SUBCOMMITTEE: TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

[The Reaper]

Dead on the money.

SOCOM has, for better or worse, evolved into a platform-centric headquarters focused almost exclusively as a warfighter on DA.

This has led to DA elements, particularly at JSOC, being assigned disproportionate percentages of the resources and leadership positions, which exacerbates the problem.

If you read this article thoroughly, SF is the only SOCOM element with the skills Boot delineates as the key competencies necessary for future success in the GWOT - "knowledge of foreign languages and cultures, skill at counterinsurgency warfare, and the ability to work with a wide range of foreign allies". Yet SF is grossly underrepresented in the General Officer ranks of SOF and the Army. The senior GO, IIRC, who actually has commanded through the ranks of white SF units (doing UW/FID) is a two star. Few SF GOs are at SOCOM, the CG is currently a Spec Ops Aviator (with a tour in SF as an enlisted soldier), the previous SOCOM CG was an AF general, and before him was an Army GO from the black side with no white SF service. In retrospect, I do not think that there has ever been a SOCOM CG who commanded through the white SF ranks. Lutz stood the command up, but never got the stars. The current USASOC CG, as well as the JSOC CG, are both Rangers.

I believe that the services are a large part of the problem, compounded by myopic leadership in key SOF and ARSOF positions. GEN Downing, while a great soldier, was part of this problem. Painful as it is to state, I am afraid that legislative action may be the only hope we have of reversing this trend.


Subject: SUBCOMMITTEE: TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

June 29, 2006 Thursday

SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY

LENGTH: 3618 words

COMMITTEE: HOUSE ARMED SERVICES

SUBCOMMITTEE: TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

HEADLINE: U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND'S MISSIONS AND ROLES

TESTIMONY-BY: MAX BOOT, SENIOR FELLOW

AFFILIATION: THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Statement of Max Boot Senior Fellow, National Security Studies The Council
on Foreign Relations

Committee on House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities

"Chairman Saxton, Congressman Meehan, members of the Subcommittee: Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the future of the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the war on terror, along with two men for whom I have great admiration Wayne Downing and Mike Vickers. I will begin by suggesting what kind of force we need to defeat our Islamist enemies, then review the deficiencies of our current force structure, and finally conclude with a suggestion for how a major organizational overhaul the resurrection of the Office of Strategic Services--could address some of these shortcomings.

My starting point is the assumption that in the years ahead key competencies for the U.S. armed forces will be knowledge of foreign languages and cultures, skill at counterinsurgency warfare, and the ability to work with a wide range of foreign allies, ranging from advanced NATO militaries and constabularies to primitive militias in places like Afghanistan and Somalia. All of these needs are dictated by the nature of the global war being waged on the U.S. and our allies by Al Qaeda and various other Islamist terrorist groups. Our enemies in this struggle cannot be defeated with conventional military force. Indeed, there is a distinct danger that indiscriminate application of violence will only create more enemies in the future. To defeat this Islamist insurgency we must be able not only to track down and capture or kill hard-core terrorists but also to carry out civil affairs and information operations to win the "hearts and minds" of the great mass of uncommitted Muslims. We are very good at eliminating top terrorists, once they have been found (witness Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's death); less good at finding them (Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are still at large); and less skilled still at changing the conditions that breed terrorism in the first place (look at the continuing violence in Iraq and Afghanistan).

Focus on Counterinsurgency

We are paying the price for this skills-deficit in places like Iraq where it has been difficult for a conventionally focused Army and Marine Corps to say nothing of the Navy and Air Force-- to pivot to counterinsurgency operations.

There is widespread concern, including within the armed forces, that a predilection for "kinetic" solutions has made the situation in parts of Iraq worse, not better. In this regard, I was stuck by an op-ed published recently in the Baltimore Sun ("Military Must Share the Blame," June 20, 2006) by a Marine officer named Erik Swabb who served in Fallujah in 2004-2005. He writes that prior to deployment, "We did not understand certain dynamics at play, such as the notion that excessive force protection alienates the populace, reduces intelligence and, therefore, makes one less secure. We knew how to raid a house but not how to build local relationships and learn where insurgents were hiding.

