The Army We Need

[BMT (RIP)]

We can't fight The Long War with the forces we have.

http://weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/013/696spjpr.asp?pg=1


BMT

[jatx]

Interesting article, but I take exception with the author's assertion that the Army's greatest impact stems from its presence alone. The last thing we need in Iraq, Afghanistan or anywhere else are more self-licking ice cream cones.

[magician]

He flirts with the new paradigm tested in Afghanistan, but reverts back to thinking in terms of large formations.

[The Reaper]

I agree with his recommendation, but don't think he gets it.

TR

[NousDefionsDoc]

He flirts with the new paradigm tested in Afghanistan, but reverts back to thinking in terms of large formations.
Can you elaborate please my Brother?

[magician]

Can you elaborate please my Brother?

Ugh. I was afraid that you might ask.

I have long believed that the way that we reduced the Taliban was infinitely preferable to the way that we reduced Saddam.

Yes, I understand very well that Iraq was not Afghanistan. Totally different targets.

But, the special ops component was sidelined in Iraq in favor of the big units, and an overwhelmingly conventional campaign. I was as impressed by "shock and awe" as the next guy, and it made for compelling television, but I still would have preferred a more precise approach with anonymous strangers in dishdashas lasing specific targets and suborning select personalities with briefcases of cash. In sum, we could have, and should have, simply decapitated the Iraqi state and installed our proxies. There would have been far less damage to infrastructure and to society, and we would not be fighting the very guys that we made jobless then right now. The Baathists could have been dealt with in due time, on a selective basis, rather than with a wholesale stroke of Jay Garner's pen, which in retrospect has not worked out so well. It is also likely that the complete dissolution of the Iraqi state would not be looming, as it is at the present time. Hindsight.

But I made similar observations after Just Cause. I spent some time in Panamá in 1990, and brother, I was really struck by how much that they hated us in town after that. Invasion was an unnecessary trauma, when you consider that Tony Noriega could have been lured to a meeting and simply treated to an accident. Rather than the billions spent, and the damage caused by unleashing guys who are only unleashed when big things need to get broken, we could have resolved the situation with a single bullet. Or a crucial screw on his airplane could have fallen out at an inopportune time. I will not get into the fact that Noriega was already on the payroll, and was simply mishandled.

I guess that what I am talking about is a fundamental change in mindset. Rather than deploying battalions, or ODAs, even, we should be deploying two man or three man cells, highly competent, specially selected and extremely polished guys. Obviously, our footprint would be a lot smaller, and the cost, measured in multiple ways, would plummet. A variation on the "one riot, one ranger" paradigm, but highly networked, and heavily supported. These guys would not so much be the point of a spear as they would be small needles precisely placed exactly where you needed them. What these guys should have up their sleeves, more than anything, would be cultural adaptability, foreign language fluency, a very benign appearance and a ready smile, with CAS on-call, access to lots of beans and bullets, and a hot-line to a reaction force. Their real weapon would be their minds, but they would have a back up in the form of a handset. Sort of like modern versions of Lawrence of Arabia, but with the ability to drop a JDAM on someone who raises their ire. Digressing slightly, it goes without saying that I would be happier to have Spectre, or a platform better than Spectre, in orbit over Baghdad 24/7 rather than any number of F16's. Old-school zoomies hate it when I say that.

I fully recognize that this way of warfare will never transpire as long as there are billions of dollars to be made (and the US economy yanked back from the precipice of recession) by doing it the old way. Our current form of government, in fact, is probably symbiotic with those that Ike warned us about in the form of the "military industrial complex." That is a bigger question.

Sticking to nuts and bolts, we not only have a conflict within our own martial institutions between fans of special ops and Big Army, but we have a team room rivalry between the operators and the so-called "white" side. I dispair of anything happening for at least three or four more generations. Too much money to be made. Too many egos, too much parochialism, and too many fiefdoms. Not enough free-thinkers who can leap forward rather than ersatz rebels who advocate mere incremental variations on the same old themes.

As a somewhat related aside, I was nonplussed to see that my old friend Craig Chretien, erstwhile jefe of DEA in Lima in 1990, was lured from retirement and can now be found in Afghanistan doing, guess what? Counternarcotics. I guess that his acting career was not doing so well. I know the feeling.

;)

Anyway. May your coffee always be strong and good, hermano.

For the moment, I am getting a little verklempt. Talk amongst yourselves. Your topic....the Holy Roman Empire was neither Roman, nor Holy. Discuss.

:)

[jatx]

Magician,

I like your thinking on this topic. The soldiers you describe remind me in some ways of the OSS's unconventional recruits during WWII, i.e. the eclectic mix of civilians recruited to serve next to the military volunteers. As our spiritual ancestors, it surprises me that the SOF community has not embraced this part of our history with much vigor (so far as I know).

However, it could prove difficult to find a large number of those individuals in today's Army, which does not exactly breed creativity, independence or fine social skills.

Solutions might include modifications to the 18X program and our use of the SF units in the National Guard. The 18X program will never draw large numbers of these individuals so long as the price of failure is service as an 11 Bravo. Recruits with the right credentials should be able to choose any alternative MOS for which they are qualified, including 09S. That would still be a win-win for the Army and the Nation. The Army could also learn something from the CIA with regard to recruiting, i.e. going where the likely candidates are with a direct appeal. When I was in grad school, both the DI and DO were present at all of our career events, and SOF could benefit from similar exposure. Many excellent potential recruits are no doubt lost due to a lack of awareness and the necessity of dealing with shady, dishonest Army recruiters. If we are going to think of ourselves as a fifth branch, then we should recruit like it.

