View Full Version : Challenging The Generals
The Reaper
08-28-2007, 09:50
Apologize in advance for the length.
Excellent read on the Army's leadership crisis, nonetheless.
Maybe this explains why the other services are getting a disproportionate number of the joint general officer billets.
TR
New York Times Magazine
August 26, 2007
Pg. 34
Challenging The Generals
By Fred Kaplan
On Aug. 1, Gen. Richard Cody, the United States Army’s vice chief of staff, flew to the sprawling base at Fort Knox, Ky., to talk with the officers enrolled in the Captains Career Course. These are the Army’s elite junior officers. Of the 127 captains taking the five-week course, 119 had served one or two tours of duty in Iraq or Afghanistan, mainly as lieutenants. Nearly all would soon be going back as company commanders. A captain named Matt Wignall, who recently spent 16 months in Iraq with a Stryker brigade combat team, asked Cody, the Army’s second-highest-ranking general, what he thought of a recent article by Lt. Col. Paul Yingling titled “A Failure in Generalship.” The article, a scathing indictment that circulated far and wide, including in Iraq, accused the Army’s generals of lacking “professional character,” “creative intelligence” and “moral courage.”
Yingling’s article — published in the May issue of Armed Forces Journal — noted that a key role of generals is to advise policy makers and the public on the means necessary to win wars. “If the general remains silent while the statesman commits a nation to war with insufficient means,” he wrote, “he shares culpability for the results.” Today’s generals “failed to envision the conditions of future combat and prepare their forces accordingly,” and they failed to advise policy makers on how much force would be necessary to win and stabilize Iraq. These failures, he insisted, stemmed not just from the civilian leaders but also from a military culture that “does little to reward creativity and moral courage.” He concluded, “As matters stand now, a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war.”
General Cody looked around the auditorium, packed with men and women in uniform — most of them in their mid-20s, three decades his junior but far more war-hardened than he or his peers were at the same age — and turned Captain Wignall’s question around. “You all have just come from combat, you’re young captains,” he said, addressing the entire room. “What’s your opinion of the general officers corps?”
Over the next 90 minutes, five captains stood up, recited their names and their units and raised several of Yingling’s criticisms. One asked why the top generals failed to give political leaders full and frank advice on how many troops would be needed in Iraq. One asked whether any generals “should be held accountable” for the war’s failures. One asked if the Army should change the way it selected generals. Another said that general officers were so far removed from the fighting, they wound up “sheltered from the truth” and “don’t know what’s going on.”
Challenges like this are rare in the military, which depends on obedience and hierarchy. Yet the scene at Fort Knox reflected a brewing conflict between the Army’s junior and senior officer corps — lieutenants and captains on one hand, generals on the other, with majors and colonels (“field-grade officers”) straddling the divide and sometimes taking sides. The cause of this tension is the war in Iraq, but the consequences are broader. They revolve around the obligations of an officer, the nature of future warfare and the future of the Army itself. And these tensions are rising at a time when the war has stretched the Army’s resources to the limit, when junior officers are quitting at alarming rates and when political leaders are divided or uncertain about America’s — and its military’s — role in the world.
Colonel Yingling’s article gave these tensions voice; it spelled out the issues and the stakes; and it located their roots in the Army’s own institutional culture, specifically in the growing disconnect between this culture — which is embodied by the generals — and the complex realities that junior officers, those fighting the war, are confronting daily on the ground. The article was all the more potent because it was written by an active-duty officer still on the rise. It was a career risk, just as, on a smaller scale, standing up and asking the Army vice chief of staff about the article was a risk.
In response to the captains’ questions, General Cody acknowledged, as senior officers often do now, that the Iraq war was “mismanaged” in its first phases. The original plan, he said, did not anticipate the disbanding of the Iraqi Army, the disruption of oil production or the rise of an insurgency. Still, he rejected the broader critique. “I think we’ve got great general officers that are meeting tough demands,” he insisted. He railed instead at politicians for cutting back the military in the 1990s. “Those are the people who ought to be held accountable,” he said.
Before and just after America’s entry into World War II, Gen. George Marshall, the Army’s chief of staff, purged 31 of his 42 division and corps commanders, all of them generals, and 162 colonels on the grounds that they were unsuited for battle. Over the course of the war, he rid the Army of 500 colonels. He reached deep into the lower ranks to find talented men to replace them. For example, Gen. James Gavin, the highly decorated commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, was a mere major in December 1941 when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. Today, President Bush maintains that the nation is in a war against terrorism — what Pentagon officials call “the long war” — in which civilization itself is at stake. Yet six years into this war, the armed forces — not just the Army, but also the Air Force, Navy and Marines — have changed almost nothing about the way their promotional systems and their entire bureaucracies operate.
On the lower end of the scale, things have changed — but for the worse. West Point cadets are obligated to stay in the Army for five years after graduating. In a typical year, about a quarter to a third of them decide not to sign on for another term. In 2003, when the class of 1998 faced that decision, only 18 percent quit the force: memories of 9/11 were still vivid; the war in Afghanistan seemed a success; and war in Iraq was under way. Duty called, and it seemed a good time to be an Army officer. But last year, when the 905 officers from the class of 2001 had to make their choice to stay or leave, 44 percent quit the Army. It was the service’s highest loss rate in three decades.
The Reaper
08-28-2007, 09:50
Col. Don Snider, a longtime professor at West Point, sees a “trust gap” between junior and senior officers. There has always been a gap, to some degree. What’s different now is that many of the juniors have more combat experience than the seniors. They have come to trust their own instincts more than they trust orders. They look at the hand they’ve been dealt by their superiors’ decisions, and they feel let down.
The gap is widening further, Snider told me, because of this war’s operating tempo, the “unrelenting pace” at which soldiers are rotated into Iraq for longer tours — and a greater number of tours — than they signed up for. Many soldiers, even those who support the war, are wearying of the endless cycle. The cycle is a result of two decisions. The first occurred at the start of the war, when the senior officers assented to the decision by Donald Rumsfeld, then the secretary of defense, to send in far fewer troops than they had recommended. The second took place two years later, well into the insurgency phase of the war, when top officers declared they didn’t need more troops, though most of them knew that in fact they did. “Many junior officers,” Snider said, “see this op tempo as stemming from the failure of senior officers to speak out.”
Paul Yingling did not set out to cause a stir. He grew up in a working-class part of Pittsburgh. His father owned a bar; no one in his family went to college. He joined the Army in 1984 at age 17, because he was a troubled kid — poor grades and too much drinking and brawling — who wanted to turn his life around, and he did. He went to Duquesne University, a small Catholic school, on an R.O.T.C. scholarship; went on active duty; rose through the ranks; and, by the time of the 1991 Persian Gulf war, was a lieutenant commanding an artillery battery, directing cannon fire against Saddam Hussein’s army.
“When I was in the gulf war, I remember thinking, This is easier than it was at training exercises,” he told me earlier this month. He was sent to Bosnia in December 1995 as part of the first peacekeeping operation after the signing of the Dayton accords, which ended the war in Bosnia. “This was nothing like training,” he recalled. Like most of his fellow soldiers, he was trained almost entirely for conventional combat operations: straightforward clashes, brigades against brigades. (Even now, about 70 percent of the training at the Captains Career Course is for conventional warfare.) In Bosnia, there was no clear enemy, no front line and no set definition of victory. “I kept wondering why things weren’t as well rehearsed as they’d been in the gulf war,” he said.
