mil.com. You are in the wrong place.

--From another former Mustang.

[Jack Moroney (RIP)]

So I ask, Are WE soldiers? Are we brothers? IF not, then WHAT ARE WE?.

While you can be proud of your accomplishments to date and you are a member of those that can be called brothers in arms you are not my brother nor are you likely to be until you knock that chip off your shoulder. While I fully understand that a lot of things can be lost in translation, because we are not standing toe to toe bantering back and forth and reading the tell tale body language or voice inflections that would indicate your attempt at humor, you seem to fail to understand that what you write and the manner in which you write it, with all your lack of attention to detail and off the cuff remarks, tends to paint you as an arrogant, disrespectful, brash, immature officer who is full of himself. So to answer your rude question, where you feel that it is necessary to yell at one of my brothers, with whom I have served, and snivel about the comments made by another of my brothers whom I know from his vetted qualifications, and read the comments of those who have given you enough cording to wrap around your cav stetson enough times to hang yourself many times over, who are soldiers all, we know who we are but, I, for one, do not really care to know much more about "one of the most squared away LTs anyone has ever seen" because I have seen more than my share and served with many that did not have to announce the fact that they were good. Their actions, and not their words, proclaimed them to be so. And no, ribbons and baubles on the uniform have nothing to do with garnering respect as they are only a reflection of past events not future ability, respect is earned and garnered from those with whom you serve solely by your actions and what makes you tick not by what you did yesterday. Everyone stands naked in a firefight.

[SF_BHT]

Young LT I would heed the words of my SF Brothers and especially the words of Col Moroney. I have been reading these comments and have restrained from commenting until now.

Here are my observations during your postings:

1. You come off as an arrogant young NCO that got commissioned and think his shit does not stink and he is better than everyone. (Seen a lot and very few ever make it to where WE have gone. ROTC, WP, OCS so what unless you got it as a battlefield commission they are just the same. I know a lot of prior service that went to ROTC and got commissioned and OCS well they screw with you but you still get the butter bar at the end. West Point well it is not called the Lower Hudson School for wayward boys.):mad:

2. You seem to be impressed with ribbons, badges and patches. :rolleyes:(I could not tell you how many ribbons I have and do not care about them. My team mates used to not wear any badges and patches other than unit patches until the General bitched and made us have at least one uniform with all. Then we just wore ABN wings and rank and unit patch. The baubles do not make the man the person makes the man)

3. Your SA is not there and that calls into question your judgment. YOU do not seem to understand where you are. You walked into our house and just started commenting like you had all the baubles and years on a team. You do not and most Soldiers that enter have enough SA to sit, listen and learn. Not your buddy and we were nice enough to allow you to interact here. Good SA would tell you to back off and sit down and absorb the info. Later you could slowly start to post and get to know the people here and make friends. 1st impressions are very important in our work. Just think of this as trying to get the G Chief to like you and win his convenience so you can do your Mission.)

4. Your chip on your shoulder with the Cav. (We are not knocking any historical part of any of the parts of the Army "CAV, Armor, AVN, etc." You do seem to be touchy about the Cav and its heritage. You know when someone jokes about SF Ranger, Marines you banter back and forth but do not get mad. Get a grip on your CAV Emotions. CAV history is great but it is not the center of the world any more than any other parts of the military. If you wish to be a part of the SF brotherhood you have to savor the past and embrace the future in SF.)

5. Writing Skills need to be worked on. (You should really work on your communications skills. For such a squared away LT you do not seem to know how to use the spell check and grammar checker that our wonderful world of windows has for free. Slow down and act as if you are in front of the COL and make sure your statements are fully thought out and when you have formulated your idea, write it in an intelligent manor with proper spelling. That will cut down on people making cracks about your lack of commo skills. We all make typos but you seem to do it on most of your posts.)

If you do not like our comments, then nothing is making you log on here. You should also remember that the SF brotherhood is very small, bad reps are hard to shake, and we know people in all SF Units. Good reps go a lot farther than bad ones do.

Hope you have a very happy Cav day.:munchin

[Stryker1A]

Col Moroney, Sir...everyone. Thanks. Will Adjust Fire and Move Out....Again I apologize for my comments, as they are out of line and out of place.

Message heeded, Sirs...Sincerely...Thank You.