We did not know these crucial aspects of counterinsurgency because we had never received training about them."

Keep in mind that Swabb went to Iraq more than year into the guerrilla war, and that he served in the Marine Corps, which has traditionally placed more emphasis on "small war" skills than have the other services. And yet, by his own testimony, he did not understand the most basic tenets of counterinsurgency warfare especially the fundamental paradox that too much aggression can be counterproductive, and that a "softer" approach can actually produce better results.

The armed services, in particular the Army and Marine Corps, are now doing a better job of training for such missions--but not good enough. That is why General George Casey Jr. felt compelled to set up his own counterinsurgency school in Iraq for newly arriving officers, a job that should have been done before they shipped off to war. Clearly there is a need for more training focused on this critical subject, as there is for more language training.

Anything this Committee could do to further prod the armed forces in this direction would be extremely useful. The Quadrennial Defense Review made the right noises about the need to focus on stability operations, language training, and related areas, but the defense budget remains overwhelmingly focused on conventional programs. Much more needs to be done to turn the rhetoric about irregular warfare into reality.

No one suggests that we go too far in the opposite direction and focus our military exclusively on waging "small wars." There is still a need to be able to fight large, conventional conflicts against potential adversaries like China and North Korea, if only to prevent them from happening in the first place. And while the regular armed forces must gain greater competence in counterinsurgency and related disciplines, they should not become the main focus of most soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines.

The bulk of this task should fall to specialists the men and women who will be on the front lines of the war on terror for decades to come. They must be experts in such fields as ethnography, linguistics, geography, history, economics, politics, policing, public relations, public administration, diplomacy, low-intensity conflict, and human intelligence collection and analysis preferably at the same time. Merely to state the list is to make obvious our shortcomings in all of these areas. We do not have nearly enough Gertrude Bells, T.E. Lawrences, Charles "Chinese" Gordons, or Richard Francis Burtons, to name only a few of the area experts from the heyday of the British Empire who immersed themselves in foreign cultures in order to advance Whitehall 's interests across the globe.

Experts Needed

Such learned men and women can be invaluable "force multipliers." Consider the case of Colonel Robert Warburton, who spoke fluent Persian and Pashto and spent 18 years (1879-1897) as the political officer in the Northwest Frontier province of what is today Pakistan. He kept this volatile region (now a Taliban and al Qaeda stronghold) quiet through his personal influence. "In an area where every male was habitually armed at all times," historian Byron Farwell wrote in Queen Victoria's Little Wars, "he went about with only a walking stick."

Within a month of his retirement, the area was swept by an Islamic fundamentalist revolt that took thousands of British soldiers to put down. I daresay we would have more luck pacifying the Northwest Frontier now a key task for our forces in Afghanistan if we had more Warburtons of our own.

Unfortunately the personnel system employed not only by the armed forces but also by State Department, CIA, and other government agencies makes it practically impossible to develop such expertise. Diplomats, soldiers, and spies alike are shuffled from post to post with dizzying rapidity. The average army officer spends an average of only 18 months at each assignment over the course of a 25-year career. The army rotates units out of Afghanistan and Iraq every year, the Marines every six to seven months. The State Department and the CIA move their employees just as often, if not more so. So just when our people on the spot start to figure out what's going on in these complex cultures, that's when it's time for them to go home and for novices to replace them.

The logic behind this system is that soldiers and other government employees are supposed to be nearly interchangeable cogs in a giant machine a tank driver ought to be able to drive an M-1 whether in Alabama or Anbar. But cultural knowledge cannot be so easily taught or transferred. In tribal societies, influence is entirely personal; the relationships cultivated by one soldier, spy, or diplomat cannot easily be passed along to a successor.