Upon returning, he spent the next six years pondering that question. He studied international relations at the University of Chicago’s graduate school and wrote a master’s thesis about the circumstances under which outside powers can successfully intervene in civil wars. (One conclusion: There aren’t many.) He then taught at West Point, where he also read deeply in Western political theory. Yingling was deployed to Iraq in July 2003 as an executive officer collecting loose munitions and training Iraq’s civil-defense corps. “The corps deserted or joined the insurgency on first contact,” he recalled. “It was a disaster.”
In the late fall of 2003, his first tour of duty over, Yingling was sent to Fort Sill, Okla., the Army’s main base for artillery soldiers, and wrote long memos to the local generals, suggesting new approaches to the war in Iraq. One suggestion was that since artillery rockets were then playing little role, artillery soldiers should become more skilled in training Iraqi soldiers; that, he thought, would be vital to Iraq’s future stability. No one responded to his memos, he says. He volunteered for another tour of combat and became deputy commander of the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment, which was fighting jihadist insurgents in the northern Iraqi town of Tal Afar.
The commander of the third regiment, Col. H. R. McMaster, was a historian as well as a decorated soldier. He figured that Iraq could not build its own institutions, political or military, until its people felt safe. So he devised his own plan, in which he and his troops cleared the town of insurgents — and at the same time formed alliances and built trust with local sheiks and tribal leaders. The campaign worked for a while, but only because McMaster flooded the city with soldiers — about 1,000 of them per square kilometer. Earlier, as Yingling drove around to other towns and villages, he saw that most Iraqis were submitting to whatever gang or militia offered them protection, because United States and coalition forces weren’t anywhere around. And that was because the coalition had entered the war without enough troops. Yingling was seeing the consequences of this decision up close in the terrible insecurity of most Iraqis’ lives.
In February 2006, Yingling returned to Fort Sill. That April, six retired Army and Marine generals publicly criticized Rumsfeld, who was still the secretary of defense, for sending too few troops to Iraq. Many junior and field-grade officers reacted with puzzlement or disgust. Their common question: Where were these generals when they still wore the uniform? Why didn’t they speak up when their words might have counted? One general who had spoken up, Eric Shinseki, then the Army chief of staff, was publicly upbraided and ostracized by Rumsfeld; other active-duty generals got the message and stayed mum.
That December, Yingling attended a Purple Heart ceremony for soldiers wounded in Iraq. “I was watching these soldiers wheeling into this room, or in some cases having to be wheeled in by their wives or mothers,” he recalled. “And I said to myself: ‘These soldiers were doing their jobs. The senior officers were not doing theirs. We’re not giving our soldiers the tools and training to succeed.’ I had to go public.”
Soon after Yingling’s article appeared, Maj. Gen. Jeff Hammond, commander of the Fourth Infantry Division at Fort Hood, Tex., reportedly called a meeting of the roughly 200 captains on his base, all of whom had served in Iraq, for the purpose of putting this brazen lieutenant colonel in his place. According to The Wall Street Journal, he told his captains that Army generals are “dedicated, selfless servants.” Yingling had no business judging generals because he has “never worn the shoes of a general.” By implication, Hammond was warning his captains that they had no business judging generals, either. Yingling was stationed at Fort Hood at the time, preparing to take command of an artillery battalion. From the steps of his building, he could see the steps of General Hammond’s building. He said he sent the general a copy of his article before publication as a courtesy, and he never heard back; nor was he notified of the general’s meeting with his captains.
The “trust gap” between junior and senior officers is hardly universal. Many junior officers at Fort Knox and elsewhere have no complaints about the generals — or regard the matter as way above their pay grade. As Capt. Ryan Kranc, who has served two tours in Iraq, one as a commander, explained to me, “I’m more interested in whether my guys can secure a convoy.” He dismissed complaints about troop shortages. “When you’re in a system, you’re never going to get everything you ask for,” he said, “but I still have to accomplish a mission. That’s my job. If they give me a toothpick, dental floss and a good hunting knife, I will accomplish the mission.”
An hour after General Cody’s talk at Fort Knox, several captains met to discuss the issue over beers. Capt. Garrett Cathcart, who has served in Iraq as a platoon leader, said: “The culture of the Army is to accomplish the mission, no matter what. That’s a good thing.” Matt Wignall, who was the first captain to ask General Cody about the Yingling article, agreed that a mission-oriented culture was “a good thing, but it can be dangerous.” He added: “It is so rare to hear someone in the Army say, ‘No, I can’t do that.’ But sometimes it takes courage to say, ‘I don’t have the capability.’ ” Before the Iraq war, when Rumsfeld overrode the initial plans of the senior officers, “somebody should have put his foot down,” Wignall said.
The Reaper
08-28-2007, 09:51
Lt. Col. Allen Gill, who just retired as director of the R.O.T.C. program at Georgetown University, has heard versions of this discussion among his cadets for years. He raises a different concern about the Army’s “can do” culture. “You’re not brought up in the Army to tell people how you can’t get things done, and that’s fine, that’s necessary,” he said. “But when you get promoted to a higher level of strategic leadership, you have to have a different outlook. You’re supposed to make clear, cold calculations of risk — of the probabilities of victory and defeat.”
The problem, he said, is that it’s hard for officers — hard for people in any profession — to switch their basic approach to life so abruptly. As Yingling put it in his article, “It is unreasonable to expect that an officer who spends 25 years conforming to institutional expectations will emerge as an innovator in his late 40s.”
Yingling’s commander at Tal Afar, H. R. McMaster, documented a similar crisis in the case of the Vietnam War. Twenty years after the war, McMaster wrote a doctoral dissertation that he turned into a book called “Dereliction of Duty.” It concluded that the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the 1960s betrayed their professional obligations by failing to provide unvarnished military advice to President Lyndon B. Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara as they plunged into the Southeast Asian quagmire. When McMaster’s book was published in 1997, Gen. Hugh Shelton, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs, ordered all commanders to read it — and to express disagreements to their superiors, even at personal risk. Since then, “Dereliction of Duty” has been recommended reading for Army officers.
Yet before the start of the Iraq war and during the early stages of the fighting, the Joint Chiefs once again fell silent. Justin Rosenbaum, the captain at Fort Knox who asked General Cody whether any generals would be held accountable for the failures in Iraq, said he was disturbed by this parallel between the two wars. “We’ve read the McMaster book,” he said. “It’s startling that we’re repeating the same mistakes.”
McMaster’s own fate has reinforced these apprehensions. President Bush has singled out McMaster’s campaign at Tal Afar as a model of successful strategy. Gen. David Petraeus, now commander of United States forces in Iraq, frequently consults with McMaster in planning his broader counterinsurgency campaign. Yet the Army’s promotion board — the panel of generals that selects which few dozen colonels advance to the rank of brigadier general — has passed over McMaster two years in a row.
