Maple Flag
10-24-2007, 21:05
It has been a while since I've posted here, but I've always enjoyed the thoughtful debate on military matter this site has offered, and I particularly enjoyed reading the discussion in the "Strategists Up!" thread. Not wanting to revive what was now a dated thread, but seeking to continue the interesting discussion on the subject (to stay or not to stay in Iraq), but from a different perspective, I offer the following thoughts that I've been giving consideration to (as an self admitted civilian armchair strategist):
I see the GWOT as a significant sideshow in the fight for global supremacy - significant in terms of political and economic costs, but a side show in the sense that I believe the U.S. is distracted from and losing ground in key strategic areas of competition for global power while fighting the GWOT in the manner in which it is.
I think most will agree that the U.S. has unsurpassed ability to achieve decisive victory against any foe in a conventional war. Unconventional warfare remains a costly endeavor where decisive victory is more difficult to achieve, especially through the use of conventional military forces.
It took a very short period of time, and a very small number of U.S. and civilian casualties, to militarily crush and overthrow the governments of both Afghanistan and Iraq, and yet fighting continues now even after the militaries of both nations were defeated decisively.
I worry that the U.S. lost sight of the military objectives (deter your enemies by bringing severe harm to those that support terrorism or otherwise threaten the U.S.), by tying on the added mission to bring stability and create allies from "enemy" nations by forcing changes in government, and then defending the new goverment.
In the mean time, the U.S.'s greatest challengers to global supremacy (Russia and China) continue to grow stronger economically (Russia especially) and militarily, while the U.S. sinks considerable resources into missions that (from my perspective) have only marginal benefit to the U.S. (Afghanistan and Iraq are not world players economically or militarily, regardless of who they ally themselves with).
I think the U.S. was smart to invade both countries and overthrow the governments. This was power projection, and it was respected, even if it was not liked by some. After installing a new goverment and dumping in their laps the basics of what the new government needed to float for a period of time (money, arms, small numbers of advisors for a defined short period, etc), it was time to pull the military might of the U.S. out and pay a visit the next nation posing a threat to the U.S.. It does not really matter if the newly installed government stays in power. After all, if they are truly democratic, the newly installed government may well be voted out next term anyhow. What matters is that the next goverment, regardless of whether it comes to power by election or by force of arms, and regardelss of their political stance, knows that if they, while they have the seat of power, follow the path of the first government, the U.S. military will be kicking their door in again, and they will fall as did the original government. I would summarize this foreign policy towards "side show threat nations" as:
"Govern your country as you want, but if you threaten us or allow your people to threaten us, we will come in, kill or imprison you, install a new government - however fragile, and be completely gone before the end of the next fiscal quarter"
Or to put it another way:
"Shock, Exit, and then sit back to watch the Awe.
A few examples set as such, and I think many will choose the path of the U.S.'s new "friend" in Libya, and at much lower cost, and higher national prestige, than the current strategy. All the while, the U.S. can keep its strategic eye, and military and intelligence resources, on the real strategic threats that Russia and China pose for global supremacy, all the while maintaining a strong, victorious, and ready military.
Which brings us to the original question - whether or not the U.S. should stay in Iraq. If the only reason to stay in Iraq is to protect the U.S.'s reputation, I think at this point, due to how events have unfolded to date, staying is worthwhile if there is a realistic and reasonably quick path to victory. Every day spent "losing" (in the perspective of many) only harms the U.S.'s reputation, and this will not be reversed without a clear victory. If the fight can be won (definition admittedly needed here), win it, and quick. If not, announce new strategy, leave Iraq to the Iraqis, and before anyone can say "look at the U.S. run from the fight", invade and successfully remove the next threat government with the new "Shock, Exit, and then Awe" strategy. You are remembered only by your most recent deeds.
That said, in critiquing my own proposed strategy, I admit that there may be unseen benefits to on-going occupation in some cases that I have not figured into this. On the counter point, any such benefits would have to be weighed against costs of long term occupation and the corresponding committment of military forces away from (what I see as) larger strategic threats (both economic and military).
Thoughts?
I see the GWOT as a significant sideshow in the fight for global supremacy - significant in terms of political and economic costs, but a side show in the sense that I believe the U.S. is distracted from and losing ground in key strategic areas of competition for global power while fighting the GWOT in the manner in which it is.
I think most will agree that the U.S. has unsurpassed ability to achieve decisive victory against any foe in a conventional war. Unconventional warfare remains a costly endeavor where decisive victory is more difficult to achieve, especially through the use of conventional military forces.
It took a very short period of time, and a very small number of U.S. and civilian casualties, to militarily crush and overthrow the governments of both Afghanistan and Iraq, and yet fighting continues now even after the militaries of both nations were defeated decisively.
I worry that the U.S. lost sight of the military objectives (deter your enemies by bringing severe harm to those that support terrorism or otherwise threaten the U.S.), by tying on the added mission to bring stability and create allies from "enemy" nations by forcing changes in government, and then defending the new goverment.
In the mean time, the U.S.'s greatest challengers to global supremacy (Russia and China) continue to grow stronger economically (Russia especially) and militarily, while the U.S. sinks considerable resources into missions that (from my perspective) have only marginal benefit to the U.S. (Afghanistan and Iraq are not world players economically or militarily, regardless of who they ally themselves with).
I think the U.S. was smart to invade both countries and overthrow the governments. This was power projection, and it was respected, even if it was not liked by some. After installing a new goverment and dumping in their laps the basics of what the new government needed to float for a period of time (money, arms, small numbers of advisors for a defined short period, etc), it was time to pull the military might of the U.S. out and pay a visit the next nation posing a threat to the U.S.. It does not really matter if the newly installed government stays in power. After all, if they are truly democratic, the newly installed government may well be voted out next term anyhow. What matters is that the next goverment, regardless of whether it comes to power by election or by force of arms, and regardelss of their political stance, knows that if they, while they have the seat of power, follow the path of the first government, the U.S. military will be kicking their door in again, and they will fall as did the original government. I would summarize this foreign policy towards "side show threat nations" as:
"Govern your country as you want, but if you threaten us or allow your people to threaten us, we will come in, kill or imprison you, install a new government - however fragile, and be completely gone before the end of the next fiscal quarter"
Or to put it another way:
"Shock, Exit, and then sit back to watch the Awe.
A few examples set as such, and I think many will choose the path of the U.S.'s new "friend" in Libya, and at much lower cost, and higher national prestige, than the current strategy. All the while, the U.S. can keep its strategic eye, and military and intelligence resources, on the real strategic threats that Russia and China pose for global supremacy, all the while maintaining a strong, victorious, and ready military.
Which brings us to the original question - whether or not the U.S. should stay in Iraq. If the only reason to stay in Iraq is to protect the U.S.'s reputation, I think at this point, due to how events have unfolded to date, staying is worthwhile if there is a realistic and reasonably quick path to victory. Every day spent "losing" (in the perspective of many) only harms the U.S.'s reputation, and this will not be reversed without a clear victory. If the fight can be won (definition admittedly needed here), win it, and quick. If not, announce new strategy, leave Iraq to the Iraqis, and before anyone can say "look at the U.S. run from the fight", invade and successfully remove the next threat government with the new "Shock, Exit, and then Awe" strategy. You are remembered only by your most recent deeds.
That said, in critiquing my own proposed strategy, I admit that there may be unseen benefits to on-going occupation in some cases that I have not figured into this. On the counter point, any such benefits would have to be weighed against costs of long term occupation and the corresponding committment of military forces away from (what I see as) larger strategic threats (both economic and military).
Thoughts?