[The Reaper]

Our personnel system further places a premium on moving officers from slot to slot from line commands to staff jobs and schools, from combat to garrison duty in order to develop a corps of generalists from which eventually the senior leaders of the services will be selected. There is a lot to be said for this system, but there must also be a way for some experts to opt out of the endless rotations to stay for years, even decades, in one job or one place and thereby gain the kind of specialized expertise that we so desperately need in the war on terrorism.

SOCOM's Shortcomings

In theory, the place where much of the expertise which I have previously described ought to reside, at least as far as the armed forces go, is the U.S. Special Operations Command. SOCOM has been designated the lead combat component in the war on terror for this very reason. In practice, however, SOCOM falls far short of what we need. It is overly focused on what is known in the trade as Direct Action on rappelling out of helicopters, kicking down doors, and capturing or killing bad guys. This strategy can occasionally pay off, as with the capture of Saddam Hussein and the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, but the aftermath of these celebrated accomplishments shows the limitations of the "manhunter" model of counterinsurgency. In both cases, the immobilization of major enemy leaders proved to be only temporary setbacks for a large-scale, decentralized terrorist movement. Making real progress, whether in Iraq or other locales, will require accomplishing much more difficult, less glamorous tasks such as establishing security, furthering economic and political development, and spreading the right information to win over the populace. Above all, it will require working with indigenous allies who must necessarily carry the bulk of the burden in this type of conflict. Native recruits have been key to America's most successful counterinsurgencies, whether the Apache scouts who helped track down the renegade chief Geronimo in 1886 or the Macabebe Scouts who helped capture Philippine rebel leader Emilio Aguinaldo in 1901. Reliance on these native helpers is necessary because few if any outsiders can be expected to match guerrillas' knowledge of local topography and society. Nor is it likely that the U.S. will ever be able to send enough soldiers overseas to win a major insurgency on their own; our resources are sufficiently limited that it will always be necessary to rely in great part on locally recruited soldiers and constables when waging an insurgency or counterinsurgency.

In the modern Special Operations lexicon, such tasks fall under the rubric of "unconventional warfare" (i.e., helping indigenous allies to carry out guerrilla operations, psy-ops, intelligence-gathering, and related activities) and "foreign internal defense" (helping friendly governments defeat guerrillas and bandits), and they are two of the primary missions of the Army Special Forces, popularly known as the Green Berets, who are supposed to work closely with psychological operations and civil affairs specialists. But there is widespread concern within Army SF circles that their "softer", but no less vital, missions are being shortchanged by SOCOM in favor of sexier SWAT- style raids. One recently retired SF colonel wrote to me a few weeks ago: "The current problem with SOCOM is that it is unbalanced. Most of the leadership and planning staff have come from the DA [Direct Action] side. They have no understanding of UW [Unconventional Warfare]. To the degree that they are starting to develop an appreciation for it, it is only as an enabler for DA operations. In other words, they want to cherry pick techniques developed to wage unconventional war and use them to support conventional commando operations."

Another more senior, retired SF officer emailed to complain of the "total USSOCOM preoccupation with raiding--SOF orientation on Special Operations and absolutely none on Low Intensity Conflict. OSD-SOLIC [Office of the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict] only has fulfilled 1/2 of its charter. Low Intensity Conflict died around 1990-91."

Similar concerns have been aired in print for instance in Sean Naylor's Armed Forces Journal article, "More Than Door Kickers" (March 2006), which quoted yet another retired SF officer (Lieutenant Colonel Mark Haselton), complaining, "My concern is that all we're focused on is direct action, to the absolute exclusion of all other things. . .. If we the spend the rest of our lives 'capturing and killing' terrorists a the expense of those SF missions that are more important gaining access to the local population, training indigenous forces, providing expertise and expanding capacity we're doomed to failure." When I hear such complaints coming from so many "snake eaters" for whom I have such high respect, I take them seriously, and I think the members of this Committee should too.

SOCOM has created the best commando forces in the world, but it will take more than commandos to win the war on terror.

