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Warrior-Mentor
12-09-2006, 16:13
A Soldier's Story
by MAJOR BILL EDMONDS

For just a minute or two, step into my life. I am an American soldier in the Army Special Forces. I have just returned from a one-year tour of duty in Iraq, where I lived, shared meals, slept and fought beside my Iraqi counterpart as we battled insurgents in the center of a thousand-year-old city. I am a conflicted man, and I want you to read the story of that experience as I lived it. In the interest of security, I have omitted some identifying details, but every word is true.

Routine and Ritual

I wake in the cold and dark of each morning to the sound of a hundred different muezzins calling Muslim men and women to prayer. These calls reverberate five times per day throughout a city the size of San Francisco. Above this sound I also hear two American helicopters making their steady patrol over the rooftops of the city and the blaring horns of armored vehicles as they swerve through dense city traffic. As a combat adviser and interrogator, I find these contrasts very appropriate for the life that I now lead.

This morning, on the Iraqi base in which I live, I walk 100 feet from my bedroom to work and back again. These are the same 100 feet I will travel month after month for one year. During every trip I smile, put a hand to my heart, sometimes a hand to my head, and say to every passing Iraqi the religious and cultural words that are expected from a fellow human being. In Iraq, one cannot separate Islamic culture from the individual. They are intrinsically woven into the fabric of daily life, but for most Westerners, they seem abnormal. I sit in smoke-filled rooms and drink sugar-laden tea in small crystal glasses. I spray tobacco-scented air freshener, kiss cheeks three times or more, allow the Iraqi on the right to pass through the doorway first. I know never to inquire on the health of a wife or elder daughter. I even hold hands with other men.

I proclaim my submission to God and my relationship to reality by saying "God willing" when referring to any future event. I say "God bless you" every time someone takes a seat. I eat with my hands, standing up, taking food from communal bowls. I attend work meetings where socializing is always the first priority. I hear the expressions "upon my mustache" or "by my eyes" or "over my head"--signifying the most binding and heartfelt of oaths. One day, I ask an Iraqi friend how many relatives he has and he answers, "In the city, maybe a thousand."

I have slowly come to realize that in Islam, and in Iraq, every action is worship. Every single thing that a person does--not just prayer or the time spent in a mosque but every action--is in fact an act of veneration. So yes, many things are different here. Yet we all have become friends--good friends--in part because I am here; I honor them and their religion by going out of my way to show them respect. Not all Americans act this way.

Many Americans assume that if a person does not speak English, it implies a lack of intelligence or some mental simplicity. We usually speak up only when spoken to. We attend meetings to pass information in the most efficient ways possible; our goal is always to decrease time while not losing content. For most Americans, God is intensely personal and religious utterances are not considered appropriate in a group of strangers. Our society is established on the principle of separating religion from state. In America, tobacco is quickly becoming a social taboo, and most men do not hold hands. If we are the first to arrive at a door, we enter first. We go on dates to meet future spouses--this is a cultural activity that I try again and again to explain. Also, Americans are a pragmatic people. We calculate the merit of an action first by its utility. In Islam, such a philosophy is immoral, and this truth is clearly manifest in the current clash between the Muslim and the postmodern worlds. So yes, we are very different. Yet if I look closely, with eyes wide open, I see that we are in some ways very much alike.

I jogged this morning around the small Iraqi base where I live. It was 6:00 a.m. and mildly warm. I wore very revealing blue Nike running shorts with ankle socks while listening to Limp Bizkit on my iPod. I slowly passed a small group of Iraqis and they all just stared, unsmiling. As I came closer, with a huge smile spread across my face, I put my hand to my heart and said, "Peace be upon you all," (in Arabic of course) while gasping for air. They all, in unison,
completely changed and beamed smiles, waved, talked, gave me a thumbs-up and replied, "Peace be upon you."

Insurgents

On this small plot of land where I live, next to the Tigris River, in the very center of an Islamic metropolis, I help find and then interrogate terrorists alongside the Iraqi officer whom I advise and with whom I also live. We interrogate hundreds of suspected terrorists over many, many months. One of my responsibilities is to insure that prisoners are not abused. This I have done.

But for a year I have also been an observer of an immensely complicated situation. I am a soldier who fights alongside Iraqis, and I interact daily with and hear the words of Iraqi soldiers, civilians and insurgents alike. Through their eyes I see the strengths, foibles and faults of my military and culture.

Sometimes I wish for the return of my ignorance. If no one else can understand my distress, I hope other Americans who fought shoulder to shoulder with other cultures--the French, Filipino, the Nungs and Yards and tribesmen of Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Cambodia--will understand.

From my seat in a dark basement room I understand that many of those who terrorize have always hated the Americans. But being Muslim is definitely not a predisposition for violence; quite the opposite for most Iraqis.

Why is it that many have slowly transformed over three years from happily liberated American supporters, to passive supporters of the insurgency, to active fighters of the American "occupation"? "I love Americans but hate your military," says a college professor turned insurgent. "Americans have come here because you want our oil and because of your support of Israel. You bring democracy, but the Iraqi pays the price." These were the first words I heard from a man I will call Ibrahim.