McMaster’s nonpromotion has not been widely reported, yet every officer I spoke with knew about it and had pondered its implications. One colonel, who asked not to be identified because he didn’t want to risk his own ambitions, said: “Everyone studies the brigadier-general promotion list like tarot cards — who makes it, who doesn’t. It communicates what qualities are valued and not valued.” A retired Army two-star general, who requested anonymity because he didn’t want to anger his friends on the promotion boards, agreed. “When you turn down a guy like McMaster,” he told me, “that sends a potent message to everybody down the chain. I don’t know, maybe there were good reasons not to promote him. But the message everybody gets is: ‘We’re not interested in rewarding people like him. We’re not interested in rewarding agents of change.’ ”
Members of the board, he said, want to promote officers whose careers look like their own. Today’s generals rose through the officer corps of the peacetime Army. Many of them fought in the last years of Vietnam, and some fought in the gulf war. But to the extent they have combat experience, it has been mainly tactical, not strategic. They know how to secure an objective on a battlefield, how to coordinate firepower and maneuver. But they don’t necessarily know how to deal with an enemy that’s flexible, with a scenario that has not been rehearsed.
“Those rewarded are the can-do, go-to people,” the retired two-star general told me. “Their skill is making the trains run on time. So why are we surprised that, when the enemy becomes adaptive, we get caught off guard? If you raise a group of plumbers, you shouldn’t be upset if they can’t do theoretical physics.”
There are, of course, exceptions, most notably General Petraeus. He wrote an article for a recent issue of The American Interest, a Washington-based public-policy journal, urging officers to attend civilian graduate schools and get out of their “intellectual comfort zones” — useful for dealing with today’s adaptive enemies.
Yet many Army officers I spoke with say Petraeus’s view is rare among senior officers. Two colonels told me that when they were captains, their commanders strongly discouraged them from attending not just graduate school but even the Army’s Command and General Staff College, warning that it would be a diversion from their career paths. “I got the impression that I’d be better off counting bedsheets in the Baghdad Embassy than studying at Harvard,” one colonel said.
Harvard’s merits aside, some junior officers agree that the promotion system discourages breadth. Capt. Kip Kowalski, an infantry officer in the Captains Career Course at Fort Knox, is a proud soldier in the can-do tradition. He is impatient with critiques of superiors; he prefers to stay focused on his job. “But I am worried,” he said, “that generals these days are forced to be narrow.” Kowalski would like to spend a few years in a different branch of the Army — say, as a foreign area officer — and then come back to combat operations. He says he thinks the switch would broaden his skills, give him new perspectives and make him a better officer. But the rules don’t allow switching back and forth among specialties. “I have to decide right now whether I want to do ops or something else,” he said. “If I go F. A. O., I can never come back.”
In October 2006, seven months before his essay on the failure of generalship appeared, Yingling and Lt. Col. John Nagl, another innovative officer, wrote an article for Armed Forces Journal called “New Rules for New Enemies,” in which they wrote: “The best way to change the organizational culture of the Army is to change the pathways for professional advancement within the officer corps. The Army will become more adaptive only when being adaptive offers the surest path to promotion.”
In late June, Yingling took command of an artillery battalion. This means he will most likely be promoted to full colonel. This assignment, however, was in the works nearly a year ago, long before he wrote his critique of the generals. His move and probable promotion say nothing about whether he’ll be promoted further — or whether, as some of his admirers fear, his career will now grind to a halt.
Nagl — the author of an acclaimed book about counterinsurgency (“Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife”), a former operations officer in Iraq and the subject of a New York Times Magazine article a few years ago — has since taken command of a unit at Fort Riley, Kan., that trains United States soldiers to be advisers to Iraqi security forces. Pentagon officials have said that these advisers are crucial to America’s future military policy. Yet Nagl has written that soldiers have been posted to this unit “on an ad hoc basis” and that few of the officers selected to train them have ever been advisers themselves.
Lt. Col. Isaiah Wilson, a professor at West Point and former planning officer in Iraq with the 101st Airborne Division, said the fate of Nagl’s unit — the degree to which it attracted capable, ambitious soldiers — depended on the answer to one question: “Will serving as an adviser be seen as equal to serving as a combat officer in the eyes of the promotion boards? The jury is still out.”
“Guys like Yingling, Nagl and McMaster are the canaries in the coal mine of Army reform,” the retired two-star general I spoke with told me. “Will they get promoted to general? If they do, that’s a sign that real change is happening. If they don’t, that’s a sign that the traditional culture still rules.”
The Reaper
08-28-2007, 09:51
Failure sometimes compels an institution to change its ways. The last time the Army undertook an overhaul was in the wake of the Vietnam War. At the center of those reforms was an officer named Huba Wass de Czege. Wass de Czege (pronounced VOSH de tsay-guh) graduated from West Point and served two tours of duty in Vietnam, the second as a company commander in the Central Highlands. He devised innovative tactics, leading four-man teams — at the time they were considered unconventionally small — on ambush raids at night. His immediate superiors weren’t keen on his approach or attitude, despite his successes. But after the war ended and a few creative officers took over key posts, they recruited Wass de Czege to join them.
In 1982, he was ordered to rewrite the Army’s field manual on combat operations. At his own initiative, he read the classics of military strategy — Clausewitz’s “On War,” Sun Tzu’s “Art of War,” B. H. Liddell Hart’s “Strategy” — none of which had been on his reading list at West Point. And he incorporated many of their lessons along with his own experiences from Vietnam. Where the old edition assumed static clashes of firepower and attrition, Wass de Czege’s revision emphasized speed, maneuver and taking the offensive. He was asked to create a one-year graduate program for the most promising young officers. Called the School of Advanced Military Studies, or SAMS, it brought strategic thinking back into the Army — at least for a while.
Now a retired one-star general, though an active Army consultant, Wass de Czege has publicly praised Yingling’s article. (Yingling was a graduate of SAMS in 2002, well after its founder moved on.) In an essay for the July issue of Army magazine, Wass de Czege wrote that today’s junior officers “feel they have much relevant experience [that] those senior to them lack,” yet the senior officers “have not listened to them.” These junior officers, he added, remind him of his own generation of captains, who held the same view during and just after Vietnam.
“The crux of the problem in our Army,” Wass de Czege wrote, “is that officers are not systematically taught how to cope with unstructured problems.” Counterinsurgency wars, like those in Iraq and Afghanistan, are all about unstructured problems. The junior and field-grade officers, who command at the battalion level and below, deal with unstructured problems — adapting to the insurgents’ ever-changing tactics — as a matter of course. Many generals don’t, and never had to, deal with such problems, either in war or in their training drills. Many of them may not fully recognize just how distinct and difficult these problems are.
Speaking by phone from his home outside Fort Leavenworth, Wass de Czege emphasized that he was impressed with most of today’s senior officers. Compared with those of his time, they are more capable, open and intelligent (most officers today, junior and senior, have college degrees, for instance). “You’re not seeing any of the gross incompetence that was common in my day,” he said. He added, however, that today’s generals are still too slow to change. “The Army tends to be consensus-driven at the top,” he said. “There’s a good side to that. We’re steady as a rock. You call us to arms, we’ll be there. But when you roll a lot of changes at us, it takes awhile. The young guys have to drive us to it.”