As far as the Guard component goes, we should do more to capitalize on the opportunity those units afford. Many of the "Renaissance soldiers" you describe would be attracted to the ability to balance service with stimulating private lives. So far as I know, though, we do not recruit outside of the already limited pool of NG recruits and soldiers.

[The Reaper]

jatx:

I will have to differ.

I surveyed 18Xs for over four years, and few, if any stated that the 11B alternative career track was a consideration.

Most just assumed that they would be 18s. The 11B alternative better prepares the kids should they decide to make another SF attempt as well.

Furthermore, at least a portion of the 18X bonus could be retained with an 11B diversion, that would not be the case with some other MOSes.

TR

[jatx]

jatx:

I will have to differ.

I surveyed 18Xs for over four years, and few, if any stated that the 11B alternative career track was a consideration.
TR

Sir,

I do not doubt what you're saying. However, there is a selection effect at work and your survey does not include those potential selectees who were turned off by the 11B alternative.

You have argued persuasively that it will be impossible to increase the size of SF and retain quality without increasing the size of the recruiting pool. WM's book and the SOPC program are aimed at decreasing unnecessary leakage from the pipeline, but can only do so much without a larger funnel. If the goal is to find fit, resilient, motivated, patriotic and highly intelligent young men, SF must go where these individuals exist in the highest concentrations, i.e. college campuses. This is not to say that a college degree makes a good SF soldier - just that campuses are the most pragmatic place to expend scarce resources.

The individuals whom SF will be most interested in in those places will not be weighing a career in SF versus one in the infantry as an E4, they will be weighing it against other opportunities providing challenge and an opportunity for impact. I.e., Special Forces vs. FBI/CIA vs. State's FSO program vs. Peace Corps vs. grad/professional school vs. Capitol Hill, etc.. Changing the fallback MOS policy would go a long way towards neutralizing common objections and increasing the pool of candidates, assuming that the change was accompanied by an active recruiting strategy (as opposed to the passive approach taken now).

SF should also use dedicated recruiters. An SF recruit should never encounter the Big Army until they visit MEPS. The sad truth is that Army recruiters give a very poor impression of the institution, are poorly informed about the SF option, and are often dishonest and encourage dishonesty. They compare very poorly to the other recruiters interacting with the individuals in question. I suggest that retired SF personnel be hired as contractors to fill this crucial role.

Again, my comments have nothing to do with the quality of today's 18X recruits, only with how to increase their number most efficiently while selecting for some of the traits that Magician mentioned.

[huzza]

[QUOTE=jatx]


The individuals whom SF will be most interested in in those places will not be weighing a career in SF versus one in the infantry as an E4, they will be weighing it against other opportunities providing challenge and an opportunity for impact. I.e., Special Forces vs. FBI/CIA vs. State's FSO program vs. Peace Corps vs. grad/professional school vs. Capitol Hill, etc.. Changing the fallback MOS policy would go a long way towards neutralizing common objections and increasing the pool of candidates, assuming that the change was accompanied by an active recruiting strategy (as opposed to the passive approach taken now).

I'm not SF, but I do not think the branch wants to attract people that are concentrating more on their fallback plan than the task or goal at hand. I doubt too many people approach the Directorate of Operations with a fall back plan to go to graduate school, and approach the DI if they fail to meet the standard of the courses provided for their training curriculum. However, I do love The Reaper's and Magician's idea of bringing back the Lodge act. But, I think it would be very hard to vet Arabs who wanted such positions, and it would possibly be better to recruit Sephardi Jews or others of Middle Eastern descent who had a thorough knowledge of Arabic, and the Muslim culture.



SF should also use dedicated recruiters. An SF recruit should never encounter the Big Army until they visit MEPS. The sad truth is that Army recruiters give a very poor impression of the institution, are poorly informed about the SF option, and are often dishonest and encourage dishonesty. They compare very poorly to the other recruiters interacting with the individuals in question. I suggest that retired SF personnel be hired as contractors to fill this crucial role.

Again, does the Special Forces really want someone who can be so easily dissuaded by small amount of adversity? It's like suggesting college registration is too difficult, and as such we're losing a lot of quality students who cannot navigate the college experience on their own. Not really. If you cannot figure out how to register, or to research it is unlikely that you are college material anyway, and I think Special Forces is the same way; if not more so. If you're not self-reliant enough to figure out how to embark on a career in Special Forces, and you're attending an Ivy League school it speaks volumes about your competence as an academic and a person. The suggestion that we should coddle these high quality candidates is only a reflection of their sense of entitlement. I, for one, cannot think of a more difficult or rewarding career than that of the Special Forces, and I think the Peace Corps volunteer would hardly be missed in the presence of such great men.

[x-factor]

huzza - I don't think he meant for recruiting to equal "coddling" so much as "informing."

magician - You might find this article interesting.

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=109

[7624U]

Sir,



You have argued persuasively that it will be impossible to increase the size of SF and retain quality without increasing the size of the recruiting pool.


Again, my comments have nothing to do with the quality of today's 18X recruits, only with how to increase their number most efficiently while selecting for some of the traits that Magician mentioned.

I work at the school as a instructor, I can tell you personel wise. we do not need anymore recrute's we can hardly keep up the pace as it is.

The quality of these personel is never a question most are very smart.
But not everyone is made for Special Forces. ( I won't go into it any further)
(Opsec reason's)

Use your imagination why someone wouldent make it.