The Iraqi Army had captured him. He was angry, and for the first time he was
sitting face to face with the American soldier whom he hates beyond reason. That was two weeks ago.

Yesterday, I put two red plastic chairs outside in the sun and spoke with him again. This time, I believe I am not the American soldier he has come to hate. This time I am "Mr. Bill," and it is now hard for him to hate me. I can see and sense his inner turmoil. For Ibrahim and for me, it is hard to hold on to the hate when the once-indistinct face becomes a real person. Later, he admits to having been deceived about the evil that is the American soldier. For two weeks I have spoken Arabic with him, started and ended every interaction with the required cultural and religious sayings, and demonstrated knowledge of his religion. For two weeks I have shown Ibrahim that I respect him as both an Iraqi and as a Muslim.

"It is how you act," he says, "and how we are treated that makes me fight. For many Iraqis this anger at you is just an excuse to kill for money or greed. But for most others, they truly feel they are doing what is right. But you give them this excuse; the American military gives them the excuse." So now terrorist leaders pretending to be pious Iraqis target this very common base anger, Iraqis fight and civilians raise their fists to salute the Holy Fighter.

"Two years ago I saw Abu Ghraib and what Americans did to women. I became an insurgent," whispers a man I call Kareem, another civilian turned insurgent.

"You come into our homes without separating the women and children, or asking the men politely if you may enter. Almost every hour of my life I hear some noise or see some sight of the American military. Soldiers talk with Iraqis only from behind a gun, from a position of power and not respect. Last week American soldiers got on a school bus and talked with all of the teenage girls. You had them take off their hijab so you could see their faces. You do not respect our women. This is the biggest of all problems of yours. You do not respect our women. How can we believe that Americans want to help when you do not even respect us or our faith?"

I later tell Kareem that these soldiers thought a person hiding a bomb was on the bus. This was obviously too little and too late. Perceptions are what count and word of American soldiers demanding to see the faces of Muslim women streamed from cellphone to cellphone across an entire city. Perhaps different from other past insurgencies fighting in different societies, within Iraq and over years, negative perceptions are what transform a citizen into an insurgency supporter and then into an insurgent. Now I drive throughout the crowded city alternating between shooting a machine gun and throwing Beanie-Babies to waving children. I think that at least the children are out in the streets and most are still waving. But even this hopeful sight is disappearing.

Warrior-Mentor
12-09-2006, 16:18
Last night the Iraqi Army captured Ibrahim's cell leader and brought the two together in the same small room. For Ibrahim, this was a very traumatic moment, for he saw that the pious Muslim man, whom he followed but had not met, was in fact a 27-year-old tattooed common criminal. Ibrahim began to weep when he realized he had been deceived. A greedy and immoral man who killed for money while pretending to be religious had skillfully manipulated Ibrahim's anger at Americans. Before Ibrahim was turned over to the Iraqi authorities, I saw him teaching soldiers to use their new office computer. He was helping them to type up his own written confession. But Ibrahim's transformation is an anomaly. Such a confluence of peaceful events does not often turn an insurgent away from the insurgency. Most insurgents continue to fight the hated American soldier whom they have never met. Their hope is that the American soldier will just go away.

Bursting Bubbles

I have slowly come to understand that if we are to succeed in Iraq, we must either change the way we perceive and treat those we want to help or we must disengage the great percentage of our military from the population. The Iraqi base where I now live was once a small American base. The anxiety and distress of American soldiers in years past are scratched in the ceiling over my bed.

"The mind is a terrible thing...," "keep a sharp look-out during your descent," "happiness is a temporary state of mind," "control is just an illusion" and "nothing is as it seems." Across the room, on another wall, next to another bed, are other words from another soldier.

They read, "My score in this War: Arabs=10, cars=10, houses=3."

American soldiers are angry and frustrated with Iraqis. Iraqis are angry and frustrated with Americans. Many Iraqis just want American soldiers to go away, and I struggle within myself not to agree. Day after day I observe the interactions of Americans with Iraqis and am often ashamed. I see that required classes given to all American soldiers on cultural sensitivity do not work; 100,000 or more American soldiers daily interacting, engaging and fighting Iraqis within their own society for more than three years will inevitably create a wellspring of citizen hostility. In this war, none of us can change who we fundamentally are.

American military culture interacts with Iraqi Islamic culture like a head-on collision. And massive deployments of American soldiers fighting a counterinsurgency now hurts more than it helps. When we focus on the military solution to resolve a social problem, we inevitably create more insurgents than we can capture or kill. As a consequence, real "Islamic terrorists" subverting their own tolerant religion will use this popular anger and sense of resentment to their advantage. As much as they hate and fear us, they also say that we cannot just leave the mess that we have made.

"I know the American military cannot now leave Iraq," says another captured insurgent whom I will call Muhammad. "If you did, we would all start fighting each other until one person killed enough enemies to come out on top. When I stop seeing your military shooting at civilians on our streets and I stop seeing Iraqi soldiers and policemen as your puppets, then I will stop fighting."