The day after his talk at Fort Knox, General Cody, back at his office in the Pentagon, reiterated his “faith in the leadership of the general officers.” Asked about complaints that junior officers are forced to follow narrow paths to promotion, he said, “We’re trying to do just the opposite.” In the works are new incentives to retain officers, including not just higher bonuses but free graduate school and the right to choose which branch of the Army to serve in. “I don’t want everybody to think there’s one road map to colonel or general,” he said. He denied that promotion boards picked candidates in their own image. This year, he said, he was on the board that picked new brigadier generals, and one of them, Jeffrey Buchanan, had never commanded a combat brigade; his last assignment was training Iraqi security forces. One colonel, interviewed later, said: “That’s a good sign. They’ve never picked anybody like that before. But that’s just one out of 38 brigadier generals they picked. It’s still very much the exception.”
There is a specter haunting the debate over Yingling’s article — the specter of Gen. Douglas MacArthur. During World War II, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower threatened to resign if the civilian commanders didn’t order air support for the invasion of Normandy. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill acceded. But during the Korean War, MacArthur — at the time, perhaps the most popular public figure in America — demanded that President Truman let him attack China. Truman fired him. History has redeemed both presidents’ decisions. But in terms of the issues that Yingling, McMaster and others have raised, was there really a distinction? Weren’t both generals speaking what they regarded as “truth to power”?
The very discussion of these issues discomforts many senior officers because they take very seriously the principle of civilian control. They believe it is not their place to challenge the president or his duly appointed secretary of defense, certainly not in public, especially not in wartime. The ethical codes are ambiguous on how firmly an officer can press an argument without crossing the line. So, many generals prefer to keep a substantial distance from that line — to keep the prospect of a constitutional crisis from even remotely arising.
On a blog Yingling maintains at the Web site of Small Wars Journal, an independent journal of military theory, he has acknowledged these dilemmas, but he hasn’t disentangled them. For example, if generals do speak up, and the president ignores their advice, what should they do then — salute and follow orders, resign en masse or criticize the president publicly? At this level of discussion, the junior and midlevel officers feel uncomfortable, too.
Yingling’s concern is more narrowly professional, but it should matter greatly to future policy makers who want to consult their military advisers. The challenge is how to ensure that generals possess the experience and analytical prowess to formulate sound military advice and the “moral courage,” as Yingling put it, to take responsibility for that advice and for its resulting successes or failures. The worry is that too few generals today possess either set of qualities — and that the promotional system impedes the rise of officers who do.
As today’s captains and majors come up through the ranks, the culture may change. One question is how long that will take. Another question is whether the most innovative of those junior officers will still be in the Army by the time the top brass decides reform is necessary. As Colonel Wilson, the West Point instructor, put it, “When that moment comes, will there be enough of the right folks in the right slots to make the necessary changes happen?”
Fred Kaplan is the national security columnist for Slate and author of the forthcoming book “Daydream Believers: How a Few Grand Ideas Wrecked American Power.”
incommin
08-28-2007, 10:43
Great post! The major problem to change is Congress and the idea that the military is totally subservient to civilian rule....the second major problem is getting the politics out of senior promotions..... until then the answer will always be, "Yes sir, yes sir, three bags full"!
Jim
Snaquebite
08-28-2007, 10:51
I read this yesterday and wondered....What assignments those Captains will receive at the end of the course.?
I agree with Incommin...the top end of the totem pole requires too much politics. Sad to say but I doubt that will ever change.
I know that they are apples and oranges, but the exact same problems in leadership plague large PD's.
Top commanders, who are the ones sitting on review boards, are not prone to promote Officers who are in the habit of telling them that they are full of sh*t, that the policies that they put in place need to be changed, etc.. It doesn't work that way. Commanders promote those who share their views, their strategies, their approach to policing/soldiering.
Not a good recipe for change or adaptation within an organization.
Peregrino
08-28-2007, 11:21
It looks like "The Watched Pot" has a few bubbles rising. It's still a long way from the roiling boil it will take to foment the degree of change that the current generation of "free thinkers" seem to feel is necessary. If this ends (unfavorably - e.g. a unilateral capitulation i.e. VN Vol. II) before that happens, does anybody want to place bets about another retreat to the next version of "Air-Land Battle" and the military leadership/political climate that gave us the foundations for today's percieved leadership crisis?
I need to add to my professional reading. The title of Kaplan's new book sounds interesting. I like his writing, I'll read him and Ralph Peters as soon as I see their names. The good thing is that a number of smart people are doing critical analysis and their work is reaching the "court of public opinion". The bad thing - as Kaplan, Yingling, and anyone else with measurable brains has noted, there are significant career risks involved in swimming against the current.
On a related note - Special Forces needs to be looking to their/our future as well. We need some free thinkers challenging the institutional norms too. The more the Army shifts towards the maneuver end of the spectrum, the less relevant our strengths, the abilities that differentiate us from "the world's finest light infantry" become. If we're just another very expensive (resource intensive) Ranger squad, how long will we continue to exist?
Thanks TR. Lots of food for thought in this. Peregrino
Remington Raidr
08-28-2007, 12:24
I know everyone will think I'm sucking up, but after reading "Chosen Soldier" and "Imperial Grunts", I think the majority of general officers should be prior SF. The change will be slow but the change must come. So go ahead and bust on me, but all the qualities listed as needed in a GO in the article start not at West Point but in Free Pineland.
The Reaper
08-28-2007, 12:37
I know everyone will think I'm sucking up, but after reading "Chosen Soldier" and "Imperial Grunts", I think the majority of general officers should be prior SF. The change will be slow but the change must come. So go ahead and bust on me, but all the qualities listed as needed in a GO in the article start not at West Point but in Free Pineland.
Well don't put any money on that, because the Army is promoting fewer SF generals than ever, and the future looks pretty bleak for the branch unless politicians intervene.
JSOC, Rangers, and DA are the name of the game as far as SOCOM and the Army are concerned. Afghanistan was an aberration, as far as they are concerned, and SF are just house cleaners. If things continue on their present course, I fully expect SF Command and their forces to be reassigned to JSOC at some point, to be used for their ash and trash details.
TR
incommin
08-28-2007, 12:55
Just remember guys, it was dashing young men in funny green French headgear, an order from JFK, and a movie by the Duke that sparked the envy in all the other branches and landed us where we are today.
Jim
In February 2006, Yingling returned to Fort Sill. That April, six retired Army and Marine generals publicly criticized Rumsfeld, who was still the secretary of defense, for sending too few troops to Iraq.
When I read this I thought of the Weinberger doctrine mentioned by Grossman in "On Killing". The points contained make good sense to me.
Is this taught as doctrine for our rising G.O.'s at any point?
I do not usually post here, however I was hoping you gentlemen could suffer a question. As far as holding generals accountable how could this be done without that position becoming yet another political football? If congress is doing the accountability there would probably be more problems created than solved. I believe the democrats would ruthlessly exploit this with as they've done with federal judges.
The Reaper
08-28-2007, 13:37
Well, for one thing, by requiring that SF leadership actually have previously served in and commanded in white side SF units before being placed in command of those units. All of the people that you think are SF generals, are usually not.
Certain positions could be coded for SF qualified GOs, and joint positions could be set aside for SF leadership.
Key positions within the Army could be coded for SF qualified personnel only as well.
