Taliban making a comeback?

[dennisw]

It seems lately I've been reading a fair amount of stories in the news about Afghanistan, and they all mention that the Taliban are making a comeback. This may be true, but it seems to be different from the stories I hear from the front lines. Today I sent an email asking this specific question and got the following response:

And I would have to say no, the taliban are not making any comebacks, if you didn't see it, coalition forces just caught one of the major taliban commanders in the helman province. And out of the many taliban killed, the britt's only lost one guy. And the taliban are getting wacked like hotcakes over here. Their so called safe havens are being exploited and they're are being forced to run and hide. So, I would have to say that they(the media) are full of shit and just putting out more propaganda to discourage the cowardly Americans we call liberals and democrats. It all lies in the numbers.

Well there you have it. It's only one viewpoint, but it's from a closer vantage point then most. I guess it's risky to take one narrow view and call it a valid sample, but I would bet dollars to donuts that the Taliban have not made the comeback the news media suggests.

I've attached a couple of pictures that I thought would be of interest. The first is CAS being called in on some of the Taliban who thought the ridgline looked safe. The other is some friendly folks and ANA viewing the Taliban with deadly intent from up high.

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[The Reaper]

Great first hand news.

Looks like a Barrett .50 in the second pic, ready to deal some love.

Thanks for sharing.

TR

[ROTCNY]

I've got a couple buddies working on ETTs training and fighting with ANA right now. Both have been in country since this past May. One of them is in Helmand and the other operates out of Kandahar and both report no significant setbacks due to recent Taliban activity.

There has been an increase in the number of engagements in the past six months, but the Taliban are getting wacked left and right with no significant NATO/ANA casualties. There is some concern regarding a major Taliban push this Spring, but my friends report that they are more than prepared.

As has been already stated, the recent influx of negative MSM reports regarding Afghanistan is nothing more than an attempt to legitimize the Liberal talking points that Iraq is a distraction from OEF.

[Jack Moroney (RIP)]

It seems lately I've been reading a fair amount of stories in the news about Afghanistan, and they all mention that the Taliban are making a comeback. This may be true, but it seems to be different from the stories I hear from the front lines.

A classic strategy of any organized resistance operation is for the guerrillas to go to ground when the conditions are not favorable for their chance of success. I would venture to say that the Taliban is still very active and well throughout the region and that their covert arms are doing exactly what I would expect them to do and that is to continue to develop their infrastructure, gather intelligence, develop and maintain funding operations, recruit, train, and conduct other supporting activities that will allow them to put their overt arm back into action if and when the occassion presents itself. Success may not be measured by the numbers they take out of the friendly forces but may very well be measured by the psychological impact that they can have just by showing that they can hit when and where they choose regardless of the number they lose on the battlefield. The effort will still need to be in supression , the elimination of the factors that allow them to exist and the source of their support.

[dennisw]

Col. Moroney,

I'm sure the Taliban are doing some of the things you suggest. However, I doubt if they are doing what you would do, because they do not have your background or intestinal fortitude. Even with their bumper crop of poppies this last year, they seemed to be unable to make any significant inroads. I know they attacked our troops on several occasions in substantial numbers without any degree of success. On one occassion, they attacked two A teams with ANA in support only to lose 500 men without any significant losses on our side. I think being soundly defeated when they bring so many assets to bear cannot but limit their impact, support and influence.

Recently they attacked an Afghan security post only to be repelled with extreme prejudice and significant losses, and it's important to note, no American or NATO forces were involved in the conflict. I'm also starting to hear that some of the ANA troops are shit hot and are willing to mix it up with a large degree of success. Maybe these are some of the things you alluded to in permanently solving the problem.

I'm not saying they are not active or still there. However, I do not believe they are not as significant of a factor that the news media makes them out to be. I also believe their practice of destroying schools and killing defenseless school marms has hurt them politically and eroded much of the support they may have enjoyed in the past.

Also, I think the safe havens they have utilized in the recent past may be no longer as safe as they would like. As you know, it takes a while to train troops, and even they cannot endure the amount of casualties they have taken and remain an effective fighting force.

I heard of one conflict where an A team killed every single Taliban in the fight. Over 100. I don't know how any army or political group can maintain a shred of morale when this kind of thing occurs.