Muhammad may be naïve and living in a bubble of projected motivations and false perceptions. But his bubble burst when he was captured and plucked from an insular society. My own bubble burst when I was taken out of my society and put into Muhammad's. Military leaders tell us to "focus on training the Iraqi soldiers and policemen to fight, and do not fight the insurgency yourself." Yet if the citizen is angry with us, won't this anger just transfer to the very people we train and fight with? What if we are unintentionally assuring that the Iraqi soldiers and policemen will have someone to fight against if we leave?

The Iraqi civilian I speak with says that is so. In the eyes of many, there is now no difference between the American on patrol and the Iraqi policeman or soldier who is with the American on patrol. If the citizen believes that the American military is an "occupying power," won't he now perceive the Iraqi policeman or soldier as this occupier's puppet?

American soldiers do live within self-imposed bubbles of isolation. These are
called American bases and are where the greatest percentage of soldiers live and never leave. These bubbles are far different from the universe of Muhammad and his colleagues. We know that Muhammad's beliefs about who we are and what motivates us are mostly false. His first perceptions are defined by culture and religion, careful words of terrorist leaders, and a thousand channels of satellite television beamed into the homes of almost every Iraqi. It is then our behavior that contributes to these negative perceptions. Our self-imposed isolation and the citizens' perceptions may be all that the insurgency needs to continue and be successful.

I have come to realize that we isolate our soldiers from the societies in which we operate. We airlift and sealift vacuum-sealed replicas of America to remote corners of the world; once there, we isolate ourselves from the very people we are trying to protect or win over. An Iraqi once told me, "How you treat us must be like how African-Americans felt."

If you're an American soldier in Iraq working as an adviser, ask yourself this:
Is the Iraqi I live and fight with not allowed to enter any American facility?
If you are a military adviser or training to be an adviser, look around where you eat:
Are the Americans on one side of the room and the Iraqis on the other?
Do you even eat with Iraqis?
Do you go out of your way to avoid eye contact and thus not greet the Iraqis you walk by?
Do you try to learn their language or follow their customs?
Do you habitually expect Iraqis to share intelligence and then not respond in kind?
Do you distrust them?

Last week I read an article in an American newspaper that described a very common scene. Getting ready to go on a mission with an Iraqi policeman, a young American soldier snaps at an Iraqi officer and says, "Get off the cellphone."

Then this same soldier turns to another American soldier and says, "He is probably warning a terrorist that we are coming." It may not be racism, only ignorance combined with frustration and paranoia, but to the Iraqi, it sure does feel like racism.

To play the role of a combat adviser--something American military personnel are increasingly asked to do--is to live within a foreign culture and to train and fight with a foreign military. Many American soldiers are not capable of such an important role or mission. The job is long, very difficult, and set within a very austere, hostile and unfamiliar environment. The adviser becomes culturally isolated and so requires a unique personality combined with extensive training; but most lack this expertise and inclination. It's a sink-or-swim job, and most candidates sink after only a few months. They then retreat inside the shells of themselves and soon become combat advisers who do not interact or even advise.

They thus form adviser teams that are dysfunctional and counterproductive. They exist until the day arrives when they can return home to a place that is familiar, where they are not hated.

Warrior-Mentor
12-09-2006, 16:22
The Tightrope

American soldiers now patrol the streets with extreme caution and quick reflexes. They have come to think that every Iraqi who runs a red light or does not yield is a terrorist. They shoot at or accidentally kill civilians, which then creates one more insurgent and three more insurgency supporters. I know this cause-and-effect explanation is simplistic for an immensely complicated situation, but you get the picture. I will never fault American soldiers for their actions and reactions; it really is dangerous out there, and no other nation could ever ask for such service and sacrifice from its citizens. Yet I also try not to fault Iraqi civilians, for their truth is just as valid to them
as is mine to me.

I have seen firsthand why I cannot create stability by force within an Islamic society and why many say democracy cannot be brought by force but must evolve.

To be a moral person in a protracted counterinsurgency is my daily struggle, one in which I am asked to instill social morality on a culture that is not my own.

So what is the balance between taking charge in Iraq and/or abandoning the country? Our best response is to pull the American soldiers back and push the Iraqi soldiers/policemen forward as quickly as possible. I feel the urgency of this mandate as I type these very words on this small Iraqi base among Iraqi soldiers. As I told Ibrahim, the captured insurgent, "I want to leave your country. The only reason I stay here is because Iraqis are dying and you insist
on fighting. All we want to do is to help."

I naturally assumed he understood this. Well, he had not, and most do not. This message is one that is lacking and one that Iraqis surely need. So I find myself balanced on a tightrope bridging a deathly height. As Iraqi intelligence officers once explained to me over hot tea, "It is a race to see which of many possibilities comes first; the competency of an Iraqi Security Force with a stable and competent government, or the formation of a monolithic and deadly insurgency or civil war, both of which would prevent the latter."

In Iraq, I wish to survive and to succeed. Yet as the days pass, my hopes increasingly become mutually exclusive: The insurgency gets more effective; the citizen anger at us and the Iraqi Security Force becomes greater; the fractions in the society grow deeper and more violent; the American public becomes more impatient as the war is perceived as less legitimate and the conditions to form a stable Iraqi government become more elusive.