Promotion numbers are driven by requirements. There are VERY few SF GO coded positions right now, so those few who are promoted either fight for those, or go elsewhere in the Army and work an immaterial position till there is an opening.
As of right now, there is very little of that, since the Army does not like SF.
For example, if there were a requirement for 12 SF BG positions, 6 SF MG positions, 3 SF LTG positions, and at least one SF GEN position, things would be vastly different.
Right now, we are headed the way of the dodo, in the middle of a war against an insurgency. What sense does that make, and what does it tell you?
TR
As of right now, there is very little of that, since the Army does not like SF.
Right now, we are headed the way of the dodo, in the middle of a war against an insurgency. What sense does that make, and what does it tell you?
TR
If you don't mind, why doesn't the Army like SF? Does it stem from a lack of understanding from those in command positions (they don't understand exactly what you do, so they don't see why you need to exist)?
Are SF units extraordinarily expensive to sustain (seen as not being cost effective by the Army)?
Have manpower shortages and the GWOT allowed (or forced) light infantry units to acquire some of the skills previously only seen in SF units, causing senior leadership to see SF as a -not as necessary- expenditure in the budget?
I'm not suggesting that any of the above are the case, just throwing out some guesses.
Take care,
Mike
SOF, and SF in particular, already seem to function like a fifth branch, so why not just formalize it? That would seem to offer an attractive promotion path and ensure that officers with at least "white side" experience were filling the top jobs. It would also put SOF people in charge of their own recruiting, instead of making the various elements dependent on conventional recruiters sourcing the right talent. Perhaps planning, budgeting and procurement, too, but I don't know much about how those work at present, so the issue could be moot.
The Reaper
08-28-2007, 14:11
SOF, and SF in particular, already seem to function like a fifth branch, so why not just formalize it? That would seem to offer an attractive promotion path and ensure that officers with at least "white side" experience were filling the top jobs. It would also put SOF people in charge of their own recruiting, instead of making the various elements dependent on conventional recruiters sourcing the right talent. Perhaps planning, budgeting and procurement, too, but I don't know much about how those work at present, so the issue could be moot.
Because not all animals are equal.
An uninformed AF officer will likely be no better than the ignorant Army Aviation commander.
A ship driver may be a poor choice to lead an organization of primarily SF personnel.
An SF officer should not be selected to command an aviation unit (funny how the reverse is not always as obvious).
Finally, a career SOF DA guy is unlikely to be able to successfully lead a UW or FID campaign.
Do some research on what component is the largest in SOCOM, and what part of Army SOF is the biggest. Look at who has borne the brunt of the action so far, who has suffered the majority of the SOF casualties, and who has produced results. Then explain the leadership decisions. I can't.
TR
Jack Moroney (RIP)
08-28-2007, 14:26
Excellent read on the Army's leadership crisis, nonetheless.
You know I have heard all this stuff since I was but a wee brown bar and I think the "leadership crisis" is but a symptom of a dumb personnel management "program". For those of you that are officers, stop and look back at your careers to date and tell me which one of you really spent enough time in any command or leadership position that you thought was really enough to prepare you to move to the next higher echelon. Now tell me just how long is really enough and tell me that when it came time to move on to the next "job" that you hadn't either left things undone, under done, or not honed to the level to which you thought they should be. I mean damn, most folks just are getting a handle on what a particular slot is all about and then they are moved for "professional development (ticket punching)" reasons to remain competitive with their contemporaries. Now look at folks sporting stars and tell me just how long did they spend in each grade and at each position that would merit the moniker of a leadership position. I have always thought that the military was made up of warriors and those that supported warriors and while you can have some that can walk in the shoes of both they are few and far between, yet we measure career development more in terms of how well a person performed at a particular job be it commanding a unit or teaching a course and some how identified that person as having the potential to move on to the next higher grade, but the next higher grade doing what? Some folks are just good at doing one thing, or working at one echelon, or in one career field and that's it. How many times have you said, "Damn he was a hell of a team leader but what a jackass Bn Cdr he turned out to be." Or something similar to that. The personnel management field looks at the wrong indicators for who should be doing what and why. I realize that this is an over simplification but just thinking of what needs to be done makes my hair hurt.
incommin
08-28-2007, 14:40
COl Jack, I once had a COL tell me that when you make COL or General you are no longer a "leader"; that you become a manager of leaders and that is why officers jump from command to staff, back and forth as they move up the chain...... how does that square with your comments???????
Jim
I read this yesterday and wondered....What assignments those Captains will receive at the end of the course.?
I agree with Incommin...the top end of the totem pole requires too much politics. Sad to say but I doubt that will ever change.
As one of the quoted interviewed individuals in this article, I'll let you know when I get my RFO for the weather station at the South Pole. :D
Peregrino
08-28-2007, 15:46
As one of the quoted interviewed individuals in this article, I'll let you know when I get my RFO for the weather station at the South Pole. :D
What's with the long face? SnoCats have tracks. :D Peregrino
I cannot help but wonder if the problem lies in an implicit assumption – said assumption being that the civilian and military leadership communicate effectively.
It is my observation that the civilian world functions differently than does the military world. For that matter, the civilian world operates differently than a large police department. Many of the basic attitudes and values are so divergent that I wonder if successful communication can exist.
That’s my job. If they give me a toothpick, dental floss and a good hunting knife, I will accomplish the mission.”
Contrast the above can-do no-whining attitude with what we see from various areas that have faced a natural disaster. In many situations, vigorous sniveling generates good rewards. People and organizations seek more resources, more money, more help of every sort – and, they get what they ask for.
If the civilian leadership doesn’t understand the communications disconnect, they might give a command to do much with little. The military personnel will seek to accomplish the mission with dental floss. The civilian leadership will then be surprised (truly, deeply surprised) when things turn out badly. After all, the military leadership assured them the mission would be accomplished. Both sides functioned according to their underlying assumptions, both sides sought to communicate, and both sides are disappointed in the results. Would a general officer weep, whine, and whimper? Obviously, such a scenario is ludicrous. However, will the civilian leader recognize urgency without accompanying drama?
I offer no solutions. I confess to deep ignorance of military matters. Still, I cannot help wondering if the problems aren’t an unintended and unconscious failure to communicate. Perhaps General Petraeus’ idea about officers attending civilian graduate schools would help.
What's with the long face? SnoCats have tracks. :D Peregrino
The COLA allowance sucks though. There isn't one (I just checked).
The Reaper
08-28-2007, 16:34
The COLA allowance sucks though. There isn't one (I just checked).
IIRC, it is all government provided quarters, dependents not authorized, and a TCS move with a very light personal hold baggage allowance.
You should get Family Separation pay though.:D
TR
Roguish Lawyer
08-28-2007, 16:44
The “trust gap” between junior and senior officers is hardly universal. Many junior officers at Fort Knox and elsewhere have no complaints about the generals — or regard the matter as way above their pay grade. As Capt. Ryan Kranc, who has served two tours in Iraq, one as a commander, explained to me, “I’m more interested in whether my guys can secure a convoy.” He dismissed complaints about troop shortages. “When you’re in a system, you’re never going to get everything you ask for,” he said, “but I still have to accomplish a mission. That’s my job. If they give me a toothpick, dental floss and a good hunting knife, I will accomplish the mission.”