An Unconventional Warfare Command?

The question is, what to do about this? Is it possible to get SOCOM to refocus more on Unconventional Warfare and less on Direct Action? Probably not.

Already SOCOM has transferred most of its psy-ops and civil affairs capabilities areas of scant interest to most Navy SEALS, Army Rangers, or Delta Force operatives to the regular army. And, as Naylor noted, of the eight top flag officers at SOCOM's headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida, not one spent his career in Special Forces. (General Bryan "Doug" Brown, the SOCOM commander, once served on an A-Team as an enlisted man many decades ago, but his specialty as an officer has been special operations aviation.) The institutional culture of SOCOM is so firmly fixed in favor of "kicking down doors" and so much of its funding is directed for such purposes that it is doubtful that any amount of outside pressure, even from this Committee, will change the dominant mindset very much, especially when the Office of the Secretary of Defense remains so fixated on such missions.

For this reason there is growing interest within the U.S. Army SF community in creating a new Joint Unconventional Warfare Command within SOCOM a UW equivalent to the Joint Special Operations Command which encompasses units like Delta Force (a.k.a. 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta) and Seal Team Six (a.k.a. Naval Special Warfare Development Group, or DevGru), and focuses on Direct Action missions. An Unconventional Warfare Command could bring together Army Special Forces, civil-affairs, and psy-ops by essentially expanding the role of the Army Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. According to a paper commissioned by the Army Special Operations Command Futures Center, this new command "could fight the GWOT [Global War on Terror] by organizing, training, equipping and/or leading indigenous assets to conduct subversion, sabotage and intelligence activities directed against groups practicing terrorism or against nation-states supporting terrorism directed against U.S. interests throughout the world."

This strikes me as a good idea, but I would also urge the Committee to consider going further and removing the Unconventional Warfare mission from SOCOM altogether. I would like to conclude my testimony with a bold idea for how this could be accomplished: by resurrecting the Office of Strategic Services that was created in 1942 to gather and analyze intelligence as well as to conduct low-intensity warfare behind enemy lines in occupied Europe and Asia.

[The Reaper]

OSS Redux

OSS was disbanded after World War II; both the Green Berets and the CIA trace their lineage to this august ancestor. My proposal is to re-create OSS by bringing together under one roof not only Army SF, civil-affairs, and psy-ops but also the CIA's paramilitary Special Activities Division, which has always been a bit of a bureaucratic orphan at Langley (and which is staffed largely by Special Operations veterans). This could be a joint civil-military agency under the combined oversight of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, like the Defense Intelligence Agency or the National Security Agency. It would bring together in one place all of the key skill sets needed to wage the softer side of the war on terror. Like SOCOM, it would have access to military personnel and assets; but like the CIA's Special Activities Division, its operations would contain a higher degree of "covertness," flexibility, and "deniability" than those carried out by the uniformed military.

One of the key advantages of OSS II is that it would be able to employ indigenous personnel on a much larger scale than is practicable today. There is currently a legal prohibition on recruiting into the U.S. armed forces anyone who is not an American citizen or permanent resident (Green Card holder).

The CIA also looks askance upon non-American officers (as opposed to agents). These are considered "security risks." But the greater risk is that we will lose the war on terror because we don't have enough understanding of the societies in which terrorists operate. Such knowledge can be acquired in one of two ways: either by long-term immersion in foreign societies or by simply recruiting from the societies in which we fight. OSS II could facilitate both approaches, in the first place by junking the military's overly restrictive personnel rotation policies, and in the second place by junking its overly restrictive citizenship requirements. The Green Berets recruited non-citizens in the 1950s when the Lodge Act allowed the enlistment of Eastern Europeans who were considered vital for operations behind the Iron Curtain. Something similar should be tried today to recruit from Muslim societies around the world, starting with the Middle Eastern immigrant community right here in the U.S. (The most reliable recruits would probably be ethnic or religious minorities within Muslim societies Egyptian Copts, Moroccan Jews, Lebanese Druze, Iranian Azeris, Saudi Shiites, Iraqi and Iranian Kurds, etc. just as the U.S. has previously made use of minorities such as the Philippine Macabebes and the Vietnamese Montagnards.) I bet there would be plenty of high-quality recruits who would be willing to serve in return for one of the world's most precious commodities U.S. citizenship.