So I run along this rope as if in a race to get away. I run knowing full well that my speed comes only at the sacrifice of my balance. I long for the tranquility of normalcy, the comfortable, the understandable, and so I want to run from Iraq. So what then can I do besides serve admirably and hope for the best while fearing the worst?

The Iraqi officer I advise once said after months of frantically working to capture terrorists, "You need to just relax. You are here, so there will always be another terrorist to capture. Sit and drink some tea with me."

I doubt he was intentionally being prophetic. As a soldier who lives with an Iraqi, I do hope to one day just sit and drink some tea with him. To sit and talk of family without a worry in the world. But to do so, I must do more than just train, advise and fight with my Iraqi friend. I must go out of my way every single day to disprove the "Ugly American" label that is attached to me. I must approach every personal interaction as a singular opportunity to battle the insurgency and then realize that my interactions with each and every Iraqi do have very lasting and very strategic consequences.

x SF med
12-09-2006, 17:44
WM-
Great post. We as SF soldiers have trained to take these advisor positions, know the need for area studies, cultural immersion, language training, and working closely with the "G's". Sometimes we fail in instilling these key points in the young SF soldiers who think the job is all door kicking.

Maj Edwards brings this to light - but focuses on a larger issue, we as a nation are not preparing our conventional soldiers to step backwards into the 12th Century with cellphones, to understand the culture and use it to get their jobs done properly - we are sending American teenagers with a case of the ass over 9-11 and MSM indoctrination to do a job that now requires a much gentler approach.

In'sh'Allah, Mahktub, Salaam, and myriad other words have secular and religious meanings, and are indicators of the culture and its temporal instability. Time is different, things happen as God wills in His time; things happen because 'it is written'; conversation and respect are the norm; social activities take precedence even in business or political situations. The Major is a QP and understands that he must supress his cultural upbringing and become a part of this new culture - not 'go ntive' but be sensitive and understanding of the implications of his actions, no matter how benign they are 'back home'.

Every soldier going to 'the sandbox' needs to read this.

Thank you. rant over

incommin
12-09-2006, 17:55
Excellent post.

Jim

The Reaper
12-09-2006, 18:26
Well said.

This is why Rangers, the 82nd, or the Marines are not the final answer to this puzzle, unless we are willing to kill everyone in Iraq.

I have said before, and will say again, this war should have been fought as a UW op from Day One, with SF in the lead, using the Kurds and the Shias to destroy Sadaam and his forces.

The initial defeat of Sadaam might have taken a little longer, but we would not be having these problems now.

This was where Rumsfeld went wrong. He listened to the conventional commanders, assumed away problems and end state, and tried to do it on the cheap with an under-resourced and inadequate conventional war plan.

Thanks for the post. Clearly, Major Edmonds is switched on and "gets it". I wish more did.

TR

Monsoon65
12-09-2006, 18:51
WM:

Great read!! Really opened my eyes to a lot of things. I will probably never have to work with Iraqis, but if I do, I will keep this in mind.

504PIR
12-09-2006, 22:35
Great read, glad you posted it.

Kraut783
12-09-2006, 23:14
Good read....this is how we treated out Afghan guards when down range. We ate our meals with them and shared our lives. I saw much from their perpective and tried to see things through their eyes. I was only a PSYOP person attached to an ODA in 2002, but we all, SF and Afghan shared much. I agree with Reaper on his post. Just my two cents....thanks for the read.

Jack Moroney (RIP)
12-10-2006, 06:10
Clearly, Major Edmonds is switched on and "gets it". I wish more did.TR

Agree, with the exception of the jogging listening to an i-pod bit, this ought to be the opening chapter of whatever that "new" Counterinsurgency Manual evolves into.

Jack Moroney (RIP)
12-10-2006, 06:15
this war should have been fought as a UW op from Day One, with SF in the lead, using the Kurds and the Shias to destroy Sadaam and his forces.TR

Couldn't agree more. The shame of it all is that we were in pretty good position to do this back in the day of Provide Comfort and in the days leading up to it. We would have had to do a lot better job with Turkey and the PPK to pull it off.

incommin
12-10-2006, 09:15
Originally Posted by The Reaper
this war should have been fought as a UW op from Day One, with SF in the lead, using the Kurds and the Shias to destroy Sadaam and his forces.TR


El correcto!

Jim

NousDefionsDoc
12-10-2006, 15:54
I agree with the premise 100%. But I would also add that there comes a time to get over cultural sensitivity, realize there is a fight going on and deemand results.
There is a fine line between building rapport and allowing them to bullshit you.

The year thing is going to be a problem (again).

Yes, I have issues.