This guys obviously knows how not to step on his Kranc.
I'll be at Caesar's all week. /rimshot
This guys obviously knows how not to step on his Kranc.
I'll be at Caesar's all week. /rimshot
And it's pronounced Krantz (Serbian). :D
Since that was my quote, let me go a shade deeper than the article quoted.
My job, as an officer (and unless I learned something wrong along the way) is to make things happen within the bounds of that which is morally and ethically feasible, tactically proficient, and in accordance with applicable ROEs and Conventions. So long as what I do to accomplish the ends assigned and tasked to me by my superiors falls along these lines, then I'm fulfilling my oath of office. I remember saying once upon a time "I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice."
Here's the caviat. It is my obligation and duty as an Officer and Soldier to inform my chain of command when the mission assigned is not feasible, is ethically imbalanced, or is unattainable. Only under certain (and very defined)circumstances am I allowed to disobey a lawful order.
I take it as a matter of personal pride that my Soldiers (not necessarily me) have accompished every mission assigned to me and my elements in my career, even if the odds were against it. Guess what? THAT'S MY JOB!!
I don't look for special recognition, that's just what my duty description entails. I chose to do this job. No one chose it for me.
There's a difference between sending up the old "Issue, Discussion, Recommendation" format and flat out bitching. There's a very fine line between the two. I've seen more of the latter than the former recently.
I think nmap hit the nail on the head. It's a communication gap. More damned people are afraid of what could happen to them if they speak up. However, people need to pick their battles and speak up when it's appropriate. The Sky is Falling crap only works once. After that, one become white noise.
If they give me a toothpick, dental floss and a good hunting knife, I will accomplish the mission
And, by the way, that's why I read the SURVIVE thread from time to time. Just in case that's all they give me.
After this week, that might be all I get. :D
One of the primary contributors (IMO) of this lack of breadth in officers is OPMS XXI. Career tracks may allow for a better chance for promotion to O-6 and above for a greater number of officers, but it limits the variety of experience many Operations track officers were once afforded. When I was a 2LT, I knew many field-grade Infantry and Armor officers having Masters degrees in everything but operations-realted subjects. That doesn't seem to be the case now. If a Field Artillery (FA) captain wants to persue an advanced degree in a language, or international finance to expand his knowledge base, he has limited his chance of promotion within the FA, and needs to consider moving from his primary branch to a Functional Area if he wishes to stay in the Army.
"The state that separates its scholars from its warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting by fools." Thucydides
60_Driver
08-28-2007, 18:17
One of the primary contributors (IMO) of this lack of breadth in officers is OPMS XXI. Career tracks may allow for a better chance for promotion to O-6 and above for a greater number of officers, but it limits the variety of experience many Operations track officers were once afforded. When I was a 2LT, I knew many field-grade Infantry and Armor officers having Masters degrees in everything but operations-realted subjects. That doesn't seem to be the case now. If a Field Artillery (FA) captain wants to persue an advanced degree in a language, or international finance to expand his knowledge base, he has limited his chance of promotion within the FA, and needs to consider moving from his primary branch to a Functional Area if he wishes to stay in the Army.
"The state that separates its scholars from its warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting by fools." Thucydides
I don't necessarily think it's wrong to give preference to officers who focus their studies on their operational fields. There are quite enough subjects and disciplines for an officer to study that will have a direct beneficial effect on his understanding and performance of his military duties.
During times when we have called upon the citizenry to provide officers and men for war, we naturally ended up with a large breadth of training, education and abilities that was often an asset. But these men were something else first, and officers and soldiers second.
Few medical doctors or archaeologists pursue degrees in international finance because the subject has little bearing on their respective fields and offers little in the way of improving their performance.
Career members of our present volunteer "professional" military are supposed to be just that...military professionals. This implies a dedication to the study of fields useful to the management of violence and the winning of wars.
Jack Moroney (RIP)
08-28-2007, 19:05
COl Jack, I once had a COL tell me that when you make COL or General you are no longer a "leader"; that you become a manager of leaders and that is why officers jump from command to staff, back and forth as they move up the chain...... how does that square with your comments???????
Jim
It does not sit well with me, probably because I was a soldier that happened to be an officer. First of all those at that level that see themselves as managers vice leaders should be backing up to the pay table. You have just as much responsibility to exercise leadership with those leaders for whom you are responsible as does a squad leader for those fire team members for whom he is responsible. The approach is different but the goal is the same-enable your subordinates to succeed. What you are hearing from those that provided you with what they see as sage advice is the Harvard Business School approach to "leadership". You might well manage resources and a bottom line but you still have to provide the leadership to those you provide the resources and manage those resources in such a way to allow those folks to succeed. That means that it becomes your responsibility as the leader who provided the mission requirements to prioritize the resources needed and manage them (time, money, materiel, etc) in such a way that those that need the most grease for that wheel you want turned get it. But unlike the manager your presence as a leader is felt either through your stated or implied vision and more often than not your physical location at the most vital points of the effort on site. Unlike the manager, you still have to set the correct command climate, personal example, etc.
Few medical doctors or archaeologists pursue degrees in international finance because the subject has little bearing on their respective fields and offers little in the way of improving their performance.
Career members of our present volunteer "professional" military are supposed to be just that...military professionals. This implies a dedication to the study of fields useful to the management of violence and the winning of wars.
I would counter that few doctors or archaeologists are often asked to perform a task well-outside their specialty, say for example a combat engineer officer acting as a town mayor, or an infantryman re-establishing the basic infrastructure to provide electricity to a village. Before you tell me those examples fall within the scope of Civil Affairs, remember how 'available' CA teams are for a specific project when there are thousands of projects requiring assistance.
Limiting one's self to only the "management of violence and the winning of wars" creates a one-trick pony with little ability to adapt to changing environments, such as those found in counterinsurgencies.
[QUOTE=Jack Moroney]You know I have heard all this stuff since I was but a wee brown bar and I think the "leadership crisis" is but a symptom of a dumb personnel management "program". For those of you that are officers, stop and look back at your careers to date and tell me which one of you really spent enough time in any command or leadership position that you thought was really enough to prepare you to move to the next higher echelon. QUOTE]
Honestly I don't know how Officers do it. I look back at how much I learned from year two on a Team until I left. Thats where I learned. The first two years were for learning lessons. I truly felt sorry for the Captains when they had to leave after a couple of years. Especially the ones who had language School count against their Team time.
5, 4, 4, are the number of years for my first three assignments in SF. The last one was SWC. When the SWC time ended I went back to a Team. It was during this fourth Team assignment where my priorities changed. Learning took a back seat to teaching and influencing decisions.
The Captains who showed up overseas already had Team time. They got lucky and got to do it again. The difference was night and day. They made every day decisions that they wouldn't of even tried to influence the first time around. To give this opportunity to everyone one idea that was thrown around.
Give Officers a choice when selected for Major. Let them put it on hold without suffering any consequences. Placing their promotion on hold lets them return to a Team. The only thing they lose is the money they would of earned as a Major during this extra Team time. Two paths to choose from.
What they gain is two more years Team experience. This is reflected on their records of course, thus an edge career wise later on down the road. So when a new Group Commander arrives. The first question everyone will have is "Is this new guy a double timer or did he just do the minimum" I think most would choose to return to a Team in a heart beat.