[Kyobanim]

I'm going to quote one of our members here:

"Somewhere a True Believer is training to kill you. He is training with minimal food or water, in austere conditions, training day and night. The only thing clean on him is his weapon and he made his web gear. He doesn't worry about what workout to do - his ruck weighs what it weighs, his runs end when the enemy stops chasing him. This True Believer is not concerned about 'how hard it is;' he knows either he wins or dies. He doesn't go home at 17:00, he is home.

He knows only The Cause.

Still want to quit?"

NousDefionsDoc


The GWOT won't be over until the last "believer" on this planet is feeding the worms.

All it takes is one to keep it going.

[incommin]

A classic strategy of any organized resistance operation is for the guerrillas to go to ground when the conditions are not favorable for their chance of success. I would venture to say that the Taliban is still very active and well throughout the region and that their covert arms are doing exactly what I would expect them to do and that is to continue to develop their infrastructure, gather intelligence, develop and maintain funding operations, recruit, train, and conduct other supporting activities that will allow them to put their overt arm back into action if and when the occassion presents itself. Success may not be measured by the numbers they take out of the friendly forces but may very well be measured by the psychological impact that they can have just by showing that they can hit when and where they choose regardless of the number they lose on the battlefield. The effort will still need to be in supression , the elimination of the factors that allow them to exist and the source of their support.

Would Tet 1968 be an example?????

Jim

[The Reaper]

Would Tet 1968 be an example?????

Jim

Jim:

To me, Tet 68 looks more like a failed attempt by the VC to transition to a Maoist Third Stage guerrilla movement with a general uprising against regular forces.

IMHO, the NVA set this up as a win-win situation for themselves, where they would take over in the event of a success, and if the VC failed, the NVA would not have to face an existing resistance movement or share power after the eventual victory.

Therein lies the advantage of a patient people.

TR

[x SF med]

TR,
Wasn't there a large backing for the VC by the NVA during TET 68? The use of the regular forces of NV as fire and logistics support almost makes an end run around a Stage 3 uprising , and goes directly to the ' fully supported insurgency' in Maoist Doctrine. It is true that there was always major support from NV throughout the war, but that was a fully coordinated effort by regular and irregular troops to impair the morale of US/allied forces.

[The Reaper]

TR,
Wasn't there a large backing for the VC by the NVA during TET 68? The use of the regular forces of NV as fire and logistics support almost makes an end run around a Stage 3 uprising , and goes directly to the ' fully supported insurgency' in Maoist Doctrine. It is true that there was always major support from NV throughout the war, but that was a fully coordinated effort by regular and irregular troops to impair the morale of US/allied forces.

Look at what they had to gain by supporting the uprising, versus their risk.

If I were the NVA, I would have backed the VC in Tet as well.

Use them up and pick up the pieces when you are ready.

TR

[x SF med]

That's one part of Leninist-Stalinist doctrine that both Mao and Uncle Ho decided was worth keeping, wasn't it? Back then Conquer.

[The Reaper]

That's one part of Leninist-Stalinist doctrine that both Mao and Uncle Ho decided was worth keeping, wasn't it? Back then Conquer.

Roger.

Look at Eastern Europe, 1939-1946.

Support anti-Nazi resistance movements, then kill them off and get their own snouts into the trough.

Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, anyone?

TR

[x SF med]

Roger.

Look at Eastern Europe, 1939-1946.

Support anti-Nazi resistance movements, then kill them off and get their own snouts into the trough.

Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, anyone?

TR

Take it into the 50's and 60's too - Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia.... already conquered, then crushed - The USSR created their own downfalls in these countries wilth the institution of local KGBs in thrall to the soviet masters, some of the most active members of the resistance were members of the State police - loyal to the country/people frist, then to the communist leadership nominally.

[incommin]

I think Tet '68 was an NVA led push....... the NVA didn't just support Tet, they led it....... Saigon, Central Highlands, and Hue....... I think I remember NVA personnel loss at around 30K and the VC loss at around 15K.....after Tet the VC were a bother and not a major threat.........and the NVA did most of the fighting from then on...... at least that is the way I remember it.....