ABN_FO
12-10-2006, 16:37
Warrior Mentor,
I am on a MiTT team now as the NCOIC. Your post is exactly what I had just about figured out on my own. If I may print and post for all to read?
First, there is not enough "cohesion" time spent with our counterparts. I even try to get the CSM (IA) to come lift in our weight room! I eat with them as often as possible. A good portion of my time is spent just "hanging out" with him. Most of the members of this team are very apethetic towards the Iraqi Army Soldiers of all ranks. They describe them as thieves, beggars and all around derelicts. We will never be able to leave this AO with "advisors" having such poor attitudes. Hell, our S-1 begins his brief every morning with " I caught him f@#$%&^ lying about etc.. Is he lying? Possibly. Did he not understand what your question is because you are a CPT with zero people skills and are one genome above been a drooling moron? Probably.

Warrior-Mentor
12-10-2006, 20:06
Warrior Mentor,
I am on a MiTT team now as the NCOIC. Your post is exactly what I had just about figured out on my own. If I may print and post for all to read?

Feel free. MAJ Edmonds published this elsewhere on the web. I just brought it here for an audience that could apprciate his insight.

I'd encourage you to copy, paste and e-mail it around as well as re-post on other sites as well.
We've got to get more to understand this...from top to bottom...

Peregrino
12-10-2006, 22:04
Thanks W-M, that is a great read. It's also our very own Catch-22. Too many mutually exclusive/contradictory elements for the controlling conventional mindset to deal with. Peregrino

ABN_FO
12-10-2006, 23:00
Thank You, Sir

kgoerz
12-11-2006, 17:25
Great read. Funny how things change in war. From the story, correct me if I am wrong. He is a SF Major assigned alone on the Base. Are things spread that thin over there. Unless just for opsec he was just talking in the single person perspective. He is right in a lot of his views. Problem being is Iraq is a big place and there is not enough advisor's to put everywhere let alone advisers as committed as the Major. As long as big Army is there things will be dealt with collateral damage along side it. Like he says a guy can feed his family for a month just planting a few IED'S. What would you do if your family was starving and there was no work to be found. I am also tired of hearing about how we trained up the German Army and helped them get their Government back together so quick after WWII, why can't that be done in Iraq. I think the cultural difference between the Germans and Muslims speaks for itself on that one. As long as Terrorist are pumping money into the insurgency to pay people to kill americans it won't stop. I believe we are on the right track which is to train up the Iraq Army and Police to take over. Question is will it work. A guy I worked with in Colombia just left a big contract training up an Iraq Assault BN before the invasion of Falusha. They were motivated and had already carried out several successfully operations. They had a kick ass Iraqi SGM. Problem was the USA didn't pay them what they were promised. Before the attack on Falusha they hadn't received pay for two months. Two days before the attack more then half went AWOL, including the SGM. They said they would not participate unless they got paid. It wasn't because they were scared. They already proved they would fight. The pay problem was brought up several times but never resolved. Three months of Spec Op's training and missions all went to wast because Someone didn't get these guys paid. Most of the interpreter's left also because of the same problem. They didn't sneak out either. They turned in their tricked out AK'S and walked off the base right in front of everyone. The ones that stayed ended up taking part in the attack but on a much smaller scale because more then half left. The marines had to pick up the slack. I was amazed this could happen. Some of the contractors were giving their own money to them just to keep the really good ones around but that didn't last long. Events like this will be why we fail I am sure there were more like it.

The Reaper
02-02-2007, 16:47
Rather than start a new thread, let me tag onto this one about advisors.

You want to wrap your head around advisory ops, check this out.

Those deploying in that capacity should have this CSI study as read ahead.

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/csi/OP%2019%20complete.pdf

There is another one covering a bit different period, and I want to read it before I put it up.

TR

The Old Guy
02-05-2007, 14:51
The write-up was outstanding and should be mandatory reading for all forces. Thank you for the time and effort it took.

We must understand the people we are working with or against. If we do not understand then we end up being the ignorant peasants and treated as such. How long have we preached the philosophy of understand the people? We have practiced this thought through area studies and language training. But outside of the SO community it is unheard of and not a priority. Culture has crushed us on this blip of the radar screen; we cannot not win with pure brute force, we must will over the hearts and minds of the people and give them hope for the future.

Thank you.

incommin
02-05-2007, 18:05
"Win the hearts and minds of the people".......where have I heard that line before????????



Jim

RTK
04-09-2007, 14:30
Rather than start a new thread, let me tag onto this one about advisors.

You want to wrap your head around advisory ops, check this out.

Those deploying in that capacity should have this CSI study as read ahead.

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/csi/OP%2019%20complete.pdf

There is another one covering a bit different period, and I want to read it before I put it up.

TR

Sir,

OP18 and 19 were two papers that LTC(ret) Odom clued me into as we began the Kilcullen summary. I wrote a companion piece where I cited both of these works using my experience as a CF advisor to a BDE in the north in 2005-6. I'll admit that we, on the conventional side of the house, are light years behind the SF community on the advisory work.

I was lucky in that two ODAs covered down on the same BDE and helped steer me onto the right path when I had questions or difficulties. I made my PLs and NCOs respect the Iraqi chain of command, as I told them their nationality didn't supercede military custom, courtesy, or decency. Some of my soldiers found this a hard hurdle to clear. I soon banned those soldiers from the IA OPS center and barracks as their pride and lack of integration was beginning to hurt our mission. We ate with the Iraqis, lived in the same quad of buildings on the IA base, and operated with them daily. I had one platoon that lived with an IA company 30KM from our main base. Fm 31-20-3 became my bible. I got some great mentorship from the AOB commander as well. It didn't hurt that I was working for COL H.R. McMaster, an extremely brilliant officer in his own right, either.