OK, You can stop laughing. I still think it's a good idea.
The Reaper
08-29-2007, 07:49
I would counter that few doctors or archaeologists are often asked to perform a task well-outside their specialty, say for example a combat engineer officer acting as a town mayor, or an infantryman re-establishing the basic infrastructure to provide electricity to a village. Before you tell me those examples fall within the scope of Civil Affairs, remember how 'available' CA teams are for a specific project when there are thousands of projects requiring assistance.
Limiting one's self to only the "management of violence and the winning of wars" creates a one-trick pony with little ability to adapt to changing environments, such as those found in counterinsurgencies.
Do not forget that the CA units bring knowledge, but few real resources.
They have a ton of expertise, but cannot build a bridge, erect a school, dig a well, open a hospital, etc. without the engineer, MP, or Medical assets to make it happen.
kg, I agree that officers are on a team for far too short a time, but that is not their choice. In the big scheme of things, they have to move on so that all of the 18As get a certain minimum amount of team time. SF needs more CPTs and MAJs in the force than would allow for TLs to be there for more than 12-24 months. It is a shame, but that is probably long enough for the leadership to figure out if the TL gets it and is able to move on and up in SF or not. It also gives the TL the ability to know what it is like on a team when he is later making decisions that affect them. There were several jobs I had in the Army where I would have gladly stayed and forfeited all future promotions to remain there. They were all troop time, none were staff jobs.
TR
The Reaper
08-29-2007, 17:30
Sir, I'm wondering, but isn't the military supposed to be completely subservient to civilian rule? If the military has power over the civilian leadership, couldn't that be a bad thing? I always assumed that civilian rule wasn't always the best idea, but that this was just a necessary evil of having a society with the civilians in charge (keeps the military from gaining too much power, but on the flip side, the civilians may not listen to their military advisors and make dumb decisions).
The first loyalty required is to the Constitution of the United States.
TR
brianksain
08-29-2007, 19:16
Do not want to stray out of my lane in this thread ... but almost identical parallells can be drawn in LE as stated previously.
Have had virtually identical conversations with guys in my biz.
Very little respect for many up the food chain.
The first loyalty required is to the Constitution of the United States.
TR
Amen.
CoLawman
08-29-2007, 20:44
The first loyalty required is to the Constitution of the United States.
TR
"I, _____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God."
The Reaper
08-29-2007, 20:47
The real question in that oath is what action is required when orders of the POTUS or appointed officers are in violation of the Constitution. Not only can they be disobeyed, but may the leadership also be removed for doing so in order to further protect the Constitution?
Now that is a real tough one.
And don't tell me that the same men who planned for an armed society to ensure the freely elected government served the People did not consider that, because I believe that they did.
TR
The answer sir is in the oath, ie, against all enemies, foreign and domestic. The big WHAT though, IMHO, is who is the deciding party on whom is an enemy? Just my .02
CoLawman
08-29-2007, 22:32
The military can take no action against the civilian leadership without orders from civilian authority. They can bring evidence and offer testimony but that ends their role, without the civilian authorization.
The Reaper
08-29-2007, 22:38
The military can take no action against the civilian leadership without orders from civilian authority. They can bring evidence and offer testimony but that ends their role, without the civilian authorization.
Citation and statute for that please?
TR
Peregrino
08-29-2007, 22:49
Citation and statute for that please?
TR
Please + 1. The issue at question keeps Patriots awake into the early hours. A definitive answer would be most welcome. Peregrino
Go For Broke
08-29-2007, 23:01
Give Officers a choice when selected for Major. Let them put it on hold without suffering any consequences. Placing their promotion on hold lets them return to a Team. The only thing they lose is the money they would of earned as a Major during this extra Team time. Two paths to choose from.
What they gain is two more years Team experience. This is reflected on their records of course, thus an edge career wise later on down the road. So when a new Group Commander arrives. The first question everyone will have is "Is this new guy a double timer or did he just do the minimum" I think most would choose to return to a Team in a heart beat.
OK, You can stop laughing. I still think it's a good idea.
KG,
I was one of those who did the 2-years :( ...and then (kicking and screaming per the advice of my CPY CDR (now 1-1 CDR, LTC JEM )) was dragged up to Bn (I believe that there are still finger nail marks in the door frame and floors of the CPY). Managed to "stay" there for 6-months before (again kicking and screaming) was wretched out of / kicked out of Group and condemed to SF Command (where I managed to foul up every assignment I was given by //CC, BDDM, and BJ). Now stuck at ILE (old CGSC) where I am trying to 1) Sell SF and 2) Subvert the system :D ...Point is, I have at least had some experience with the "enemy": SF Command (sorry //CC) and ASOC...hopefully I can bring some of that experience with me back to a Group (fingers crossed)...but regardless, I treasure (and more importantly remember) the time spent with the team, and the lessons that they taught me. That helped to guide me at the Bn Level and "Div" level...even when dealing with FL based organizations that are Echelons Above Reality. Bottom Line - Officers have to go somewhere...might as well make the best of a "bad" situation, and try to help the Regiment. Also helps that I am able to stay in contact with my mentors (Officer, NCO and now GS Civilian), they help keep me straight (which is a full time job at times)
FWIW - I was luckier than one of the Echos on the team... he had 18-months as an E-6 before he was dragged kicking and screaming (and over the loud protests of his TL and TS) to Bn SIGDET where he pinned on E-7. FWIW, we did go up to the Bn Leadership...also FWIW, any future / current TLs reading this...don't step on your crank with the BC...while you may not care about your career progression, if you do not retain good rapport with the boss, you lose fights when it counts...
V/R,
CoLawman
08-30-2007, 00:03
Citation and statute for that please?
TR
I am assuming that this is a trick question. But I will wade into the mine field risking life and limb.
The only way to remove the President of the United States is through the House of Representatives bringing the articles of impeachment. The senate then is the legislative branch which trys the impeachment. This is all laid out under Article 1 sections 2 and 3 of the United States Constitution. The word "solely" obviously is a succinct use of a word to insure there is no ambiguity on how the President is to be lawfully removed from office.
So there is no cite and no statute addressing this. It is laid out in the constitution.
I would go into Posse Comitatus but I will save that for rebuttal and keep it holstered for now.
(keeping my fingers crossed that Airborne Lawyer is out there willing to jump to my defense if attacked.)
82ndtrooper
08-30-2007, 00:18
I am assuming that this is a trick question. But I will wade into the mine field risking life and limb.
The only way to remove the President of the United States is through the House of Representatives bringing the articles of impeachment. The senate then is the legislative branch which trys the impeachment. This is all laid out under Article 1 sections 2 and 3 of the United States Constitution. The word "solely" obviously is a succinct use of a word to insure there is no ambiguity on how the President is to be lawfully removed from office.
So there is no cite and no statute addressing this. It is laid out in the constitution.
I would go into Posse Comitatus but I will save that for rebuttal and keep it holstered for now.
(keeping my fingers crossed that Airborne Lawyer is out there willing to jump to my defense if attacked.)
Didn't Posse Comitatus come into play with Waco ? Branch Davidians as a domestic enemy ? Hardly, but then again it was the Clintonian years and Janet Reno.
