Themistocles
04-11-2006, 18:43
Intelligence in War
By John Keegan.
I do not endorse this book for SF. Especially considered in light of the types of missions run by SF and the reality of the GWOT, this book is not especially useful or instructive, and your time would be better served reading other books.
The basic premise of the book is that it is the conventional wisdom that intelligence is the necessary key to success in military operations (see pages 6, 9, 15, and 334 for supporting quotes). Keegan then takes this conventional wisdom as his target, and goes on to offer a number of case studies which show that other necessary factors are involved in order to achieve victory in battle (in the case of Nelson chasing Napoleon’s fleet, persistence and determination; in the case of Midway, good luck for the Americans; in the case of the Battle of the Atlantic, the development of superior ASW technologies and tactics; etc., etc.)
The best quote is probably found on 334: “Its [the book’s] purpose is to demonstrate that intelligence, however good, is not necessarily the means to victory… That is not the currently fashionable view. Intelligence superiority, we are constantly told, is the key to success in war, particularly the war against terrorism.” Instead, Keegan believes that we should always bear in mind that, “Intelligence may be usually necessary but is not a sufficient condition of victory” (334).
A number of complaints come to mind upon reading this. First, who cares if that is the conventional wisdom? Is any harm done if we believe that ‘intelligence superiority is the key to success in war’? Keegan never identifies the problems which such a view fosters.
Second, does anyone actually believe that? Keegan never identifies or quotes any sources which promote the view (leading one to wonder if he is attacking a Straw Man). He claims that intelligence alone doesn’t win battles; I cannot think of a single person who would deny this. Obviously, force is a necessary requirement for victory in battle (for instance, a high school football team playing the NY Jets could not win the game even with perfect intelligence concerning the plays before they were run: the preponderant size, speed, and strength of the Jets’ players would overcome any intelligence advantage possessed by the high school players.)
Third, is this conventional view that far off the mark? Surprisingly, Keegan himself offers evidence that the conventional view may be right in its emphasis on intelligence in the GWOT. Consider the following quote: “In what both sides came to call ‘American warfare,’ [during the French and Indian war in the mid-18th century] intelligence remained at a premium and usually provided the basis of victory or defeat (15). In other words, in unconventional conditions which closely mirror in many respects the GWOT, Keegan candidly holds that intelligence is at a ‘premium’ and provides ‘the basis for victory or defeat’. And again, when discussing how Wellington was able to become the leading general in India in the early 19th century, he writes, “In order to win Wellington needed a steady stream of up-to-date information, from both far and near, so as to anticipate the movement of his enemies and gain forewarning of shifts of alliances, the gathering of stores, the recruitment of soldiers and other signs of offensives in the making”” (16). This sentence could just as easily have been written about Iraq, and again Keegan bluntly acknowledges that ‘in order to win’ Wellington needed ‘a steady stream of up-to-date information’. In light of these two examples which are relevant to the GWOT, is Keegan justified in writing an entire book which downplays the importance of intelligence?
Speculating on my own, I believe that Keegan simply has not adapted to the conditions of the current age. Every case study he examines involved the clash between conventional forces; there is not a single case study concerning UW or guerrilla conflict. And though he has an incredibly rich and detailed knowledge of the history of these conventional conflicts, the reality is that we are no longer living in those times. By contrast, today the enemy does not have an army in the conventional sense; today the enemy deliberately does NOT want to meet 1st world armies on the field of battle; and today the combatant/non-combatant distinction has been deliberately blurred like never before.
I believe there are a number of crucial factors which have helped heighten the emphasis on intelligence collection in the GWOT. First, compared to conventional conflicts, martial events in the GWOT can be remarkably small in size and duration (for instance, it might be a group of 8 placing weapons in a cache in Iraq over an hour, vs. General Jackson moving thousands of his troops in the Shenandoah Valley). When dealing with such small numbers (often operating in large rugged areas) you simply have to have excellent intelligence in order to be able to take any action at all. Second, as noted above, the combatant/non-combatant distinction has been blurred like never before; thus, we need good intelligence sometimes even in order to make a judgment about who is, and who is not, the enemy. Third, the high degree of global media scrutiny puts a very steep price on civilian casualties; thus very precise intelligence is needed to avoid accidental deaths which could cause political problems. These factors seem to have escaped Keegan (who does not note them in his review of the causes behind the formation of the conventional view on page 335).
On the positive side, I liked reading his case studies: there is something about British wit and dry humor that I always enjoy. But if, like myself, you are interested in intelligence in this age of the GWOT, you must look to some other book to satisfy that interest.