Putting guys like LTC John Nagl in charge of training MiTT teams is a good step in the right direction. We on the conventional side still have a long way to go.

medic
04-09-2007, 19:09
I want to say thank you for putting this out there for every one to see. I have not been to Iraq so I have no first hand knowledge of how things are going over there. I was involved in Operation Bright Star and I know how I reacted to the Egyptian soldiers and other soldiers from the Middle East.

I was probably the #1 Ulgly American. I did everything I could not to show them respect. I would not look at them I would go along with the group and laugh and make jokes while in their bazzar (sp?) knowing that they could hear us.

Up until I read this post I didn't think anything of it, now I am ashamed of the way I acted and wish I could go back and change things. I guess I was like every other person in America and thought that all of the Iraqis were out to get us and that there was no way of winning this war. But knowing that there was no way out for us now.

Now, I see the way to win and the way out. We need to be more diplomatic and have a better knowledge of the culture before we put boots on the ground. I know even more than ever want to get out and learn about the culture and the people. I pledge to myself and my country right here that when I get over there that I will make every attempt to learn more about the people that I am dealing with.

x-factor
04-10-2007, 17:54
First, I think the author should be applauded for being so intellectually and emotionally honest with himself and his audience. Besides being an excellent piece from a practical sense, the author is so eloquent that it borders poetic in some places.

Second, please correct me if I'm wrong, guys. I'm not a trained UW guy, but I've been around a little bit and I've seen it go right and I've seen it go wrong. It seems to me (like the author implies) that so much of the craft is just basic human empathy. Its the handlers that try to "play" (bully, manipulate, trick, etc) people that fail, while the one's who treat people like people (even when things aren't going their way) have success.

Again, please educate me if I'm too far out of my expertise and talking out of my ass. I mean no disrespect to the UW profession, just trying to learn.

As for the Iraq case in particular, I'm going to stick my neck out there and disagree with TR. I don't think you could have overturned Saddam with a pure UW campaign. The RG was not the Taliban.

That said, there was definitely a happy medium to be had between a pure UW campaign and Rumsfeld's plan which was conceived as much to prove his technical/doctrinal theories as to achieve any proper war aim. For my money, the real crux of our screw up was the first month after the fall of Baghdad when we didn't quickly and smartly transition to a CA/UW campaign. As soon as the statue of Saddam fell, PSYOPS and ODAs should have been given the lead to spread out accross the country retaining/reconstituting Iraqi Army units. (I was only in elementary school, but isn't this basically what we did in Panama?)

Ret10Echo
04-11-2007, 05:21
First, I think the author should be applauded for being so intellectually and emotionally honest with himself and his audience. Besides being an excellent piece from a practical sense, the author is so eloquent that it borders poetic in some places.

Second, please correct me if I'm wrong, guys. I'm not a trained UW guy, but I've been around a little bit and I've seen it go right and I've seen it go wrong. It seems to me (like the author implies) that so much of the craft is just basic human empathy. Its the handlers that try to "play" (bully, manipulate, trick, etc) people that fail, while the one's who treat people like people (even when things aren't going their way) have success.

Again, please educate me if I'm too far out of my expertise and talking out of my ass. I mean no disrespect to the UW profession, just trying to learn.

As for the Iraq case in particular, I'm going to stick my neck out there and disagree with TR. I don't think you could have overturned Saddam with a pure UW campaign. The RG was not the Taliban.

That said, there was definitely a happy medium to be had between a pure UW campaign and Rumsfeld's plan which was conceived as much to prove his technical/doctrinal theories as to achieve any proper war aim. For my money, the real crux of our screw up was the first month after the fall of Baghdad when we didn't quickly and smartly transition to a CA/UW campaign. As soon as the statue of Saddam fell, PSYOPS and ODAs should have been given the lead to spread out accross the country retaining/reconstituting Iraqi Army units. (I was only in elementary school, but isn't this basically what we did in Panama?)

Understand that UW is not a profession, is scalable and has many facets. Please read the following definition: Executed as defined you would find yourself in a situation where the citizens of the country have determined their future through their own actions. There is no vaccuum created as with the sudden removal of the political infrastructure. Instead there is a slow, diliberate replacement. Success is measured over time. We currently live in an impatient society whithout the willpower for the long-haul.