They made that decision pretty easily.
Sec. 1385. - Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus
"Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both".
I suppose both Bill Clinton and Janet Reno should have served those two years and or been fined.
Were the riots of 92 in Los Angeles Marshal Law or Posse Comitatus ?
incommin
08-30-2007, 05:38
Sir, I'm wondering, but isn't the military supposed to be completely subservient to civilian rule? If the military has power over the civilian leadership, couldn't that be a bad thing? I always assumed that civilian rule wasn't always the best idea, but that this was just a necessary evil of having a society with the civilians in charge (keeps the military from gaining too much power, but on the flip side, the civilians may not listen to their military advisors and make dumb decisions).
Yes, the military is to bow to civilian control. However, that does not mean the civilians should be telling the military how to conduct a war once they start one, or promote and assign senior officers based on politics rather than knowledge and ability.
Jim
It occurs to me that the various emergency powers of the President leave very few possibilities for unlawful orders. While a law could be held to be unconstitutional, that seems likely to be an arena for constitutional scholars and supreme court justices.
The issues seem to be addressed in U.S. Code 50, Chapter 34, LINK (http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode50/usc_sup_01_50_10_34.html)
The various Executive Orders, from 10997-11005, along with EO 12472, EO12656, and EO 12919 also seem to apply.
These can be viewed at: LINK (http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-orders/)
My understanding (which is only cursory at best) is that a President can, under a declared emergency, do just about anything he wants to do. Also, I'm under the impression that the President has broad discretion to declare an emergency.
I'll leave the implications to people wiser and better than I.
It occurs to me that the various emergency powers of the President leave very few possibilities for unlawful orders. While a law could be held to be unconstitutional, that seems likely to be an arena for constitutional scholars and supreme court justices.
When the Army trains new officers, they put a pretty fine point on the meaning of "unlawful orders"! This is not one of those cases. Doesn't mean that you can't "win friends and influence people", though!
The Reaper
08-30-2007, 08:15
Didn't Posse Comitatus come into play with Waco ? Branch Davidians as a domestic enemy ? Hardly, but then again it was the Clintonian years and Janet Reno.
They made that decision pretty easily.
They use the Guard to get around it. They are excepted.
TR
Retired W4
08-30-2007, 08:38
They use the Guard to get around it. They are excepted.
TR
I think JTF-6 was invoked, as well, due to the prior presence of a meth lab on the compound. .02
82ndtrooper
08-30-2007, 09:26
They use the Guard to get around it. They are excepted.
TR
From my reading of the subject matter, which has long perplexed me, at the Justice Department in Washington on that day of the massacre a then Col. Gerald Boykin and Gen Peter J. Schoomaker were present since elements of CAG/DELTA/1st/SFOD (Whatever we're calling them this week) were in fact at the Waco grounds.
The tanks were from Ft. Hood, then under Wesley Clarks command. Although the Governor consulted with Clarks second in command during the wait and see period.
President Clinton signed a waiver of Posse Comitatus ? How does a President do that exactly without congressional approval ?
The Reaper
08-30-2007, 09:54
I think JTF-6 was invoked, as well, due to the prior presence of a meth lab on the compound. .02
That was a cover story the BATF used to get JTF-6 assets.
When challenged on why the BATF was involved in a drug case, they changed it to illegal firearms.
The SF CO at JTF-6 called back to USASFC and after legal counsel refused to provide certain requested training because of the weak justification and posse commitatus.
I was at USASFC when Waco went down, saw the message traffic, heard the phone calls, and watched at least two members of the command testify in front of Congress. One is a member of this board.
82T is right, it was a massacre, and was absolutely unnecessary.
TR
incommin
08-30-2007, 10:29
Posse comitatus? Who needs the military any more with the heavy militarization of many LE departments. We have three armored vehicles in our secure parking yard and a reaction force that has been to Fort Benning three times for sniper and tactical movement training.
Police departments of today are not what your daddy live with!
Jim
x-factor
08-30-2007, 20:19
Do not want to stray out of my lane in this thread ... but almost identical parallells can be drawn in LE as stated previously.
Have had virtually identical conversations with guys in my biz.
Very little respect for many up the food chain.
Much the same on the civilian side of the national security business, I'm afraid. I'll leave it at that though.
Jack Moroney (RIP)
08-31-2007, 04:56
Very little respect for many up the food chain.
I can understand this from many perspectives, however I also see folks both in the military and in the civilian world where a lack of respect for perceived performance or goals has as much to do with lackof understanding of the overall missions/goals/external factors outside of the organizations control to do anything about but deal with them/failure of those spread throughout the food chain to either perform to standard or lack commitment to their chosen profession/etc. I have found that trying to empathize with folks with whom you do not see eye to eye and that control more of your destiny than you seem to do at any particular time puts you in a position to not only understand what is going on but allows you to manage from the bottom up so that those for whom you are responsible can still succeed.
I think that what is missing from Kaplan's article--and, with respect, from LTC Kingling's as well--is a historical perspective. In my view, Kaplan’s article does not display an understanding between the close relationship between the army and congress as the United States armed itself to fight the Second World War. As Mark Skinner Watson observed:
The period of 1939-1941 is not fully understandable unless one is aware of the part which a military witness played at the time in the decisions of a friendly and trusting Congress.
Because of that witness and his patient work with Congress during those two years, lawmakers afforded the Army considerable leeway in the opening months of America's official involvement in the war when events seemed to be unfolding so badly.
Additionally, during the Second World War there was broad agreement on two points: (a) Germany first, and (b) overcoming the logistical hurdles to defeat Germany first "rather than on adapting the plans to current logistical conditions."*
Moreover, by my reading of LTC Kingling's article, it seems he accepts the premise of a revolution in military affairs (RMA). However, the concept of RMA remains a topic of ongoing debate among military historians and practitioners of the art of war. As participant in this discussion noted:
For all the “Fourth Generation of War” intellectuals running around saying that the nature of war has fundamentally changed, the tactics are totally new, etc., I must respectfully say: “Not really.” Alex the Great would not be the least bit perplexed by the enemy that we face right now in Iraq, and our leaders going into this fight do their troops a disservice by not studying (studying, vice just reading) the men who have gone before us. We have been fighting on this planet for 5000 years and we should take advantage of their experience.**
Given that there is still no consensus among civilians and the armed services as to the nature of the current war (just as there was no consensus over the nature of the war in Vietnam) I do not know to what extent the army’s general officers should be excoriated for not giving better advice to civilians regarding the future of warfare.
As Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor argued in COBRA II , Secretary of Defense Weinberger was contemptuously dismissive of the army’s initial operational plans and he hectored planners until they gave him what he wanted rather than what they felt was needed. Who is to say that, had those recommendations received the discussion they merited, that OIF would have unfolded differently and that the insurgency would have been vastly different in size, scope, and duration? That is to say, is the ‘lesson’ of the war that the generals did not speak up or that the civilians did not listen?
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* Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations [The United States Army in World War II: The War Department] (1950; reprint, Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History, 1985), 8-9.
** James Mattis, unpublished and undated email to undisclosed recipient at the National War College, as quoted in Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich, “Introduction,” The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession ed. Murry and Sinnreich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 7.