It might even make sense to create an entire brigade or even a division of foreign fighters led by American officers and NCOs. Call it the Freedom Legion, in homage to the French Foreign Legion. Such units have been successfully raised by every great power in history. Think, for example, of the Gurkhas who still serve in large numbers, and with considerable distinction, in the British and Indian armies. Some Americans may recoil from the idea of enlisting "mercenaries " but these men and women would be a lot more useful and a lot more disciplined than most of the "security contractors" we employ en masse today in places like Iraq. More specialized indigenous units could be formed specifically to work in areas like Somalia, Syria, North Korea, and Iran, where there is either no effective local government or the government is hostile to the U.S. OSS II would be a natural repository for such outfits, considering the success of the original OSS in running indigenous forces such as the Kachin tribesmen who battled the Japanese in Burma.

It would be a bit more of a stretch to designate OSS II as the primary repository of nation-building expertise within the U.S. government, but given the unwillingness of other agencies, civil or military, to fill this yawning gap, this might be the most convenient expedient. The new OSS could cultivate a corps of experts, civil and military, coming from both government and the private sector, who would be skilled in the difficult task of rebuilding stateless or war-torn societies in cooperation with other federal departments, international agencies, American allies, and non-governmental organizations.

These skills are closely related to those needed for counterinsurgency, because the most effective way to counter any insurgency is not to kill a bunch of guerrillas but to create an effective government that can provide for the needs of the people better than can the guerrillas' shadow government. We have paid a heavy price in Iraq for not having such a nation-building (or, more accurately, state- building) capacity on tap; Jay Garner's Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance and Jerry Bremer's Coalition Provisional Authority were last-minute expedients that could not possibly have succeeded because they did not spend nearly enough time preparing for the daunting task of running a country of 25 million people.

I realize that the creation of a new OSS is a radical notion that could not be implemented tomorrow. It would require the most sweeping legislation since the 1987 Nunn-Cohen Amendment that created SOCOM in the first place. Obviously such a step needs a good deal more study and discussion. But if we are to be successful in the Long War, we need to think outside of the traditional bureaucratic boxes, because the U.S. government as currently set up and that most assuredly includes SOCOM simply is not adequately configured for the tasks ahead. Given the potential threat posed by our enemies a threat of which we were reminded by news of an Al Qaeda plot to release poison gas on the New York subway that could turn out to be a very dangerous deficiency.

Thank you for your time and attention. I would be happy to answer any questions you might have."

[Doc]

Amen Boss.

[7624U]

Call it the Freedom
Legion, in homage to the French Foreign Legion. Such units have been
successfully raised by every great power in history.

In iraq ISOF could fill this role easy if we are allowed to teach them UW they are already a DA unit, They just need to be Vetted for INTEL activities then they can continue to plan and execute thier own missions under QP's watchful eye's. then its just a matter of shipping them around to other countries when we need them.

[Jack Moroney (RIP)]

Concur TR, absolutely!

[PSYOP Rob]

Great article, and his book on Small Wars was excellent .

[MtnGoat]

Yes SOCOM is broken. The don't know what to do as far as UW or COIN war. IMO. But we really don't need anything new units made, we (DoD) have enough new units, Organization being made after every new devolvement in this War.

SOCOM needs to take what it has now, stop funding new "UNIT" projects, use the ones that they have spent millions of dollars on already. Why because units like SF, SEALs, and other will lose what the have. Yes, we will, to some point that is. SF & SEALs will never go away, that's not what I'm saying. We will lose the mission we are doing now. But, making new three letter units, doesn't help others out. It takes funds, radios, weapons, supplies, support, ETC that are needed to run those units away from them (us). Look what happen with the aviation wing being pulled from SF Groups. Its nice to see the reorganization of 528th into a USASOC Sustainment Brigade and the new USASFC-GSB, and 75th-RSC.