My .02

Unconventional Warfare (UW). These are operations that involve a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. UW is unique in that it is a Special Operation (SO) that can either be conducted as part of a geographic combatant commander's overall theater campaign, or as an independent, subordinate campaign. When conducted independently, the primary focus of UW is on political-military objectives and psychological objectives. UW includes military and paramilitary aspects of resistance movements. UW military activity represents the culmination of a successful effort to organize and mobilize the civil populace against a hostile government or occupying power. From the US perspective, the intent is to develop and sustain these supported resistance organizations and to synchronize their activities to further US national security objectives. SOF units do not create resistance movements. They advise, train, and assist indigenous resistance movements already in existence to conduct UW and when required,accompany them into combat. When UW operations support conventional military operations, the focus shifts to primarily military objectives; however the political and psychological implications remain. Operational and strategic staffs and commanders must guard against limiting UW to a specific set ofcircumstances or activities defined by either recent events or personal experience. The most prevalent mistake is the belief that UW is limited to guerrilla warfare or insurgency. UW includes, but is not limited to, the following activities:

Guerrilla Warfare. These are military and paramilitary operations conducted by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces in adversary-held or hostile territory. It is the military aspect of an insurgency or other armed resistance movement. Guerilla warfare techniques can undermine the legitimacy of the existing government or an occupying power as well as destroy, degrade, or divert military capabilities.


Subversion. These operations are designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime or nation. The clandestine nature of subversion dictates that the underground elements perform the bulk of the activity.


Sabotage. These are operations that involve an act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war material, premises, or utilities, to include human and natural resources. Sabotage selectively disrupts, destroys, or neutralizes hostile capabilities with a minimum expenditure of manpower and materiel.


Intelligence Activities. These activities assess areas of interest ranging from political and military personalities to the military capabilities of friendly and adversary forces. SOF perform intelligence activities ranging from developing information critical to planning and conducting operations, to assessing the capabilities and intentions of indigenous and coalition forces.


Unconventional Assisted Recovery (UAR). These operations consist of UW forces establishing and operating unconventional assisted recovery mechanisms and unconventional assisted recovery teams. UAR operations are designed to seek out, contact, authenticate, and support military and other selected personnel as they move from an adversary-held, hostile, or sensitive area to areas under friendly control.

x SF med
04-11-2007, 07:09
TR-
Thanks for posting the OP, it was amazing to me how little UW/FID/GW has changed from Lawrence's time, and IIRC what was taught in the quonsets at CMK back when I went through the course. A lot of it (to me, at least) is the implementation of "hiding in plain sight" with your HN/G group... language, culture, advice, rapport, acceptance...

Conventional forces are not trained in this, and I'm not sure if a 'short course' for them would be a good thing - a little knowledge can be a dangerous thing, especially if there is no one wit hthe depth of knowledge to guide them.

Well, just my .02 on the consistency of UW (wow, that seems like an oxymoron, doesn't it?).

RTK
04-11-2007, 07:39
TR-
Thanks for posting the OP, it was amazing to me how little UW/FID/GW has changed from Lawrence's time, and IIRC what was taught in the quonsets at CMK back when I went through the course. A lot of it (to me, at least) is the implementation of "hiding in plain sight" with your HN/G group... language, culture, advice, rapport, acceptance...

Conventional forces are not trained in this, and I'm not sure if a 'short course' for them would be a good thing - a little knowledge can be a dangerous thing, especially if there is no one wit hthe depth of knowledge to guide them.

Well, just my .02 on the consistency of UW (wow, that seems like an oxymoron, doesn't it?).

As a conventional guy I totally agree.

Conventional forces aren't trained on this and few have a good excuse on why. Particularly in terms of the operating environment conventional units find themselves into today, it's a tragedy that some simply don't make it a priority for training. Those are the units we read about in USA Today.

There are a lot of units collocated on the same post as a group. My Regimental Commander aked the 10SFG commander to give an 4 hour OPD. Our regimental S2 section learned from a lot of the group S2 people. IMHO that worked pretty good. Outside of that, we tried to integration ODAs into the MRE before deployment to at least give commanders at the troop and company level the experiece of what it meant to cohabitate the same AO with a team and how to compliment strengths (heavy armor protection (ACR) with cultural awareness and FID/IDAD experience (SF)). Good units are brining in outside cultural experts as well. More emphasis on language and cultural training is being placed in the training calandar.

A lot of units just look at the kinetic fight as the decisive point. The bottom line is that many conventional units need to ask themselves if they're truely prepared to operate within the given environment and win, not just on the tactical kinetic engagement level, but throughout all the lines of operation that don't include combat operations (Civil-military operations, training, equiping, and operating with indigenous forces, economic development, and Information Operations).

For what it's worth...

The Reaper
04-11-2007, 10:32
I have written a very long response to this and lost it twice, so bullet comments, for now.

IMHO, the center of gravity for COIN (and the GWOT) is the support of the populace.

Gs cannot conduct ops or survive without popular support of some kind, even if it is just regional or neighborhood. As Mao said, a G without the people's support is a fish out of the water. No to low support, lots of actionable intel, low G activity, controllable violence.

The Dems, MSM, and anti-war nuts have already lost this war with their cut and run efforts, successful, or not. Done deal, put it in the history books.

If I am an Iraqi sitting at home and I see the supporting government debating on the date for the cut and run, I am not helping anyone till the deal is over and I see how things sort out. See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil. Step up and rat out the Gs to the government and you will pay. Best to say nothing. The US forces will largely be gone or going by the next inauguration. Be sure that if you supported the US, you are on the last plane out.