Jim

[MAB32]

Tet was an NVA directed operation carried out mostly by the Viet Cong. It is true though that they were reduced to almost nothing right after TET and failed to become anything worth mentioning until after April 1975. You half to remeber that the NVA and the VC did not get along, period. Each disliked the other because each felt the other did not understand their plight. I am reading a book about this very subject and to state it in terms that we can all understand; The NVA and VC situation was like the U.S. in the south during the Civil Rights movement during the 1960's.

Even the NVA that had snuck down the Ho Chi Minh Trail away from AM, Jack, and the others here, were not welcomed by the VC. The VC looked at the NVA with a mistrust and almost blatant hatred for them. There are instances where they worked together, but, generally speaking, they would refuse to work with each other. This is why you don't hear much about the VC in Laos and Cambodia.

[Jack Moroney (RIP)]

[QUOTE=dennisw]I'm sure the Taliban are doingQUOTE]

What you are addressing here is correct, but again you are only addressing the overt arm of a resistance movement-the guerrillas. You still have the covert and controlling parts of the movement that are calling the shots/resourcing the effort and using the guerrillas for political, intelligence gathering, and psychological purposes. While I have no doubt that anytime that they go toe to toe with us they will get the snot kicked out of them but every action has many facets that go unseen by us and are used for confirming intelligence, building psychological support, laying the ground for future operations, and drawing support from the rest of that target rich environment of islamic fundamentalists and their witting and unwitting supporters. The guerrillas are expendable in the eyes of those that are committing them but in their own eyes they are martyrs and heroes among their tribes and within their cultures. We can stop them on the battlefield but we need to kill them and the movement before it gets to the battlefield, be it on the plains and in the mountains of SWA or the cities of the non fundatmentalist muslim and non-muslim world. Also remember the Taliban are primarily Pashtun which makes up 48% of Afghanistan and no one can rule Afghanistan with their support which brings me to my second point. This, like any insurgency, cannot be resolved by "hot shit ANA" of any other "hot shit" force alone because unless the Pashtuns are brought into the fold and their grievences addressed this will, as it has before, go on for ever. You can kill a guerrilla but you also have to kill the "idea" that drove him to become a guerrilla. Remember insurgencies are resolved not by the military but by the political, economic and social efforts to resolve the ills that feed the "ideas" that breed insurgents. And yes, there are many things I would be doing differently had I been a Taliban insurgent, but then we really cannot get into Tactics, Techniques and Procedures in this forum.

[SF18C]

The amount of intelligence running through this thread is amazing. Thank God that the USA has folks like you all standing watch. Compared with the statements here I am but a simpleton.

I am now going back to the comedy zone!

[MAB32]

Not meaning to hijack this thread but could the Taliban be using General Vo Nguyen Giap's Three Phases for a protracted war.

Here they are:

1) Contention - the weaker force is on the strategic defensive, tactical offensive.
2) Equilibrium - both sides contend equally.
3) General counteroffensive - The weaker power gains superiority and launches a counteroffensive that forces the stronger side onto the strategic defensive and tactical defensive.

The above three phases are broken down further to mean:

1) Guerilla warfare is emphasized. Guerrillas will only attack when superiority is assured.
2) This is the phase whereby larger units are formed. They will add to all guerrilla activity and attack only when superiority is assured. By the way, it was during this phase that Giap called for initiation of "mobile warfare" by the larger units.
3) Mobile warfare is conducted by increasingly larger units until it assumes a conventional warfare dimension.

I guess like Giap stated in his book, "It is all about strategic mobility".

[The Reaper]

Giap stole that from Mao.

Damn Commies!

TR

[x SF med]

Almost word for word from "On Guerrilla Warfare", and that was stolen from the Soviet "Directions for the Partisan Forces" which was lifted in part from MAJ Rogers "Rules" for his Rangers..... do we see a pattern for the basis for an insurgency?

[Peregrino]

There are very few original ideas. Unfortunately, when it comes to "People's War", the Communists have done a better job of codifying/publicizing the TTPs and getting them out for use by the masses. Of course their doctrine "encourages" spontaneous action by the masses. Anybody who wants to study revolutionary warfare (in any of its aspects) needs to go to the "masters". FWIW - Peregrino