Look what is happen now with JSOC and their new Three star - Rangers are going their way. Way?

Like it has been posted before, why hasn't a "real" SF non-DA two star level or above taken over with this GWOT for at least one position? Why didn't an SF GO take over with the change out of GEN Abizaid? "They" don't want that. A real SF GEN running things, they don't want a UW style warfare. DA missions are the money maker. CNN, ABC, FOX cover them (DA) not UW - nation building.

I disagree (IMHO) with the creation of a new "OSS-II" styled unit. We have USASFC within DoD which fills that role. To meet/make what you are saying can be done by using the current laws that are in place that lets the foreigners that current going the US Military (I.E., Puerto Rico, Guam, Canada, European, ETC). We have this now, so let us it. They serve a given time period, get a Green Card, then after their time frame they get U.S. Citizenship. Getting the people that you are talking about, which is a good idea, would be easy in the sense that we (SF) and the CIA also to "Recruit" for these positions. Maybe relook the FAO/DAO position and added something there for this "job". Look at recruitment of these people coming into the U.S. through the Visa system. We may need to make some changes to laws or rules, but there are law/rule in place now to help out with foreigners coming into the military. USE them NOW.

The create an entire new brigade or units of foreign fighters led by U.S. Leadership. Well, isn't that what SF was in the beginning? The "old" OSS which was made up of foreign members. I see what your are talking about Reaper, all SOO very true. IMHO I look at it as... Wasn't SF this way until the late 60's and early 70's??? These personnel should be added to the position that are currently being filled with Soldiers coming right off the street (18X's) with little to no skills brought to the ODAs. Foreign members that meet the security clearance would bring the background that these street kids bring now, plus the foreign language skills that we are teaching them (18X) now. But, the good thing is, just like with American English, they (foreigners) have their "style" of their language from their area (AO). Just like with Spanish, Arabic, Chinese, ETC. Every Country that speak a similar language to the country that is next to it, talks a bit different. These foreign soldier bring everything that you are talking about to the table.

We don't need a new UW Unit IMO, we have that now. Make a Smaller (ODA to Company) unit within SFG would be better. This way these new soldiers bring their experiences to the table that other SF Guy can gain from. Why can't we get the Aviation wing back to the USASFC Group? TF 160 is over worked, AC are going down, OPSEC//OPSEC//OPSEC. An aviation that trains, plans, and deploys with the Group it is assigned to. Let make that happen. A newer unit will pull from support elements. Right now its hard for SFGs to get everything they need as far as the FEDLOG, JOSCAT, ETC now.

I two have wondered why we (DoD) have gone away from getting foreign national person into the military to fill the SF type units faster. They would fill so many different areas of expertise. A plan that we should get back to, as faster. Get them a bigger bonus for enlisting, 20K is the baseline. Give them 25K or more.

But, if we do need a newer units that can meets the needs for this "New" Warfare? Politics will play so much in the creation of this new OSS style unit. That Politics will play who will run it, pay for it, and how things will be done. Is that right or wrong? It's all how your looking at it. It the balance of Power, and they way they just are, it's ensuring thing are done properly and by law.

TR you are SOOOOO RIGHT on the USSOCOM not being on target with "their" Mission or Charters. They are missing out on the Low Intensity Conflict part, UW warfare side of the mission. Look how well USASOC/USASFC WON the Afghanistan campaign. Now why didn't USASFC get the lead in Iraq, because Conventional Army got their @$$ spanked. They didn't want to see SF Guy riding on Horseback again or ATV or "killing" a tank battalion with three ODAs. Oh, wait that tank thing did happen. So now USASOC can't do their war against AQ or GWOT. You got "PEOPLE" telling USSOCOM & DOD that USASOC can't run an effective GWOT and they need a Third star to run their War Plan. So they won over the head pieces. Now USASFC will fall to the sidelines again, Rangers and the DA SWAT style warfare will increase and the UW, force multipliers SF Types, and this Low Intensity Conflict war for the OSD-SOLIC will fall where? In who's hands?