By John Keegan.
I do not endorse this book for SF. Especially considered in light of the types of missions run by SF and the reality of the GWOT, this book is not especially useful or instructive, and your time would be better served reading other books.
The basic premise of the book is that it is the conventional wisdom that intelligence is the necessary key to success in military operations (see pages 6, 9, 15, and 334 for supporting quotes). Keegan then takes this conventional wisdom as his target, and goes on to offer a number of case studies which show that other necessary factors are involved in order to achieve victory in battle (in the case of Nelson chasing Napoleon’s fleet, persistence and determination; in the case of Midway, good luck for the Americans; in the case of the Battle of the Atlantic, the development of superior ASW technologies and tactics; etc., etc.)
The best quote is probably found on 334: “Its [the book’s] purpose is to demonstrate that intelligence, however good, is not necessarily the means to victory… That is not the currently fashionable view. Intelligence superiority, we are constantly told, is the key to success in war, particularly the war against terrorism.” Instead, Keegan believes that we should always bear in mind that, “Intelligence may be usually necessary but is not a sufficient condition of victory” (334).
A number of complaints come to mind upon reading this. First, who cares if that is the conventional wisdom? Is any harm done if we believe that ‘intelligence superiority is the key to success in war’? Keegan never identifies the problems which such a view fosters.
Second, does anyone actually believe that? Keegan never identifies or quotes any sources which promote the view (leading one to wonder if he is attacking a Straw Man). He claims that intelligence alone doesn’t win battles; I cannot think of a single person who would deny this. Obviously, force is a necessary requirement for victory in battle (for instance, a high school football team playing the NY Jets could not win the game even with perfect intelligence concerning the plays before they were run: the preponderant size, speed, and strength of the Jets’ players would overcome any intelligence advantage possessed by the high school players.)
Third, is this conventional view that far off the mark? Surprisingly, Keegan himself offers evidence that the conventional view may be right in its emphasis on intelligence in the GWOT. Consider the following quote: “In what both sides came to call ‘American warfare,’ [during the French and Indian war in the mid-18th century] intelligence remained at a premium and usually provided the basis of victory or defeat (15). In other words, in unconventional conditions which closely mirror in many respects the GWOT, Keegan candidly holds that intelligence is at a ‘premium’ and provides ‘the basis for victory or defeat’. And again, when discussing how Wellington was able to become the leading general in India in the early 19th century, he writes, “In order to win Wellington needed a steady stream of up-to-date information, from both far and near, so as to anticipate the movement of his enemies and gain forewarning of shifts of alliances, the gathering of stores, the recruitment of soldiers and other signs of offensives in the making”” (16). This sentence could just as easily have been written about Iraq, and again Keegan bluntly acknowledges that ‘in order to win’ Wellington needed ‘a steady stream of up-to-date information’. In light of these two examples which are relevant to the GWOT, is Keegan justified in writing an entire book which downplays the importance of intelligence?
Speculating on my own, I believe that Keegan simply has not adapted to the conditions of the current age. Every case study he examines involved the clash between conventional forces; there is not a single case study concerning UW or guerrilla conflict. And though he has an incredibly rich and detailed knowledge of the history of these conventional conflicts, the reality is that we are no longer living in those times. By contrast, today the enemy does not have an army in the conventional sense; today the enemy deliberately does NOT want to meet 1st world armies on the field of battle; and today the combatant/non-combatant distinction has been deliberately blurred like never before.
I believe there are a number of crucial factors which have helped heighten the emphasis on intelligence collection in the GWOT. First, compared to conventional conflicts, martial events in the GWOT can be remarkably small in size and duration (for instance, it might be a group of 8 placing weapons in a cache in Iraq over an hour, vs. General Jackson moving thousands of his troops in the Shenandoah Valley). When dealing with such small numbers (often operating in large rugged areas) you simply have to have excellent intelligence in order to be able to take any action at all. Second, as noted above, the combatant/non-combatant distinction has been blurred like never before; thus, we need good intelligence sometimes even in order to make a judgment about who is, and who is not, the enemy. Third, the high degree of global media scrutiny puts a very steep price on civilian casualties; thus very precise intelligence is needed to avoid accidental deaths which could cause political problems. These factors seem to have escaped Keegan (who does not note them in his review of the causes behind the formation of the conventional view on page 335).
On the positive side, I liked reading his case studies: there is something about British wit and dry humor that I always enjoy. But if, like myself, you are interested in intelligence in this age of the GWOT, you must look to some other book to satisfy that interest.