KSC
06-04-2007, 10:05
I'd like to start by saying that I don't know if this is the best place for this thread, and it might or might not fit better into the area study section. I'd also like to say these points are all losely related and that I'm presenting them from an insiders point-of-view but would like more educated minds to share with me what they think on the matters. I'd like others to share problems they might have had over here, and hear of any solutions they might have come up with. Also, any one else's Iraqi enigmas and paradoxes that this country seems to be rich with.
First off, I'm on a military transition team working to train the IA and mold them into a self sufficient army. The bribery and internal insurgency has pretty much been worked out of the batallion i work with, but there is still a lot of tension and inefficiency. Since Tikrit is a near 100% Sunni population and nearly all the soldiers work close to their homes since they go on leave once a month, they don't take kindly to having Shias in their batallion. The Shias are usually pressured into quitting within the first few weeks. Also, any talk of the batallion moving out of the Tikrit area is met with an uprising of more than 3/4 of the soldiers, all of them saying they will quit if forced to move and fight away from their home. This hometown/sect related attitude almost makes the IA seem more like a militia than an Army- they only want their own people, and are only interested in fighting for their hometown. I can't imagine the trouble they have in areas that are of mixed population. How do they ever get the units to function properly?
Last NOV, after a car bomb killed civilains in downtown Tikrit, we started to get intel that there were Sunni militias being formed in the area to keep the Shias from seeking any reprisal in the Tikrit area since it might be an easier, softer Sunni target than Baghdad. Those attacks never came and we did what we could to quell the supposed militia. I sat down one night and talked with a very educated interpreter who happend to be from Sadr City. He was talking to me about the Mahdi Army and how people back home felt about it. He said the people felt safe in the city when the militia was operating overtly and had armed guards manning checkpoints. He said they were safe from Sunni attacks and this was also somewhat true in the neighborhoods of Najaf and Karbala. However, not all the people supported their extremist role and their stance against the US in Iraq. Knowing I was of Irish decent, and him being the extremely educated man that he was, he compared them to the IRA Wof the mid-late 1900s. The people loved the IRA for the protection they provided from the loyalists, but denounced their violence. Sectarian war seems the same across the board. With the combination of the campaign against the Mahdi Army and the surge around Baghdad, attacks on the Shias of Sadr City, Najaf, and Karbala have increased exponentially because of the decreased presence of the militia. The militia was even informed that if they joined the IP or the IA they would work near their homes, but refuse due to the cooperation the gov't has with the US. As I stated before, the IA treat themselves as a local militia and most local militias don't wage violence on them, but they refuse to work together, or leave the militia to join the Army.
As for the insurgents, I can't say anything new or even interesting. They all seem to have Qubtist roots and seem to all refrence either Jihad or Sunni. They even refuse to have any sort of interagency cooperation. With the recent events between Ansar al Sunna and Tawhid al Jihad, the two biggest groups in Iraq are not only divided, but claiming to be taking arms against one another.
Remember, the only cooperation that came from the IRA was through negotiations and compromises. Staying true to US policy and the popular opinion of Americans who matter, we will never negotiate with al Sadr, AQ, AAS, or JAA, or any other group we recognize as terrorists. A divided Iraqi nation won't work, got it. The Kurds will be up the creek without a paddle and will be thrown to the wolves of the combined Arabs, Turks, and Persians. There are no completely divided areas aside from some near 100% Sunni areas in Anbar and Salah Ad Din, so what's the fix? My biased opinion, the next unified Iraq will come with the next dictator.
First off, I'm on a military transition team working to train the IA and mold them into a self sufficient army. The bribery and internal insurgency has pretty much been worked out of the batallion i work with, but there is still a lot of tension and inefficiency. Since Tikrit is a near 100% Sunni population and nearly all the soldiers work close to their homes since they go on leave once a month, they don't take kindly to having Shias in their batallion. The Shias are usually pressured into quitting within the first few weeks. Also, any talk of the batallion moving out of the Tikrit area is met with an uprising of more than 3/4 of the soldiers, all of them saying they will quit if forced to move and fight away from their home. This hometown/sect related attitude almost makes the IA seem more like a militia than an Army- they only want their own people, and are only interested in fighting for their hometown. I can't imagine the trouble they have in areas that are of mixed population. How do they ever get the units to function properly?
Last NOV, after a car bomb killed civilains in downtown Tikrit, we started to get intel that there were Sunni militias being formed in the area to keep the Shias from seeking any reprisal in the Tikrit area since it might be an easier, softer Sunni target than Baghdad. Those attacks never came and we did what we could to quell the supposed militia. I sat down one night and talked with a very educated interpreter who happend to be from Sadr City. He was talking to me about the Mahdi Army and how people back home felt about it. He said the people felt safe in the city when the militia was operating overtly and had armed guards manning checkpoints. He said they were safe from Sunni attacks and this was also somewhat true in the neighborhoods of Najaf and Karbala. However, not all the people supported their extremist role and their stance against the US in Iraq. Knowing I was of Irish decent, and him being the extremely educated man that he was, he compared them to the IRA Wof the mid-late 1900s. The people loved the IRA for the protection they provided from the loyalists, but denounced their violence. Sectarian war seems the same across the board. With the combination of the campaign against the Mahdi Army and the surge around Baghdad, attacks on the Shias of Sadr City, Najaf, and Karbala have increased exponentially because of the decreased presence of the militia. The militia was even informed that if they joined the IP or the IA they would work near their homes, but refuse due to the cooperation the gov't has with the US. As I stated before, the IA treat themselves as a local militia and most local militias don't wage violence on them, but they refuse to work together, or leave the militia to join the Army.
As for the insurgents, I can't say anything new or even interesting. They all seem to have Qubtist roots and seem to all refrence either Jihad or Sunni. They even refuse to have any sort of interagency cooperation. With the recent events between Ansar al Sunna and Tawhid al Jihad, the two biggest groups in Iraq are not only divided, but claiming to be taking arms against one another.
Remember, the only cooperation that came from the IRA was through negotiations and compromises. Staying true to US policy and the popular opinion of Americans who matter, we will never negotiate with al Sadr, AQ, AAS, or JAA, or any other group we recognize as terrorists. A divided Iraqi nation won't work, got it. The Kurds will be up the creek without a paddle and will be thrown to the wolves of the combined Arabs, Turks, and Persians. There are no completely divided areas aside from some near 100% Sunni areas in Anbar and Salah Ad Din, so what's the fix? My biased opinion, the next unified Iraq will come with the next dictator.