Now lets see what will happen in the next two years with SOCOM and JSOC. Who will have the power, will JSOC get what they want? Will there be new unit made within DOD that will pull from the Pool of equipment and support? Will USSOCOM be the lead still. By this CAPITOL HILL Hearing Testimony things will get better, but for whom?

We need SF to be the lead on the one DoD mission we have and no one else has - UW

"unconventional warfare" (i.e., helping indigenous allies to carry out guerrilla operations, psy-ops, intelligence-gathering, and related activities) and "foreign internal defense" (helping helping friendly governments defeat guerrillas and bandits), and they are two of the primary missions of the Army Special Forces, popularly known as the Green Berets, who are supposed to work closely with psychological operations and civil affairs specialists.

SOCOM's has some major Shortcomings!! Yes, it is because of their staffing of Officers and NCOs coming from where? Those three letter units not many from USASFC.

Wish something could be done. :boohoo

My .02

[NousDefionsDoc]

Outstanding article and thread!

I will have to study on it some more before I form an opinion. Seems to be an extension of the "Two Armies" concept advocated by others. I think the JUWC would be a poor second cousin to JSOC. Bet resources would be hard to come by.

Max Boot Bio (http://www.cfr.org/bios/5641/max_boot.html)

[Jack Moroney (RIP)]

Bet resources would be hard to come by.

That is what has caused the basic problems we have now-the philosophical differences between "black" and "white". Having worked in both arenas I can guarantee that not only resources will be different but also command climates. We have talked a lot about growing our own troops and leaders throughout this forum and many of us have served with those whose backgrounds and experiences have varied greatly from the units with/in which they serve or lead and it can be disastorous. It is not the individual SF soldier that is the problem, he will always come through regardless of the situation but he will be at his best when provided with the right resources and a capable chain of command whose sole focus should be to enable him to succeed. I know what I would like to see happen and the first thing would be with a restatement of the mission.

[Solid]

Colonel,
Is there a big difference in terms of mentality, personality, or skill in the white vs. black side soldiers?


Thank you,

Solid

[BMT (RIP)]

I might be barking up the wrong tree!!
Does a Team get NOTICED more if all they do is kick door's or the same Team move into an area develop's the situation and take's necessary action to counter the threat and stablize the area?

BMT
GFOG

[7624U]

I might be barking up the wrong tree!!
Does a Team get NOTICED more if all they do is kick door's or the same Team move into an area develop's the situation and take's necessary action to counter the threat and stablize the area?

BMT
GFOG
Right now its DA or training security forces, and make sure you take some good video so we can show it to all the other QP's out there. see how much better we are sir !!!! (let me back the tape up and show you).. (big mistake) cause all this stuff leaks out onto the internet....

[The Reaper]

I might be barking up the wrong tree!!
Does a Team get NOTICED more if all they do is kick door's or the same Team move into an area develop's the situation and take's necessary action to counter the threat and stablize the area?

BMT
GFOG

IMHO, everybody wants to be a door kicker and a shooter first.

Those with a bit more insight and maturity recognize that our value as trainers and force multipliers is more important, and work to maximize those assets.

TR

[7624U]

IMHO, everybody wants to be a door kicker and a shooter first.

Those with a bit more insight and maturity recognize that our value as trainers and force multipliers is more important, and work to maximize those assets.

TR

Agree with above..

[Jack Moroney (RIP)]

Colonel,
Is there a big difference in terms of mentality, personality, or skill in the white vs. black side soldiers?