US has not had a good track record of taking care of people who helped us. Look at the Afghan local who took care of the last SEAL from the recon mission that went south. He should have been rewarded and given passports and tickets to the land of the big PX for him and his immediate family. Big PSYOP theme, like the "last season's winners" in "The Running Man". Instead we left him out to dry. Now a G theme - "Help the US and get screwed, then we saw your kids' heads off."

The US public lacks patience and political will for a COIN campaign with any media coverage. MSM provides a daily PSYOP assault on US populace with loss reports, bad news, failures, and a never ending parade of armchair generals passed over and who are "experts" at critiquing the ongoing operation. Better to hide the long war in a box and report back every five years. Easier for the politicians to oppose the war from the beginning, hope we lose, work towards that end, claim partial credit and point out mistakes if we win.

Conventional forces do not have the tools for this. Conventional Army in 2000 was still focused on Fulda Gap against the Soviets, repelling NK invasion, or DS all over again. Little if any thought on LIC, COIN, or post-conflict activity. Best to have conventional force learn Galen's "First, do no harm." Provide exploitation and QRF, help train government military and LE forces, assist with local security efforts (without making HN forces look weak or antagonizing populace).

Do not lose core MOS skills. Tankers still need to spend time making sure that they can shoot. Gun bunnies still need to remember how to shoot and scoot.

Even SF, with years of experience in FID, language training, area orientation, cultural awareness, etc., decided a long time ago that SF could not maintain proficiency in more than one or two of our then five core missions, so we specialized. FID/COIN is a tough one, and requires a lot of maturity, social skills, and experience, which you are not going to get in a two-week class. Large US presence now works against our goals and the Iraqi government. Shows foreign influence, delegitimizes, makes HN forces look incapable of providing internal security, a core mission.

The conventional war is over. Kinetic solutions are not the key to this war anymore, hearts and minds are. This is pretty much a lost cause due to strategic political decisions, except at the lowest level where "un-ugly Americans" and indig meet.

Best hope now, IMHO, is to try to lay a big smackdown on the most visible insurgent threats (why is al Sadr still alive?), buy the Iraqi (and Afghan) governments time to get their forces ready, to train and equip them to the best of our capabilities, to put at least a rudimentary PSYOP effort into place to win over the populace, to help people who help us, and to try and transition this back to a SOF campaign (not the ballistic solution DA SOF, the hearts and minds SOF). We need to be helping the Iraqi government, not doing their jobs for them.

How many of these were observed in the US war plan?

Imperatives
Understand the operational environment
Recognize political implications
Facilitate interagency activities
Engage the threat discriminately
Consider long-term effects
Ensure legitimacy and credibility of Special Operations
Anticipate and control psychological effects
Apply capabilities indirectly
Develop multiple options
Ensure long-term sustainment
Provide sufficient intelligence
Balance security and synchronization


Just my .02, YMMV.

TR

Ret10Echo
04-11-2007, 11:31
Looking forward to the LP version

RTK
04-11-2007, 15:01
US has not had a good track record of taking care of people who helped us.


George Packer wrote an excellent but sad article (http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/03/26/070326fa_fact_packer)speaking to this last month in the New Yorker.

Intel_Airman
04-20-2007, 10:11
Outstanding post. It made me think back to how some of my fellow Airmen acted when we worked with the Iraqis. Once again though, how can you prep the average 19 year old for a situation like this? It's extremely difficult. Your post should be a mandatory reading for all those going to the AOR.

scmarines9303
04-23-2008, 06:42
Is the Iraqi I live and fight with not allowed to enter any American facility?
If you are a military adviser or training to be an adviser, look around where you eat:
Are the Americans on one side of the room and the Iraqis on the other?
Do you even eat with Iraqis?
Do you go out of your way to avoid eye contact and thus not greet the Iraqis you walk by?
Do you try to learn their language or follow their customs?
Do you habitually expect Iraqis to share intelligence and then not respond in kind?
Do you distrust them?

We have this same problem in our own military, blacks sitting with just black, white sitting with just white, etc... Usually it has to do with what or who you are most comfortable around. As a rule I usually make my soldiers eat as a team!! Just a thought!!

SF_BHT
04-23-2008, 07:24
Is the Iraqi I live and fight with not allowed to enter any American facility?
If you are a military adviser or training to be an adviser, look around where you eat:
Are the Americans on one side of the room and the Iraqis on the other?
Do you even eat with Iraqis?
Do you go out of your way to avoid eye contact and thus not greet the Iraqis you walk by?
Do you try to learn their language or follow their customs?
Do you habitually expect Iraqis to share intelligence and then not respond in kind?
Do you distrust them?

We have this same problem in our own military, blacks sitting with just black, white sitting with just white, etc... Usually it has to do with what or who you are most comfortable around. As a rule I usually make my soldiers eat as a team!! Just a thought!!

scmarines9303
You seam to have a lot of questions on your first couple of Post. I would recommend that you Read a lot and learn. After a few months you should absorb enough info and then you can formulate good meaningfully questions and observations that will contribute to this QP Board. Use the Search button and welcome to the Board.