[RTK]

Col Moroney, Sir...everyone. Thanks. Will Adjust Fire and Move Out....Again I apologize for my comments, as they are out of line and out of place.

Message heeded, Sirs...Sincerely...Thank You.

Stryker1A,

Since you're most likely one of my former students from the past two years at Armor BOLC III, let me give you the following advice:

Remember that our types with the funny felt hats and gold stuff on our boots are guests here. This is not a Cav site. It's run be those who have been or are currently Quiet Professionals. Take a lesson from their book.

Go into turret defilade and turn your MCS to listening silence. You're not helping your cause, no matter what you're typing in return. Acknowledge by not posting for at least the next two weeks. I don't want to have to answer for your antics.

L6

[SFC Donnell]

Sirs

After reading this thread I started to think about it, after a year in Iraq, I do not believe that I saw a single Green Beanie in that year. We, (us CF Pukes) ended up training and equipping the ICDC ourselves. Should that not have been a SF mission?

Come to think of it I have not seen not heard anything about the SF since the liberation of Afghanistan in 2001. Does the US still have a SF? I am not being a smartass, the SF seems to have dropped off the radar screen.

What was direly predicted several years ago, the end of the SF, has this happened? I just assumed that the SF were just keeping a low profile and that was why I had heard so little. So what is the current situation?

Robert

[head]

Sirs

After reading this thread I started to think about it, after a year in Iraq, I do not believe that I saw a single Green Beanie in that year. We, (us CF Pukes) ended up training and equipping the ICDC ourselves. Should that not have been a SF mission?

Come to think of it I have not seen not heard anything about the SF since the liberation of Afghanistan in 2001. Does the US still have a SF? I am not being a smartass, the SF seems to have dropped off the radar screen.

What was direly predicted several years ago, the end of the SF, has this happened? I just assumed that the SF were just keeping a low profile and that was why I had heard so little. So what is the current situation?

Robert

You can find several examples of our recent successes and failures in Iraq and Afghanistan and beyond throughout this forum and the rest of the internet.

[Richard]

...after a year in Iraq, I do not believe that I saw a single Green Beanie in that year.

Didn't see any of these out there, huh?

http://www.google.com/search?tbm=isch&hl=en&source=hp&biw=1137&bih=568&q=green+beanie&btnG=Search+Images&gbv=2&aq=f&aqi=g2g-m4&aql=&oq=

I would've been tempted to wear one of these on ops just to give the Taliban bad dreams. ;)

Richard :munchin

[olhamada]

Didn't see any of these out there, huh?

http://www.google.com/search?tbm=isch&hl=en&source=hp&biw=1137&bih=568&q=green+beanie&btnG=Search+Images&gbv=2&aq=f&aqi=g2g-m4&aql=&oq=

Richard :munchin

Richard, you are on a roll today!! (I wish you guys had a LOLROTF emtiocon). :D

[1stindoor]

Sirs

After reading this thread I started to think about it, after a year in Iraq, I do not believe that I saw a single Green Beanie in that year. ...Robert

I think it's pronounced Green Beans...and I thought they were still in Iraq. I know they were in Afghanistan the last time I was there.

[1stindoor]

...and another thing...what's with you reviving long since dormant threads? I think you're now like 3 for 3 or 4 for 4...I'm giving credit for the intro thread.

[Dusty]

Sirs

After reading this thread I started to think about it, after a year in Iraq, I do not believe that I saw a single Green Beanie in that year. We, (us CF Pukes) ended up training and equipping the ICDC ourselves. Should that not have been a SF mission?

Come to think of it I have not seen not heard anything about the SF since the liberation of Afghanistan in 2001. Does the US still have a SF? I am not being a smartass, the SF seems to have dropped off the radar screen.

What was direly predicted several years ago, the end of the SF, has this happened? I just assumed that the SF were just keeping a low profile and that was why I had heard so little. So what is the current situation?

Robert

Everybody's doin' black ops, now. The SEALS get the CNN shit. :D

[MtnGoat]

Sirs

After reading this thread I started to think about it, after a year in Iraq, I do not believe that I saw a single Green Beanie in that year. We, (us CF Pukes) ended up training and equipping the ICDC ourselves. Should that not have been a SF mission?

Come to think of it I have not seen not heard anything about the SF since the liberation of Afghanistan in 2001. Does the US still have a SF? I am not being a smartass, the SF seems to have dropped off the radar screen.