Thank you,

Solid

Not in my experience, as long as you are talking SF folks. I have commanded both in both roles and they are the best you will find anywhere. Now if you are talking ability to maintain certain skill sets that require resources to maintain and dedicated training time some skills will degrade over time but if you are talking the raw material, any solid SF soldier can do any of the missions given the resources and support required from the leadership. There are also skill sets that can only mature to full potential over time and the lateral movement from black to white for certain missions is often more difficult than movement from white to black depending on the mission profiles of the units involved. I am sure that I will find those that will disagree with me on this statement, but I have seen it first hand in units with which I have served and those for which I was responsible as the commander to make sure that these transisitions occured.

[NousDefionsDoc]

Agree with above..
+1

[The Reaper]

I cannot tell you how many groups of visitors (up to Senators) I have seen briefed at SOCOM and USASOC. The briefings always start off with the "We are the only language qualified, area oriented, culturally attuned force in the military."

How many language qualified, area oriented, culturally sensitive forces do we have in SOF?

Here is a clue. They are all ARSOF, unless you include the number of other elements with members who have native language skills.

Only one is composed of guys who are also shooters. That is the force that freed Afghanistan from the Taliban, has primary responsibility for training the Iraqi Army, is doing the bulk of the GWOT HN force training, and is the focus of this website.

Not tooting any horns, or downplaying anyone elses' role. Just stating facts.

DOL brothers.

SOF Truths

Humans are more important than Hardware.

Quality is better than Quantity.

Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced.

Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur.

TR

[Solid]

The one thing that I am not sure about regarding the idea of a (or a set of) global intervention forces- Freedom Legions, permanently stationed black teams, whatever you want to call them- is that oversight would become difficult. A look back through history seems to indicate that if you stick a bunch of guys with guns and money (no lawyers!!) down-range, and give them all the rope they need, they won't hang themselves... but several years later there will be unforeseen reprecussions of their actions, which can be deleterous for the health of their country(s).

The above leads to another question: can you provide sufficient oversight for a long-term black force?

Thank you,

Solid

[Martin]

Good questions, Solid! :munchin

M

[Jack Moroney (RIP)]

The above leads to another question: can you provide sufficient oversight for a long-term black force?

Thank you,

Solid

Yes

[racing_snake]

In iraq ISOF could fill this role easy if we are allowed to teach them UW they are already a DA unit, They just need to be Vetted for INTEL activities then they can continue to plan and execute thier own missions under QP's watchful eye's. then its just a matter of shipping them around to other countries when we need them.


When i was in Iraq, and if you approached the ISOF in a non-threatening conversational manner it would only take them a few minutes to reveal, 'wahabi good, zarqawi good.' So I dont think this approach is a reliable method, and especially since many of the recruits are former republican guard.

snake

[tk27]

Painful as it is to state, I am afraid that legislative action may be the only hope we have of reversing this trend.

Sir, I maybe getting ahead of myself and the thread, but in your opinion what would the legislation entail? In the article Boot goes so far as to say the creation of “OSS II” would require legislation on the scale of Nunn-Cohen. In this thread NDD mentioned the similarities of Boot’s hearing and the “two force” concept advocated by others; is such legislation or force restructuring necessary to maintain SF and its skill set?

[x SF med]

It was beaten into the SFQC candidates in "my generation" that above all - the primary mission of Special Forces was:

To TRAIN, ADVISE, ORGANIZE and ASSIST indiginous forces in their fights against oppressive governments or regimes.

Has this changed? We had to be better than everybody else in order to train people correctly. We had to be smarter than the majority of the Army because we were required to think on our feet. We had to have and use tact, cultural awareness and situational awareness, so that we would not create a bigger mess than we had been dropped into. Door kicking was glamorous, but secondary - we were first and foremost UW/FID/CA with the best training to fight our way out of a bad situation.

DA has forgotten our primary mission, we should never forget it.

End Rant

TR excellent post - the Sluggos and FNGs need to be reminded we're not Rangers, we are Special Forces, we are the best trainers and advisors, the best soldiers in the Army, that's why that's our primary mission, different from any other branch.