What was direly predicted several years ago, the end of the SF, has this happened? I just assumed that the SF were just keeping a low profile and that was why I had heard so little. So what is the current situation?

Robert


Like HEAD said.. Look around; SF is everywhere in the News. You just don't look closely enough I think. As the way I look at it, I don't want to be in the news. Don't tell of what I'm (we) doing in this shit hole or that place. We deploy and train people to hunt the enemy for us. To kick in those doors for their news not for CNN or FOX News.

SF has been doing a lot in Iraq you just don't know of it. Iraqi Conventional Force are the boy Scouts in most military thinking groups. Speed bumps for other to jump over.

You need to search more (top right) on PS.com and lurk around reading more.

You can go here.. http://www.professionalsoldiers.com/forums/forumdisplay.php?f=38

or here.. http://www.professionalsoldiers.com/forums/forumdisplay.php?f=42

or read an area study before you deploy. Believe us it helps out knowing what your getting into.

Thanks for join and looking around.

Start here.... http://www.professionalsoldiers.com/forums/forumdisplay.php?f=106

[Dusty]

Personally, Richard, I prefer...



If anyone can get Dusty in that and take a pic, I would pay big money....or double triple stuffed oreos!

I'm in. :cool:

[Richard]

If anyone can get Dusty in that and take a pic, I would pay big money....or double triple stuffed oreos!

Dusty wants to know where you found his 'green beanie'...and he wants it back ASAP! :p

Richard :munchin

[greenberetTFS]

Sirs

After reading this thread I started to think about it, after a year in Iraq, I do not believe that I saw a single Green Beanie in that year. We, (us CF Pukes) ended up training and equipping the ICDC ourselves. Should that not have been a SF mission?

Come to think of it I have not seen not heard anything about the SF since the liberation of Afghanistan in 2001. Does the US still have a SF? I am not being a smartass, the SF seems to have dropped off the radar screen.

What was direly predicted several years ago, the end of the SF, has this happened? I just assumed that the SF were just keeping a low profile and that was why I had heard so little. So what is the current situation?

Robert

If your not trying to be a smartass why these asinine statements?.........:mad:

Big Teddy :munchin

[Richard]

If your not trying to be a smartass why these asinine statements?

Teddy,

It's obvious...

Come to think of it I have not seen not heard anything about the SF since the liberation of Afghanistan in 2001.

PDRL for being blind and deaf. ;)

Richard :munchin

[SFC Donnell]

Gentlemen


Thank all of you for the answers.

I am going to have to call you guys out on the term Treadhead which I see on this site from time to time, we prefer: "Dumb Ass Tanker" or "DAT" for short, thank you. We are not actually dumb asses just hard of hearing and myopic. Outside my area of expertise, I don't know much, just asking.

As for not seeing the SF, I went from seeing the 10th Group every day at Ft. Devens to not hearing a peep for years. For example LANG's 225th Engineers served well and honorably in Desert Storm only to be all but disbanded after the war, likewise the 2-63AR was disbanded after a very successful tour of duty in Iraq. The Army does have a way of doing rather silly things. After reading this thread, I began to wonder if the dire predictions were coming true.

The fact that I had not heard much lately is in fact a testament to these men. Now I understand the term: "Quiet Professional."

Robert

[wet dog]

...I have not seen not heard anything about the SF since.....

"Quiet" and "Professional".

Have a very "SF" day.

[Ironmike]

In the late 60's and 70's the Armed Forces as a whole lost favor with many in this country. S.F. was sort of looked on by the standard military in a un savory way (jealously). We didn't have a quartermaster at that time. We had no trucks or motor pool. All of that changed as S.F was reabsorbed into the main military establishment. Money for school was short; money to get trainings was short. When members came back from a school, they would cross train the ones needing training. Detachments from active S.F. would train the Guard. At that time a Full Flash said you were S.F. qualified. There were many correspondences courses to take when you could not get active training. A good many our people had made one or more tours in Southeast Asia. We were trained by these folks. Many did not have a full flash just because the money was not there. With Iraq and Afghanistan cooling off looks for the money to stop flowing. The money may not have been there but we received world class training anyway. S.F. will always have the best resources. The S.F. Troopers.

[Utah Bob]

Things wax.
Things wane.
It has always been thus, Grasshopper.